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
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A

PRACTICAL TREATISE

Walsley Reginald Parker

P O W E R S.

BY

SIR EDWARD BURTONSHAW SUGDEN.

THE FIFTH EDITION.

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TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
JOHN LORD ELDON,
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR,
&c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

It was with great diffidence that I ventured to ask your Lordship's leave to prefix your name to this work. The extent of your Lordship's constitutional and legal knowledge, if it has ever been equalled, has certainly never been surpassed: and I naturally paused before I ventured to solicit the high sanction, which your Lordship's permission to affix your name, must give to any treatise on English Law. I felt the presumption of addressing such a request to a Judge, who has so often excited the admiration of the Bar, by a display, without effort, of an extent of knowledge in every branch of Jurisprudence, which the life of man appears to be insufficient to acquire.

If these considerations deterred me from making the application, I was encouraged to it by that judicial mildness and gravity, that

P R E F A C E

TO THE

FIRST EDITION.

THE subject of the following work embraces a very large portion of the law of real property. It is a subject which demands and must attract the Conveyancer's peculiar attention: the connection and symmetry of its parts, while they excite the admiration of the Student, will amply repay the labour which the study of it requires.

As a work upon Powers has already been published, it may be expected that some reasons should be given for presenting the Profession
with

with a new one. It may be thought to be a sufficient reason that Mr. Powell's Essay embraces but a partial view of the subject. But had that been the only objection to the performance, his deficiencies might have been supplied without retreading his steps. The execution, however, of what Mr. Powell did attempt is not such as to invite to a study of the subject, or to render his work practically useful. It is common to meet with statements of facts, occupying many pages, which serve only to confound the attention, when the precise point decided might have been expressed in the same number of lines. The errors in law, as well as in the statement of facts, are very numerous, and in few instances is much labour of research exhibited. The author of the present volume, however, wishes it never to be forgotten, that as far as Mr. Powell did treat of the learning, he was the *first* who attempted it.

The writer deprecates too severe an examination of his work from the preceding observations.

tions. It is more easy to criticise the works of others, than to write a better on the same subject. His pretensions to notice are, that it has been his endeavour to exhaust this branch of the law : an independent and original view has been taken of every part of it ; the *report* of every case has been anxiously consulted ; and much labour has been bestowed in examining reported cases with the Register's books, and searching for cases not in print. The writer has also attempted to treat of this abstruse and intricate learning in a familiar and practical way, to avoid burdensome statements of cases, and to introduce the points decided with as much brevity as appeared to be consistent with accuracy and perspicuity. In no instance has he shrunk from the consideration of the difficulties which presented themselves, although, following Bacon's example, he has directed his endeavours rather to open the law upon doubts, than doubts upon the law. How far he has succeeded in this arduous attempt, it is for the Profession of which he is a member to decide.

He

He has in common with others to plead as an excuse for any inaccuracies in so long a work, that it was written in moments snatched from the labours of his profession, with few opportunities of taking a continued and connected view of the subject.

12 March 1808.



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A
TREATISE
OF
P O W E R S.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF POWERS BEFORE AND SINCE THE
STATUTE OF USES; AND OF THE SUSPENSION,
EXTINGUISHMENT AND MERGER OF POWERS,
DERIVING THEIR EFFECT FROM THE STATUTE.

SECTION I.

POWERS are either common-law authorities; declarations or directions operating only on the conscience of the persons in whom the legal interest is vested; or declarations or directions deriving their effect from the statute of uses. A power given by a will to *A* to sell an estate (I), and a power given by an act of parliament to sell estates, as in the instance of the land-tax redemption acts, are both common-law authorities. The estate passes by force of the will, or act of parliament, and the person who executes the power merely nominates the party to take the estate. A power of attorney is

(I) This is doubted where a seisin is raised to feed the devise. The doctrine cannot be considered, till the student is made acquainted with the nature of this seisin.

is also a common-law authority ; but the estate is not in this, as in the other cases, actually transferred by the instrument creating the power. It is a mere authority to execute a conveyance in the place of the principal ; and the estate, therefore, must be conveyed by the attorney, with the same solemnities as would have been requisite upon a transfer executed by the principal himself. A power to dispose of an estate, or sum of money, of which the *legal* interest is vested in another, is a power of the second sort. The legal interest is not divested by the execution of the power, but equity will compel the person seised of it to clothe the estate created with the legal right.

To understand correctly the nature of powers deriving their effect from the statute of uses, which it is the principal object of these sheets to elucidate, we must consider, 1st, The nature of trusts before the statute of uses ; and 2dly, The effect of the statute (*a*).

The simplicity of the common law was admirably adapted to times when transfers of property were not frequent. It was essential to the validity of such transfers, that corporal possession of the land should be delivered to the purchaser in the presence of his neighbours ; thus, every one's title was publicly known, and secret and fraudulent transfers of property never could take place. This mode of transfer was termed a feoffment, with livery of seisin, a conveyance which is still frequently used. And the like strictness required, that estates thus notoriously transferred should not be defeated by the mere execution of a deed ; and, therefore, a power of revocation annexed to a feoffment was void
in

(*a*) See the Introduction to Gilbert on Uses. Appendix, No. 1.

in its very creation. A condition, it is true, might at all times have been added to a feoffment ; but the strict rule of the common law did not permit the breach of such condition to be taken advantage of by any but the feoffor or his heirs—principally with a view to prevent maintenance. These rules opposed an effectual barrier against such modifications of estates as prevail at this day. When to this rigour we add, that, except in some few places, by force of a custom, lands could not be devised, we shall not be surprised that the wants of succeeding times should invent a mode to defeat the excessive rigour, and subvert the simplicity of the common law. This was effected by the introduction of uses. It is not within the plan of this work to consider the precise time when, or by whom, uses were introduced. The *nature* of them only requires our attention. A use, then, was a mere confidence in a person to whom an estate was conveyed, without consideration, to dispose of it as the persons by whom it was conveyed should direct. The estate was regularly transferred to a friend, upon trusts designated at the time; or upon such trusts as should be afterwards appointed by the real owner. But still the person to whom the estate was conveyed was, to all intents and purposes, owner of the estate at law. It is observed in Chudleigh's case, that he who hath an use, hath not *jus neque in re neque ad rem*, but only a confidence and trust for which he had no remedy by the common law : and Serjeant Frowick, afterwards Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, remarked, in the reign of Henry the 7th, that by the course of the common law *cestui que use* had no more to do with the land than the merest stranger in the world. To

prevent, in some measure, the consequences of this doctrine, it became usual to have several joint feoffees; so that, on the death of any, the estate might survive to the others, and not be subject to the dower of the deceased's wife, &c. And it also became customary for the owner himself to be one of the feoffees; nor did any inconvenience result from this practice; for the judges held, that although the use was in part suspended, yet it might be disposed of in the same manner as if the entire legal estate was vested in others. This mode of conveyance became indeed so common, that in the statute of uses, to which our attention will presently be called, an express provision was inserted to meet this case.

Equity, after some time, and by degrees, assumed the jurisdiction which it now exercises, in enforcing the performance of trusts and contracts. The person who had conveyed his estate, or the *cestui que use*, as he was then termed, answered almost precisely to the *cestui que trust* of the present day. After uses were established, and not noticed by the courts of law, who acknowledged the legal tenant only, the complication of modern settlements was soon introduced. Thus, POWERS arose; for although it was repugnant to a feoffment at common law, that a power should be reserved to revoke it, yet there was no such repugnancy as to trusts, which were simple declarations, or directions to the person seised of the legal estate, in what manner, and to whom he should convey the estate. And, for the same reason, the owner might direct the trustee to convey as a stranger should appoint, although a power of entry for a condition broken could not be reserved to a stranger on a common-law conveyance.

Equity,

Equity, however, only lent its aid where there was a valuable or good consideration. The first arose upon a real contract, and was termed a bargain and sale. It was, in fact, originally a mere contract by *A* to sell his estate to *B*, although in process of time it became a mode of settlement, and equity did not inquire into the *amount* of the consideration; the second was also a mere contract or agreement, by a husband, parent, or kinsman, to settle his estate upon his wife, children, or relations. This was styled a covenant to stand seised—Money, rent, or services incident to tenure, were sufficient to sustain the former: the consideration of marriage, and natural love and affection to a legitimate child, brother, nephew, or cousin, the latter. In order to comprehend the doctrines which we shall hereafter have occasion to discuss, it will here be necessary to observe, that a *consideration* was only required where the inheritance *remained in the contracting party*. Now a covenant to stand seised, or a bargain and sale, did not transfer the possession to the covenantee or bargainee: it was a mere contract, and was, therefore, termed a conveyance, not operating by transmutation of possession; the party with whom the contract was made could only obtain relief in *equity*, and equity following the rule of the civil law would not enforce a mere *nudum pactum*. But, where a conveyance did operate by transmutation of possession, as a fine, recovery, feoffment, or release, which vest the legal estate in the conusee, recoveror, feoffee, or releasee, and uses were declared on such a conveyance, equity did not inquire into the consideration: the real owner having divested himself of the legal estate, it was not necessary

to resort to equity as against him ; and the person in whom it was vested being a mere naked trustee, was bound in conscience to execute the directions of the donor. This is clearly laid down by St. German, who says, that when an use is *in esse*, he that hath the use may, of his mere motion, give it away if he will, without recompense, as he might the land if he had it in possession. But he took it for a ground, that he could not so begin an use without livery of seisin, or upon a recompense or ground ; and the doctrine is referred to its true principles.

This important distinction applies closely to the usual conveyance by lease and release. Where the lease for a year is intended to operate under the statute, a valuable consideration is, according to the above rule, absolutely necessary ; but *if* valuable, it need not be pecuniary—a pepper-corn rent is sufficient. The *release* operates at common law ; and as the common law never requires a consideration upon a solemn conveyance by *deed*, none need be given, although it is usual to express that a nominal consideration, as 10*s.* was paid ; nor is a consideration necessary, although uses are declared by the release, for they fall within the above principle. This distinction, which was never denied, was expressly taken in the case of *Pawlyn v. Hardy* (*b*), where it was determined, that if he in reversion release to the tenant in possession, all his estate, right, title, &c. there need no consideration to be mentioned or proved, it is good without ; otherwise, if by grant, &c.

(*b*) Mich. 36 Car. II. B. R. MS.

SECTION II.

OF THE STATUTE OF USES.

MANIFOLD frauds were the consequence of the introduction of uses; heirs were unjustly disinherited; the King lost his profits of the lands of attainted persons, aliens born, and felons; lords lost their wards, marriages, reliefs, heriots, escheats, aids; married men lost their tenancies by the curtesy, and women their dower; purchasers were defrauded; no one knew against whom to bring his action, and manifest perjuries were committed. Several statutes were passed to remedy these grievances, particularly a statute in the reign of Richard the 3d (c), whereby it was enacted, that all estates, &c. created by *cestui que use*, should be good as against his feoffees. Modes were soon invented of evading these acts. At last, it was thought that all these wrongs would be avoided by, as it is usually termed in conveyances, transferring uses into possession, or, perhaps, to speak more correctly, by transferring or turning uses into possessions. With this view, the statute of 27 H. VIII. c. 10, commonly called the Statute of Uses, was passed, which enacted, that where any person or persons stood or were seised, or at any time thereafter, should happen to be seised of and in any honours, or other hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or persons, or of any body politic, by any manner of means whatsoever it should be; that, in every such case, all such

(c) 1 R. 3. c. 1.

such person and persons and bodies politic, that had, or thereafter should have any such use, confidence, or trust in fee simple, fee tail, for term of life, or for years or otherwise, or any use, confidence, or trust, in remainder or reverter, should from thenceforth stand and be seised, deemed and adjudged in lawful seisin, estate, and possession of and in the same honours and hereditaments, with their appurtenances, to all intents, constructions, and purposes in the law, of and in such like estates, as they had or should have in use, trust, or confidence, of or in the same; and that the estate, title, right, and possession, that was in such person or persons, that were, or thereafter should be seised of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust of any such person or persons, or of any body politic, should be from thenceforth clearly deemed and adjudged to be in him or them that had or should have such use, confidence or trust, after such quality, manner, form, and condition, as they had before in or to the use, confidence, or trust, that was in them.

The statute then provides for the case of several persons being jointly seised to the use of any of them. And contains two savings, 1st, To all persons (other than those person or persons which were seised, or thereafter should be seised of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to any use, confidence, or trust) all such right, title, entry, interest, possession, rents, and action, as they had, or might have had, before the making of the act; And 2d, To all persons seised to any use all such former rights as they had to their own *proper use*, in or to any manors or hereditaments, whereof they should be seised, to any other use.

It

It has been quaintly said, that uses were by this act, with an indissoluble knot, coupled and married to the land, which, of all the elements, is the most ponderous and immovable.

Whether the Legislature did, or did not, intend to crush uses, it is not material for us to inquire (*d*), as it was soon settled that uses might still, as formerly, be raised, upon which however the statute would instantly operate; but neither the Legislature nor the Judges admitted uses with all the latitude of construction with which they were adopted before the statute of uses: Previously to the statute, a mere contract unenrolled by *A* to sell his estate to *B* was sufficient, without words of inheritance, to pass the equitable fee to the vendee, but the Legislature, by an act passed immediately after the statute of uses (*e*), required, that to transfer the legal estate by force of that act, such contract should be by deed enrolled. And the Judges resolved that words of inheritance were absolutely necessary to pass the fee at law. And, at this day, it is clear that a mere contract to sell for a valuable consideration paid, importing a future conveyance, would not raise a use in the purchaser, so as to attract the statute, although by deed duly enrolled, and containing words of inheritance; but still it would, in the view of modern equity, convert the vendor into a mere trustee for the purchaser, and entitle him to call for a regular conveyance.

To the raising of a use which the statute will turn into a possession, it is necessary that there should be, 1st,
one

(*d*) See n. (1) to Gilb. on Uses, p. 139.

(*e*) 27 H. VIII. c. 16. Note, this act did not extend to covenants to stand seised, and only to estates of freehold, or inheritance.

one person seised to the use of another, *in esse*; and 2dly, a use *in esse*, but whether it is limited in possession, remainder, or reversion, is immaterial. Thus, where a man, for a valuable consideration, contracts to sell an estate to another in fee, which contract is properly enrolled, or, as we now term it, conveys his estate by bargain and sale enrolled, equity instantly fastens on the conscience of the vendor, and holds him to be a trustee for, or to be seised to, the use of the vendee or bargainee: here then the requisites concur: there is a person seised to the use of another, to whom a use in possession is limited; immediately, therefore, *on the enrolment of the deed (f)*, the legal estate, by force of the statute of uses, vests in the bargainee as effectually as it would have done at common law by a feoffment, accompanied with livery of seisin or corporal delivery. Had it not been for the statute of enrolments the legal estate would have vested in him upon the execution of the deed.

By an unaccountable construction of the courts of law it was held that a use could not be limited on a use, that is, that the statute would operate on the first declaration of trust only; thus, if by a bargain and sale the use is limited to *A* and it is then declared that he shall stand seised in trust, or to the use of *B*, the statute will vest the legal estate in *A*, and the law will not advert to the trust declared in favour of *B (g)*.

The Court of Chancery soon seised upon this narrow construction as a pretext to revive uses under the name of trusts; and accordingly it was determined, that *B* was in conscience a trustee for *C*, and should be compelled to convey

(f) See n. (4) to Gilb. on Uses, p. 208.

(g) See n. (1) ib. p. 347.

convey the estate to him. This equitable branch of jurisdiction was extended by the resolution of the courts of law, that neither copyhold nor leasehold estates could be conveyed to uses upon which the statute would operate. A term of years may of course be created out of a freehold estate by way of use, but when it is once a subsisting interest it cannot be conveyed to uses. Therefore if it were assigned to *A* to the use of *B*, the legal interest would remain in *A* who, however, would in equity be deemed a mere trustee for *B* (*h*).

(*h*) The discussion in the first edition, on the Stat. of Richard III. will be found in n. (2) to Gilb. on Uses, p. 67.

SECTION III.

OF SCINTILLA JURIS.

POWERS before the statute of uses were, as we have seen, mere directions to the trustee of the legal estate how to convey the estate; in truth, they were *future uses* to be designated by the person to whom the power was given (*i*): these, when they arose, equity compelled the trustee to observe; and when conveyances under the statute of uses became established, it was still usual to reserve or limit such powers, as the exigencies of the case required; thus, powers to lease, to sell, or exchange, to jointure, to charge with portions for younger children, or to revoke the settlement itself, soon became usual. In the reign of Elizabeth, however, it was insisted, that a man having once limited the fee-simple in use, could not reserve a power by a future act to defeat the uses, and to raise

(*i*) See the n. to Gilb. on Uses, p. 148. Appendix, No. 2.

raise new ones by force of the same assurance; for as the statute extinguished the use in the possession, it could no more be determined, and new estates created, without a new livery, than an estate in possession. But to this it was answered, that uses were not to be compared to the land itself, being mere accidents inherent to the possession, and built thereon by civil equity; and that the statute only imbued the possession with the quality, form, and condition of the use, but did not effect any alteration in the mode of limiting and raising present and future uses, which remained as before (*i*). And accordingly Manwood laid it down in Brent's case, that although the possession was executed to the use, yet the property and quality, as abstracted from the possession, should not be drowned in the possession (*k*).

Powers after the statute still remained as mere rights of designation which bound the conscience of the trustee, and the estates to be created by force of them were still clearly *future or contingent uses*. But when a power was executed, as the person in whose favour the appointment was made became invested with the use, he instantly gained the legal estate by force of the statute. Now, to attract the legal estate under the statute, it is necessary that there should be a use *in esse*; whereas the uses to be raised under powers are not *in esse*, or defined, but until ascertained and limited under the power are merely tantamount to future or contingent uses. What operation the statute had upon *contingent uses* has been the

(*i*) Anon. Mo. 608. The arguments in this case are deserving of the Student's attentive perusal. Mr. Powell has made a considerable part of them serve as an introduction to his work on Powers, although the case is not referred to.

(*k*) See 2 Leo. 16.

the subject of much judicial controversy, and demands our particular attention.

Perhaps no question ever occurred on which the Judges were so divided in opinion ; some held that the estate vested in the first *cestui que use*, but subject to the contingent uses which should be executed out of *his* seisin as they arose ; but this was soon over-ruled, and it was determined, that a use could not arise out of a use. It is observable, that most of the Judges who espoused the first opinion, also held that the contingent uses bound the land, and could not be barred by any act whatever ; others held that the seisin to serve them was, to use their own expressions, *in nubibus, in mare, in terra, or in custodia legis* ; they also seem to have been of opinion, that contingent uses could not be barred. Again, some thought that the trustees were merely pipes, through whom the estate was conveyed to the uses as they arose, while others thought that so much of the inheritance as was limited to the contingent uses remained actually vested in the feoffees till the uses arose. But according to some of the books, the majority of the Judges held, that there remained not an actual estate, but a possibility of seisin, or a *scintilla juris* in the feoffees or releasees to uses to serve the contingent uses as they arose. And this is expressed to be the law in the modern works written upon uses.

Before the statute of uses the feoffees to uses were absolutely seised of the legal estate, and, therefore, if *cestui que use* levied a fine, or executed a feoffment, the entry of the feoffees was requisite, because the wrong was done to them ; and if such feoffees were disseised before the statute, no use could be executed after the statute,

statute, except by their entry; for the statute only executed those uses to which any person was *seised*, which they who were *disseised* of course could not be. Thus, where Robert Delamere made a feoffment before the statute to several persons in fee, to the use of himself and his wife in special tail, remainder to himself in tail general, remainder to the use of Simon Delamere his brother, in fee: Robert Delamere before the statute enfeoffed another in fee, who also before the statute enfeoffed another in fee, and he made a feoffment in fee over to Simon Delamere after the statute, who again enfeoffed another. After the death of Robert Delamere, and the first feoffees, the heir of the survivor of such feoffees entered to revive the use to the wife of Robert Delamere, and the entry was adjudged to be lawful (*l*).

This case, at first view, does not appear to be relevant to the point in discussion, but it certainly had considerable influence over future decisions; and cases where a clear seisin existed were confounded with this case in which the statute could have no operation till a seisin was regained by entry. The doctrine of *scintilla juris* was first started in Brent's case, which arose six years after Delamere's case (*m*). A feoffment was made by Robert Brent after the statute to divers persons; to the use of himself, and Dorothy his wife, for their lives; remainder to the use of himself, and of any after-taken wife, for their lives; remainder to *B* in fee. Afterwards *B* with the feoffees, by consent of the feoffor,

(*l*) Delamere v. Sermon,
Plow. 346, 10 Elizabeth.

(*m*) Dyer, 340 a. 2 Leon. 14.
Dall. 112.

feoffor, joined in a feoffment to new feoffees, to the use of the feoffor, and Dorothy his wife, for their lives, remainder to *A* in tail, remainder to the feoffor himself; and he levied a fine with proclamations to the same uses. The wife died, the husband took a second wife, and died. The second wife, by the assent of the first feoffees, after five years had passed since the fine, entered to raise the use to her under the first feoffment. The cause was compromised; but the case is very important, because it shows the difficulties under which the Judges laboured with respect to the construction of contingent uses. This case was first heard in the King's Bench, and in the next year it came on in the Common Pleas, when Mounson held that the wife might enter of her own authority, and that she was well entitled. His opinion appears to have been, that future uses could not be barred. And Manwood argued strongly in favour of uses, and held, that the wife was capable of the use according to the will and direction of the donor. He seems to have thought that until the future uses were executed, the feoffees had a fee simple determinable, or that the estate in the mean time resulted to the feoffor. Harper, who was thoroughly acquainted with the reasons and intent of the makers of the act, said, that they intended to pen the statute so precisely, that nothing should be left in the feoffees, but that the whole estate should be executed by the statute, so as the said statute did utterly take out all from the feoffees: and he agreed with Mounson and Manwood. Dyer, Chief Justice, said, that it was to be granted that the statute doth divest all out of the feoffees, yet it doth not divest it before that the use be vested in *cestui que use*; the vesting

vesting of the use ought to precede the execution of the possession to it. And he was of opinion, that this future use limited to the second wife did *remain in the feoffees* at first, but that they had destroyed it by their feoffment. He, as well as Manwood, held, that the feoffees had *a fee simple determinable* until the future use arose. He expressly said, that the interest which the feoffees had in the interim, until the execution of all the uses, was *a fee simple determinable*, for the whole interest was not divested or driven out of the feoffees until the whole trust was accomplished, that is, until all the uses limited upon the feoffment were executed, and had their full perfection.

This is according to Leonard's, which is by far the best report of the case. According to Dyer's own report, Manwood and he held that it was necessary for the feoffees to enter to revive the use; and although by the words of the statute the freehold of the land and the fee simple also of the feoffees are vested in the *cestuis que use*, yet, as it is expressed, *adhuc remanet quædam scintilla juris et tituli, quasi medium quid. inter utrosque status, scilicet illa possibilitas futuri usus emergentis, et sic interesse et titulus et non tantum* (I) *nuda auctoritas.*

(I) In 2 Sid. 99, the words *non tam* are, in citing this passage, substituted for *non tantum*; but they appear to make nonsense of the sentence. The word, in Dyer, is abbreviated thus: *t̄m.* which appears to be the proper abbreviation for *tantum*, and is decidedly so used by Dyer himself in another case. The question was, whether a rent created after the statute of uses was executed by the statute? and Dyer reports, that it was contended that the clause in the statute which commences, "and where also divers persons stand and be seised of and in, &c." provides remedy, "*t̄m. p. r̄ets. in esse in use, tempore*

seu potestas remanet. Ultimately, Mounson and Harper were in favour of the second wife's claim, and Manwood and Dyer against it; and thereupon the matter was adjourned into the Exchequer Chamber, where the parties came to a compromise (I).

Leonard's reports were always in high estimation, and from them it clearly appears that Dyer was of opinion, that a sufficient portion of the fee-simple to serve the contingent uses remained actually vested in the feoffees; and perhaps he meant the same thing by this doctrine of *scintilla juris*, for he defines it to be an *interest* and *title*, and not merely a naked authority or power. At all events this opinion was not sanctioned by at least two of the Judges.

In the next year Manning and Andrew's case (n) was heard, which was a case nearly similar to Delamere's case.

Geoffries, Justice, was of opinion, that as to contingent uses, a sufficient estate was left in the feoffees, and they ought to enter. But Southcote, Justice, held that nothing remained in the feoffees to serve contingent uses, and that therefore they could not enter. Wray, Chief Justice, was of the same opinion; he thought that the whole estate was settled in the *cestui que use*,
yet

confectionis statuti, et non pro tempore futuro." In this passage unquestionably *tñ.* stands for *tantum*. It is very important that the true reading of the passage in the text should be determined.

(I) There were several other questions in the case, upon which the Judges were divided—the validity of the limitation itself, the effect of the livery, which was by attorney, &c.

(n) 1 Leo. 256.

yet subject to such contingent use, and he should render the same upon the contingency. The best construction of the statute, he said, was, that it draws the whole estate of the land, and also the confidence out of the feoffees, and repositeth it upon the lands, the which, by the operation of the statute, shall render the use to every person in his time, according to the limitation of the parties; and also, if any interest doth remain in the feoffees, then if they convey to any person upon consideration who hath not notice of the use, the use shall never rise, which is utterly against the meaning of the parties; and, therefore to construe the statute to leave nothing in the feoffees, will prevent all such mischiefs. And it is true at the common law the entry of the feoffees was requisite, because the wrong was done unto them by reason of the possession which they then had; but now by the statute all is drawn out of them, and then there is no reason that they meddle with the lands wherein they have now nothing to do; and the scope of the statute is utterly to disable the feoffees to do any thing in prejudice of the uses limited, so as the feoffees are not to any purpose, but as a pipe to convey the lands to others; so they cannot by their release or confirmation, &c. bind the uses which are to grow and arise by the limitation knit unto the feoffment made unto them.

This case is very important. It appears clearly that the doctrine of *scintilla juris* was not then received as law; and, indeed, that no fixed or settled notions were formed respecting the operation of the statute on contingent uses; Geoffries thought with Manwood and Dyer, (according to Leonard's report of Brent's case,) that a sufficient actual *estate* remained in the feoffees to
support

support the uses, while Southcote and Wray were of opinion that the feoffees were by the statute made mere conduit-pipes, and were divested of all estate.

About thirteen years after Manning and Andrew's case the famous case arose which is constantly referred to as having decided the doctrine of *scintilla juris* (n). I allude to Chudleigh's case :

Sir Richard Chudleigh conveyed an estate to the use of trustees, and their heirs, during the life of his son Christopher, remainder to the use of the sons of Christopher successively in tail, remainders over. The feoffees afterwards enfeoffed Christopher of the lands before he had a son. For the extinction of the use, the case was argued by analogy to cases before the statute, where the feoffees had the fee simple. Against the land being bound by the use, it was said to be absurd that confidence can be reposed in land, which wants sense, and, against its being in the custody of the law, it was insisted, that it would be absurd for the law which by its definition is *sanctio sancti, jubens honesta, and prohibens contraria*, to be the conservator or preserver of a thing *impious and fraudulent*, which an use is.

The Judges who delivered their opinions were, Popham, Chief Justice of England ; Anderson, Chief Justice of Common Pleas ; Periam, Chief Baron ; Justice Clench, Baron Clark, Justice Gawdy, Justice Walmsley, Justice Fenner, Justice Beaumont, Justice Owen, and Baron Ewens (I). They delivered their opinions *seriatim*, which occupied six days.

Periam

(n) 1 Rep. 120.

(I) It is observable, that not one of the several Judges who had

Periam and Walmesley argued that the use was not destroyed. They held, that it would be against the meaning and letter of the statute to say any estate, or right, or *scintilla juris*, should remain in the feoffees after the statute of 27 Hen. VIII.; for it appears by the preamble that the makers of the act intended to eradicate the whole estate of the feoffees; and by the letter of the body of the act the whole estate, right, title and possession, is in the *cestui que use*. The Chief Baron said, that Dyer's *scintilla juris* was like Sir Thomas More's Eutopia; nor did Walmesley treat it with more respect. They insisted that the seisin which the feoffees had at the beginning by the feoffment, would be sufficient within the act to serve all the uses, as well future when they come *in esse*, as present, for there needs not many seisins, nor a continued seisin, but a seisin *at any time*, so a seisin at one time would suffice; for the statute says, seised at any time, and it would be hard, when the statute requires but one seisin at one time only, that many seisins, and at several times against the intent and letter of the act, should be required.

But then Walmesley insisted, that the future use not having been *in esse*, could not be suspended; nothing remained in the feoffees, therefore they could not affect it; the persons taking under the same seisin could not affect it, as it did not derive its essence from their estate, but from the original seisin; and Periam agreed with him, and held that these uses were *in nubibus*, and in the preservation

already had occasion to consider this point, was then on the bench. They were Dyer, Manwood, Harper, and Mounson; Wray, Southcote, and Geoffries.

servation of the law : and he insisted that the statute did not require the *cestui que use* to be *in esse*. They agreed that uses and estates ought to be governed by the same rules, but they were in favour of the uses, because not having been *in esse* they thought that they could not be suspended.

On the other hand, the remaining nine Judges, or at least eight of them, agreed “ that the feoffment made by the feoffees, *who had an estate for life by limitation of the use*, divested all the estates and the future uses also ;” for as Gawdy, who was one of those Judges, observed, these uses ought to be subject to the rule of law, which in this respect is, that he in the remainder must take the land when the particular estate determines, or else the remainder shall be void ; and there is no difference when the estate of the tenant for life determines by his death, and when it determines in right by his forfeiture, for in both cases entry is given to him in the next remainder, and then, if he cannot take the land when the particular estate determines the remainder is void.

And they held, that the statute could not execute any uses that were not *in esse* ; and, after arguing that the statute did not divest the feoffees of the estate, it was held by the two Chief Justices, and Fenner, Beaumont, Owen and Ewens, that the *feoffees, since the statute, had a possibility to serve the future use when it came in esse ; and that in the mean time all the uses in esse shall be vested ; and when the future use comes in esse, then the feoffees (if the possession be not disturbed by disseisin or other means) shall have sufficient estate and seisin to serve the future use when it comes in esse, to be executed by force of the statute, and that seisin and execution by*

force of the statute ought to concur at one and the same time. And they held, that if the possession was disturbed by disseisin or otherwise, the feoffees would have power to enter to revive the future uses, according to the trust reposed in them, unless they did by any act bar themselves of their entry. But the resolution of the eight Judges was merely that contingent uses might be destroyed or discontinued before they came *in esse*, by all such means as uses might have been discontinued or destroyed by the common law ; but Periam and Walmesley did not agree to this.

It appears (o) that Gawdy was for placing contingent uses on exactly the same footing as contingent remainders; and Clench entirely agreed with him. Gawdy's opinion is worthy of observation; he conceived that the use was executed by the intent, but not by the letter of the statute, for the purpose was to remove all the estate from the feoffee, and to put it in *cestui que use* wholly, (to wit) in possession to the uses which were *in esse*, and in abeyance as to the uses which were to come, and contingent; and now by the same statute the contingency of the possession shall go in lieu of the contingent use ; and now an use limited to one for life, with remainder over to the heirs of the body of *J. S.* shall be in the same manner as if land at this day had been letten to one for life, with remainder over to the heirs of the body of *J. S.* ; for the quality which he had in the use, the same (by the very letter of the statute) he shall now have in the possession and estate of the land, and the statute is not to undo any use, but to transfer an estate in the land to the use. But then he agreed, that by the feoffment
the

(o) Poph. 70. 1 Rep. 135 a.

the contingent use was utterly destroyed, in the same manner as where a lease is made for life, the remainder to the heirs of the body of *J. S.* ; if the tenant for life dies, or commits a forfeiture, and determines his estate in the life of *J. S.* his heir shall never have the land by remainder, because he was not *in esse* as an heir at the time when the estate ended. As to the principal doctrine, it is merely said in *Popham's* own argument, “ And *nota*, that by a disseisin, the contingent use may be disturbed of his execution ; but there, by the regresse of the feoffee, or his heirs, when the contingent happens, it may be revived to be executed. But by the release of the feoffee, or his heirs, the contingent in such a case, *by Popham*,” (observe), “ is barred of all possibility at any time to be executed.” And according to his own report, he said plainly, that if the exposition made on the other side shall take place, it will bring in with it so many mischiefs and inconveniencies, *to the universal disquiet of the realm, that it will cast the whole commonwealth into a sea of troubles, and endanger it with utter confusion and drowning!!*

Coke's report has hitherto been referred to, because that is the authority always quoted in favour of the scintilla ; but Lord Chief Justice Anderson's report of this case is indisputably the best (*p*), and from that it appears clearly, first, That the Judges were of opinion, that not a mere *scintilla* remained in the feoffees, but a sufficient *estate* to support the uses ; and they argued by analogy to the statute of Richard the Third, which enabled

(*p*) 1 And. 309. See an abstract of a translation of the report in Sugden's *Gilb. on Uses*, App. p. 521.

enabled *cestuis que use* to grant their estates as if they were seised of the freehold ; and upon that statute it was holden, that where a man was seised to the use of one for life, the remainder to another in tail, the grant of the tenant for life did not affect the estate of which the feoffees were seised to the use of the tenant in tail ; and, secondly, that they went upon the intention of the statute to extirpate uses, and the mischief which would ensue from supporting them. They showed that the statute of Richard the Third only *took as much out of the feoffees* as was granted away by the *cestuis que use*. And they said that this statute and the statute of uses were one in effect ; *and that there was no reason to make any difference as to the purpose of extirpating or extinguishing the estate of the feoffees more upon the statute of 27 H. 8, than the statute of Richard 3.* And they held, that if a feoffment at this day be made to the use of one for years, and afterwards to the use of another in tail, and afterwards to the use of the right heirs of the tenant for years, the lease for years ends, the tenant in tail levies a fine, with proclamations, the lessee (living the feoffees) after the estate-tail is ended recovers the land, the fee is in them and no other ; and if afterwards the lessee for years die, leaving an heir, he now (by the death of the tenant, and by the statute) is seised of the land in fee, and thus it is in all these contingent uses when they come *in esse*, *and an estate is left in the feoffees by which they may enter.*

When Chudleigh's case is attentively considered, our surprise cannot fail to be excited at it's ever having been considered as a decisive authority for the doctrine in question. The opinion of the six Judges on this point;

point, as stated by Coke, was merely an *obiter dictum*; and there even appears to be reason to doubt whether any such opinion was ever delivered (I). In Lord Chief Justice Popham's report of the same case, this opinion is given as coming from himself only. And Lord Chief Justice Anderson, who is made by Coke to concur in this opinion, reports no such matter in his book, but states the opinion of the Judges very differently. Finch, in arguing the case of Heyns and Villars (*q*), said, that it is reported by the Lord Anderson in his private reports, that the Lord Coke (at that time Attorney-General) has greatly abused him and others of the Judges in reporting such judgments and resolutions in *Shelley* and *Chudleigh's* case as they never delivered. Anderson's severe censure of Coke's report of Shelley's case is in print, and well known, but I have not met with the observation alluded to on Chudleigh's case. It is observable, that Finch speaks of the *private* reports of Anderson, and he must have seen the manuscripts of them, for his argument was delivered in 1658, and the first edition of Anderson was not published till 61 years after. The fact, therefore, cannot be doubted, although the censure is not in print. Finch also referred to Popham's reports, p. 83, where it appears, that the opinion
respecting

(*q*) *Infra*.

(I) Let not our just admiration of Sir Edward Coke's profound legal learning carry us too far. His system of turning every judgment into a string of general propositions or resolutions, has certainly a very imposing appearance, but it is a system of all others the least calculated to transmit a faithful report. Is it not to be feared, that the bias of a man's own sentiments may involuntarily lead him to pervert the opinions of others, in order to support his own?

respecting the *scintilla juris* was delivered by Popham only ; for the observations of the other Judges, as reported by Popham, appear to the writer to be strongly in favour of the construction for which he contends.

We may, therefore, safely conclude that this opinion was merely an *obiter dictum* of Lord Chief Justice Popham's. Indeed, had the whole Court delivered this opinion it would not at this day be entitled to much attention. All the settlements in the kingdom are made by way of use, which is there styled *impious*; and Coke calls the case, Chudleigh's case, "*commonly called the case of perpetuities.*" No settled notions then existed as to the time within which contingent uses might be raised ; and it is evident, from the very name of the case, that the Judges were alarmed lest they should introduce perpetuities. Accordingly, it was said in *Kent v. Harpool*, 1 Ventr. 306, that the great reason in Chudleigh's case, and other cases wherein contingent remainders have been held to be destroyed, was for the preventing perpetuities, which would have been let in if contingent remainders had been preserved.

Pollexfen, in his able argument in *Hales and Risley* (r), against the necessity of the feoffees entering to vest contingent uses, says, That at the time Chudleigh's case was adjudged it was not taken for law ; that the destruction of the particular estate by feoffment or conveyance, before the contingent remainder came *in esse*, was a destruction of the contingent remainder. And that though this was so adjudged in Archer's case (Co. 66), and though that case was reported before Chudleigh's case, yet that it appeared that Chudleigh's case was
first

(r) Pollex. 389.

first adjudged. Pollexfen was right as to the time the cases were adjudged. Chudleigh's case was decided in the 37th, and Archer's in the 38th of Elizabeth, but the last case began in Trinity term in the 36th of Elizabeth; and the opinion of the Judges was, that the contingent remainder was destroyed by the destruction of the particular estate. The decision in Chudleigh's case certainly, however, settled this doctrine, *and was determined on that point simply*; and that decision has always been adhered to (s). In Archer's case it was said that this point was so agreed by Popham, C. J. and divers justices in the argument of the case between Dillon and Frein (Chudleigh's case), *and denied by none*. It is a mistake to consider Archer's case as establishing the rule as to a contingent remainder. It merely restored the rule which had been impeached, for in Chudleigh's case the Chief Justice denied the opinion of Gascoigne in 7 H. 4, who thought that contingent remainders should not be defeated by the feoffment of the tenant for life. The argument upon the statute was merely to show that contingent uses were not protected against the effect of the feoffment. The points decided, were, first, that the contingent uses were destroyed by the feoffment of the tenants for life, by analogy to the rule of law; it was necessary to decide this point, in order to raise the second question; and secondly, that they were not saved by the letter or equity of the statute. Coke observes, that "the question in this case was no other but whether the contingent uses before their existence, by the said feoffment of the feoffees, were destroyed and subverted so that they should never
arise

(s) See Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102.

arise out of the estate of the feoffees after the birth of the issues." This of itself shows that the question was whether the contingent uses were destroyed by the destruction of the particular estate, for it is manifest that the reporter refers to the estate *pur auter vie* in the feoffees ; and it cannot be objected to this interpretation, that the uses could not rise *out of* the estate *pur auter vie*, because the expression merely means that they take their rise from that as their root or dependence. Many of the Judges, however, at first held that the estate vested in the first cestui que use, subject to the contingent uses which should be executed out of *his* estate as they arose, although a less estate *in interest* was given to him.

Coke, after reporting the arguments of the two Judges who argued in favour of the use, says, " and on the other side it was argued by the remaining nine Judges to the contrary." And it was agreed by them all that the feoffment made by the said feoffees, *who had an estate for life by limitation of the use*, divested *all the estates*, and the future uses also. Gawdy, particularly, observed, that the rule of law was, that he in the remainder must take the land when the particular estate determines, or else the remainder shall be void ; and in this case, forasmuch as by the feoffment of the tenants for life their estate was determined, and title of entry, and then, those in the future remainder were not *in esse* to take it, for this reason their remainders were barred. Of the same opinion was Popham, Chief Justice ; Baron Clarke and Owen. The Chief Justice denied the opinion of Gascoigne in 7 H. 4, who thought that such remainder should not be defeated by the feoffment

ment of the tenant for life. And Coke, at the end, says, 1st, It was adjudged in this case, that where there is a tenant for life, the remainder in tail, the reversion in fee, and the tenant for life enfeoffs him in the reversion in fee, it is a forfeiture of his estate, and shall divest the estate-tail in remainder.

This shows that the Judges held a feoffment to have the same operation over contingent uses as over contingent remainders. Indeed, as it appears that Popham only made the observation upon the *scintilla juris*, the decision cannot be accounted for on any other ground. We should never have heard of this fiction had it then been settled, as I apprehend it now is, 1st, That where such a construction can be put upon a limitation that it may take effect by way of remainder, it shall never take place as a springing use (and it even seems to be law, that where a limitation was intended to take effect as a remainder, and cannot, it shall not be supported as a springing use). 2dly, That a *contingent* use, or remainder, must take effect, if at all, *eo instanti* that the preceding estate ceases; and 3dly, That *springing* uses must be so limited as to take effect, if at all, within the period of a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards and a few months, allowing for gestation. It is not settled that the twenty-one years and a few months can be taken independently of the birth and infancy of the *cestui que use* (*t*). These rules leave no danger to be apprehended from conveyances to uses, and they must now be supported as the common assurance of the realm.

Hitherto

(*t*) *Beard v. Westcott*; see *Gilb. on Uses* 270, n.; 5 *Barn. & Ald.* 801; *Bengough v. Edridge*, 1 *Sim.* 173.

Hitherto we must admit that this doctrine of *scintilla juris* was not settled.

The case of Wegg and Villers, which first came on in 24 Car. 1, is very important on this point, not, indeed, in regard to the judgment, but by reason of the *dicta* of the Judges.

Sir Edward Coke covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself for life, remainder to the use of his wife for life, remainder to the use of his daughter for life, remainder to the use of her first and other sons successively, in tail, reversion to the use of his own right heirs, and afterwards he granted the reversion without consideration, and the former settlement was recited in the deed, and then he made a feoffment of the lands, and the daughter had issue a son. Sir Edward died, the wife entered, then the daughter died, and then the wife, and it was resolved that the grant did not prevent the contingent uses from arising, because it was without consideration, and the first uses were recited in the grant ; so the grantee had notice, and therefore took the lands subject to the grantor's covenant to stand seised, and the feoffment did not destroy the contingent estate, because the *right* of remainder for life in the daughter, upon which she might have entered for the forfeiture, supported it ; for the feoffment of Sir Edward was a forfeiture of his estate for life, and of the estate of his wife in remainder during the coverture, so that the daughter might have entered for the forfeiture during the coverture, and this right of entry was sufficient to support the contingent remainder to the sons without question ; and when Sir Edward died, and his wife entered, that reduced her estate for life, and the estate
of

of her daughter for life, and so the contingent use was reduced also, and vested by force of the statute of uses in the first son of the daughter. But it was holden by Glyn, Chief Justice, that if in this case the feoffment had been made before any grant of the reversion, the contingent use would have been destroyed notwithstanding the right of entry in the daughter (*u*).

Lord Chief Justice Roll states, that in the debate of this case, he and his brothers, Nicholas and Aske, came to five resolutions :

1st, That the estate of a tenant for life in remainder, under a feoffment, would support contingent uses by reason of his right of entry against the feoffment of the immediate tenant for life.

2dly, That the entry of such remainder-man, whether in the life-time, or after the decease, of the first tenant for life, would reduce the remainders.

3dly, That if such an entry was not made, the contingent *cestui que use* coming *in esse* could not enter ; “ but, in this case, the first feoffees may enter to revive this contingent use, and then, by their entry the contingent use shall be settled and executed in the persons entitled to it by the statute of uses ; for there is a *scintilla juris* in the feoffees to enter in such cases of necessity to revive contingent uses, because otherwise the contingent use will be destroyed.”

4thly, That when a feoffment is made to certain uses with remainder over in contingency, and no estate left in

(*u*) 2 Ro. Ab. 796, pl. 11 ; 2 Sid. 64, 98, 129, 157, nom *Heyns v. Villers*.

in the feoffees, and then the feoffees enter on the land, and disseise the tenant in possession, and make a feoffment in fee, this does not destroy the contingent use, if the tenant in possession, or any one in remainder, in whom an estate certain was settled before the feoffment, re-enters, for his entry shall reduce all the contingent remainders, and make them capable of execution by the statute of uses; because the feoffees are, as it were, conduits to convey the estates, and have not any power left in them to destroy contingent uses.

And, lastly, That when a feoffment is made to certain uses, with divers remainders over in contingency, and no estate left in the feoffees; yet if the estates *in esse* are divested before the events happen, and then the contingencies happen during the divestment, and then the estate *in esse* determine before any re-entry; if the feoffees release all their right in the land, or make a feoffment of the land, or bar their entry by any other means, in that case the contingent use can never be revived so as to be executed by the statute of uses, because the feoffees who had *scintilla juris* in them, in case of necessity to revive the contingent uses, have barred their entry to revive the contingent uses, and no other can enter to revive them so that they cannot be executed by the statute.

When the same case came before the King's Bench, Newdigate, Justice, thought, that rather than a contingent use should be destroyed, the covenantees might employ their *scintilla juris* to preserve them. And Glyn, Chief Justice, held, that the uses were executed by the covenant, but the contingent uses were not; and
where

where it is said by some that the estate that feeds them is *in nubibus*, and of others *in terra*, and by some other *in custodia legis*, until the contingency happen; yet he held, that they are preserved by a *scintilla juris*, which term was first *invented* by my Lord Dyer.

Now these resolutions, which are all that are in the books on this point that can be considered as of any authority, were probably founded on Chudleigh's case, as reported by Coke, and at most were mere *dicta*, not in anywise necessary to the decision of the court. The two last resolutions it is impossible to reconcile. It is first holden, that a tenant for life may re-enter and revest the *scintilla* in the *feoffees* against their own feoffment, "because the feoffees are, as it were, conduits to convey the estates, and have not any power left in them to destroy contingent uses:" and, secondly, that if the estates *in esse* are divested, the feoffees may then, by release, &c. destroy their right of entry, and so for ever destroy the rising of the contingent uses; that is, "although they have not any power left in them to destroy contingent uses," yet when *their* entry only will, according to this doctrine, revest the uses, then they may effectually overthrow the settlement. What is the distinction between their feoffment before their supposed right of entry requires to be exercised, and their feoffment at or after that time? What is this "*scintilla juris et tituli*?" If it be an actual interest, it cannot be revested in the feoffees against their own feoffment. If it be not, why should it not be considered in the same light as a collateral power, which the donee cannot destroy?

Wegg and Villers's case arose upon a covenant to

stand seised. So did Perrot's case (*u*), which was decided on a point of pleading, or, at least, it was not decided upon the doctrine under consideration (*x*). It is observable, that in this case, Moor treated it as a doubtful point, whether at that day a future use was a real interest, or that a seisin was requisite at the instant of its rising as it was before the statute of uses. In *Wood v. Reignold* (*y*), and *Bould and Winston* (*z*), the question was, how far uses under a covenant to stand seised could be destroyed, or how far they could be bound by a lease granted by the covenantor before the arising of the use? The point underwent great consideration. But, in the first case, no judgment was given; in the second, the reporters differ as to the judgment.

Sir Thomas Palmer's case (*a*), likewise, was a covenant to stand seised to the use of himself for life, remainder to Thomas Palmer, his nephew, for life, remainder to the first and other sons of Thomas Palmer in tail, remainder to the right heirs of himself. He was attainted and executed before the birth of any son of Thomas; and it was resolved by Flemming, Chief Justice; Coke, Chief Justice; and Tanfield, Chief Baron; that by the attainder before the birth of the son, any after-born son was barred, and the crown had the fee-simple, discharged of all the remainders limited to the sons unborn. But note, the reporter adds, that for sundry vehement presumptions of forgery of the deed of covenants

(*u*) Mo. 368; 36 and 37 Eliz. Jac. and see *Barton's case*, Mo.

(*x*) See 2 Ro. Abr. 795, pl. 8. 742.

(*y*) Cro. Eliz. 764, 854; 41. (*a*) 9 Jac. Mo. 815. See *Fearne*,
and 42 Eliz. 426.

(*z*) Cro. Jac. 168, Noy, 122; 4

covenants it was censured and damned. And three years afterwards the sole question in a case was, whether an use arising by covenants to the right heirs of a daughter yet alive, should so far transfer the remainder in abeyance, that it should not be as a reversion still in the covenantor, whereof livery should be sued after his death, because there was no person in being (which is the word of the statute of uses) in whom the land may vest (*b*); and the decision in *Hales v. Risley* (*c*) seems to be in favour of contingent uses under covenants to stand seised (*I*). Indeed, the author of the celebrated treatise of equity (*d*) refers to this case, as having settled, in opposition to the former authorities, that to the raising of the future uses after the statute the regress of the feoffees is not requisite, and that they have no power to bar those future uses, for the statute has taken and transferred all the estate out of them, and they are as mere instruments. So that contingent uses do now, like other contingent remainders, depend upon the particular estate.

We have now gone through all the cases on this subject. The positions which they are generally thought to establish are,—1. That a *scintilla juris* remains in the feoffees, releasees, or conusees to uses, to support and feed the contingent uses as they arise;—2. That if a contingent use be divested, an actual entry must be made to revest it, although a right of entry is sufficient to support a contingent remainder at common law; and

3. That

(*b*) *Barne's case*, Hob. 74.

(*d*) Book ii. ch. 6, s. 2.

(*c*) Poll. 369.

(*I*) The Profession has great reason to lament that Pollexfen did not preserve a note of the judgments of the court as well as of his own arguments.

3. That by force of this *scintilla* the feoffees, &c. may enter to revest the contingent uses, and by a parity of reason may, by release, feoffment, &c. destroy their *scintilla*, and so prevent the uses from arising.

We have seen that this doctrine has never received a judicial decision. There is not a single case in the books in which it was necessary to decide the point. The authorities have, indeed, been generally treated as decisive of the doctrine, but independently of there being no *decision* on the point, it will appear from the foregoing cases, that the following eight Judges, viz. Wray, Chief Justice; Periam, Chief Baron; and Mounson, Harper, Southcote, Walmesley, Gawdy, and Clench, although they differed in some respects, were all of opinion that no right or interest was left in the feoffees. Lord Hardwicke, in one of the ablest judgments ever delivered, said, that in order to determine Chudleigh's case the Judges entered into very refined and speculative reasonings, some of which (he said he spoke it with reverence) were not very easy to comprehend (e): and Lord Chief Justice Willes, in delivering judgment in *Parkhurst v. Smith* (f), treated this doctrine of *scintilla* as a *great stretch* in the court, and a commendable *astutia* to *invent* a method to prevent the statute of uses working a wrong, and overturning the intent of the parties. Therefore, had he seen that this invention itself overturned the intent of the parties, it is evident that he would have discountenanced this *great stretch*, and not have considered it a commendable *astutia*. There are only two or three more Judges on the other side
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(e) *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. 183; and see Hard. 417.

(f) Willes, 341.

of the question, if we admit the authenticity of Coke's report of Chudleigh's case ; and even some of these Judges thought that the feoffees took not a mere *scintilla*, but a fee-simple determinable ; a doctrine which is now entirely exploded. But if we consider Coke's report as inaccurate, which, in this respect, it evidently is, then the preponderance of authority is greatly against this fiction.

Considering the point then as still open, we may shortly notice the inconveniences of this doctrine, and how it relates to the subject before us, and then show by what construction these difficulties may be avoided, and the common law restored, so far as it can consistently with the doctrine of uses ; and this will involve the consideration of the real meaning of the statute. I shall first dismiss from my consideration the cases which have arisen on covenants to stand seised, nor shall I consider the nature of contingent uses limited on a bargain and sale. These conveyances do not operate by transmutation of possession, but the estate remains in the covenantor or bargainor, and the uses are fed out of his seisin as they arise. In this respect they are very distinguishable from conveyances which do operate by transmutation of possession, as feoffments, releases, fines, and recoveries. These vest the fee-simple in the feoffees, &c. and the uses arise out of *their* seisin. Now, covenants to stand seised are at this day wholly disused, any further, indeed, than a defective feoffment, bargain and sale, or release, may, where there is a sufficient consideration in favour of the intention, be construed a covenant to stand seised. And as to bargains and sales, I apprehend, that contingent uses to persons not *in esse*

cannot be raised upon them. The following observations, therefore, are confined to uses raised by those conveyances only which do operate by transmutation of possession :

First, then, as to the mischievous tendency of the doctrine under discussion. Take a common marriage settlement to father for life, remainder to his wife for life, with proper limitations to preserve ; remainder to the sons in tail. If, as Mr. Fearne remarks, the father should divest the estates, an actual entry must either be made by the mother, or the trustees, to preserve, or the releasees, supposing them to be different persons, or the contingent uses to the unborn sons, would be defeated (*g*). This is a point never attended to in practice. And Pollexfen has observed (*h*), that “ it must not only be inquired what acts the tenants for life have done before the contingent uses came *in esse*, but it must also be known whether the feoffees or their heirs have done no act before those remainders came *in esse*, whereby these remainders should be destroyed.” Besides, if we hold that the releasee to uses must have a seisin *at the time the contingent use arises*, we are bound to inquire whether there is such a person in existence. There may be no such person, and thus half the settlements in the kingdom may be defeated.

The doctrine applies with equal force to POWERS ; the estates to be created by them are, as we have seen, contingent uses, and may, under this doctrine, be in like manner destroyed by the destruction of this *scintilla juris*. It would be impossible, perhaps, at the
same

(*g*) 1 Fearne, 443.

(*h*) Poll. 384.

same time to maintain, according to the fourth resolution in Wegg and Villers, that if the releasees were to disseise the tenant for life, and make a feoffment, his entry would revest the *scintilla*, and so support the uses. We should be told more precisely the nature of this seisin. It is clearly descendible we learn, but is it grantable and devisable? Will it escheat? These and many more questions must be solved if this fiction is to be supported.

But if limitations to uses can consistently with the statute be construed in like manner as limitations at common law, no mischief will ensue. The law will then be uniform and simple. A use limited to *A* for life, remainder to trustees to preserve; remainder to his first and other unborn sons in tail, would stand in the same condition as a feoffment at common law to the same uses; the use to *A* would be vested, and the uses to the sons would be contingent remainders, or uses depending on the particular estate, and in case of a feoffment, &c. by the tenant for life, would be supported by the right of entry in the trustees. If there were any powers in the deed the estates to be created under them would, in like manner, be preserved. The releasees to uses, *as such*, could neither destroy nor support the contingent uses; and now that uses are in most cases subject to the same rules as contingent remainders, such a power is wholly unnecessary.

Lord Chief Justice Wray's construction of the statute is the best, viz. that it draws the whole estate of the land, and also the confidence, out of the feoffees; the which, by the operation of the statute shall render the use to every person in his time according to the limita-

tion of the parties; or, in other words, the true construction is this, that upon a conveyance to uses operating by transmutation of possession, immediately after the first estate is executed, the releasees to uses are divested of their whole estate; the estates limited previously to the contingent uses take effect as legal estates; the contingent uses take effect as they arise, by force of, and relation to, the seisin of the releasees under the deed; and any vested remainders over take effect according to the deed, subject to open and let in the contingent uses. This, if established, would at once overthrow the fiction of *scintilla juris*, and with it the necessity of an actual entry to revive contingent uses; and would in every other respect place contingent uses on the footing of contingent remainders, which Gawdy thought was the real intent of the act.

To ascertain whether this was the intention of the legislature, it will be necessary to keep in view the provisions of the statute, which are — 1. That the *cestui que use* shall be deemed in the possession of the land for the like estate that he had in the use; — 2. That the estate of the feoffee, &c. to uses, shall be deemed to be in *cestui que use*; and, 3. After providing for the case of joint feoffees to the use of one of them, there are two savings, the one of the rights of all persons “other than those persons which be seised, or hereafter shall be seised of any lands, &c. to any use, confidence, or trust;” and the other of the estates of the feoffees to the uses in their own right.

Mr. Fearne, who combats this doctrine of *scintilla juris*, so far as it is supposed to render an actual entry necessary to revest contingent uses divested, argues from

the words of the act, which are, that where any person is seised to the use of others, such other persons shall be deemed and adjudged in lawful estate and possession, &c. to all intents, constructions, and purposes in the law, of and in such like estates as they had in the use, &c. But perhaps this is not the strongest ground that can be taken, as the majority of the Judges in Chudleigh's case held decidedly, that by force of these words contingent uses were not executed by the statute, inasmuch as it is required that there should be a person entitled to the use before the statute can operate; and they said it was clear that none can stand seised to the use of him who is not, neither can he who is not in *rerum natura* have any use. It is not, however, necessary for us to contend against this opinion.

Lord Chancellor Bacon, in his reading on the statute of uses, which was delivered a few years after the decision in Chudleigh's case, admits that the statute did not intend to execute contingent uses (i); but nevertheless holds, that the word "clearly," in the clause, that the estate of the person seised to the use shall be vested in the *cestui que use*, seemed properly and directly to meet with the *conceit* of *scintilla juris* (I), as well as the words

(i) p. 42.

(I) In this passage the word *conceit* is evidently used in a sense of contempt, and from this it may be inferred, that Bacon did not consider the doctrine as decided. He would never have treated that as a *conceit* which all the Judges had decided to be the law of the land. He himself was Counsel in Chudleigh's case, and he had no reason to be out of temper with the decision, as his client the Defendant had a verdict. Indeed, he opens his discourse with a declaration, that by Chudleigh's case the statute was reduced to a true

words in the preamble of extirpating and extinguishing such feoffments, so that their estate is clearly extinct (*k*). And, speaking of the savings, he observes (*l*), that “the first and second cases are not penned with an *ac si*, but absolute; that *cestui que use* shall be adjudged in estate and possession, which is a judgment of parliament, stronger than any fine, to bind all rights; nay, he observes, the first clause hath further words, namely, in lawful estate and possession, which maketh it stronger than any in the second clause. For if the words only had stood upon the second clause, namely, that the estate of the feoffee should be in *cestui que use*, then perhaps the gift should have been special, and so the saving superfluous: and this note is material in regard of the great question, whether the feoffees *may* make any regress; which opinion, I mean that no regress is left unto them, is principally to be argued out of the savings, as shall be now declared: for the savings are two in number: the first saveth all strangers rights, with an exception of the feoffees; the second is a saving out of the exception of the first saving, namely, of the feoffees in cases where they claim to their own proper use. It had been easy in the first saving out of the statute, *other than such persons as are seised, or hereafter shall be seised to any use*, to have add to these words, *executed by this statute*; or in the second saving to have added

(*k*) p. 47.

(*l*) p. 50.

true and sound exposition; and that he was induced to consider the statute with a view to correct the many doubts and perplexed questions which had since arisen, as, he observes, it cometh to pass always upon the first reforming of inveterate errors.

added unto the words, *claiming to their proper use*, these words, *or to the use of any another, not executed by this statute* : but the regress of the feoffee is shut out between the two savings ; for it is the right of a person claiming to an use, and not unto his own proper use ; but it is to be added, that the first saving is not to be understood as the letter implieth, that feoffees to use shall be barred of their regress, in case that it be of another feoffment than that whereupon the statute hath wrought, but upon the same feoffment ; as, if the feoffee to an use before the statute had been disseised, and the disseisor had made a feoffment in fee to *I. D.* his use, and then the statute came : this executeth the use of the second feoffment ; but the first feoffees may make a regress, and they yet claim to an use, but not by that feoffment upon which the statute hath wrought."

It is clear, therefore, that Lord Chancellor Bacon, who has written so profoundly on uses, thought, that although contingent uses were not executed by the statute, yet there was no *scintilla* in the releasees, and they could not enter.

Let us suppose a feoffment *before* the statute to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* for life, remainder to his first and other unborn sons in tail, remainder to *C* in fee. Now here *A* retained the *entire fee simple*, and executed the uses as they arose ; if we put the case *after* the statute, we should at first, perhaps, be inclined to hold, as many of the Judges did, 1st, That the estate for life was absolutely vested in *B* ; and, 2dly, That a sufficient estate remained in *A* to serve the contingent uses, which would have superseded the necessity of limitations to preserve contingent uses ; but then *C*'s remainder

is

is a serious obstacle to this construction, because that is vested in him by force of the statute; and it would be difficult for *A* to retain a sufficient estate consistently with the vested remainder in *C*; besides, the words of the statute were satisfied by the possession vested in *B* for life, remainder to *C* in fee, and those estates exhausted the entire seisin of the feoffee.

But as on the one hand the legislature never intended to destroy contingent uses, and on the other, the Judges determined that an estate in contingency was no estate till the contingency happened, it was necessary to support them by holding that the estates would open so as to let them in as they came *in esse*. Where, however, is the necessity for any *scintilla juris* in the *feoffees*? As we are compelled to hold that the estate is executed in the remainder-man, so as to exhaust the seisin of the feoffees until the raising of the use, what is there in the act which should enforce us to say that the estates shall not open, and at once let in the contingent uses as they come *in esse*? The intention of the act was to divest the feoffee of every thing: he *was* seised to the use of the unborn *cestuis que use*, and when they come *in esse* the words of the statute are satisfied: the common law is, in a great measure, restored, which it is on all hands agreed was the intention of the act; and a fiction is got rid of, to the mischievous consequences of which we never advert; for no inquiry is ever made to meet the difficulties which arise from this doctrine. No one, for instance, taking an estate under the execution of a power, thinks of asking whether the releasee to uses has died without an heir. It behoves us, therefore, not on slight grounds to sanction that which would introduce such
serious

serious consequences, and to the effect of which we never practically attend (*m*).

No case ever occurred in practice in which the point fairly arose. It is indeed said (*n*), that the destruction of this *scintilla juris* occasioned one of the objections to the title in *Wheate v. Hall* (*o*). But this objection was certainly not put on the right ground, for the releasee to the uses, whose conveyance is supposed to have destroyed the *scintilla juris*, was also *donee of the power*, and trustee to preserve the contingent uses. The real question therefore was, whether his conveyance did not release or extinguish *the power*, and not whether it destroyed the supposed *scintilla*.

(*m*) See n. (10) to Gilb. on Uses, p. 296.

(*n*) Sand. on Uses, vol. 1, p. 164.

(*o*) 17 Ves. Jun. 80.

SECTION IV.

OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF POWERS DERIVING THEIR EFFECT FROM THE STATUTE OF USES.

HAVING thus attempted to explain the nature of powers deriving their effect from the statute of uses, it remains only, in this chapter, 1st, To class the several kinds of powers upon which the statute at this day operates, and lastly, to show in what manner they may be suspended, extinguished, or merged.

Powers are either given to a person who has an estate limited to him by the deed creating the power, or who had an estate in the land at the time of the execution of the deed; or to a stranger to whom no estate is given, but the power is to be exercised for his own benefit

benefit; or to a mere stranger to whom no estate is given, and the power is for the benefit of others. The first two may be distinguished into two kinds, 1st, Appendant or appurtenant; 2d, Collateral, or in gross. The third, it should seem, is a power in gross. The latter are termed powers *simply* collateral.

I. 1. Powers appendant or appurtenant are so termed because they strictly depend upon the estate limited to the person to whom they are given. Thus, when an estate for life is limited to a man, with a power to grant leases in possession, a lease granted under the power may operate *wholly* out of the life-estate of the party executing it, and *must*, in every case, have its operation out of his estate during his life. And this, as well as every other power which enables the party to create an estate which will attach on an interest actually vested in himself, is a power appendant or appurtenant.

2. Powers collateral, or in gross, are powers given to a person who had an interest in the estate at the execution of the deed creating the power, or to whom an estate is given by the deed, but which enable him to create such estates only as will not attach on the *interest* limited to him. Of necessity, therefore, where a man seised in fee settles his estate on others, reserving to himself only a particular power, the power is collateral, or in gross. A power to a tenant for life, to appoint the estate after his death amongst his children (*a*), a power to jointure a wife after his death, a power to raise a term of years to commence from his death, for securing younger childrens portions, are all powers collateral, or in gross; the estates to be created by them cannot
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(a). *Vide infra*.

in any event affect the life-estate of the donee, and are, therefore, correctly termed collateral, or in gross; nevertheless they are considered as emoluments annexed in privity to his estate, or as a part of his old dominion: and it even seems that a power to a perfect stranger who has no estate limited to him, to charge the estate *for his own benefit*, would be deemed a power in gross. (b).

A power may, with reference to the different estates in the land over which it rides, have different aspects; it may, in regard to one, be a power appendant; in respect to the other, a power in gross. Thus, where an estate is settled to A, for life, remainder to B, in tail, remainder to A, in fee, and A has a power to jointure his wife after his death, this power is collateral, or in gross, as to the estate for life, but appendant or appurtenant as to the remainder in fee. It *may* affect the latter, but can never attach on the former.

II. A power simply collateral is defined by Sir Matthew Hale to be a power given to a party who has not, nor ever had, any estate in the land. As, where such power is given to a stranger (c). This definition, however, is not correct. It is certainly clear, that if a man seised in fee reserve a power of revocation to himself, such power is a power in gross, and part of his old dominion; but although he might formerly have been owner of the estate, the power will be *simply* collateral, unless his interest existed at the time of the execution of the deed, so that by the revocation he would *acquire* an estate. Again, it should seem that a power to a perfect stranger to charge the estate for his own benefit would not be deemed a power *simply* collateral. A power of
this

(b) But see *Hutcheson v. Hammond*, *infra*.

(c) *Hard* 415.

this nature may therefore be thus defined : A power to a person not having any interest in the land, and to whom no estate is given, to dispose of, or charge the estate in favour of some other person. We have seen, that before the statute of uses *cestui que use* might direct his trustees to convey as a stranger should appoint. When the statute came, it of course operated on the declaration, or direction made by the stranger ; and this was termed a power *simply* collateral. Perhaps the best instance that can be given of it, is a power to a stranger to revoke a settlement, and appoint new uses to other persons designated in the deed. The usual example given of this power is a power from *cestui que use* before the statute to his feoffees to sell the estate, but this does not give an accurate idea of such a power since the statute. This example is taken from a case heard in the reign of Henry the Seventh, when land, unless by force of a custom, could not be devised except by way of use. The Judges, therefore, considered the will as affecting only the equitable right which they thought might be disposed of by the feoffees, even after they had departed with the legal estate. Since the statute, such a power would be a simple declaration of trust upon which the statute would not operate, and for a breach of which equity only could relieve.

This classification of powers is important only with reference to the ability of the donee to suspend, extinguish, or merge the power. And although a scientific arrangement of the work would appear to require that this subject should be considered at the close of the volume, yet we shall find, on a closer examination, that we could not well proceed till this branch was discussed.

SECTION V.

OF THE MODES BY WHICH POWERS MAY BE SUSPENDED, EXTINGUISHED AND MERGED.

WE must, therefore, now consider the various modes by which powers may be suspended, extinguished, and merged. And, first, we may quickly dispose of powers *simply* collateral, for the donee thereof cannot by any act whatever suspend or extinguish his power (*a*) (I). Thus, it was resolved in Digges's case, that he who hath a power to revoke estates, and has no estate himself in the land, cannot by fine, feoffment, or release, extinguish this power, because it is but an authority, and no interest, as, if a *devise* be, that a man shall sell certain land, and the person authorized levies a fine, or executes a feoffment, or releases all his right, yet he may afterwards sell the land (*b*). And the law is the same as to powers created by way of use. Nor can such powers be barred or extinguished by the act of any other person. Therefore, where a stranger had a power to raise a term of years for securing a sum of money, although the freeholder levied a fine, and five

years

(*a*) 15 H. 7. fol. 11. b.; 1 Rep. 111, 174; Mo. 605.

(*b*) Mo.; and see acc. Co. Litt. 237 a. 265 b.

(I) This is a case always referred to on this subject. As every one has not the year-books at hand, a literal translation of the case is inserted in the Appendix, No 3.

years passed without any claim, Lord Hardwicke held that the power was still subsisting, and might accordingly be exercised (c). In the case of *Hucheson v. Hammond* (d), where a testatrix gave a fund to A, for life, and after his decease to his daughter, and willed, that if she should marry without her father's consent, then he should have a power to appoint the fund *to whom he pleased*; it was not necessary to decide the point; but Mr. Justice Buller said, that he was clear the power could not be released, for which he cited Co. Litt. 265 b; Brownlow, 210. The first reference is to the case before mentioned, of a power to executors to sell, and I have not been able to find any thing in Brownlow on this question. But it should seem that the learned Judge's opinion cannot be supported; for as the power was for the father's own benefit, it ought, perhaps, to have been deemed a power in gross, which, therefore, as we shall hereafter see, he might release; and although the power was merely equitable, yet in these cases equity must follow the law.

As to powers annexed to the land, we may consider, secondly, What acts will *suspend* these powers; thirdly, What acts will destroy powers appendant, but not powers in gross; and so, fourthly, *è converso*; fifthly, we may treat of the cases common to both these powers; and, lastly, we may consider in what cases these powers are merged.

II. Secondly, then, As to the *suspension* of powers appendant, and in gross: *With respect to the former*;

If a tenant for life, with a power of revocation, grant a lease, rent-charge, &c. to take effect out of his interest,
natural

(c) *Willis v. Shorral*, 1 Atk. 474.

(d) 3 Bro. C. C. 128.

natural equity requires that he should not be permitted to defeat this interest (*e*).

In *Snape v. Turton*, a tenant for life, with general power of revocation, first made a lease for a year, and then, reciting his power, granted the reversion to another in fee, to whom the lessee attorned. And it was determined that the lease for a year suspended the power, but only as to the lease, and should be good for the reversion in fee *in presenti*. The decision, however, was, that the lease and release was one assurance, and a good revocation (*f*). In a later case (*g*), *Snape v. Turton* was cited as an authority, that a lease for years suspends the power of revocation *during the term*, but, it is added, that none would venture on this.

In a case in *Moor* (*h*), a man covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself for life, with remainders over, with a general power of revocation. He then made a lease for years to a stranger, and afterwards, during the term, he revoked. The question was, whether he could revoke, or whether he had suspended his power of revocation by his lease during the term. Coke, Chief Justice, held that he might revoke all except the term ; and that if one make a conveyance, with power to make leases, and with power of revocation, if he make a lease, he may revoke for the residue. But the doubt here was, where he had not power to make leases,

(*e*) Hard. 415, Attorney-General v. Gradyll, Bunb. 92; Goodright v. Cator, Dougl. 477.

(*f*) Cro. Car. 472; 1 Jo. 392; 2 Ro. Abr. 263, pl. 2. 1 Cha. Rep. 112.

(*g*) Lord Mordaunt v. the Earl of Peterborough, 3 Keb. 305.

(*h*) Yelland v. Ficlis, 788, S. C. nom. Yeoland v. Fettis, 1 Ro. Abr. (K) pl. 3.

leases, and yet made a lease. And at last the court were divided in opinion. According to Roll, they agreed that he could not revoke during the lease, and it was doubted, whether he could revoke even after the lease.

In a prior case (*i*) there is an admirable argument against the suspension of the power. It was argued by analogy to the case of a lease by one joint-tenant, which will not impede the *jus accrescendi*, to a lease by tenant for life, who might still surrender, and to the case of a lessee for life, with a condition to have a fee, where a lease for years would not suspend the power to increase the estate by the condition. It was allowed that the lease ought not to be defeated; but it was insisted that the doctrine of absolute suspension would be highly mischievous, when all men of landed property having made leases would be disabled to revoke, or to make jointures, or advance their issue with the rents and reversions.

At this day, it is quite clear that a lease for years granted out of the interest of the donee of the power cannot be defeated by a subsequent exercise of the power, for the power is, quoad *that*, suspended. The question then is, what is the *operation* of a suspension? Does it merely postpone the estates created by the power, or does it, according to the above opinion in Roll, actually suspend the very right of executing the power? It seems clear that it only postpones the vesting in possession of the estates, and that a power may be exercised although it be suspended. This seems to have been taken for granted in the case of *Goodright v. Cator* (*k*), where tenant for life, with a general power of

(*i*) Anon. Mo. 612; and see (*k*) Dougl. 477.
Bullock v. Thorne, Mo. 615.

of revocation, first granted a lease out of his interest, and then revoked *during the term*. And it was determined, that the power was well executed, subject to the lease. And the word "suspension" seems to have been used in the same sense in *Snape v. Turton*. This also was the opinion of my Lord Chief Justice Coke. Indeed, the point has been so long considered as settled, in practice that it would now be too late to subvert it, were it even contrary to law, for *communis error facit jus*. But if we recur to first principles we shall not hesitate to pronounce the point free from doubt. Consider the case before the statute of uses: *A*, legal tenant for life, and equitable tenant in fee in remainder, first grants a legal use to *B*, and then, *during the term*, conveys his life interest, and directs his trustee to convey the inheritance to *C*. Of the legality of this no doubt can be entertained. The case stands thus since the statute: the legal tenant for life and donee of the *power*, which comes in place of the equitable fee before the statute, first grants a lease to *B*, and then appoints to *C* in fee. It is very right to hold that he shall not defeat his own grant; but what is there, subject to that, to prevent the immediate operation of the statute of uses, when before the act the trustee would be clearly seised to the use of the appointee from the very execution of the deed, and the statute expressly extends to remainders. On the one hand, this doctrine cannot be productive of any inconvenience, whereas a contrary determination might, in some cases, actually operate as an extinguishment of the power.

As to powers in gross, they are independent of the estate of the donee, and would not therefore be sus-

pendent by the grant of a lease. In *Edwards v. Slater* (*l*), it was holden, that where a tenant for life committed a forfeiture by accepting a feoffment, and then exercised a power in gross, and afterwards a remainder-man entered and reduced the estates, the power was well executed, as the donee had a *right* to make it. And on the same principle it was said, that if the tenant for life had been disseised, and then had exercised his power, and had entered, this would have reduced the right to an actual estate.

These observations do not apply to leases granted under the same, or any other power, nor to leases for life, or a total disposition of the estate for life. The former will be a subject of future inquiry; and the latter we are now to consider in treating thirdly of the *extinguishment* of powers appendant.

III. We have seen that a charge on the estate to which the power is appendant suspends the power during the interest granted; it follows, therefore, on the same principle, that a total alienation of the estate must operate as an extinguishment of the power. Thus, if tenant for life, with a power to grant leases in possession, convey away his life-estate, the power is gone; it is no longer possible for the donee to execute it, inasmuch as it would be derogatory to his own grant (*m*). Where a tenant for life intends to mortgage or sell his estate, and it is wished to preserve his powers, the estate is only demised for a long term, depending on the life of the tenant

(*l*) Hard. 410.

(*m*) See Dougl. 293. And see *Cooke v. Bromehill*, Noy, 66. Note, the letter L appears to be

misprinted for the letter P. See the case. This seems to have misled Sir Matthew Hale; see Hard. 413.

tenant for life, who is made to covenant with the mortgagee, or purchaser, to exercise the powers as he shall direct. So where he joins in a recovery the universal practice is to convey only during the joint lives of himself and the tenant to the precipe. And it is also customary, in these cases, to insert an express declaration that the demise or conveyance shall not affect, but, on the contrary, be subservient to, the powers. These precautions apply to powers in gross as well as to powers appendant, because the object is to leave a reversion in the tenant for life (*n*); and as the grantee takes the estate subject to the power, no fraud is committed on him, and the power, therefore, may, it should seem, be executed in the same manner as if the donee had not parted with any portion of his estate. Sometimes upon a recovery the estate is conveyed for the joint lives of the tenant to the precipe and the tenant for life; and a clause is inserted for making void the conveyance, in case a very large sum is not paid within a given time to the tenant for life: the money of course is not paid, and then the tenant for life is in of his old estate to which the powers are annexed; nor does this mode affect the validity of the recovery, it being sufficient that the tenant to the precipe has the freehold at the time of suffering the recovery.

In the case of *Roper v. Halifax* (*o*) there was a settlement, with a power of sale in the trustees, with the consent

(*n*) Vide *post*.

(*o*) C. B. T. & M. Terms 1816. MS. Appendix, No. 4. The sketch of an argument is added to the case in the Appendix, in favour of the destruction of the power, 8 Taunt. 845.

consent of the tenant for life. A recovery was suffered, in which the tenant in tail only was vouched, which was to enure, to confirm the estates previous to the estate-tail, and the powers annexed to them, and subject thereto, to the joint appointment of the father, tenant for life, and son, tenant in tail under the settlement. The deed making the tenant to the precipe contained the 100,000 *l.* clause, as it is called ; and the estate was vested in the tenant to the precipe for the joint lives of him and the tenant for life only. The father and son made a joint appointment (subject to the aforesaid estates and powers), to new uses ; and the trustees, and the father and son, conveyed (subject as aforesaid) to new uses, recapitulating the old ones previously to the estate-tail, and new powers of sale, &c. were given. It was held, that the power of sale under the original settlement was not destroyed by the recovery or by the new settlement.

Lord Mansfield held, that where the conveyance by the tenant for life was only by way of mortgage, the power was not destroyed, as it would be contrary to the intention of all the parties to hold that the power was extinguished (*p*). But in the case of *Vincent v. Ennys* (*q*), it was held by Lord Chancellor King, that a power to a tenant for life to grant leases was destroyed by a mortgage made by him, and a tenant for life in remainder under the same settlement ; and the same point was decided the same way a few days before (*r*). And the case before Lord Mansfield was certainly decided in opposition to the general sentiments of the Profession, and appears to have been grounded on his opinion, that
a mortgage

(*p*) *Ren v. Bulkeley*, Dougl.
292.

(*q*) 3 Vin. Abr. 432, pl. 10.

(*r*) *Corker v. Ennys*, ib.

a mortgage was, even *at law*, a mere security for the debt, and not an actual conveyance. Thus, shortly afterwards, he held, that a mortgagee to whom a term had been assigned could not be sued as assignee of all the interest of the mortgagor before he took possession (*s*). But in *Stone v. Evan* (*t*), before Lord Kenyon, his lordship expressly declared, that he could not subscribe to the doctrine laid down in *Eaton v. Jaques*, and would over-rule it without hesitation (*u*), and it has since been over-ruled (*w*). The cases of *Ren v. Bulkeley*, and *Eaton v. Jaques*, depend so strictly on the same principle that it is impossible to over-rule one without shaking the other.

In the late case of *Long v. Rankin* however, in the House of Lords, where a tenant for life, with a power of leasing, conveyed away his life estate, but it was stipulated that he might exercise his power of leasing with the consent of the grantee, it was held that the power might be legally exercised by the tenant for life notwithstanding the conveyance of the life estate (*x*). The principles upon which this case was decided, are fully stated in the opinion which the Judges delivered in the House of Lords, and they will excite great attention.

The doctrine of the extinguishment of powers has, in some cases, been carried to a great length in practice. In a recent case *A* was tenant for life, under a settlement

(*s*) *Eaton v. Jaques*, Dougl. 445.

(*t*) *Woodfall's L. and T.* 113;

Abbot on Merch. 14, n. b.

(*u*) And see *Mayor, &c. of Carlisle v. Blamire*, 8 East, 487.

(*w*) *Copeland v. Stephens*,

1 Barnw. & Ald. 593.

(*x*) *Dom. Proc.* 1822. Ap-

pendix, No. 5, MS.

ment, with remainders over, in which there was a power of sale and exchange to be exercised with her consent, and the usual power of appointing new trustees with her consent. On her second marriage she conveyed all her estates, by lease and release, to trustees and their heirs, to the use of trustees for 500 years, upon certain trusts, remainder to such uses as she should by deed or will appoint, and in default of appointment, to the use of trustees in fee, for her separate use. New trustees were appointed under the power, and the usual deeds executed. It was objected, by a purchaser, that *A*'s power to consent to a sale was suspended or extinguished by her conveyance on her second marriage. In answer to this objection it was urged, that if the case were considered as it would have stood before the statute of uses, the fee would be in the trustees, in trust for *A*, for life, with remainders over, with a power to sell with her consent. Now a mere conveyance not operating by wrong, of her life-estate to other trustees, in trust for herself, could not possibly disturb her power; it would in no manner affect the interest to be defeated by the exercise of the power. Why should not the trustee convey according to his trust, by her direction, as well after as before the execution of such a conveyance? The only instance in which a power like the present could be affected before the statute, by a simple conveyance of the interest, was where the rights of third persons were let in upon the estate. If the tenant for life sold the estate to a stranger, and an intention should be collected that he was to retain the estate discharged from the power, that would affect the conscience of the trustee, and be a bar to his selling, although with the consent
required

required by the settlement. The case, it was said, in no respect differed since the statute. It would not be contended that the mere transfer of the life-estate defeated the power in the trustees, unless by preventing *A* from consenting to an exercise of the power. There was not any rule of law which prevented *A* from consenting. Her consent would not affect third persons, but still, merely so far as related to her interest, act upon her life-estate under the original settlement. It was considered, therefore, that by removing the term of 500 years out of the way the power might be exercised with effect. But in order to obviate all difficulty, it was recommended that *A* should appoint the estate to herself for life. She would then be in of her old use, and might well execute her power. It would be the mere case of a conveyance of the life-estate, by an innocent conveyance, to a releasee, to the use of herself for life. The use she would take under the conveyance would in no respect be different from the use which was before vested in her. If no use had been declared, the old use would have resulted to her, and the express limitation of the use would not render it a new one.

The purchaser, however, chose to be himself at the expense of an act of parliament, by which—after reciting that doubts had arisen, whether, upon the execution of the settlement on the second marriage, *A*'s powers of consenting to a sale, and to the appointment of new trustees, did not become suspended or extinguished; and in case such powers were only suspended, whether, upon the execution of the deeds appointing new trustees, the same did not become absolutely extinguished—the powers were confirmed. The objections were not considered

sidered of much weight, although the act was suffered to pass. It would certainly be desirable in such cases to compel the parties to first try the point at law, for such acts of parliament, although passed merely to obviate doubts which may not be well founded, are, in time, quoted as precedents, and relied upon as showing the opinion of the Judges and the House (*y*).

Where an estate is limited to such uses as *A* shall appoint, and in default of and until appointment to him in fee, the power is clearly appendant; and by a conveyance of his interest would be destroyed. This point is very important, as the limitation is similar in effect to the usual limitation to bar dower, of which we shall hereafter have occasion to speak. In *Penn v. Peacock* (*z*), an estate was conveyed to a trustee in fee, in trust, to pay the rents to the separate use of a woman for life, and, after her decease, in trust, for such uses as she should by will appoint, and for want of appointment to her own right heirs. She joined with her husband in conveying the estate by demise, with a fine, to a mortgagee. And it was insisted for her, that she had but a mere naked power without any interest, and could not be barred by the fine. Lord Talbot, however, held that it was a power coupled with an interest, and annexed to her inheritance, and so destroyed by a fine, since that a lease and release, or any other conveyance, will carry with them all powers that are joined to the estate.

This case appears clearly to answer an objection sometimes taken, that where the power only authorizes a disposition by *will*, the title cannot be accepted; for it

is

(*y*) Vide *post*.

(*z*) For. 41.

is clear, that where the party could convey the fee if the power were void, he may make a good title, as he would not be permitted to avoid his own grant by a future exercise of the power (I). But where he cannot convey the fee independently of the power, the objection holds ; as if he was tenant for life of the legal estate, remainder to such uses as he should appoint by *will*, remainder to a trustee in fee, in trust for his right heirs, there the estate for life and remainder cannot coalesce, but his right heir would take as a purchaser, and, consequently, the destruction of the power would not help the purchaser (*a*).

It is to be observed, that as to the destruction of the power the effect is the same, although the estate is conveyed by operation of law. Thus, it has been determined, that where a man, tenant for life, with remainders over, and the ultimate remainder to himself, in fee, with a power of revocation, became bankrupt, the life-estate and remainder in fee vested in the assignees, and his power of revocation was gone (*b*).

IV. As to the *extinguishment* of powers collateral or in gross. An assignment of *totum statum suum*, or other alteration of the estate for life, does not effect such a power ; so if the donee be tenant for years, and survive the

(*a*) See *Parkes v. White*, Britain, 2 Barn. & Ald. 93 ; see 11 Ves. jun. 209. *Thorpe v. Goodall*, 17 Ves. jun.

(*b*) *Anon. Lofft.* 71 ; *Doe v.* 388, 460.

(I) *Kirkpatrick v. Capel*, V. C. T. T. 1819. MS. Bequest to trustees of funds, in trust for *A*, for life, remainder for such persons, &c. as he should appoint by will. In default of appointment, in trust for his executors or administrators. It was held that he might assign the fund absolutely.

the years, still he may exercise his power (c), because the power does not fall within the compass of his estate, but takes effect out of an interest not vested in him.

And although the tenant for life assume to pass a fee, yet if he convey by an innocent conveyance, as a bargain and sale (d), covenant to stand seised, or lease and release (e), the power will not be destroyed, for this obvious reason, that the conveyances enumerated pass only what the tenant for life lawfully may pass, viz. his estate for life; so if the donee of a power in gross be only tenant for years, an assignment of his whole term will not defeat his power (f). And by a parity of reason, a re-conveyance or re-assignment to the donee of the power will not affect it.

The cases have generally turned on particular powers, as a power of jointuring, or a power of charging with younger childrens portions; but they seem to establish this general principle, that every power in gross may well be exercised, although the donee may have previously parted, by an innocent conveyance, with the estate to which it was annexed, in privity. Where a person is tenant for life, with a power to appoint the reversion, or tenant for life, with remainders over, with a power of revocation, in the first case, the power is wholly a power in gross; in the second, it is in gross as to the remainders, although appendant to the life-estate. But, nevertheless, it has been doubted, whether, in either case

(c) *Saville v. Blacket*, 1 P. 412; *Scrope v. Offley*, 4 Bro. P. Wms. 777. C. 237. See p. 241, where it

(d) *Edwards v. Slater*, Hard. 410; *Jenkins v. Kemis*, 1 Ch. 103. appears, that the appointee recovered in ejectment.

(f) *Saville v. Blacket*, 1 P. Wms. 777.

(e) *Phitton's case* cited, Hard. Wms. 777.

case, the donee can exercise his power after having departed with his life-estate. Mr. Booth, it seems, entertained this doubt. It is said, that in a case where *A* was tenant for life, with remainder to such uses as he and his wife, notwithstanding her infancy, should appoint, and they executed an appointment during her infancy, and *A* conveyed his estate for life, by lease and release, by way of mortgage; he (Mr. Booth) doubted whether a new appointment, on her coming of age, would make good the security, the husband having parted with his estate for life, *which* (he thought) *destroyed the power of appointment*. To avoid any doubt on this point, where *A* is tenant for life, remainder as he shall appoint, it is usual to first appoint the estate, and then convey the life-estate. And this, it is quite clear, may be done by the same deed, although, *ex abundanti cautela*, some have exercised the power by one deed, and conveyed the estate by another. It will here, however, be proper to inquire, whether the above opinion can be supported. A difference of opinion has certainly been expressed. In Roll's report of Snape and Turton (*g*), the court said, that if tenant for life, with power of revocation, makes a lease for life, that suspends his power as to the fee. This, however, it is conceived, meant only that he could not *defeat* the lease for life. In *Clarke v. Philips* (*h*), it is said, that Keeling and Twisden were of different opinions in this point, viz. If he that hath power of revocation over lands make a lease for life, whether it suspends the power only, as a lease for years would do, or extinguish it as a feoffment.

(*g*) 2 Ab. 263, pl. 2.

(*h*) Carth. 24.

ment (I). And in *Herring v. Brown*, Justice Lutwich said, that if a power of revocation is annexed to an estate for life, and that estate determines before the power is executed, by that means the power is extinguished (*i*). This is all the authority that I have met with in favour of the extinction of the power, and it must be admitted not to be of much weight. For Keeling and Twisden were opposed to each other, and Justice Lutwich's opinion in *Herring and Brown* was overruled by six Judges. On the other hand, the decision in *Edwards v. Slater* is directly the other way. There the donee made a bargain and sale in fee, and Lord Chief Justice Hale expressly said, *that if the bargainor had a power of revocation, he might well execute it after the executing this conveyance (k)*: and he said, that if the tenant for life had a power of revocation, and should make a lease, that would not destroy his power, *because no estate is displaced by it*. So, in *Saville v. Blacket (l)* there was a tenant for 99 years, if he should so long live, with a power to charge the lands; and Lord Maclesfield held, that he would have had this power though he should have survived the term of 99 years; for still he might have charged the premises therewith; so might he have done though he had assigned over the term: and although this case turned on a particular power, yet it is impossible, without discarding all principle, to distinguish it from the case of a general power (I). Hale's argument, that a lease does not de-

stroy

(i) 1 Ventr. 42.

(l) 1 P. Wms. 777.

(k) Hard. 413, see 10 East, 443.

(I) Keble states, that Keeling and Moreton were opposed to Twisden. Neither of the Reporters states what estate the donee of the power had. 2 Keb. 555, nom. *Clerk v. Pywell*.

(I) See the observations on the suspension of a power, *supra*.

stroy the power of revocation, *because no estate is displaced by it*, applies as forcibly to a lease for life as a lease for years, and refers the doctrine to the true ground.

The better opinion, therefore, clearly is, that the power is not in such case destroyed. The contrary doctrine appears to owe its origin to powers having been on their first introduction after the statute of uses assimilated to conditions at common law, which they do not resemble. By the common law, if lessee for life, upon condition to have a fee, made a lease for life, that prevented the estate rising under the condition, *because the privity of the estate was destroyed (m)*. But this could never apply to a power which is *a mere declaration of trust* upon which the statute of uses operates, and this seems to have struck the Judges in *Bullock v. Thorne (n)*, where Walmesley, Justice, held, that a lease for years does not suspend the power of revocation if it be raised by way of use, *otherwise, if it is of a condition annexed to an estate in possession*. And the court held, that, if one has a power of revocation entire, and he extinguishes, or suspends, the power in part, he may still revoke for the residue, if it be by way of use, *but not so of a condition annexed to the land*.

V. *As to cases common to both powers*. A present power, not simply collateral, may be extinguished by release to any one who has an estate of freehold in the land, in possession, reversion, or remainder; and thereby the estates, which were before defeasible or chargeable by

(m) Lord Stafford's case, 8 Rep. 73.

(n) Mo. 615.

by the proviso, are by such release made absolute (*o*): and where in a deed executing a power there are words which show that the party has fully executed his power, or which amount to a release of it, he cannot execute it further (*p*); but the intention must appear clearly, therefore a declaration in a deed partially executing a power of jointuring, that it is in bar of dower and thirds, and that the remainder-man shall have the surplus, will not operate as a release of the power, for they are only words put in by conveyancers as of course (*q*).

And where the power is future, and to arise by a contingent event, it may be defeasanced, and thereby utterly annulled (*r*). So it may be defeated in part. Thus where a man had a general executory power of revocation, and he covenanted not to exercise the power without the consent of the Lord Keeper; and granted that all revocations without such consent should be void, it was determined that the power being executory might well be defeated by a subsequent deed (*s*). But it seems to have been doubted whether a power can be released in part (*t*).

If the tenant for life levy a fine, execute a feoffment, or suffer a recovery, all his interest and power is forfeited and extinguished, and he gains a new estate by wrong.

(*o*) Albany's case, 1 Rep. 110 b.
Co. Lit. 265 b.

(*p*) See 2 Atk. 567.

(*q*) Hervey v. Hervey, 1 Atk. 561; Zouch v. Woolston, 2 Burr. 1136; and see Earl of Uxbridge v. Bayly, 1 Ves. jun. 499.

(*r*) Albany's case, *ubi sup*.

(*s*) Leigh v. Winter, 1 Jo. 411; and see Earl of Tankerville v. Coke, Mose. 146.

(*t*) Digges's Case, Mo. 605; but see Countess of Roscommon v. Fowke, 4 Bro. P. C. 523.

wrong (*u*). It is not material whether the power is present or future. Fines and feoffments, Sir Matthew Hale has observed, do ransack the whole estate, and pass, or extinguish, all rights, conditions, powers, &c. belonging to the land, as well as the land itself; so a recovery does not only bar the estate, but all powers annexed to it; for the recompense in value is of such strong consideration that it serves as well for rents, possibilities, &c. going out of, or depending upon, the land, as for the land itself (*x*). Where the fine is levied to the tenant of the land, it will operate by way of extinguishment and release (*y*). But if the fine or feoffment only relate to part of the land, the power remains for the residue of the land (*z*); although in the case of a common-law condition the entire condition would be extinct (*a*).

But the *acceptance* of a feoffment by a tenant for life will not destroy a power in gross, for the power was never in the feoffor, nor reserved to him, and by the entry of the remainder-man the estate created by the power will be reduced (*b*).

And there are cases in which a feoffment or fine will be deemed not an extinction of the power, but a further assurance of it, or at least merely void.

Thus, if tenant for life, with power of leasing, make a lease by livery, the lease will take effect by the deed,

(*u*) Albany's case, 1 Rep. 111.
4 Leo. 13, 219; Digges's case,
1 Rep. 175 a. Mo. 603; Ed-
wards v. Slater, Hard. 410.

(*x*) King v. Melling, 1 Ventr.
225; Savile v. Blacket, 1 P.
Wms. 777.

(*y*) Bird v. Christopher, Style,
389.

(*z*) Digges's case, *ubi sup.* and
see Mo. 618.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 37 a.

(*b*) Hard. 417; see Shep. Touch.
p. 14, as to the distinction be-
tween *levying* and *accepting a fine*.

and so the livery comes too late to do any hurt. This is an instance of a power appendant (c). So where a power in gross given to a tenant for life was well executed by deed, and he afterwards levied a fine, in pursuance of a covenant in the deed, the fine was considered inoperative, as the power was executed antecedently to the fine (d).

In *Bullock v. Thorne* (e), it was agreed, that if one, with power of revocation, make a lease for years, and levy a fine for assurance of the lease without use expressed, the power of revocation is not extinct by the fine, but suspended during the term.

In some cases, a fine accompanied by a deed will operate as an execution of the power. In the Earl of Leicester's case, the earl having a power of revocation, duly executed a deed, whereby he covenanted to levy a fine to other uses, and then levied a fine accordingly; it was determined, 1st, That the covenant was not of itself a good execution; but, 2dly, That the deed and fine taken together were a good execution of the power (f).

In this case, however, it was doubted, whether the power would not have been destroyed had the fine been levied before the execution of it. In a subsequent case the precise point arose. A tenant for life, with power of revocation, levied a fine, and then, by a deed executed a short time after, declared the uses of it, and the deed was executed in the manner required by the power.

The

(c) See 1 Ventr. 291.

(f) 1 Ventr. 278. S. C. nom.

(d) *Thomlinson v. Dighton*, 10 Mod. 71.

Wigson v. Garrett or Gerrad, 2 Lev. 149; Raym. 239; 3 Keb. 366. 489. 510. 536. 572; and

(e) Mo. 615; and see *Perrot's case*, Mo. 368.

see 11 Mod. 184.

The jury found the fine to be levied with an intention to make partition, and to the uses declared in the deed. This case was argued by all the able men of the time, and it was determined by Lord Chief Justice Herbert, Holloway, and Wright, against Withers, that the fine had destroyed the power. The main argument was, that the fine had destroyed the power, and then it could not be restored by the subsequent deed. From this judgment, however, there was an appeal, and it was reversed by six Judges against two, principally on the ground that the fine and deed were but one and the same conveyance, and both together were an execution, and not an extinguishment of the power; for it was agreed, that a fine alone, without a deed, declaring the uses, would have extinguished it, but it was said not to be so where there was a deed to declare the intention of the parties at the time of the levying thereof; and though the date of this deed was *subsequent* to the fine, yet that was for no other reason but because the fine ought to relate to the precedent term, though in truth it might be levied in the vacation, and so the deed might be executed at the same time the fine was acknowledged; therefore it would be unreasonable to make a forfeiture or extinguishment of a right merely by relation, which is but *fictio juris* (g).

This case did not decide that a declaration of uses at any time after the fine would prevent the forfeiture, and operate as an execution of the power. Indeed, Mr. Justice Withers, who was the only Judge of the King's Bench that held the power was not

(g) Herring v. Brown, 2 Show. 185; 1 Ventr. 368. 371; Skin. 35. 53. 71. 184; Carth. 22; Comb. 11.

destroyed, expressly said that the fine and deed should be considered as one conveyance in favour of common assurances, *where the distance of time is not apparently long* (h). Where it is recited in the deed, that the fine was, at the time of levying it, intended to enure to the uses expressed, it seems that no party to the deed, nor any one claiming under him, can insist upon the forfeiture; the deed would operate as an estoppel (i). But, as against strangers, it is conceived, that it would be left to a jury to say whether the fine was, or was not, levied to the uses subsequently declared (k).

In a recent case, a man was tenant for life under a will, with remainders over, in strict settlement, with powers of sale and exchange, and other powers. After the testator's death his heir at law agreed to do all acts for obviating any doubts under a prior will, and accordingly he and the tenant for life conveyed to a tenant to the precipe, for suffering a recovery to enure to the uses of the last will; and it was expressly declared to be "for the more effectually assuring and settling the estate according to the uses in the will of the last testator." The tenant for life was vouched in the recovery jointly with the heir at law. A purchaser to whom the estate was sold, under the power of sale in the last will, objected to the title, on the ground that the power was extinguished. In support of the title it was insisted that a fine or recovery by a donee of a power does not necessarily, and in all cases, operate as a destruction of it. Herring and Brown shows that it is a question of intention. The same

(h) Comb. 12.

(i) Carth. 24.

(k) See *Bushell v. Burland*, Rep. temp. Holt. 733; 11 Mod. 196.

same construction must prevail whether the fine be intended as as *confirmation* or an *execution* of the power. In Bullock and Thorne it was even said that the fine would not extinguish the power, because it was for further assurance, *although no use was expressed*. In the present case, the intention was, by the precedent deed, declared expressly to be to further assure the estate to the old uses. A deed and recovery by the tenant for life, intended as an *execution* of the power, would have had that effect only. A deed and recovery by him, intended as a *confirmation* of the power, must, upon the same principle, have that operation and no other. The *innocent intention* prevents the recovery from ransacking the whole estate, and extinguishing the powers.

In this case also (*l*) the purchaser thought proper to be at the expense of an Act of Parliament. It recited that *A* being tenant for life in possession of the estates, and having joined in conveying the same in order to suffer a common recovery thereof, wherein he was vouched, for strengthening and corroborating the title thereto, and the uses to which the same were limited by the last will, and which recovery had been duly suffered, it was apprehended that the powers given to *A* by the will had been by such common recovery defeated and destroyed. And it revived and confirmed the powers.

But in a later case, where, upon the same grounds, a similar act was applied for, the Judges expressed their opinion verbally against the necessity of the act; and Lord Eldon, after consideration, declared that there was no ground for the doubt, and the bill was abandoned (*m*).

(*l*) Vide *supra*, p. 59.

edit. p. 380; and see the learned

(*m*) Butler's n. to Fearn, last

Editor's reasons.

There, by a settlement executed in 1806, estates were settled to the use of *J*, and *C* his wife, for their lives successively, remainder to their sons successively in tail male, remainder, if *C* should survive *J*, to *C*, her heirs, and assigns; if *J* should survive *C*, to their daughters successively in tail male, remainder to such of her relations as she should by will appoint, in default of such appointment to her in fee, with powers of sale and exchange, exercisable by trustees, with the consent of *J* and *C*. In 1807 *J* and *C* executed a deed, in which, after reciting that *C* was desirous of acquiring an absolute power of appointment over the hereditaments comprised in the settlement, on the event of her surviving, or dying in the life-time of *J*, and there being a general failure of issue of her body entitled or inheritable under the uses of the settlement, they covenanted to levy fines of the settled estates, and directed them to operate to the uses of the settlement, antecedent to those to her in fee-simple, and after the determination of those uses to such uses as she should appoint by deed or will, and in default of such appointment to the use of her in fee-simple. The fines were accordingly levied in a subsequent term. Part of the estate being offered for sale, an objection was taken that by the inherent and unavoidable operation of the fine at the common law, all the uses might be considered to have been divested, and the powers extinguished or determined.

The case above referred to is *Lord Jersey v. Deane* (*m*). The fines were *sur conuzance de droit come ceo*, &c.; and it was held by the Court of King's Bench, that the fines did not operate to extinguish, destroy, or suspend the

(*m*) 5 Barn. & Ald. 569.

the right or power of the Earl and Countess, and the survivor of them, to request and direct a sale or exchange of the settled estates under the powers for that purpose contained in their marriage settlement, so as to prevent an exercise of those powers by the trustees of the settlement.

In a later case, where a person whose consent was requisite to the exercise of a power of sale in a strict settlement, being married, joined with her husband in granting an annuity out of her interest in the estate, and conveyed the fee (subject to the intervening uses), and levied a fine to a trustee to secure the annuity, and then consented to an exercise of the power of sale by the donees of the power, it was held that the power was not destroyed by the fine, as the only object of the deed and fine was to secure the annuity. The case was not considered distinguishable from that of Lord Jersey and Deane, for although there the object of the parties was expressly stated in the deed, yet it was equally clear there, upon the whole of the instruments taken together, that the intention of the parties was to limit the operation of the fine and prevent the destruction of the power (*n*).

Where, as in a case before put, a power is appendant as to some estates, and in gross as to others (*o*), an act of the donee may bar it, so far as it is appendant, and leave it in full force so far as it operates as a power in gross. Thus, to put the same case: *A* is tenant for life, remainder to *B* in tail, remainder to *A* in fee, and *A* has a power to jointure. We have seen, that the
power

(*n*) *Tyrrell v. Marsh*, 3 Bing.

(*o*) *Vide supra*, p. 47.

31 ; and 10 Moore 305.

power is in gross as to the estate for life and remainder in tail, appendant as to the remainder in fee. If, therefore, *A* should convey the fee by an innocent conveyance, he would destroy his power so far as it is a power appendant, and consequently, if the remainder in fee should come into possession, the grantee would not be bound by a jointure created under the power; but the power, so far as it took effect as a power in gross, would not be defeated; and therefore the jointure would be binding on the estate after *A*'s death, and during the continuance of *B*'s estate-tail.

In a former part of this chapter it is stated that a power to a tenant for life to appoint the estate amongst his children, is a power in gross, and consequently it may be released or extinguished. But lawyers of great eminence have been of opinion, that a power to a tenant for life to charge portions for his children, or to appoint the estate amongst his children, is a mere right to nominate one or more of a certain number of objects to take the portions or the estate; and that, consequently, it is merely a power of selection, and cannot be barred by fine. Numerous titles have been objected to on this ground. The force of this objection could not be examined until it was shown that a power in gross could be extinguished.

In a recent case (*p*), *A*, tenant for life (without any limitation to trustees to preserve), remainder to his children, as he should appoint, remainder to himself in tail, remainder to himself in fee, levied a fine before making any appointment, and the title was objected to by a gentleman, for whose opinion I cannot but have great respect,

(*p*) 1808, in which year the first edition was published.

respect, on the ground that the power was merely a power of selection, and therefore could not be released or extinguished by fine.

It must be admitted, that the power in this case was merely a power of selection, or, as it is generally termed, a power of specification; but it does not appear to follow from that admission that the power could not be released or extinguished. The only ground upon which it can be contended that the power could not be extinguished or released is, that it was a power *simply* collateral; but, as we have seen, a power is only *simply* collateral when the donee has no interest whatever in the estate (*q*), and such a power certainly cannot be released or extinguished either by fine, feoffment, or common recovery.

A power appendant, at least as to the life-estate, it certainly was not; but it seems to have been a power in gross, which, although it did not arise out of the estate of the tenant for life, must be considered as exercisable by him for his own benefit, and not as a *mere* collateral power. A power to a tenant for life to jointure after his death is a power in gross (*r*). Now, what is a power to jointure but a power of selection or specification. The tenant for life selects the woman whom he chooses to marry, and then appoints that after his death, *when his estate has ceased*, she shall take the estate for life. Here, as in the case before us, the estate appointed cannot take effect out of the interest of the donee of the power, and yet a power of jointuring, like every other power in gross, may be extinguished by fine (*s*). Indeed

(*q*) Vide *supra*, p. 47.

(*r*) *Edwards v. Slater*, Hard. 410.

(*s*) *King v. Melling*, 1 Ventr. 225.

deed it would be difficult to discover any real distinction between a power of jointuring and a power of appointing to children. In neither case is the donee compellable to exercise his power ; and, in each case, the power is annexed in privity to his estate for life, and he has an interest arising from the exercise of his power by the benefits it enables him to bestow. In *Edwards v. Slater* (*t*), a power to a tenant for life to create a lease for thirty-one years, to commence after his death, was held by Hale, Chief Baron, and Baron Turner, to be a power in gross, and to be barrable by a fine or feoffment. Lord Chief Baron Hale said, that where the power does not fall within the compass of the estate, as where the tenant for life has a power to make an estate which is not to begin till after his own estate is determined, such power is not appendant or annexed to the land, but it is a power in gross, because the estate for life has no concern in it ; and yet such a power (he added) may, by apt words, be destroyed by release, or by fine, or feoffment, which carry away and include all things relating to the land. This case seems to govern the point before us. Sir Matthew Hale's definition of a power in gross clearly embraces a power to a tenant for life to appoint the estate amongst his children after his death, and the cases are not easily distinguishable.

The doctrine that powers of this nature cannot be released or extinguished is by no means new. It has been frequently urged, but without success ; and, in the very case of *Edwards v. Slater*, Baron Rainsford held the power to create the term to be a power simply collateral ; but this Lord Chief Baron Hale and Baron
Turner

(*t*) Hard. 410.

Turner clearly over-ruled, which makes the case as strong an authority as can possibly be wished for.

The opinion under discussion owes its origin, perhaps, to powers in gross being frequently termed powers collateral; and the word "collateral" being considered as meaning *simply* collateral. Thus, in *Savile v. Blackett* (u), a power to a tenant for life to charge money on the estate was called by the Lord Chancellor a collateral power; and it is observed in a modern publication of much merit (v), "That the power in that case is erroneously called *collateral*, whereas, according to Lord Hale's definition, it was certainly in gross." The observation, that the power in question was a power in gross, is correct; but it was not *erroneously* called *collateral*, for a power in gross, and a power collateral (not *simply* collateral), is one and the same thing.

There is, however, still an authority behind, which may perhaps be adduced against these observations. The case to which I allude is *Thomlinson v. Dighton*, reported in many books, which was a devise to A for life, and then to be at her disposal, provided that she disposed of the same to any of her children after her death. She executed the power by lease and release, and a fine; and a question arose as to the due execution of the power. According to the report in *Salkeld* (w), two questions were made, the second of which was, whether this power could be construed as a power appendant to the estate for life, so as by the destroying of that it might be destroyed or extinguished, or a collateral one. Powell, Justice, said this was not a power appendant or appurtenant,

(u) 1 P. Wms. 777.

(w) 1 Salk. 239.

(v) 1 Saunders on Uses, 164.

tenant, nor was it in the nature of an emolument to the estate like a lease for life, with a power to make leases for twenty-one years, for that affects the estate for life, and is concurrent with it, and has its being and continuance, at least for some part, out of it; but this power arises after the estate, and has its effect upon another interest, so that the estate for life is perfect without it, and in no wise altered or affected by the execution of it.

Upon an attentive consideration of this case, it will appear that the question was, whether the power was appendant, or in gross; the word "collateral" being, as we have seen, sometimes used as synonymous to the words "in gross." That this was done in the case before us is proved by Mr. Justice Powell's argument, which is to the same effect as Hale's definition of a power in gross in the case of *Edwards v. Slater*. Mr. Justice Powell's opinion certainly was, that the power was a power in gross; and it seems so to have been considered by Mr. Peere Williams, who, in his admirable argument in that case (*x*), in answer to an objection that the power was destroyed, admitted that if the fine had been levied before the lease and release, it would have operated as an extinguishment of the power. For he contended, that as the fine came *after* the release *it came too late to do any hurt*; and although he afterwards said, that the power seemed collateral, yet he did not rely upon that position, and cited no other authority for it than the old case of a power to executors to sell, which is clearly a power simply collateral. Parker, Chief Justice, in delivering the resolution of the court, said, that as to the first objection, that

(*x*) See 1 P. Wms. 149.

that the power was extinguished by the fine, it might be answered, that if the power was well executed it was executed by the deed which was antecedent to the fine, and therefore it was impossible for the power to be extinguished by the fine (*y*). This appears to be a clear admission by the court, that the power might have been destroyed by fine ; for otherwise the answer would have been, not that the fine came too late, but that the power could not have been extinguished by fine.

The late Mr. Powell, however, in his treatise (*z*) of Powers, has considered the power in this case as a power simply collateral. He states broadly, that the court were unanimously of opinion, that the wife had, under the will, an estate for life *only, with a power of specification simply collateral*.

If the learned reader should think that in *Thomlinson v. Dighton* the power was deemed a power in gross, that case alone must have considerable influence on the question under consideration, and, indeed, the very system of powers must be overturned to hold the power simply collateral. Should it be determined that a power of this nature cannot be barred by a fine, the intention of many settlements must inevitably be defeated. If an estate be limited to the children of the marriage, as the parent shall appoint by will, or to the children *living at the parent's decease*, as he shall appoint by deed or will, with a remainder, in either of these cases, to the children in fee, in both these cases no effectual settlement can be made upon, or by a child, until the parent's death. I have put the case of a remainder *in fee* to the children in default of appointment, because it has
been

(*y*) 10 Mod. 72.

(*z*) Powell on Pow. p. 9. 33.

been contended, that although the power is simply collateral, yet, where the children are tenants in tail, a recovery suffered by *them* will over-reach and destroy the power of appointment. The case has been considered similar to that of Page and Hayward (*a*). To this opinion the author himself once inclined, but further consideration has induced him to consider the point very doubtful. For in Page *v.* Hayward, although the words expressed a condition, yet they were construed to be a limitation; and therefore it is the common case of a vested estate-tail, with a limitation over in a certain event, in which case it is quite clear that a recovery suffered before the happening of the event will defeat the limitations over. It is like the case put by Hale, Chief Justice, in Benson *v.* Hodson (*b*), of a tenant in tail, with a limitation so long as such a tree shall stand; and he held that a common recovery would bar that limitation. But in our case the question would be, whether, during the life of the donee of the power, the estates to be created under the power would not be considered a *charge* upon the estate-tail. Every purpose of such a power might, under a contrary construction, be sometimes defeated. Suppose a father, tenant for life, with an exclusive power of appointment to his children, to sell his life-estate, we have seen that he might still execute his power: but if the purchaser were to join with the children in suffering a recovery, the parent would according to this doctrine be deprived of the right for which he stipulated by the settlement of selecting the child to inherit his estate. What would be

(*a*) Page *v.* Hayward, Pig. App. Comm. Rec. 176; 2 Salk. 570.

(*b*) 1 Mod. 188; 2 Lev. 26; and see White *v.* West, Cro. Eliz. 792.

be the consequence of this doctrine if *A* were tenant for life, remainder to *B* for life, remainder to his children as he should appoint, remainder to his first and other sons in tail; and upon a child coming of age, *A*, without the concurrence of *B*, were to join with the child in suffering recovery? Would not *B*, the father's power be destroyed? There is a wide difference between the *donee* of the power having ability by a recovery to destroy the power, and the remainder-man in tail having the same right. Again, it has been contended, that although the power cannot be extinguished, yet it may be released to the remainder-man in exclusion of the objects of the power, as the donee is equally a trustee for them all. This opinion, however, assumes that the donee is *a trustee* of the power, a doctrine which it would be difficult to support; and even should it be proved, yet ulterior questions would arise. It might be questioned, whether, as he was a trustee, he could bind his discretion during his life; and whether he would not be guilty of a breach of trust in preferring the remainder-man to the immediate objects of the power. But it really seems so clear upon principle as well as authority, that the power is a power in gross, that it is not thought necessary to pursue our inquiries on points arising out of the doctrine that the power is *simply* collateral. The objection is now (1815) daily losing ground.

Since the publication of the above observations, the point has been argued at great length before the Vice-Chancellor in Sir John Berney's case, and the opinion of the court was, that the power was destroyed (*c*), but it became unnecessary to decide the

(*c*) West v. Berney, Ch. Hilary Term, 1819. MS.

point. It was again shortly argued before the same Judge in *Smith v. Death* (*d*), and he decided in favour of the destruction of the power. The point, therefore, may now be considered at rest.

VI. It remains only to inquire in what cases a power is *merged*; although, perhaps, in strictness, *merger*, in the sense it is here used, is but a mode of *extinguishing* a power.

Where an estate was limited to such uses as *A* should appoint, and in default of appointment to himself in fee, great difference of opinion formerly prevailed whether the power was not merged in the fee: latterly, however, it was the universal opinion of conveyancers, that the power was not merged.

In the late case of *Maundrell v. Maundrell* (*e*), it appeared, that before marriage the estate was limited to such uses as the husband should by any deed or will appoint; and in default of appointment to the use of himself for life, and after his decease to the use of his right heirs. After the marriage, the husband conveyed the estate to a purchaser, and it was contended that the purchaser was in under the appointment, and consequently that the wife was not entitled to dower.

But the court said, that "the power of appointment was merely nugatory, and nothing distinct or different from the fee. The fee was clearly in the husband until appointment. In *Goodhill v. Brigham* (*f*) it was held that a power added to the fee was merely void. So the power in this case, followed by a limitation of the fee, must be absorbed in the fee which includes every power.

The

(*d*) Ch. 19 June 1820, MS. S.C.
5 Madd. 371. See 1 Bligh, 15.

(*e*) 7 Ves. jun. 567.
(*f*) 1 Bos. and Pull. 192.

The reason commonly given why a power may have effect though limited to the owner of the fee, is, that he may appoint in a mode by which his legal fee would not entitle him to convey: The court gave no opinion upon the sufficiency of that reason; but in this case it is to such uses as he should appoint by deed or will legally executed, and by those instruments he might have passed the fee, though nothing was said about the appointment. The limitation, therefore, operates purely as a limitation of the fee, and that fee he could only convey subject to her right of dower."

From this decision there was an appeal to Lord Chancellor Eldon. The point could not but be highly interesting to a conveyancer; and as the author had made some observations on the doctrine, he took the liberty of sending them to Lord Eldon shortly after the appeal was lodged. This he was induced to do from observing that the point had really come on at the Rolls by surprise, and the material authorities had not been referred to. So little is to be met with in the Books on this subject, that he shall make no apology for inserting the argument alluded to.

After adverting to the decision of the Rolls, and stating that Lord Ashburton had also taken an objection to the power, contending that the separate existence of a power of appointment was incompatible with the ownership of the fee; it proceeded thus:

"In Sir Edward Clere's case, however (g), upon a feoffment by a person seised in fee to such uses as he should appoint by will, it was settled by all the Judges
of

(g) 6 Rep. 17 b.

of England (*h*), after great consideration, that by operation of law the use vested in the feoffor, and he was seised of a qualified fee, (that is to say,) till declaration and limitation were made according to his power; and, 2dly, If in such case the feoffor by his will limit estates according to his power reserved to him on the feoffment, then the estates shall take effect by force of the feoffment, and the use is directed by the will, so that in such case the will is but declaratory. But that if he devised his land without reference to his authority, there it should pass by his will, for the testator had an estate devisable in him, and power also to limit an use, and he had election to pursue which of them he would. The case of *Goodhill v. Brigham*, which was referred to at the Rolls, was a devise to a feme covert in fee, with a power superadded to dispose of the estate without the control of her husband, and the power was held to be void. In this case the court of Common Pleas seemed to favour the doctrine since espoused at the Rolls. Le Blanc, Serjeant, defined a power to be an authority enabling one person to dispose of the interest which is vested in another; and Buller highly approved of this definition, which was of course denying the validity of a general power of appointment limited to a person with remainder to him in fee (*i*). Now according to Sir Edward Clere's case a power may be defined to be an authority enabling a person to dispose, through the *medium* of the statute of uses, of an interest vested either in himself or in any other person. Buller, after commending the definition, said, "suppose by transposing the clauses we could construe this to be a devise to

(*h*) See *Parker v. Sir Edward Clere*, Mo. 567.

(*i*) See 10 Ves. jun. 265, on the appeal.

to such persons and uses as E. Rogers (the feme covert) should appoint, and for want of such appointment to her and her heirs ; if the devise had stood thus she could have taken nothing till her death, or till her appointment," which, he argued, would have overthrown the testator's intention. This position clearly subverted the definition of which he had before so highly approved, and is another authority for the existence of the power in question ; and if the devise would have admitted of this construction the decision may be doubted ; for notwithstanding Buller's opinion, it is now too late to contend that the wife would not have taken a vested estate subject to be divested by the execution of the power ; and, indeed, Buller himself, about a month afterwards, expressly recognized this doctrine (*k*). At any rate the husband would in equity have been a mere trustee for the wife (*l*). To return, however, to the point before us, for it is not my intention to investigate the case of *Goodhill v. Brigham* any further than it relates to this point, in a case before the late Lord Alvanley when Master of the Rolls (*m*), in which, upon the authority of *Goodhill v. Brigham*, it was contended that a general power of appointment was absorbed in the fee limited, in default of appointment, to the person to whom the power was given, his lordship said, " I shall not enter into the question whether upon the case of *Goodhill v. Brigham* the power could not have been exercised. I think, notwithstanding that case, he might have appointed a use under the power, for I do not conceive the

Judges

(*k*) See 3 Ves. jun. 661 ; and see post, ch. 2. s. 4.

(*l*) See *Bennett v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316.

(*m*) *Cox v. Chamberlain*, 4 Ves. jun. 631.

Judges meant to decide, that when there is a conveyance to such uses as a man shall appoint, and in default of appointment to his own right heirs, the party may not, under the power, create an estate that will supersede the estate in fee, though perhaps not to bar dower. If that case is taken in the full extent it is very doubtful, and would set aside half the conveyances in the kingdom; and I desire to be understood that it is not my opinion."

Lord Hardwicke also appears to have acceded to the doctrine in *Sir Edward Clere's* case; for in the case of *Peacock v. Monk* (*n*) he said, an estate might be settled to the separate use of a feme covert by way of power over an use, as if she conveyed the estate to the use of herself for life, remainder to the use of such persons as she by any writing, &c. should appoint, and in default of appointment to her own right heirs.

So in *Tickner v. Tickner* (*o*), where Henry and Robert Tickner were seised of an estate in gavelkind as heirs of their father; Robert made his will, and devised his undivided moiety to his wife Elizabeth T. and her heirs. After making his will, by a deed of partition between Robert and Henry, and by a fine, all the gavelkind estate which Robert had devised, was allotted entirely to Robert, to such uses as he should appoint by deed or writing, and in default of appointment to him in fee. This transaction was holden to be a revocation of the will. Now it had previously been decided, that a partition by deed and fine would not revoke the devise where the estate was limited to the devisor in fee (*p*).

In

(*n*) 2 Ves. 190.

(*o*) 3 Atk. 742, cited.

(*p*) See *Webb v. Temple*,

1 Freem. 542. *Luther v. Kidby*,

3 P. Wms. 170, n. April, 1730.

In the case of *Tickner v. Tickner*, therefore, it was clearly considered that the power of appointment was not merely nugatory, in which case it could not have operated as a revocation, but on the contrary, that the fee could be divested by an execution of the power. It is observable, that of the many Judges who have commented on these cases (*q*) no one seems to have thought the power of appointment void. On the contrary, Lord Hardwicke, Lord Rosslyn (*r*), and Lord Eldon (*s*), appear to have considered that the cases of *Tickner v. Tickner*, and *Luther v. Kidby*, can well stand together, which can only be on the ground of the power of appointment being valid. Heath, Justice, seems even to have thought that a claim of dower might be barred by an execution of the power (*t*); and Lord Alvanley made two decisions similar to that of *Tickner v. Tickner* (*u*), (in one of which Mr. Justice Barington concurred) notwithstanding the point of the power being merged in the fee was expressly urged against the revocation (*x*). But Lord Alvanley said there was a power to dispose, which he agreed was not larger than the fee, but it was a different power of disposition; he could grant it by a single paper; he could not convey the fee except by the common modes of conveyance; and though the power was not larger, yet it was to be executed in a different manner.

Indeed, from Sir Edward Clere's case to that of *Maundrell v. Maundrell*, with the exception of Lord

(*q*) See 2 Ves. jun. 157, 429,
662. 6 Ves. jun. 219.

(*r*) See 2 Ves. jun. 429.

(*s*) See 8 Ves. jun. 281.

(*t*) See 3 Ves. jun. 657.

(*u*) *Kenyon v. Sutton*, 2 Ves.
jun. 601, cited; and *Notts v.*
Shirley, *ibid.* 604, n.

(*x*) See 8 Ves. jun. 115.

Ashburton's opinion, and the supposed opinion of the Judges in *Goodhill v. Brigham*, it has been considered clear that the power in question was not absorbed in the fee, and innumerable conveyances have been prepared on that opinion.

The reason generally given in favour of the existence of the power appears to be too well grounded to be easily answered, and it prevails as much in the case of *Maundrell v. Maundrell* as in any case whatever; for even admitting that the power implied that the deed or will ought to be legally executed, yet if the power subsisted the estate might have been conveyed by virtue of it, without the necessity of the person to whom it was conveyed previously taking possession of the estate, or the possession being vested in him by force of the statute of uses, which must have been done if the power was absorbed in the fee. Besides, the point does not seem open after the case of *Tickner v. Tickner*, in which the same words were used.

Upon the whole, therefore, there is a decision by all the Judges of England, given after mature deliberation, and acknowledged by many subsequent Judges, in favour of the existence of the power; and, on the other hand, in favour of the absorption of the power, there is Lord Ashburton's private opinion, to which no attention has ever been paid, and the decision at the Rolls, where the authorities which settled the contrary doctrine were not adverted to.

Before quitting this subject, we may remark, that upon its being settled that in these cases the fee was vested, subject to be divested by an execution of the power, it was doubted whether a right of dower which
had

had attached on the estate could be over-reached by an execution of the power. The late Mr. Fearne, and many other gentlemen of eminence, thought the execution of the power defeated the right to dower, and it has never been directly settled that it will not. From this doubt, however, and because a power of appointment is liable to be suspended and destroyed, and the existence of the power is, in a case of this nature, the only circumstance which precludes the wife from her dower (*y*), it is usual to require a fine on the part of purchasers; and conveyancers in this, as in all other cases where a person has a power, and also an interest, *ex abundanti cautela*, generally make him not only exercise his power, but also convey his interest. To this practice, and the decision that a devise to such persons as *A* shall appoint is a fee, I am persuaded that the denial of the existence of the power owes its origin."

When the case came before Lord Eldon he expressed himself dissatisfied with the decision in *Goodhill v. Brigham*; and upon the authority of Sir Edward Clere's case, Lord Hardwicke's opinion, and the cases before cited on partitions, and upon the general practice of conveyancers, he held clearly that the power might well subsist with the fee. His Lordship's authority has quite settled the point (*z*). In the case of *Roach v. Wadham* (*a*), which was decided six months *before* Lord Eldon made his decision, and in which the same point arose; it was erroneously stated, that the decree at the Rolls in *Maundrell v. Maundrell* had been reversed in the House of Lords, and thereupon the counsel on the other

(*y*) N. 2 Co. Litt. 216 a.

(*z*) *Moreton v. Lees*, C. P. Lancaster 1819, post.

(*a*) *Roach v. Wadham*, 6 East. 289.

other side admitted that the power was not merged in the fee, and the Court of King's Bench in delivering judgment took the point for granted.

There are still, however, two cases which escaped the attention of every one; I allude to *Cross v. Hudson* (*b*), before Lord Thurlow; and *Dobbins v. Bowman* (*c*), before Lord Hardwicke; to which I might add the case of *Abbot v. Burton* (*d*). In the first case, an estate was conveyed to John Hay for life, with remainders over, with the ultimate remainder to the use of *the survivor* of him and his wife in fee. And a power was given him, in the usual terms, to appoint a 100 *l.* a year to take effect after his decease. He exercised this power by his will. His wife died in his lifetime, and all the intermediate remainders became incapable of taking effect, so that he was seised in fee; and Lord Thurlow held that the power was merged by the accession of the fee.

This case is not precisely like *Maundrell and Maundrell*. There the donee of the power acquired the *estate* immediately on the execution of the deed creating the power, so that unless the power had been upheld it would have been void in its creation. But here the donee had not any estate at the execution of the deed in which the power could, under any construction, be absorbed, and consequently the decision, that the power was merged by the accession of the fee, did not wholly strike the power out of the deed creating it, as from its execution, for the power subsisted until the happening of the contingency, which cast the fee itself on the donee. But although the cases may thus be

(*b*) 3 Bro. C. C. 30.

(*d*) *Vide infra*.

(*c*) 3 Atk. 408.

be distinguished, yet the *principle* of the decision was over-ruled by the case of Maundrell and Maundrell. The counsel who argued in Cross and Hudson in favour of the extinction of the power, rested their case on the simple ground that a power could not subsist in a person having the fee. It was said, that wherever a less estate and a larger coincide in the same person, a merger takes place, as an estate *pur autre vie* will merge in an estate for the party's own life, and a base fee in an absolute fee. In this case, it was added, it was the estate of the wife, who gives to the husband a power, which is a mode of property or interest in the land; *the same person cannot have a partial ownership and an absolute dominion, the interest being of the same kind, and only inferior in degree.* Lord Thurlow in delivering judgment adopted these arguments, for he merely said, he thought with the defendants that the power was merged. Now the above arguments are precisely those which were over-ruled in Maundrell and Maundrell. As the power then *may* subsist with the fee, why, it may be asked, should it be considered as extinguished? This construction would in many cases work great injustice. For instance, where the power is in gross as to the life-estate, and consequently not to take effect till after the donee's death, although he duly execute the power by will before the happening of the contingency, yet the execution will be avoided by the accession of the fee. The courts will, indeed, make his interest in the fee bear out his disposition, but still that in many cases might not be equally beneficial with an appointment under the power. Besides, should the case of Cross v. Hudson be supported, it may be thought, that
if

if a man having a particular power gain the fee by descent, or subsequent conveyance, the power will be merged ; in which case a prior execution of it by will would be void, and could not be made good out of the fee, as the testator was not seised of it at the execution of his will. But there appears to be no solid ground upon which this distinction can be supported. In many cases the fee is taken not strictly under the instrument creating the power, but by way of resulting use ; yet it is settled that the power may subsist with this resulting fee. Indeed in *Cross v. Hudson* the husband had no interest in the estate at the date of his will, which he could charge by will, because the limitation in the settlement was to an uncertain object, viz. the *survivor* of the husband and wife (e).

It frequently happens that a tenant for life of an estate in strict settlement, with the ultimate remainder to himself in fee, with powers of leasing, jointuring, charging portions, sale and exchange, &c. acquires the fee by the failure of the limitations intermediate between his life-estate and remainder : and it may be questioned, whether all these powers continue after the accession of the fee. Perhaps the better opinion is, that the powers cannot be exercised after the union of the estates, on the ground, not that the powers are merged, but that according to the true construction of the settlement, they were not to endure beyond the continuance of the limitations which they were intended to over-reach. To this there could be no objection ; it would not affect any prior exercise of the power although by will. Of course where the power has been executed
by

(e) See *Doe v. Tomkinson*, 2 Maul. & Selw. 165.

by deed the accession of the fee will not invalidate the execution.

In *Mortlock v. Buller* (f) the estate was settled to trustees for a term, to raise pin-money, remainder to the husband for life, with the usual remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the wife for life, remainder to trustees for a term, to raise portions for younger children, remainder to the sons of the marriage in tail, remainder to the husband in fee, with a power of sale and exchange in the trustees, to be exercised at any time or times, at the request of the husband and wife, or the survivor. The wife died in the husband's life-time, without issue. Lord Eldon, according to the report, stated, that the trustees had only an estate to preserve contingent remainders during the existence of the marriage; and in the event that had happened, the husband's life-estate and remainder in fee being brought together, in law the power of the trustees is extinguished and gone. The estate to preserve contingent remainders was of course still subsisting, and the life-estate and remainder in fee were only executed *sub modo*. The substantial ground upon which such a power in trustees should be held not to be subsisting, is, that the *intention* of the settlement was to confine it to the time during which the uses of the settlement existed. By the decree, which was drawn up by the Lord Chancellor himself, it appears that he did not intend to decide the point.

In *Trower v. Knightley* an estate was devised to trustees in fee, in trust, as to a moiety for each of two daughters of the testator and their issue at twenty-one, with

(f) 10 Ves. jun. 292.

with a general power to the trustees to sell. One daughter died, and her children attained twenty-one, and were entitled to the fee of one moiety. The trustees sold the entirety; and the Vice-Chancellor held that the powers continued in the trustees until there were owners competent to deal with the whole estate, and consequently supported the sale (g).

In a recent case, the estate for life and reversion in fee, had, by the failure of the preceding limitations, united, and the settlor had devised the reversion in fee to uses in strict settlement. There was a power of sale in the original settlement which was exercisable by the consent of a jointress, who was still alive. It was contended, that the power still existed, and might be exercised so as to defeat the uses created by the will. The Master of the Rolls, without determining whether the power was legally extinct, held that it could never be intended to refer to a perfectly new set of limitations in a new settlement, at a long subsequent period, under a disposition of the estate made by the will of *the owner of the fee* (h).

In the case of *Dobbins v. Bowman* before referred to, the uses of a recovery were declared to the use of Henry Reynal in fee, *and* to such uses as he by his will, or any instrument in writing by him duly executed, should limit and appoint. He exercised this power by his will, and it was insisted that the will was void, as a use could not be limited on a use; but although Lord Hardwicke admitted this rule, yet he thought the word *and* must be understood disjunctively for the word *or*; but at any rate he thought the estate passed by the will.

(g) 6 Madd. 134.

(h) *Wheate v. Hall*, 17 Ves. jun. 80.

will. This case then is another authority in favour of the existence of a general power given to the tenant in fee. This point was taken for granted both at the bar and upon the bench. So Lord Chief Justice Trevor, in delivering the judgment of the court in the famous case of Abbot and Burton, treated it as clear, that a remainder limited to a married woman in fee, with a power to her during the coverture to dispose of it as she should think fit, was a valid limitation, and that the power subsisted, and might be legally exercised (*i*). And Lord Kenyon, I find, when at the bar, gave an opinion in favour of the limitation.

In *Goodhill v. Brigham*, before referred to, the devise was to a married woman in fee, with a power super-added for her to dispose of the estate as she should think proper, and as if she were sole. The Court of Common Pleas held this power to be void, as repugnant to the fee before vested in her. This decision, however, cannot be relied on. It has never been spoken of with satisfaction. If the opinions in *Dobbins v. Bowman*, and *Abbot and Burton*, were correct, it is clear that the court might have considered the devise as giving her a power of appointment with a remainder in fee. It was much more difficult to make this construction in those cases, as the question there arose upon a limitation in a *deed*. I have seen an opinion of the late Lord Rosslyn's, given in the year 1775, where the estate was limited by a fine and declaration of uses, to the use of *C. M.*, a married woman, in fee, "together with such powers as are hereinafter mentioned and reserved, (that is to say,) that it should be lawful for her to appoint any new or other
use

(*i*) 11 Mod. 181; and see Willes, 180.

use or uses, estate or estates," &c. in the usual way. The question was, whether the power was well created. He wrote the following opinion: "The intent of the deed is clearly to give Mrs *M.* an option to dispose of her estate, notwithstanding her coverture; and that construction of the words which will give effect to the clear intent of the deed, and not destroy it, is certainly the best construction. The fee limited to Mrs. *M.* is qualified in the very sentence itself by the powers after mentioned, inserted for no other purpose but to enable her to dispose of that fee, and which are to take effect out of the very estate given to her. *The deed would have been more properly drawn if the first use declared had been to such person or persons, and for such estates, as she by deed or will should appoint, and in default of appointment to her in fee*; but it is exactly the same thing in substance to limit the estate to her in fee, subject to her power of appointment; for whoever claims as heir to her, must, by the express terms of the deed, take subject to the power of appointment; and if it is well executed, as in this case it appears to be, the execution of the power defeats the title of the heir."

From this opinion it may be inferred that Lord Rosslyn would not have agreed with the decision in *Goodhill v. Brigham* had that case come before him; and it clearly shows that he thought an estate might be effectually limited to such uses as a person should appoint, and in default of appointment to the same person in fee. In a case before Lord Kenyon he treated it as wholly immaterial in what part of the deed powers are inserted, whether before or after the estates created (*k*).

(*k*) *Rex v. the Inhab. of Easington*, 4 Term Rep. 177.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CREATION OF POWERS.

SECTION I.

OF THE WORDS BY WHICH POWERS MAY BE CREATED.

TO the valid creation of powers it is essential that there should be first, sufficient words to denote the intention ; secondly, an apt instrument, and, thirdly, a proper object. Of each of these I propose to treat in its order : and then, lastly, to show the effect of the creation of a power.

First, then, no precise form of words is necessary. Powers, we have seen, are mere declarations of trust, and therefore any words, however informal, which clearly indicate an intention to give or reserve a power, are sufficient for the purpose (*a*). The same rule prevails as to common-law authorities created either by will (*b*) or deed. Neither is it material in what part of the instrument the power is inserted (*c*). So a recital or preamble in a deed may operate as a good reservation of a power (*d*); but a recital in a deed of an invalid prospective

(*a*) Anon. Mo. 608. *Snape v. ley*, 2 Ves. 175 ; *Warneford v. Turton*, 2 Ro. Abr. 262 (B) pl. 3 *Thompson*, 3 Ves. jun. 513.

Bishop of Oxon v. Leighton, (c) *Rex v. Inhab. of Easington*, 2 Vern. 377 ; and see *Fitzg.* 4 Term. Rep. 177.

222. (*d*) *Fitzgerald v. Fauconberge*,

(*b*) *Earl of Stafford v. Buck- Fitz.* 207.

power will not operate as a reservation of a new power although if the error had been discovered the donee could have created a new power (*e*). This can only be understood by an example: In *Hele v. Bond* a general power was given to appoint and revoke *toties quoties*; the donee in a deed of appointment executed under this power, recited the power fully, but neglected to reserve a new power of revocation, which he might have done; and it was determined that the recital of the old power did not operate as the reservation of a new one.

If an estate be settled with powers, and a new settlement be made of a part of it, with like powers, it must depend upon the intention, to be collected from the instrument, whether the powers are accumulative or not. The general construction would be against double powers in the same person for the like purpose (*f*).

It was at first doubted whether a power deriving its effect from the statute of uses was well limited, unless there were words in the assurance that the feoffee and his heirs should stand seised to the uses to be created by force of the power (*g*). In old precedents such a clause was usually inserted. This practice has been long discontinued, and it is clear, that at this day it is wholly unnecessary.

In old precedents of settlements it is not unusual to meet with powers by which the donees are authorized *to limit and appoint* the estates which they are enabled to create. In later times, the mind being carried to the *effect* of the *act* to be done, and not to the *mode* in which

(*e*) *Hele v. Bond*, *infra* Appendix, No. 4, MS.

(*f*) *Wigsell v. Smith*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 321.

(*g*) Poph. 81.

which it was to be exercised, it became usual to empower the donee to "lease, sell, exchange," &c. and not to limit or appoint by way of lease, sale, or exchange. In fact, both forms are accurate; the ancient mode describes the *operation* of the act, the modern practice points out the *effect* of it; and when it is considered that the power is equally well created, whether words denoting the operation, or words describing the effect, are used, and, that when the power is executed the interest created by it is an actual lease, or exchange, &c. we shall probably think that it is wholly immaterial which form is used. The point, however, has been the subject of much learned controversy (*h*).

It will here be proper to consider what is a *power*, and not an *interest*.

A devise to *A* for life, expressly, with remainder to such persons as he shall by deed or will appoint, will of course not give him the absolute interest, although he may acquire it by the exercise of his power (*i*).

It is said, that where an estate is given absolutely, without any prior limited interest, to such uses as a person shall appoint, it would be an estate in fee (*j*). But this doctrine refers only to a devise, for in a conveyance such a limitation would merely confer a power on the party, and not give him an estate in fee.

(*h*) See Butl. n. l. to Co. Litt. 1 Leo. 156; Anon. 3 Leo. 71, 271 b; Powell's n. to Fearn's pl. 108; Baldwin v. Pole, Ch. Ex. Dev. p. 379; and Preston's Trinity T. 8 Geo. III; and see Tracts, p. 84. 3 Ves. jun. 470; and see Hales

(*i*) See Barford v. Street, 16 Ves. jun. 135. Keith v. Seymour, 4 Russ. 263. v. Margerum, 3 Ves. jun. 299; Cook v. Duckenfield, 2 Atk. 565.

(*j*) Whiskon v. Cleyton,

Where there is an express estate for life given by will, with liberty to give the fee to particular persons, the devisee shall take for life, with a power to appoint the estate to the objects designated (*k*). But where an estate for life is not expressly given, but the estate is bequeathed generally to the devisee, to such uses as he shall appoint at his will and pleasure, nevertheless, restraining the disposition to particular objects, it seems doubtful whether the devisee will take a fee-simple conditional, or an estate in fee upon trust, or an estate for life, with a power to dispose of the inheritance. This is the case of *Daniel and Ubley*, where the devise was, to "Agnes my wife, to dispose at her will and pleasure, and to give to such of my sons she thinks best." According to Sir William Jones's report of this case (*l*), he, and Crew, Chief Justice, thought that the wife had an estate for life, with a power to appoint the reversion, and if not, that she had a fee-simple conditional; and if she conveyed contrary to the condition, the heir at law might enter for the condition broken (*m*): and Whitlock and Dodridge were of opinion that she had a fee-simple upon trust. In Noy's reports (*n*) it is stated generally, that the wife had a power; and in Latch's report (which is the best) (*o*), Whitlock and Jones are stated to have held, that the wife had an estate for life, with power to appoint the reversion; while Dodridge, who relied on the word *dispose*, was of opinion, that she had a fee-simple

(*k*) *Liefe v. Saltingstone*,
1 Mod. 189; 1 Freem. 149. 163.
176; *Cart. 232*; *Dighton v.*
Thomlinson, 1 Corryns, 194;
1 P. Wms. 149.
(*l*) 1 Jo. 137.

(*m*) See 49 E. 3. 16, pl. 10;
Anon. Dall. 58, pl. 5; *Doe v.*
Pearson, 6 East, 173.
(*n*) P. 80.
(*o*) P. 9. 39. 134.

simple conditional; and Crew, Chief Justice, agreed with him: but on a subsequent argument it seems that the Chief Justice came over to the opinion of Whitlock and Jones, and thought that the wife had only a power to appoint the reversion.

In a modern case (*p*) the devise was of the testator's "lands, tenements, and hereditaments, to his wife, to be divided and disposed of amongst his youngest children;" and it was determined by Sir Joseph Jekyll, that the word *disposed* related to the estate of the devisor, for that the lands could not be disposed of, but the estate, and consequently the wife had a fee.

The better opinion, however, certainly is, that the devise is for life, with a *power* to appoint the inheritance, unless the words of the will clearly negative such a construction, and the authorities appear to be greatly in favour of that opinion. The most objectionable construction is, that the devisee takes a fee-simple upon trust: for it must at this day be considered clear, that if the devisee be a married woman she cannot convey without a fine, because the law will not advert to the trust; and, in regard to its being an estate upon condition, we may observe, that what by the old law was deemed a devise *upon condition*, would now, perhaps, in almost every case, be construed a devise in fee upon trust (*q*), and by this construction, instead of the heir taking advantage of the condition broken, the *cestui que trust* can compel an observance of the trust by a suit in equity..

But suppose an estate to be given to *A* expressly for life, with remainder to such persons, &c. *generally* as he shall appoint, will the devisee in that case take a fee?

(*p*) Anon 2 Kel. C. C. 6.

(*q*) See 49 E. 3, 16, pl. 10.

In a case, in the third volume of Leonard (*r*), the lands were devised “to the wife for life, and after her decease she to give the same to whom she will.” It was determined that she took for life only, but with an authority to give the reversion to whom she pleased, for the express estate for life should not be enlarged by implication (*s*). In a case, about ten years afterwards, reported in Leonard’s first volume (*t*), the devise was to the testator’s wife Edyth, during her widowhood, remainder to *A* in tail, and if *A* died without issue in the life of the wife, that then the land should *remain to her* to dispose thereof at her pleasure. *A* did die in her lifetime without issue, and it was determined that the wife took a fee-simple. The court relied upon the words of the limitation of the remainder to the wife, *Quod integra remaneat dictæ Edythæ*.

In a modern case (*u*), the devise was to the testator’s *heir at law*, for her life, and after her death to her lawful issue; and if she should have no issue, then that she should have power to dispose thereof at her will and pleasure. She died without issue. The whole court was clearly of opinion that she had an estate in fee-simple by the will, as the contingent remainder to the issue never vested: that the testator by giving her power to dispose thereof at her will and pleasure, in case she had no issue, had given her a fee-simple: but supposing the words did not carry the fee-simple, yet, as she was heir at law, the fee descended to her upon the death of the testator,

(*r*) Anon. 3 Leo. 71, pl. 108;
4 Leo. 41, pl. 110.

(*t*) Jennor v. Hardie, 1 Leo.
283.

(*s*) See Lord Parker’s judgment in Thomlinson v. Dighton,
1 P. Wms. 171.

(*u*) Goodtitle v. Otway, 2 Wils. 6.

testator, and she having no issue it was never out of her ; and the Judges, therefore, held a will made by her during her coverture to be void. Against this opinion, the before-mentioned case in 3 Leon. was cited, but the court said that that case was not law, and that the case in 1 Leon. was determined after that in 3 Leon. In a very late case (*x*), where an estate for life only was given, with a power to dispose by *will* in a contingent event, the case of Goodtitle and Otway was not referred to, but the case in 3 Leon. was relied on as an *authority* ; and it was determined, that the devisee took for life only, with a power of disposition by will.

It remains for us to attempt to reconcile these cases ; and it is conceived that the case in 3 Leonard must still be deemed a binding authority. As a general rule, it must be admitted that the law does not incline to enlarge *express* estates by implication. But the case of Goodtitle and Otway, as well as the case in 1 Leonard, may well stand without subverting the authority of the case in 3 Leonard. The case in 1 Leonard seems to have been decided on the apparent intention of the testator, that in case of the death of *A* without issue, in the life of the wife, she should take the whole dominion. The estate for life was given merely on account of the remainder, and the words applied rather to an actual estate than to a power. In Goodtitle and Otway also, the estate for life was created only to introduce the remainder. Besides, if (which the court seemed to doubt)

(*x*) Reid v. Shergold, 10 Ves. land, 18 Ves. jun. 111, cited, jun. 370 ; and see Nannock v. Bradley v. Westcott, ib. 445. Horton, 7 Ves. jun. 391, acc. ; Fowler v. Hunter, 3 You. & Jerv. Randal v. Hearle, 1 Anstr. 124 ; 506. and Fisher v. the Bank of Eng-

the words did not carry the fee-simple, then it was no objection that the fee descended to the daughter, and was never out of her; for the fee descended, charged with the power, and under that construction she had a general power of appointment, with remainder to herself in fee; and as her will was void unless it operated as an execution of her power, it ought to have been deemed an exercise of it, according to the cases noticed in a subsequent part of this work. This case was certainly very distinguishable from that in 1 Leonard. The cases, however, may perhaps be thought to authorize the following conclusions:

1st, That where there is an express estate for life given, with a gift in default of appointment generally, as the devisee shall appoint, without any intervening estate to strangers, the devisee shall take for life only, with a power of disposition over the inheritance. The rule is more inflexible where a specific mode of exercising the power is pointed out. But,

2dly, Where the estate for life is given in order to let in estates to strangers, and no specific mode is required to the disposition of the inheritance, there, in the event of the mesne estate not taking effect, the devisee shall take the entire fee-simple. These, however, cannot be treated as general rules applicable to every case. Wherever a *power* is clearly intended to be given, the devisee cannot be holden to take a fee. Had the devise, for instance, in Goodtitle v. Otway, in failure of issue, been "that the wife should have power to dispose thereof at her will and pleasure, *notwithstanding her coverture*," she would have taken a *power* merely, and not the fee-simple.

In

In *Robinson v. Dugale* a direction by a testator, that 200 *l.* should be at the disposal of his wife, in and by her last will and testament, to whom she shall think fit to give the same, was holden to be an absolute gift to her (*y*). But this case has been questioned on the abstract point, and it has been determined that a bond for payment of a sum of money, as *A* shall by will appoint, does not secure the sum to *A*'s representatives in default of appointment (*z*). But a gift of a sum to the testator's wife, to be disposed of as she thinks proper, to be paid after her death, is not a power, but vests the whole interest in the legatee (*a*).

It has always been considered that a devise to trustees and their heirs, upon trust, in a given event to sell, or to do any other act which may require the inheritance, vests the legal fee in the trustees, and they cannot, upon the construction of any subsequent devise, be held to take merely a power, for that would defeat the express devise to them. This rule was not attended to in the late case of *Hawker v. Hawker* (*b*), nor does the attention of the court appear to have been called to it. That case, and *Doe v. Simpson* (*c*), render it very difficult for counsel to advise upon titles depending on the union of estates.

Here we may notice a case where the devise was to *A*, a single woman, for life, in case she should continue unmarried, *and after her decease* as she should appoint
by

(*y*) *Robinson v. Dugale*, 2 Vern. 181.

(*z*) *Buckland v. Barton*, 2 H. Black. 136.

(*a*) *Hixon v. Oliver*, 13 Ves. jun. 108; see *Hales v. Margerum*, 3 Ves. jun. 299; *Croft v.*

Slee, 4 Ves. jun. 60, and 7 Ves. jun. 400; *Standen v. Standen*. 2 Ves. jun. 589; *Bradley v. Westcott*, 13 Ves. jun. 445.

(*b*) 3 Barn. and Ald. 537.

(*c*) 5 East, 162.

by deed or will, and in default of appointment over. But in case *A* married with the consent of persons named in the will, her life-estate was to continue. The court held that the life-estate only was subject to the condition (*d*).

We are now to consider in what cases executors take a fee-simple upon trust to sell, under a will, or are invested merely with a power of disposition. As far back as the reign of Henry the Sixth, it was laid down in a case in the year-books, that if one devise that his executors shall sell his lands, and die seised, his heir is in by descent, and, consequently, the executors have only a power; but that if one devise his land to his executors, there the freehold passes to them by the devise (*e*). The same distinction is again taken in the same book. It is said, that if I devise that certain lands shall be sold by my executors, although my heir is in by descent, and his heir after him, yet the executors may enter upon the heir by descent, by reason of the will (*f*). This distinction, namely, between a devise of lands to *executors to sell*, and a devise that *executors shall sell the land*, is mentioned by Justice Doderidge as a common difference (*g*). So Littleton (*h*) puts the case of a man devising that his executors may sell his estate, which he treats as a mere power passing no interest; and therewith Sir Edward Coke in his comment agrees. But he says, that if a man deviseth lands to his executors to be sold, there the estate passes. In a subsequent folio (*i*) he takes

(*d*) *Aislaby v. Rice*, 3 Madd.
256; and 2 Moore, 358.

(*e*) 9 H. 6. 24 b. 25 a.

(*f*) *Ibid.* 13 b.

(*g*) *Latch.* 43.

(*h*) *S.* 169.

(*i*) 181 b.

takes precisely the same distinction, viz. between a devise that *executors shall sell the land*, and a devise of *the land to his executors to be sold*; and in the case of Houell and Barnes, where the testator *ordered the land to be sold by his executors*, Jones, Berkeley, and Croke resolved, that the executors had not any interest by this devise, but only an authority (*k*). So in the modern case of *Yates v. Compton* (*l*), a devise that the executors should sell the land was treated as giving them a power only. And in the still later case of *Lancaster v. Thornton* (*m*), it was in like manner held that a *power* only passed under a “*devise*, that in case of a deficiency of another estate the testator’s two sons and his daughter shall and may absolutely sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, his freehold estate for the payment of such of his debts, legacies, and funeral expenses as the leasehold estate should not be sufficient to pay his discharge.” Against the weight of *authority* there is merely an *obiter dictum* of Sir Matthew Hale’s when Chief Baron, that it had been held, that if a man devises that his lands shall be sold by his executors for payment of his debts, that will give the executors an interest as well as if he had devised his lands to his executors to be sold (*n*). But he did not refer to the case in which this point was decided. The case, however, was not only in opposition to former opinions, but has been completely over-ruled by the later cases of Houell and Barnes, and Yates and Compton.

Thus far the distinction is intelligible and reasonable. A devise of the land to executors to sell, passes the
interest

(*k*) Cro. Car. 382.

(*l*) 3 P. Wms. 308.

(*m*) 2 Burr. 1027.

(*n*) *Barrington v. The Attorney General*, Hard. 419.

interest in it, but a devise that executors shall sell the land, or that lands shall be sold by the executors, gives them but a power.

Littleton, in his 383 section, gives an exact copy of a case from the book of the assizes (*o*); where it is stated, that the ancestor of the plaintiff devised his lands to be sold by the defendant who was his executor, and, as he had not sold, it was held that the heir should recover by reason of the breach of the condition. Upon this case Coke observes, that it appeareth that when a man deviseth his tenements to be sold by his executors, it is all one as if he had devised his tenements to his executors to be sold, and the reason is, *because he deviseth the tenements*, whereby he breaks the descent.

Mr. Hargrave, addressing himself to the case of a devise, that *executors shall sell the lands*, observes (*p*), that as to the power's not surviving for want of an interest, Lord Coke concedes, that if one *devises lands to be sold by his executors* an interest will pass. Now such a devise so resembles devising that executors shall sell the land, as to give the distinction made between them the appearance of too curious and overstrained a refinement, such as rather consists in the formal arrangement of words than of any thing substantial; and he refers to the above-mentioned case cited by Lord Hale, as a judgment against this distinction. But he admits that the cases of Houell and Barnes, and Yates and Compton, are the other way. This learned writer, however, is for construing a devise that executors shall sell the land, as well as a devise of lands to be sold by executors, as investing them with the fee-simple, and not merely a power.

But

(*o*) 38 E. 3, pl. 3.

(*p*) Note (2) Co. Litt. 113 a.

But from the cases which have been stated, it should seem that a devise, that *the executors shall sell the land*, or, that *land shall be sold by the executors*, will give them simply an authority. The only question then is, whether a devise *of the land to be sold by his executors* will operate as a devise of the estate to the executors. But according to the observation on the other side of the question, a distinction of this nature would be too curious and refined; and, therefore, assuming the first point to be clear, it would seem to follow, that these words would confer a power only on the executors; and this appears also upon the authorities. In the case cited by Littleton it was taken for granted that the estate passed to the executors; and the reporter appears to have thought it necessary to state only the *effect*, and not the *words* of the devise; and Coke cites no other authority for his opinion. Lord Nottingham, in his note to this passage in Littleton (*q*), states the statute of 21 Hen. VIII. which applied only to cases where *lands are willed to be sold by executors*, and it was considered, in strictness, as embracing powers only; and he cites the 49 Ed. III. 17. "The case was: A woman, seised of lands in London, *devised them to be sold by her executors*, and died without heir; that devise prevented the escheat which the king pretended to have, and the executors could enter and sell; therefore more than a bare authority passed. Yet in 1651, on evidence at the bar, between Wilkinson and White, this case was started, and Lord Chief Justice Roll doubted of this opinion, because, he said, it was only a descent according to the words of Littleton; and that it appeared to him, that
where

where lands are devised to be sold by executors, there no interest passes, as in the last clause here."

In the case cited by Lord Nottingham from the year-books, it appears, that no judgment was given; and indeed it is quite clear, that at this day the devise in that case would be held to give a power only. The devise was (after an estate-tail) of the lands to be sold by the executors, or the executors of the executors, if all the executors should die, and four parishioners of the parish in which the land lay.

In the case of *North v. Crompton* (r) the testatrix appointed Henry North executor of her will: "and I do give all my estate, real and personal [to dispose of for the payment of all my just debts, and for the performing of all such legacies as I have herein, or by the codicil annexed, bequeathed], unto my executor above named;" and then she gave legacies to several persons. This was held to be a devise to the executor in fee. In the late case of *Lord Cholmondley v. Lord Clinton*, before the late Vice-Chancellor (I), in which this point arose, it was insisted that *North and Crompton* was a clear authority in favour of Coke's doctrine. No question upon a power however arose in that case. The words between crotchets were of course to be read in a parenthesis. The devise was expressly to the executor, and so it is stated in 2 Vern. 253, and the only question was, whether the fee passed although there were no express words of inheritance.

The reliance which is placed upon the *devise* of the
land

(r) 1 Cha. Ca. 196.

(I) A case was ordered to be sent to the Court of King's Bench for their opinion; but none has yet been sent.

land in these cases is not well founded. As Lord Mansfield observed, the expression, *I devise*, is here synonymous to saying *I will*, or *my mind is* (s).

Upon the whole, therefore, the analogy of this case to that of a devise that the executors shall sell the land, or that the land shall be sold by the executors, as well as the authorities, seem to warrant the conclusion, that even a devise *of land to be sold by his executors*, without words giving the estate to them, will invest them with a power only, and not give them an interest.

Technical words are so essential to the creation of estates by *deed*, and their import is so generally understood, that a question rarely arises upon a *deed*, whether a party take an actual estate, or only a power. In the case of *Keene v. Deardon* (t), it appeared, that estates were conveyed to the use of trustees, and their heirs, in trust, with the consent of the parties interested, to sell the inheritance in fee, and apply the money upon trusts ; but it was provided, that until the inheritance should be sold, the rents should be received by the persons who would have been entitled thereto if the deed had not been executed. It was determined that the trustees took the legal fee, but the counsel entered into an argument of some length, to show that they took a *power* only—a doctrine utterly subversive of all received notions on this branch of the law of real property. The proviso as to the receipt of the rents and profits is similar to that inserted in mortgages, that the mortgagor shall receive the rents until default is made in payment of the mortgage-

(s) 2 Burr. 1031.

(t) 8 East, 248.

mortgage-money; which clearly, at most, makes him but tenant at will. The proviso, in truth, operates as a declaration of trust, and every *cestui que trust* in possession is as tenant at will to his trustee. But even if such a proviso were, in defiance of all principle, admitted to have any *legal* operation, yet upon what ground could it be argued that this proviso would convert the prior legal estate of inheritance, created with proper technical words, into a mere power. It were surely more consistent to say, that the persons named in the proviso would have a *power* of entry till sale, or default in payment, &c. However, it is quite clear that provisos like these have no other than an equitable operation.

In a case in Ireland (*u*) a recovery, in which *A* and *B* were the recoverors, was declared to enure, to the intent to let in several debts as charges on the estate. And upon trust that *A* and *B*, and the survivor of them, and his heirs, should forthwith, or as soon as conveniently might be, with the consent of the tenant in tail, and after his decease, of their own free will, by sale or mortgage of the estates, or a competent part thereof, raise sufficient money to pay the debts and interest, and expenses; with a declaration that the trustees receipts should be discharges, and after payment of the debts, &c. “upon trust, to hand over the residue of the money arising from such sales or mortgages, if any, to the tenant in tail, his executors and administrators, and subject to the aforesaid power of altering or mortgaging, so granted to the said *A* and *B*, the said estates, or such of them as shall remain unsold, to enure to the use of the tenant in tail, his heirs and assigns for ever.” It was contended,
upon

(*u*) *Eyre v. Fitton*, Excheq. 1815. MS.

upon a trial in ejectment, that the use resulted to the tenant in tail, and that the trustees took a power only. Mr. Baron George reserved the point, and the Court of Exchequer, after argument, determined that the legal estate was conveyed to the trustees, and remained still in them, to enable them to execute the trust.

By our law, if an estate is given to a man he must take it with all its incidents. Therefore, although a provision may be made to cease on the bankruptcy, or insolvency, for example, of the party for whom it is made, yet if it is given to him for life it will be subject to his debts; and he may alien the property notwithstanding any declaration to the contrary in the instrument by which the estate was created (*x*).

But it is usual to create an unalienable personal trust in favour of married women, the object being to provide them with a separate maintenance which neither they nor their husbands can alien.

Lord Eldon has observed that in regard to property given to the separate use of married women, the directions originally were, that the money was to be paid into their proper hands, and their receipts alone to be a discharge; it was held, that a married woman might dispose of property so given to her, and that her assignee might take it, as this court would compel her to give her own receipt in affirmance of her own contract. In Miss Watson's case the words "*and not by anticipation*" were introduced by Lord Thurlow: his reasoning was this; I do not hereby take away any of the incidents of property at law; this interest which a married woman is
suffered

(*x*) *Brandon v. Robinson*, 1 Rose, 197.

suffered to take is a creature of equity, and equity may modify the power of alienation (*y*).

Upon the first introduction of the words *by anticipation*, it was however the general opinion of the Profession that they were simply void, and that the woman's power of alienation still existed. Equity, in upholding settlements on a married woman for her separate use, considered her for this purpose as a feme sole, and viewed in that light she must, like a person *sui juris*, take the property with all its incidents. There is, perhaps, no sound principle upon which a restraint upon alienation can in any case be supported, where the interest is not given over or made to cease upon alienation; and at all events it may be thought, that giving full effect to Lord Thurlow's doctrine, the power of alienation cannot be suspended beyond the coverture of the object of the provision, and this very point has lately been so decided (*z*).

Where a married woman has property settled to her separate use, without any restraint on alienation, she is in equity deemed a feme sole, and may dispose of it accordingly (*a*) (I); but it is said not to be liable to answer general demands on her (*b*), although this has
never

(*y*) 1 Rose, 200.

(*z*) Burton v. Briscoe, Jac. 603.

(*a*) Bell v. Hyde, Prec. Cha. 328; Norton v. Turvill, 2 P. Wms. 144; Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. 517; Davison v. Gardner, Treat. Purch. p. 509; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16.

(*b*) Stuart v. Lady Kirkwall,

3 Madd. 94. Aguilar v. Lou-sada, V. C. July 1820, MS. In Clinton v. Willes, Rolls, 1820, the Master of the Rolls appeared to be of opinion that it could make no difference, whether the debt was secured by writing, as a promissory note, or not. MS.

(I) As to what will amount to an execution of a power by a feme covert, see post. ch. 5, s. 5.

never been decided, and is a point that deserves great consideration.

It may not, perhaps, be wholly irrelevant to our subject to touch slightly on the distinctions between what is an unalienable personal trust, and what is a power of disposition.

And first, a gift simply to the separate use of a feme covert is tantamount to a gift to such uses as she shall appoint by deed or will (*c*), although Lord Rosslyn in one case (*d*) considered, than an absolute power *to appoint* was essential where the trust was to pay from time to time. This, however, proceeded from the particular circumstances of the case, and his disinclination to support alienations by married women of their separate property; his decisions, latterly, on this point, were in direct opposition to the doctrine laid down by Lord Hardwicke and Lord Thurlow, and have been since frequently shaken by Lord Eldon (*e*). And in a late

(*c*) *Peacock v. Monck*, 2 Ves. 190; *Fettiplace v. Gorges*, 3 Bro. C. C. 8. 1 Ves. Jun. 46. *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. Jun. 319; *Wagstaff v. Smith*, *ib.* 520; *Burnaby v. Griffin* (*), 3 Ves. Jun. 266; and see 8 Ves. Jun. 176; 11 Ves. Jun. 222. (*d*) *Mores v. Huish*, 5 Ves. Jun. 692. See *Newmon v. Whistler*, 4 Ves. Jun. 129. (*e*) *Sperling v. Rochfort*, 8 Ves. Jun. 164; *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. Jun. 209.

(*) The question in this case arose upon the validity of an equitable recovery, where the tenant to the precipe was made by a married woman. Lord Rosslyn held it good, and expressed his marked disapprobation of the objections taken to the title. His decision, however, in *Mores v. Huish*, although universally considered by the Profession as an unsound judgment, has not been since *expressly* over-ruled; and therefore no title is at present considered as marketable upon which this objection occurs; but see now (1820) *Essex v. Atkins*, 14 Ves. Jun. 542.

case (*f*) Sir William Grant made a decision directly contrary to that in the case before Lord Rosslyn.

The mere circumstance of the interest being directed to be paid from time to time will not prevent the wife from making a sweeping appointment at once (*g*). Where it is intended that the wife shall not dispose of the interest, it is now usual to insert an express clause that she shall not sell, mortgage, charge or otherwise dispose of the same in the way of anticipation.

But although these words, or words of the like nature, are omitted, yet if the instrument point to a personal enjoyment, the fund cannot be alienated ; as, where in a deed of *separation* a trust was created to permit a person to receive the dividends of stock, for the maintenance and support of the wife, it was determined that she had no dominion over it, but that it was subject to the special trust for her maintenance and support, although the trustee covenanted to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts (*h*). So in *Hovey v. Blakeman* (*i*), where the trust was to pay the rents and interest, in equal divisions, into the respective proper hands of the testator's two sisters, as long as they should live, and the same to be to their separate use, the Master of the Rolls thought that

(*f*) *Essex v. Atkins*, 14 Ves. Jun. 542.

(*g*) *Clarke v. Pieter*, 3 Bro. C. C. 346, n. ; *Ellis v. Atkinson*, 3 Bro. C. C. 565 ; 2 Dick. 759 ; *Pybus v. Smith*, 3 Bro. C. C. 340 ; 1 Ves. Jun. 189 ; *Witts v. Dawkins*, 12 Ves. Jun. 501 ; and see *Sperling v. Rochfort*, 8 Ves. Jun. 164 ; *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. Jun. 209. Note, *Socket*

v. Wray, 4 Bro. C. C. 483, depended on Lord Alvanley's opinion, that the power in that case could only be exercised *by will* ; see *Sperling v. Rochfort*, *ubi sup.* *Anderson v. Dawson*, 15 Ves. Jun. 532.

(*h*) *Hyde v. Price*, 3 Ves. Jun. 437.

(*i*) 9 Ves. Jun. 524, cited.

that an absolute property was not intended to be given to them, so as to give a power of disposition: that it was a personal bequest to them, to be paid into their proper hands, and without a power of disposition; and he dismissed the petition of an annuitant, under a grant from one of them, leaving him to file a bill, but intimating an opinion against it. But, as we have seen, a simple gift to the separate use of a feme covert gives her the absolute disposition of it. And in the late case (*k*) of *Wagstaff v. Smith*, where the trust was to permit the wife to take or receive the dividends to her own use, during her life, independently of her husband, the late Master of the Rolls held, that as to this property she was to be deemed a feme sole. There were, he observed, no words of control, no words of restriction. The trustees were not even to pay from time to time into her hands upon her receipt, but she was to receive. Here were the very words to give the absolute property. If land had been given to trustees in these terms it would have been an use executed, and the party would have the legal estate (*l*).

Again in a later case (*m*) where the trust in a will was "to permit and suffer his niece to receive and take the interest, dividends, and proceeds, of the capital sum of 2,100 *l.* or so much thereof as should from time to time be vested in his said trustees for the purposes of his said will, during her natural life, for her own sole and separate use and benefit, notwithstanding any husband she might

(*k*) 9 Ves. Jun. 520.

(*m*) *Brown v. Like*, MS. S. C.

(*l*) And see *Jones v. Harris*, 14 Ves. Jun. 302.

9 Ves. Jun. 486; *Parkes v. White*,

11 Ves. Jun. 209.

might happen to marry, and should pay the same into her own proper hands, for her own separate use and benefit ; and that her receipt and receipts alone should from time to time be a good and sufficient discharge and discharges for the same ; and that the same, or any part thereof, should not be subject or liable to the debts or engagements, power or control of any such husband ;” the question was, whether the niece could make a sweeping appointment. The able counsel for the defendant gave up the point without argument ; and it was accordingly decreed that an absolute sale by her was valid.

The distinctions taken in the cases on this head appear extremely refined and subtle, and it is almost impossible for a practitioner to advise, confidently, on any case where the very words have not received a judicial determination. It is probable, however, that had the case of *Hovey and Blakeman* come on again, it would have been decided that the wife had a power of disposition. There is no inconvenience in this doctrine, because express words of restriction are now universally used where it is intended that the wife shall not have the absolute dominion. Where these words are omitted, it were perhaps better to hold that the wife may alien the property (*n*). In a late case, the Vice-Chancellor considered *Brown v. Like* not to be an authority, as the point was not argued ; and his Honor was of opinion, that in a similar case the wife had not a sweeping power of appointment ; but no judgment has been delivered in the case ; and the Lord Chancellor has expressed a clear opinion

(*n*) See Lord Alvanley's judgment in *Hesse v. Stevenson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 565.

opinion in favour of the wife's right in such cases to appoint the whole fund. That opinion entirely accords with the general opinion of the Profession : a contrary rule would now create great confusion in titles.

Since the above observations were written the case of *Acton v. White* (o) has been decided, and it may now be considered that express words of restriction are necessary to prevent the right of alienation. In that case the trust was for the separate use of the testator's wife for life in the usual way. And it was declared that the rents and interest should be paid, as the same should become due, into her hands, and not otherwise ; and that her receipt alone for what should be actually paid into her own proper hands should be a good discharge for the same ; and the Vice-Chancellor said, that it was too late to contend that a lady is restrained from the power of alienating her life interest, because it is given to her sole and separate use, and is to be paid into her own proper hands, and upon her receipt alone. The contrary is settled by repeated authorities. The construction given to the expressions in question is, that they are intended only to exclude the marital claims of any present or after-taken husband, and not to control that right of disposition which is incident to property.

In some cases, where a married woman, having an absolute power of appointment over a fund, has executed it, a bill has been filed, in order that the wife might consent in court to her disposition ; and this practice occasioned a doubt whether it was not necessary that the wife's consent in court should be taken (p).

(o) 1 Sim. & Stu. 429.

(p) See 8 Ves. Jun. 181, 182.

But, unquestionably, the appointment is valid without any consent; appointments are daily made to purchasers, unattended by any other solemnities than those required by the power (*q*), and it has frequently been decided lately, upon petitions, that the wife need not appear and consent.

It remains to observe, that no particular solemnities are by law required to the execution of powers. It rests in the breast of the person creating a power to impose such ceremonies as he thinks proper. A power *may* be reserved to be executed by a simple note in writing (*r*), or by *will* unattested, or attested by only one or two witnesses, and this although the subject over which it rides is *real* estate. This point has been considered as decided by Lord Chancellor Jefferys, in the case of Day and Thwaites, which was afterwards approved of by Mr. Baron Powel (*s*). Lord Hardwicke appears clearly to have entertained the same opinion (*t*). In *Goodhill v. Brigham* (*u*), however, Mr. Justice Buller seems to have taken it for granted, that such a power could not be reserved; but this was a mere *obiter dictum*. Lord Hardwicke's opinion is full and clear, that the statute of frauds is entirely out of the question, except so far as it is the rule which the donee is directed to follow in the execution of the power. The will, he said, operates by appointment, though the party may arbitrarily insert the rules prescribed by the statute (*x*).

A distinction

(*q*) *Sturgis v. Corp*, 13 Ves. Jun. 190.

(*r*) *Vide infra*, ch. 5, sect. 2.

(*s*) Sec 3 Cha. Ca. 69.

(*t*) *Wilkes v. Holmes*, 9 Mod. 485.

(*u*) 1 Bos. and Pull. 198.

(*x*) Sec 9 Mod. 485, 486.

A distinction has, indeed, been taken by a late writer, between a will *nominatim*, and a *writing purporting to be a will*. Without referring to any authority, the first is treated as doubtful; but in the last case it is said to be well established, that it may be reserved to be executed without the formalities imposed by the statute of frauds (*y*). It is apprehended that no authority can be adduced in support of this distinction. To show that it is unfounded, it may be sufficient to observe, that Lord Macclesfield decided, on very solid grounds, that the words "any writing in the nature of a will," mean the same as a will (*z*). It seems clear, however, that in both cases the reservation is valid.

But of course a man cannot reserve such a power to *himself* by his own will (*a*), for that would be simply an evasion of the statute of frauds.

(*y*) Rob. on Stat. of Frauds,
332.

(*a*) *Habergham v. Vincent*,
2 Ves. Jun. 204.

(*z*) *Longford v. Eyre*, 1 P.
Wms. 740.

SECTION II.

OF THE INSTRUMENTS BY WHICH POWERS MAY
BE CREATED.

A POWER of appointment or revocation may be reserved either in the body of the deed, or by indorsement, before the execution of it (*a*), or by a deed of even date with the settlement; and there need not be any counterpart of the deed (*b*). And although the power be interlined, yet it will be good, in the absence of evidence, to show that the interlineation was made after the execution.

We are never to lose sight of the *origin* of powers. And here we must recur to the distinction taken in a previous page, between conveyances operating by transmutation of possession, and conveyances which have not that operation.

For as to the latter, one of those assurances, namely, a bargain and sale, can only be sustained by a *valuable* consideration. A power in such a conveyance to lease to any man, although for a valuable consideration to be paid or rendered, is too general, and therefore void. Equity, before the statute of uses would not sanction so indefinite an executory agreement; and therefore the statute could never attach on the estates attempted to be created under such a contract. To the validity of the other of those assurances, viz. a covenant to stand seised, a *good* consideration is essential, and a proviso to lease to any one, is for the same reason also void;
nor

(*a*) Griffin v. Stanhope, Cro.
Jac. 456. See Outon v. Weekes,
2 Keb. 809.

(*b*) Fitz v. Smallbrook, 1 Keb.
134; and see 3 Cha. Ca. 83.
119.

nor is it any argument in favour of a lease under such a power that it is granted to some person within the consideration, of blood (c); because by reason of its generality, the power was void at the time the deed was executed.

But it seems clear, that a power may be reserved in a bargain and sale to grant a lease to a person from or on behalf of whom a valuable consideration moved at the execution of the deed (d). So a power may be reserved in a covenant to stand seised to grant a lease to a person named in the deed, and within the consideration of blood or marriage, although such a lease cannot be granted where a *general* power is reserved to lease to any man (e).

Mr. Cruise has observed in his valuable Digest, that the usual powers of leasing given in modern settlements may be valid though inserted in a bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, as it is always required that the best and most improved rent should be reserved, and a lessee is a purchaser for a valuable consideration (f). Now it is certainly clear, that a reservation of rent, even a pepper-corn, is a sufficient consideration

(c) Mildmay's case, 1 Rep. 175. Mo. 144, S. C. cited Goulda. 173, pl. 106, nom. Sharrington's case; and see Mo. 373; Cross v. Faustenditch, Cro. Jac. 180. S. C. 2 Ro. Abr. 260. (A) pl. 1; Dorothy Chute's case, 1 Lev. 30. S. C. 1 Keb. 34, nom. Lady Dacre v. Hazel; Prince v. Green, cited 1 Cha. Ca. 161, 3 Cha. Ca. 91; Baynes v. Belson, Raym. 247; Pine v. Pine, 2 Keb. 809;

and see Cary, p. 22; Goodtitle v. Pettoe, Fitzg. 299.

(d) See and consider Parsons v. Mills, 2 Ro. Abr. 786 (M), Mo. 547.

(e) Mildmay's case, 1 Rep. 175; Goodtitle v. Pettoe, Fitzg. 299; 2 Barn. 10. 90. 142; 2 Str. 934. See a *dictum* by Lord Chief Justice Raymond, *infra*.

(f) 4 Cruise's Dig. 322.

tion to support a bargain and sale. But this does not altogether remove the difficulty. In a covenant to stand seised, it might be a question whether a lease for any other consideration than that of blood or marriage would be valid. And upon both assurances the question still remains, whether the generality of the power does not render it void, and whether the consideration ought not to move from the lessee, or become a debt due from him at the time of the execution of the deed creating the power, or at least, whether the consideration ought not to be ascertained and fixed in the deed, although it should not be made obligatory on him to accept a lease. The affirmative would seem to follow from the decided cases; and Lord Chief Baron Gilbert has observed, “that no use can arise in this case; for where *the persons are altogether uncertain, and the terms unknown*, there can be no *consideration*, and for which reason the former estates raised upon good consideration cannot by such lessees be defeated” (*g*). If such leases were to be supported, it might on the same ground be argued, that contingent uses to persons not *in esse* could be raised on a bargain and sale, provided they paid a consideration when born. Besides, powers could not, under any construction, be reserved on a bargain and sale to any but the bargainor, as the consideration must be paid to *him*, in order to raise the use.

It is clear, however, that a general power of *revocation* may be reserved either on a bargain and sale, or a covenant to stand seised (*h*), and in *Goodtitle v. Pettoe* (*i*), Lord Chief Justice Raymond expressed an
opinion

(*g*) Gilb. Uses. 46.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 237 a; Shep. Touch. 524, 525.

(*i*) Fitzg. 299.

opinion, that a power might be given in a covenant to stand seised, to appoint the use in favour of *any* of the covenantor's relations, *in consideration to continue the estate in the family of the covenantor*; and that it might be averred after the appointment, that he to whom the use was appointed was of the blood of the covenantor. As a general power of appointment is tantamount only to an estate in fee, it might perhaps originally have been holden with perfect consistency, that upon a bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, such a power might be given to any one to whom a fee might be limited. But in *Goodtitle v. Pettoe*, it was solemnly decided, that such a general power in a covenant to stand seised was void in its creation, although an estate in fee might have been given by the deed creating it to the donee of the power (*k*); and that an appointment could not be made even to one of the *covenantor's* blood, according to the rule in *Mildmay's* case (*l*). And in the prior case of *Warwick v. Garrard* (*m*), it was determined, first at law and afterwards in equity, that such a power reserved even to the covenantor himself was void (*I*).

Thus much for conveyances *not* operating by transmutation of possession. *Powers* may of course be limited in every conveyance which operates by transmutation

(*k*) *Goodtitle v. Pettoe*, Fitzg. 299; 2 Barn. 10, 90, 142; 2 Str. 934.
 (*l*) *Vide supra*.
 (*m*) 2 Vern. 7.

(*I*) The reporter ends this case with a *quære tamen*. The grounds of the decision do not appear upon the registrar's book; but the mere point must have been tried at law, as the necessary directions were given by the decree for that purpose. Reg. Lib. 1685, B. fol. 840, *Warwick v. Garrard*.

mutation of possession. The estates created by force of them arise out of the seisin of the releasees, feoffees, conusees, or recoverors. Now we have seen that before the statute of uses the legal estate remained vested in the releasees, &c. who were bound in equity to execute the estates created, although they were not supported by a valid consideration. By this rule, therefore, a person taken under the execution of a power, raised by a conveyance operating by transmutation of possession, acquires an equitable estate, or a use; and by force of the statute the legal estate itself is instantaneously transferred to him, without reference to any consideration.

We have seen that a power of revocation could not be reserved on a lease at common law. It has been said, that if a feoffment, or lease and release, be made to *J. S.* and his heirs, *to the use of J. S.* and his heirs, with a power of revocation reserved thereupon, such a power is void; because *J. S.* is in by the common law. And upon the same ground, the same writer doubts whether, upon a conveyance to a purchaser and his heirs to such uses as he shall appoint, and in default of and subject to such appointment, *to the use of the purchaser and his heirs*, such a power can be exercised, for, subject to the power, the purchaser is in by the *common law*, and the reservation of the power *before* the limitation to the purchaser cannot make any difference (*n*). The authority for this point is an observation by Sir Edward Coke, in the few remarks which he has made on uses that in case of a feoffment, or other conveyance, whereby

(*n*) 1 Sanders on Uses, p. 157, and note ib.

whereby the feoffee or grantee, &c. is in by the common law, such a proviso were merely repugnant and void (*o*). And a passage in Shepherd's Touchstone (*p*), where the author, referring to Co. Litt. says, "But in case of a feoffment, or other conveyance, whereby the feoffee or grantee is in by the common law, as where *A* doth enfeoff *B* and his heirs *to the use of B* and his heirs, *it is said* such a proviso is merely repugnant and void." It should seem, however, that Coke had not any such case in contemplation. He appears to have alluded to a feoffment at common law, to the feoffee at once, *and not by way of use*.

To consider this point accurately, we should inquire, 1st, Whether the releasee *is* in by the common law; and, 2dly, Whether, independently of that objection, the power is merged in the fee. The last objection has been fully discussed in the preceding chapter; and as to the first, although the statute requires that *one* person should be seised to the use of *another*, yet there are several cases in which it vests the use in the very person in whom the seisin is vested: *intention*, in this respect, appears always to have been attended to. Thus, nine years after the statute of uses, it was holden, that if a man make a feoffment in fee to the use of himself for life, and that "after his decease *J. N.* shall take the profits," that shall create an use in *J. N.*; otherwise, if it had been said, that "after his death the feoffees should *receive* the profits, and *pay* them over to *J. N.*" because *J. N.* would not receive them but through the hands of the feoffees (*q*). So
in

(*o*) Co. Litt. 237, a.

(*p*) P. 525.

(*q*) 36 H. 8; Bro. Feoffments

al Uses, 340, pl. 52; and see

Symson v. Turner, 1 Eq. Ca.

Abr. 383 n.

in a case in *Moore*, in 5 Elizabeth, it was laid down as clear, that if a feoffment was made to *J. S.* to the use of him, and that he should be seised to the use of *R. H.* that was void as to *R. H.*, because that the use and possession was before in *J. S.* (*r*). And in *Sammes's* case this construction was adopted, and the reason of it was stated to be, that the statute of uses had been always beneficially expounded to satisfy the intention of the parties (*s*). It seems also very lately to have been thought, that even where the estate is not limited unto and to the use of the releasees, yet if none of the limitations of the settlement could possibly take effect without giving the legal estate to the trustees, the settlement must be so construed; and this, it is said, was done in a case in the House of Lords (*t*). From these observations, it seems to follow, that in the case under consideration, in order to preserve the power, and to effectuate the intention of the parties, the releasee would be deemed to be in under the statute of uses.

Since these observations were published, Mr. Sanders has entered into a further examination of the authorities in support of his opinion (*u*). It may be conceded to him, that upon a conveyance to *A* and his heirs, to the use of him and his heirs, *A* would take in the course of possession by the common law, but that admission does not affect the question; for in the case put, "the conusee," as Pratt, C. J. observed (*x*), "did not want the help of the statute, and therefore it meddles not with him,

(*r*) *Mo.* 45. pl. 138.

(*s*) 13 *Rep.* 56.

(*t*) See *Doe v. Martin*, 4 Term.
Rep. 39.

(*u*) *Uses*, vol. i. p. 149, 3d
edit.

(*x*) *Long v. Buckeridge*, 1 Str.
111.

him, but leaves him in at common law." No case has ever been decided in which, under a conveyance to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, *A* has been held to be in at the common law. It is true that in such a case *A* takes the legal estate, but that is in favour of the intention, and he must necessarily take it under the statute. The limitation *unto and to the use* has received a settled construction, which is not suffered to be disturbed by a subsequent limitation of the use from which a different intention might be inferred. But where a further use is declared, *A* must necessarily take under the statute in order to prevent the statute from executing the use limited over. Where no use is limited over to a third person, the estate vests at the common law, and the aid of the statute is not required. The limitation of the use therefore is not called into action. But in the other case, if the estate vest in *A* by the *common law*, as it is contended, it is clear that the statute would execute the use limited to *B*; for, independently of the statute, *A* cannot take a legal estate under a conveyance upon which the statute would not operate if uses were declared of it. It seems wholly unimportant that the *use* is declared to him if it be a use upon which the statute would not operate. It cannot be contended with success that such a use prevents the further limitation of a use, because previously to the statute a conveyance to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *A* and his heirs, would have prevented a resulting use; and yet this appears to be the only ground upon which the opinion against the operation of the statute can be maintained. For even before the statute a conveyance to *A* and his heirs, to the use of him and his heirs, to

the use of *B* and his heirs, would have unquestionably vested the beneficial interest in *B*. This must be denied by the other side, or the question is, it may be thought, at an end. If the statute do not operate on the use limited to *A*, it must by the very words of it execute the use limited to *B*. In the case therefore of a conveyance to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, *A* would have wanted the help of the statute in order to effect what is deemed the intention in these cases, and therefore "it would have meddled with him and not left him at common law." It is however insisted, on the other side, that in the above case, *A* takes the estate at the common law. And this, and the case stated by Coke, are said to be grounded upon the same established rule, "that a use cannot be limited to arise out of the estate of a *cestui que* use taking the legal estate at the common law; that a use cannot be limited on a use, although the first use being limited to the grantee, is not a use within the statute." To this it may be answered, that the law knows no such rules as those stated. If the party out of whose estate the use is to arise, do "take the legal estate at the common law," he is not a *cestui que* use; and if the first use "is not a use within the statute," then is it not a use at all; and therefore the use over must be executed by the statute. Where it is said that the fine or conveyance is a common-law conveyance, by which both the legal estate and the *use* pass to the conusee without any declaration of uses, it is meant that the whole beneficial interest passes, and the instrument amounts to a limitation of the estate, and *not* a limitation of the *use* properly so called. In truth, if the supposed use which *A* takes,

A takes, is not a use under the statute, it is simply void. But, as in the case of a conveyance unto and to the use of *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, the use to *B* is void, it follows of necessity that the use to *A* is executed by the statute.

It is further said, "that if the estate is conveyed to and to the use of *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, or to and to the use of *A* and his heirs, subject to a power of appointment reserved to *B*, and if in the case first mentioned the use to *B* cannot be executed in consequence of the seisin of *A* being clothed with the use limited to him, upon what principle can the appointee of *B* in the second take a legal estate? Upon what rational distinction can the appointee acquire a legal estate under the limitation effected by the exercise of the power, when, if the same limitation had been included in the deed itself, he would merely have taken an equitable interest?"

The distinction, it is apprehended, between the cases is simply this : in the first case, the use being vested in *A*, the use to *B* is a use upon a use, and therefore void ; in the last case, *A* takes a seisin, and a use, but the use is subject to the power, and is only during the existence of the power executed, *sub modo*, that is subject to open and let in the estate to be created under the power. When the power is executed, the use appointed takes effect as if properly limited in the deed creating the power ; therefore the use arises out of the original seisin of *A*, and defeats instead of deriving its essence from the use limited to *A*. But it is argued, that here the use would arise out of the seisin of *A* previously
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clothed with a use: "What difference," it is asked, "can be discovered between the limitation of a use under a power to arise from the estate of a *cestui que* use having the legal estate by the statute, and from the estate of *cestui que* use having the legal estate at the common law?" To this the answer still is, that the case cannot exist "of a *cestui que use* having the legal estate at the common law," unless it is understood of a person to whom the use is limited in words, but which never arises, because not requiring the aid of the statute he takes by the common law.

It remains to say a few words on the authority cited from Coke. It is said, that if there be any meaning at all in the observation, Coke could have contemplated no other case than that put in the Touchstone. "If a feoffment be made to *A* and his heirs, it is necessary, in order that he may obtain the legal estate at the common law, that there should be either a declaration of the use to him, or a consideration paid by him, to prevent a resulting use to the grantor; so that, although a grantee may still have a legal estate at the common law, the rule is grounded upon the practice and construction of uses: and it is to be presumed, that Sir Edward Coke, who, in the case stated, was explaining the operation of the statute of uses, understood the principles upon which a legal estate was created at the common law (*y*)."

It was not intended, in the observations on this point in the first edition of this work, to deny that Coke understood the principles upon which a legal estate was created at the common law, but merely to show that his observation did not apply to the case of a use
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under the statute. He speaks simply of a feoffment, or other conveyance whereby the feoffee or grantee is *in* by the common law. What has this to do with uses. Is not a lease for life such a conveyance? Is not a conveyance in fee for a consideration paid, such a conveyance? As there are conveyances in which the feoffee is *in* by the common law, why should it be supposed, in the absence of all evidence in support of such a supposition, that Coke alluded to a conveyance upon which the statute had some operation. A legal estate may be created at the common law wholly independent of the statute, and upon which it cannot have any operation directly or indirectly. Gilbert understood the passage in Coke to refer to cases purely at common law. It is still, therefore, with a sincere respect for the contrary opinion, submitted to the learned reader, that in the case under discussion the statute would be attracted, and consequently the power would be good.

Since these observations were published it has been decided that the power is in the disputed case well raised. The conveyance, in the case in which the point was decided, was by feoffment to the purchaser and his heirs, *habendum* to him, his heirs and assigns, to such uses as he should appoint by deed or will, and in default of and until appointment, to the use of the purchaser, his heirs and assigns. He exercised the power by an appointment in fee, and his wife brought an action to recover her dower. The objection was taken, that the husband was *in* at the common law, and the power was void; but the contrary was decided, and the wife

was held to be barred of dower. This decision, therefore, sets the point at rest (z).

The above observations also show that there is no weight in an objection that is sometimes made, viz. that where it is intended a purchaser shall only take a trust-estate, the release ought to be to *A*, to the use of *B*, in trust for *C*, the purchaser (*a*), on the ground that a limitation unto and to the use of *A*, in trust for *B*, the purchaser, would give *B* the legal estate, as *A* would be in at the common law, and the statute would operate on the trust limited to *B*. Every day's practice, however, evinces the opinion of the Profession on this point. In numberless conveyances, estates have been limited unto and to the use of the releasees; in order to vest the legal estate in them. This point, indeed, is so clear, that in *Doe v. Martin* (*b*), where it was insisted that the legal estate was vested in the releasees of a settlement, Lord Kenyon said, that in answer to that, it was sufficient to observe that it was limited to the trustees, without saying "to and to the use of the trustees." Indeed, it is apprehended that no one would in practice venture to contend that any limitation could be executed by the statute, after a limitation unto and to the use of the releasee in fee. Even if the objection were well founded, yet it would not be necessary to convey to *A*, to the use of *B*, in trust

(z) *Moreton v. Lees*, C.P. Lancaster, March Ass. 1819. Case reserved and argued before Lord Chief Baron Richards, and Mr. Baron Wood, at Serjeant's Inn.

See *Doe v. Passingham*, 6 Barn. & Cress. 5.

(a) *Watk. Prin. Conv.* 72. n.

(b) 4 *Term. Rep.* 39.

trust for *C*; but the estate might be conveyed to *C*, (the intended *cestui que trust*) as the releasee, to the use of *B* the trustee, in trust for *C* himself.

In the opening of the work it was observed, that a power given by a will was a common-law authority. But here we must consider whether a devise to uses through the medium of a devisee, as a devise to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, will not take effect under the statute of uses. Upon this point a difference of opinion has been expressed (*c*); and, indeed, the subject is exhausted by the learning which has been displayed upon it (*I*). It must be admitted

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(*c*) Butl. n. to Co. Litt. 271, 195; and Fonbl. n.(e) to 2 Treat. b. III. s. 5; Powell on Devises, Eq. p. 24, 2d Edit. 272: and see 1 Sand. on Uses,

(*I*) Mr. Booth, it is said, wrote the following postscript to an opinion: "Powers under wills are not like powers under conveyances, operating by way of use. The execution of a power under a devise is not the limitation of a use; no, not where the devise is to uses: as where there is a devise to *J. S.* and his heirs, to the use of *A* for life, remainder to *B* in tail, with power for *A* to limit a jointure, or lease, or charge, there will be no seisin in *J. S.* consequently no such use in *A* or *B*, as is executed by the statute of uses; consequently the execution of the power is no use; it operates as a devise under the statute of wills." But in another opinion of Mr. Booth's, the authenticity of which is equally well known, he says, speaking of a power of exchange under a will to a tenant for life, that "when he (the tenant for life) executes his power of exchanging, he is the declarer of the use, and a fee passes out of the estate of the persons who are the devisees to the uses in the will: for it has been resolved, that a devise to an use may be as well as a feoffment to an use; and the uses under such devises will have the same operation as uses under feoffments."

to be quite clear, that an immediate devise to *A* for life, remainder to *B* in fee, would be good, although no seisin was raised to serve those estates; or, in other words, lands may be devised without the aid of the statute of uses, and it is not material that the limitations are termed *uses*. On the other hand, it seems equally clear, that where a seisin is raised by will to feed uses created by it, such uses will be executed into estates by the statute of uses.

In support of the contrary opinion, it is insisted that the statute of uses cannot refer to the statute of wills, which was not then in contemplation. It is said to be difficult to conceive how uses created under the testamentary power given by the statute of wills can be within the statute of uses; and that it may be argued that a statute can *never* be considered as relating to any thing which did not exist at the time of its passing. But this is well answered by my Lord Chief Justice Coke, who in *Vernon's case* (*d*), addressing himself to the precise objection, said "it is frequent in our books, that an act made of late time should be taken within the equity of an act made long time before," of which he gives many instances (*e*). In the principal case, that part of the statute of uses which relates to jointures, was holden to be within the equity of the statute of wills. It appears to have been thought in *Andrews's case*, in 18 Eliz. (*f*), that the statute of uses would operate on uses created by will; and in *Popham and Bampfield*, 34 Car. II. (*g*), and *Burchet and Durdant*, 2 Wil. & M. (*h*), the same point was admitted both at the bar and

(*d*) 4 Rep. 1.

(*f*) Mo. 107.

(*e*) And see *Williams v. Drewe*,
Willes, 392; *Lane v. Cotton*,
 1 Com. 100.

(*g*) 1 Vern. 79.

(*h*) 2 Ventr. 311.

and by the court. In the case of *Hore and Dix*, 12 Car. II. (i), it was resolved, that an use could not be raised without a deed. And as to the case of a devise of land to uses, by a will in writing, which is not a deed, it was said, that that went upon another reason, *scil. rather upon* the statute of 32 H. VIII. of wills, *than upon* the statute of 27 H. VIII. of uses. This case has been treated as an authority, that the use is executed by the statute of wills, and not by the statute of uses; but, on the contrary, it appears to admit that the statutes may have a concurrent operation. It was in like manner admitted in *Broughton and Langley*, 2 Ann. (k), that a devise of lands may be by express words to the use of another than the devisee, and that such devise will be executed by the statute of uses. In later times, the same point has been repeatedly ruled, or treated as clear (l), and there is not a single case in which the point has been doubted. It must be considered therefore as settled, upon principle as well as authority, that the statute of uses *may* operate on uses created by will: and that where a seisin is created to serve the uses, the statute will in most cases transfer the possession to them. It is not denied, that a devise unto *and to the use* of one, will vest the legal estate in him, although ulterior uses are declared in favour of others; but this, perhaps, it may be said, is not by the operation of the statute of uses, but depends on an irresistible inference of the testator's intention, in analogy

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| (i) 1 Sid. 26, 4th resol. | 1 Ves. 143; <i>Wright v. Pearson</i> , |
| (k) 2 Lord Raym. 873, 2 Salk. 679. | <i>Fearn. Cont. Rem.</i> 128; <i>Perry v. Phelps</i> , 1 Ves. jun. 255; |
| (l) <i>Hopkins v. Hopkins</i> , 1 Atk. 589; <i>Bagshaw v. Spencer</i> , | <i>Thompson v. Lawley</i> , 2 Bos. & Pull. 311. |

analogy to the resolutions or limitations to uses in deeds (*m*).

It has been observed, that whether a devise to uses operates solely by the statute of wills, or by that statute jointly with the statute of uses, is, *except in a very few cases*, a matter rather of speculation than of use; as it is now settled that an immediate devise to uses without a seisin to serve those uses is good; and that where the estate is devised to one for the benefit of another, the courts execute the use in the first or second devisee, as appears to suit best with the intention of the testator. It is, however, indispensably necessary, that this point should be settled: Suppose an estate to be devised to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, and *A* die in the testator's life-time, is the devise void? The solution of this question depends upon the previous one, viz. whether the devise do, or do not, operate under the statute of uses. If it do not and the use should be considered as vested in *B* under the statute of wills, then the death of *A* would not defeat the devise. If it do operate under the statute of uses, then in fact, the entire estate is given to *A*, and as the devise lapses by his death, there would be no seisin to serve the use limited to *B*, when it ought to arise by the death of the testator, and consequently it may be contended that the devise would be void. But although it seems clear that the statute in this case operates on uses created under the statute of wills, yet as every testator has a power either to raise uses by the joint operation of the statute of uses and the statute of wills, or by force of the statute of

(*m*) Robinson v. Comyns, For. 164. Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. jun. 120; and Doe v. Passingham, 6 Barn. & Cress. 305.

of wills only; the courts would, it is apprehended, in favour of the intention, construe the devise as a disposition not affected by the statute of uses, but as giving the fee to *B* at once (*n*).

But even admitting that the devise is void at law; yet equity would, it should seem; compel the testator's heir at law to fulfil the intention, by conveying the estate to the same uses.

Nor is this the only case in which it is of real importance that this point should be understood. Till we ascertain whether or not a power in a will is a common-law authority, or a power deriving its effect from the statute of uses, we cannot discover in whom, by virtue of an appointment under such power, the legal estate is vested. This will be explained in a subsequent chapter (*o*). To prevent these questions from arising, estates should be devised to the devisees at once, and not through the medium of a devise to uses. Where the limitations in a will are numerous, a seisin to serve them is frequently created for the sake of brevity; as it saves the repetition of words of gift preceding every limitation; but the same purpose will be effectually answered by devising the estate "to the uses after expressed," without naming any devisee to the uses, and then going on in the usual way with the limitations. If it should be thought necessary, in any case, to raise a seisin to serve the uses, in order to attract the statute of uses, several devisees to the uses should be named, so that, in case of the death of any of them in the life-time of the testator; the

(*n*) See and consider *Dobbins v. Bowman*, 3 Atk. 408; and *Cross v. Hudson*, 3 Bro. C. C. 30.

(*o*) Chapter 5, *post*.

the estate might survive to the others, which it would certainly do if the estate was given to them, as it of course ought to be, as joint-tenants.

Before we close this head of our inquiry it should be observed, that a seisin must be raised commensurate with the estates authorized to be created under the power. If a life estate, for example, were conveyed to *A*, to such uses as *B* should appoint, and *B* were to appoint to *C*, in fee, this disposition could not take effect beyond the interest conveyed to *A* (*p*). And where it is intended that the estates to be created by the *execution* of the power shall be invested with the legal estate by force of the statute of uses, the land should be conveyed to the releasee, &c. to the uses intended to be appointed, and not to the releasee, *to the use of himself*, to the uses, for in that case any estate created under the power would be a use upon a use, and consequently would be void at law, although it would be supported as a trust in equity. Where the legal estate is vested in any person independently of the deed declaring the uses, as in the case of the recoveror in a recovery, or the conusee in a fine, it should, for the same reason, be declared, that the recoveror or conusee shall stand seised *to the uses*, and not that the recovery or fine shall enure *to the use of him*, to the uses. This, which is a clear point, was so laid down by Lord Hardwicke in the case of *Lloyd v. Abrahall* (*q*), where a fine was levied to two trustees; and it was declared that it should enure *to the use of them, their heirs and assigns*, to the uses; and Lord
Hardwicke

(*p*) See Gilb. on Uses, p. 127, II. MS.; and see *Phelp. v. Hay*, and n. (2). MS.; and in Appendix.

(*q*) T. Term, 27 and 28 Geo.

Hardwicke decided the case (which was argued by the most eminent counsel of the day) wholly on the ground that the legal estate was in the trustees. The case arose upon a devise *for want of issue of the testatrix's body*, to whom no estate was limited; and Lord Hardwicke supported the devise, which was otherwise void as too remote, because it was of trust-estates; and he was of opinion, that if there had been issue living, who had brought a bill for a conveyance, the court would have decreed a strict settlement in order to effectuate the devises over. The estate is to this day enjoyed under this decision; but unless in a case where the trusts are executory, and not executed, such a decision would not now be made. A mere devise not pointing to a future settlement must receive the same construction, whether the testator be seised of the legal or only of the equitable estate; or whether he devise legal or equitable estates to the devisees intended to take beneficially.

Sometimes in a power to appoint a life estate it is necessary to authorize a limitation to trustees, to preserve contingent remainders in the instrument creating the power, of which the life-estate is to take precedence. This should always be attended to. Where an estate is limited to trustees and their heirs generally, to preserve contingent remainders, and a general power of appointment is afterwards given, they will take the fee, because, under the power, contingent remainders might be created which would be liable to be defeated if the fee were not vested in the trustees. This question of course arises only in those cases where the court *can*, in favour of the intention, hold the trustees *not* to take the fee, although the estate is limited generally to them and their

their heirs, and is not confined to the life of the person taking the precedent estate of freehold (*r*).

If uses in strict settlement are directed to be raised by a will, and it is intended that the usual power of sale and exchange should be inserted in the settlement, an express declaration of the intention should be made: such a power cannot be implied (*s*). The same observation applies to articles for a settlement. But in a case (*t*) where the articles contained a clause that the husband and wife, and the survivor, should have a power to appoint new trustees, “and also all such other powers and provisos for effectuating the intention of the parties as are usually contained in settlements of the like nature as shall be approved of by the trustees;” Lord Eldon determined that powers of selling, exchanging, and investing in new purchases, are usual in settlements, and therefore powers of sale and exchange came within the meaning of this clause, and ought to be inserted in the settlement. In the case of *Williams v. Carter* (*u*), where money was settled, with a power to the trustees to change the stocks, funds, and securities, in which it might be invested, for others of the same or the like nature, and the intended husband covenanted to settle any real estate to which he and his wife might become entitled in her right, upon the same trusts, and subject to the powers, &c. declared of the funds, or as near thereto as the nature of real estate would admit of, it was held that the settlement ought to contain powers of sale and exchange,

(*r*) See *Venables v. Morris*, 7 Term Rep. 342. 438; *Doe v. Hicks*, ib. 433; *Baker v. Anscombe*, 1 New Rep. 25; *Curtis v. Price*, 12 Ves. jun. 89.

(*s*) *Wheate v. Hall*, 17 Ves. jun. 80.

(*t*) *Peake v. Penlington*, 2 Ves. & Bea. 311.

(*u*) Appendix, No. 7.

change, and a distinction was taken between a covenant to settle a particular estate, and a covenant to settle all estates generally.

In *Brewster v. Angell* (*w*), estates were devised to trustees, in trust for certain children for their lives, with remainders in strict settlements. And the testator, after directing his trustees to make a settlement of his estate accordingly, and that the share of each of his two daughters A. W. and M. W. Smith should be for her separate use, with a power of appointment amongst her issue, directed that in such settlement there should be inserted all proper powers and authorities for making leases, and otherwise, according to circumstances, to and for the tenants for life, to be exercised by them at such times as they should be by law qualified so to do, and the same powers and authorities to be exercised on their behalf by the said Brewster, and the others their heirs and successors, whenever such tenants for life respectively should be disabled or disqualified by law to act freely and of their own uncontrolled authority in the said premises; and that provisions should also be made in such settlement for the appointment of new executors, trustees and guardians, in the like manner as the said testator had directed respecting his personal estate, alluding to another will disposing of his personalty.

A settlement was made under the direction of the court, in which was contained a power to the trustees under the will, and the survivors, &c. with the consent of the tenants for life, and after their decease, of the
person

(w) 1 Jac. & Walk. 625.

person in remainder, if twenty-one, and if not, of the proper authority of the trustees, to sell, exchange and make partition of the estates. The estate was sold under the power, and the purchaser objected to the title. The Lord Chancellor said the question was, whether a power given to trustees to sell, with the approbation of the tenants for life, which he could not give if he were disqualified, is such a power as is authorized to be put into this settlement. Now, what are the words of the will? they are, "all proper powers for making leases and otherwise, according to circumstances, &c." whatever then is the meaning of the words "and otherwise, according to circumstances," they are to be powers and authorities "to the tenants for life, to be exercised, &c." Supposing that a power of sale and exchange could be given under these words, it is, according to the common sense of them, to be given to the tenants for life, and in case they are disqualified, to the trustees; but this is a power to act with the approbation of the tenant for life, qualified or not. The inclination of his opinion was, that this was not a proper power; but his Lordship was quite clear he could not compel a purchaser to take a title depending on it. The question to be decided was not whether a power of selling and exchanging might not have been given to the tenants for life, if qualified to act, and if not qualified, to the trustees; but whether such a power could be given to the trustees acting with their approbation, should they be or be not qualified.

Upon a bill filed to correct the settlement, it was

held that the will did not authorize the insertion of a power of sale and exchange (x). In *Higgenson v. Barneby* (y) a testator by his will directed a strict settlement to be made of his real estate on his nephews and their sons, and that there should be a power for the nephews to jointure to a certain extent, and a power to the trustees to sell and exchange, and also a power to the beneficial devisees and trustees to lease; "and that there should also be contained in such settlement all other clauses, powers, and provisoes as are usually inserted in settlements or deeds of that kind:" it was held, that the will did not authorize a power to appoint portions to younger children, because the effect of such a power would be to diminish the estate, which was expressly limited in strict settlement, and because there was no certain rule as to the quantum of such portions, by which the Court could be guided. The words were considered as referring to usual and necessary powers of management.

In a case (z) where the articles before marriage stipulated that the settlement should contain a power of leasing for twenty-one years on possession, a power of sale and exchange, of appointing new trustees, "and all such other powers, provisoes, clauses, covenants, and agreements as are usually inserted in settlements of the like nature," it was held that a power to grant building leases for the usual term was not authorized by the articles.

(x) *Horne v Barton*, 1 Jac. 437. (y) 2 Sim. & Stu. 516.

(z) *Pearse v. Baron*, 1 Jac. 158.

SECTION III.

OF THE OBJECTS FOR WHICH A POWER MAY BE CREATED.

WE come now to consider the validity of a power with reference to its object.

And, first, a power may be reserved to revoke the whole settlement, or even any particular limitation in the settlement, leaving the other limitations unaffected (*a*). Where, however, a man has an estate to which powers are annexed, and it is intended to leave his estate undisturbed, but to reserve a power to revoke the powers given to him and all the subsequent estates, it should not simply be declared that all the limitations, &c. subsequent to his estate, may be revoked, but it should be expressly provided that his powers may be revoked. For in a case, where under a settlement *A* was made tenant for life, with powers of leasing, &c. and the settlement directed, that unless he settled another estate to the same uses, all the uses, &c. *subsequent* to his estate for life should cease, and he neglected to make the settlement, it was determined, that the estates created by *A*, under his powers, were not defeated, as there was no express declaration to that effect, so that the court considered the powers as benefits annexed to the estate for life, which were not intended to be defeated (*b*).

So

(*a*) Thomson v. Freston, 2 Ro. Abr. 262, (B) pl. 1; Anon. 1 Str. 584. (*b*) Freke v. Lord Barrington, 3 Bro. C. C. 274.

OBJECTS FOR WHICH A POWER MAY BE CREATED. 147

So a power may be reserved to raise concurrent interests for different purposes, as powers to a tenant for life to grant a jointure to his wife, and to create a term, to commence from his death, for securing younger childrens portions, in which case, during the continuance of the jointure, the term will not take effect in point of interest, but shall go on in time, and the residue of the term that remains unexpired after the death of the jointress shall take effect in interest, and no more (c).

Where the object of a power is to create a perpetuity, it will be considered simply void. This was decided in the great case of *Spencer and the Duke of Marlborough* (d), where, in a strict entail under a will, a power was inserted, authorizing trustees, on the birth of each unborn tenant in tail, to revoke the uses limited to them, and to limit the estates to them for their lives, with remainder to their sons in tail. Lord Chancellor Northington held this power to be void, as tending to a perpetuity, and repugnant to the estate limited. And this decree was confirmed in the House of Lords upon the unanimous opinion of the Judges, that such a power, whether in deed or will, was void (I).

In

(c) *Edwards v. Slater*, Hard. 410. *v. Lord Godolphin*; see *Woodhouse v. Hoskins*, 3 Atk. 22;

(d) Dom. Proc. 1763; 5 Bro. and see 16 Ves. jun. 308; P. C. 592; *Barnard, C. C.* 69; *Lade v. Holford*, 3 Burr. 1416, reported 1 Eden, 404, by the 1 Blackst. 428. Ambl. 479. name of Duke of Marlborough Butl. n. to Fearne, p. 530.

(I) *Heath v. Heath*, 2d July, 1765, the Lord Chancellor decreed, that the trusts of the will should be performed, except as to the powers in the will, so far as they relate to the alteration of estates-tail into tenancies for life, which is void in law, MS. in 2 Eden, 330.

In *Ware v. Polhill* (e) freeholds and copyholds were devised to the testator's son for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainders over; and leaseholds were bequeathed to trustees, to renew and to pay the rents to the persons who under the above limitations should for the time being be entitled to the rents of the freeholds and copyholds; and the trustees were empowered at any time thereafter, with the consent of the person or persons who should as aforesaid be entitled to the rents of the freeholds and copyholds, or in case such person should be a minor, at the discretion of the trustees, to sell the leaseholds, and lay out the purchase-money in the purchase of freeholds or copyholds, to be settled to the uses of the freeholds and copyholds devised; and until such purchase the money to be invested, and the interest paid to the persons for the time being entitled to the rents of the freeholds and copyholds devised. The power of sale was not exercised; a grandson died under twenty-one; and upon a bill filed, it was insisted, that under the provisions of the will the intention of the testator was, that all his property not real estate should, after payment of his debts, &c. be converted into real estate, and limited in strict settlement; and the trustees ought to have sold all the leasehold estate accordingly: That the intention was to provide for the issue male; and that the leasehold estate, while unsold, should go with the freehold, as far as the rules of law and equity would permit, and not vest in a tenant in tail, so as to be transmissible, unless such tenant in tail attained the age of twenty-one. The Lord Chancellor's opinion was against this

(e) 11 Ves. jun. 257.

this construction. Upon a subsequent day his Lordship observed, that upon further consideration as to the leasehold estate, he thought that power of sale was void, for it might travel through minorities for two centuries; and if it is bad to the extent in which it was given, you cannot model it to make it good. His Lordship thought the soundest ground was that the power was bad.

The point decided by the above case is, that where a leasehold estate is settled as a real estate, but so as to vest absolutely in a *quasi* tenant in tail, a power to defeat his estate by selling the property and buying a real estate to be resettled, is void. In practice, the case has been treated as an authority that the common power of sale and exchange is void, as too remote, if it be not expressly confined to lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards. But it is clear that the Lord Chancellor did not mean to impeach the validity of such powers. The general practice has been not to confine them to lives in being, and twenty-one years; and half of the titles in the kingdom depend on the validity of such powers. If the power be within the law of perpetuities, the line can always be drawn, and there appears to be no reason why it should be deemed void in its creation. But such a power does not, like the power in *Ware v. Polhill*, operate to defeat the estate of the minor tenant in tail, but *transfers* it from one property to another. He is still tenant in tail; whereas in *Ware v. Polhill* the effect of a sale might be to defeat altogether the estate of the representative of a person who died entitled to a vested interest in the absolute property. General powers of sale and exchange in a strict settlement appear to be

L 3

valid,

valid, on the same ground that a shifting use may be limited to take effect at any period, however remote, where the estate is regularly limited in tail, because the tenant in tail may destroy the shifting use by a common recovery; yet there the estate of a tenant in tail not having suffered a recovery may be defeated altogether; whereas under the exercise of a power of sale and exchange there is merely a change of title, and not a destruction of interest. In point of fact, such a power enables the alienation of property without affecting the interest of the person beneficially entitled to the property.

But a general power to appoint to children, grandchildren, or issue, without expressing the time within which they must be born, is good, for the donee *may* appoint to such issue as are within the line of perpetuity (f).

SECTION IV.

OF THE EFFECT OF THE CREATION OF POWERS ON
THE ESTATES LIMITED IN THE INSTRUMENTS
CREATING THEM.

IT remains only to consider the effect of the creation of a power on the estates limited in the instrument creating it: the effect of the *erecution* of powers will form a subject of future inquiry.

Where a power of revocation is deemed void, as in the Duke of Marlborough's case, noticed in the last section, of course the estates actually limited in the
instrument

(f) Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. jun. 357.

instrument creating the power cannot be affected by the power, but will take effect in the same manner as if it had not been inserted in the instrument. And the law is the same in regard to estates given in default of any appointment under a power, which is void in its creation. Therefore, if under a covenant to stand seised a general power of appointment be reserved, or given to any person, and for want of such appointment the estate be limited to some person within the consideration of blood, or marriage, as the power would be void, the estate limited in default of appointment would take effect in possession (a).

It is obvious, that every power of appointment is, strictly speaking, a power of revocation to the extent of its operation ; but still there is a striking distinction between estates actually limited in a settlement with a power of revocation, and estates limited in default of the exercise of a preceding power of appointment. In the first case, the estates are vested subject to be revoked, or defeated by the exercise of the power.

Whether, in the last case, the estates limited in default of appointment are, during the continuance of the power, contingent or vested, has been the subject of much discussion. The question arose in Leonard Lovie's case (b), and it was determined, that the estates limited in default of appointment were contingent (c). In Walpole v. Lord Conway (d), Lord Hardwicke held the same opinion. In Cunningham v. Moody (e) his Lordship is

(a) *Warwick v. Garrard*, 2 Vern. 7 ; *Goodtitle v. Pettoe*, Fitzg. 299. (d) 3 Barnard, 153 ; see 4 Term Rep. 57 n. ; and see 2 Ves. jun. 709.

(b) 10 Rep. 78, see fo. 85 a.

(e) 1 Ves. 174.

(c) See 2 Ves. jun. 704, 5, 6.

supposed to have altered his opinion, and to have determined, that the power of appointment does not suspend the vesting of the subsequent remainders; and in *Doe v. Martin* (*f*), after a splendid argument, it was solemnly decided, that the estates limited in default of appointment were vested, subject to be divested. The Court relied on *Cunningham v. Moody* in opposition to *Leonard Lovie's* and *Lord Conway's* cases.

Mr. Fearne, who discusses these cases (*g*), enforces the authority of *Doe* and *Martin*; and between the case under consideration, and those upon limitation after a contingent limitation of the fee-simple, takes this clear distinction, that in the latter the limitation is *originally* and *finally* contained *in*, and made by, the *conveyance itself*, while the former have no existence till the power is executed, so that, in truth, there is no estate limited until an appointment is made.

Lord Rosslyn, however, in a still later case (*h*), at first considered this doctrine very doubtful. He insisted, that in *Cunningham v. Moody*, it was not necessary to determine the point, and treated the case of *Doe* and *Martin* as a case of compassion. However, the point did not then call for a decision; and in pronouncing his decree he did not advert to it. In a subsequent case he treated it as clear that the power did not prevent the estates from vesting (*i*). Without considering whether it was absolutely necessary to decide the point in *Cunningham* and *Moody*, Lord Hardwicke's opinion is too clearly

(*f*) 4 Term Rep. 39; and see *Doe v. Weller*, 7 Term. Rep. 478.

(*h*) *Smith v. Lord Camelford*, 2 Ves. jun. 698.

(*i*) See 5 Ves. jun. 748

(*g*) Cont. Remainders, 290—299, 4th edit.

clearly expressed to be misunderstood. He said, that the power of appointment did not make any alteration in the vesting of the remainder in fee; for the only effect thereof was that the fee which was vested was thereby subject to be divested.

Besides these leading cases there are several *dicta* upon this point. In a case in Lord Raym. (*k*), Powell, Justice, said, that if a fee-simple be limited to such persons as *A* shall appoint by his will, remainder over, that is a good remainder *vested till* the appointment. In *Goodhill v. Brigham* (*l*), Mr. Justice Buller put the very same case, namely, a power to *A* to appoint the fee, and in default of appointment, to himself in fee, and held, that *A* could take nothing till his death, or till his appointment. But he must for the moment have forgotten the decision in *Doe and Martin*, which was decided eight years before, whilst he was a Judge of the King's Bench, and in which he entirely concurred; and in a case which occurred about the same period as *Goodhill v. Brigham*, he treated the fee as clearly vested till appointment, and referred to the case of *Doe and Martin* as an authority in that respect. Lord Thurlow (*m*), Lord Alvanley (*n*), Lord Redesdale (*o*), the late Master of the Rolls (*p*), and Lord Eldon (*q*), have all expressed themselves decidedly of the same opinion; and in a late case in Ireland, Lord Manners treated *Doe v. Martin*

(*k*) Vol. 2. 1150.

(*l*) 1 Bos. and Pull. 198.

(*m*) *Madoc v. Jackson*, 2 Bro. C. C. 588; see 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 293.

(*n*) See 4 Ves. jun. 636; *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, ib. 771.

(*o*) See 1 Rep. Temp. Redesdale, 293.

(*p*) See 7 Ves. jun. 583.

(*q*) See 10 Ves. jun. 265.

Martin as a clear authority for this construction, and decided accordingly (*r*).

The result of the authorities therefore is, that the power of appointment does not prevent the vesting of the estates limited in default of appointment; and it is equally clear that the same doctrine applies to personality; and that where the money is absolutely given over in default of appointment, it is vested, subject to be divested by the execution of the power (*s*).

Where a term is created by a settlement to raise portions, with a general power of revocation of the settlement, although the portions become actually due, yet while the power subsists, it suspends and prevents the portions from being *payable*, because the donee of the power may revoke at any time before the portions are raised and paid, although the right to the portions is become vested under the terms of the settlement (*t*).

The essential difference between a power and an estate has led to the distinction, that although a partition will not revoke a previous devise where the estate is limited to the devisor in fee, yet if the estate be limited to such uses as he shall appoint, the partition will revoke the devise, although the fee be limited to him in default of appointment (*u*). And it has recently been

(*r*) *Osbrey v Bury*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 53.

(*s*) *Coleman v. Seymour*, 1 Ves. 209; see 2 Ves. 208; *Gordon v. Levi*, Ambl. 364; *Reade v. Reade*, 5 Ves. jun. 748.

(*t*) *Reresby v. Newland*, 2 P.

Wms. 93. affd. Dom. Proc. 2 Bro. P. C. 487; see *Vane v. Lord Dungannon*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 118. *Wynter v. Bold*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 507.

(*u*) Vide *supra*, p. 86, and the

cases there cited.

been determined (I), that a devise of a freehold estate contracted for, is revoked by a subsequent conveyance to

(I) In adverting to this point in the *Treatise on Purchases*, 4th edit. p. 148, the author added a note on Lord Rosslyn's observation in 2 Ves. jun. 429, 430, that the rule in equity, that a devise of an equitable estate is not revoked by taking the legal estate, was first established at law. In *Rawlins and Burgis* the above note was, I am told, cited by the Court with approbation. The reporters have made the following observations on the note in question :—"It seems extraordinary that such an error should be imputed to Lord Rosslyn in his very able judgment upon this subject, as the conception that a feoffment to the use of a man before the statute of uses conferred the legal seisin, or that the fact was at variance with his Lordship's statement, that the feoffment was to the use of the devisor. As an instance of a decision at law, that by *taking* the legal estate a devise is not revoked, his Lordship translates, correctly and literally, this case from Rolle, who states shortly the ground, that after the feoffment the devisor had the use as before ; guarding against any inference from that fact, and probably thinking it unnecessary to add the general effect of the statute transferring the seisin. To that Lord Rosslyn evidently points ; meaning to represent the case as amounting to an authority for his position, considering the distinction as to the mode of acquiring the legal estate, whether by the statute or by conveyance, immaterial." 2 Ves. & Bea. 385, n.

The object of the note in the book on *Purchases* was not to impute error to Lord Rosslyn, who in fact borrowed the observation from Lord Hardwicke, but to show that no such rule of law ever existed. If, however, as it is insisted, Lord Rosslyn did understand the case correctly, he must have known that it did not establish the rule which he stated, for Rolle himself shows that the statute of uses, by turning the use into a possession, destroyed the use, and consequently any devise of it before the statute. The reason why the will was not revoked in the case in Rolle, cited by Lord Rosslyn, was, that "the devisor had *the same use* which he had before ; consequently

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to the usual uses to bar dower, where the contract does not provide for the conveyance of the estate to such uses (x).

But where a man seised in fee devised the estate and then mortgaged it, with a direction that upon payment of the money, the estate should be re-conveyed to himself, his heirs and assigns, or to such person or persons, and for such estate and estates, and to and for such lawful trusts, intents, and purposes as he, his heirs and assigns, should by any deed or instrument in writing direct, limit or appoint; it was held that no new power was created, and therefore the mortgage was only a revocation *pro tanto* (y).

(x) *Rawlins v. Burgis*, 2 Ves. v. Moore, 4 Madd. 368.
and Bea. 382. The decision (y) *Brain v. Brain*, 6 Madd,
was appealed from. See Ward 221.

consequently the legal estate was vested in him, not by the conveyance but by the statute of uses, and the will must have been within the saving in the statute. If the will had not been saved by the statute it would have had no operation. Lord Rosslyn was certainly in error. He either overlooked the circumstance that the feoffment was to *the use of* the devisor, and not to him at once, or he forgot that the statute itself, if it did not vest the legal estate in the devisor, destroyed the will, unless it was within the saving in the act. In no view of the case can it possibly be considered as a decision establishing the rule stated by Lord Rosslyn. Indeed the statute of uses was passed to put an end to the testamentary power over land through the medium of uses, but it contained a saving of wills made before the statute by persons who died before the 1st of May 1536. This saving of itself shows that the legislature considered that the act by its operation would defeat existing devises of uses. Therefore the decision in question did not establish a general rule of law, but was founded on the particular saving in the statute, which took the case out of the general rule.

CHAPTER III.

BY WHOM POWERS MAY BE EXECUTED.

SECTION I.

OF THE LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE DONEE.

TO ascertain by whom a power may be executed, we must first inquire into the legal capacity of the claimant; and secondly, we must examine the instrument creating the power, to see that he is duly authorized to perform the act. I propose, therefore, to consider, first, who is by law capable of executing a power; and, secondly, to state a few special cases which have arisen on the second head of inquiry.

And, first, every person who by the laws of England is capable of disposing of an estate actually vested in himself, may exercise a power over land, or, in other words, direct a conveyance of that land.

By the common law a married woman cannot dispose of her own estate without a fine or recovery; but, simply, as the instrument, or attorney of another, she may convey an estate in the same manner as her principal could, because the conveyance is considered as the deed of the principal, and not of the attorney, and her interest is not affected.

When

When we consider that a power *not simply* collateral gives the complete dominion over the estate to the extent of the power, we may perhaps incline to think that a married woman ought not to be permitted, in opposition to the rule of law, to divest herself of any estate or interest by the mere execution of a writing without a fine or recovery, although certainly there is no objection to her executing a power *simply* collateral. And that great lawyer, Chief Justice Bridgeman, appears to have adopted this distinction (*a*). However, it has long been firmly settled, that a married woman may execute a power, whether appendant, in gross, or *simply* collateral (*b*), and as well over a copyhold as a freehold estate (*c*) (I). Thus, if a married woman is tenant for life, with a power of leasing in possession, she cannot raise a mortgage-term, for instance, without a fine or recovery; but by the mere execution of her power she may create a lease which will, at least in part,

and

(*a*) See 1 Cha. Ca. 18; 2 Freem. 168; and see Blithe's case, 2 Freem. 91; and Godolphin v. Godolphin, 1 Ves. 21.

Bayley v. Warburton, 2 Com. 494; Thomlinson v. Dighton, P. Wms. 149; Travel v. Travel, 3 Atk. 711, 2 Ves. 191, cited by Lord Hardwicke.

(*b*) Harris v. Graham, 1 Ro. Abr. 329, pl. 12; 2 Ro. Abr. 247, pl. 6; Gibbons v. Moulton, Finch. 346; Daniel v. Uply, Latch. 39; Godb. 327, pl. 419;

(*c*) Driver v. Thompson, 4 Taunt. 294; Boddington v. Abernethy, 5 Barn. & Cress. 576.

(I) But although a feme covert may exercise a power over a copyhold, yet, notwithstanding the decision in Driver v. Thompson, it deserves re-consideration whether she and her husband can surrender *her* estate to the use of her will, for she is incapable of making a will, technically speaking, and her will in such a case operates on the inheritance which remains vested in her and her husband in her right.

and may perhaps wholly, take effect out of her interest. So if she has a general power of appointment, with a limitation in default of appointment to herself in fee, she cannot affect the estate vested in her except by a fine or recovery; but she may defeat the limitation, and convey away the estate by the execution of her power.

It is not material whether the power is given to an unmarried woman, who afterwards marries (*d*), or to a woman while she is married, who afterwards takes another husband (*e*): in both cases she may execute the power, and the concurrence of her husband is in no case essential. But, of course, a power given expressly to a woman "*being sole*" cannot be executed by her during her coverture (*f*). And where, in a marriage settlement, the trust of a term was, if the wife should die and leave no issue by her husband living at her decease, that the trustees should within six months after the decease of the survivor of the husband and wife raise 1,000*l.* and pay the same to such persons as the wife "at any time or times hereafter during her coverture, and notwithstanding the same," by any deed, &c. should appoint, it was held that the wife had a power only to appoint during the first marriage, and that an execution of the power by her during her second coverture was void (*g*).

It

(*d*) *Gibbons v. Moulton*, Finch, 346; *Churchill v. Dibben*, Reg. Lib. A. 1753, fol. 252. 2 Eden, 252.

(*e*) *Bayley v. Warburton*, 2 Com. 494; *Burnet v. Mann*, 1 Ves. 157.

(*f*) *Lord Antrim v. Duke of Buckingham*, 1 Cha. Ca. 17, 2 Freem. 168. There is an imperfect note of this case in

1 Sid. 101.

(*g*) *Horseman v. Abbey*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 381.

It must be remarked, that on the authority of the case of *Rich v. Beaumont* (*h*), it has been sometimes considered doubtful whether a power given to a feme sole was not suspended by her marriage. By the settlement in that case powers were given to a single woman to be executed by deed or will; she afterwards married; and during her coverture exercised the powers by will. Upon a bill filed by the appointee to establish the execution of the power, Lord King dismissed it, on the ground that the remedy lay at law; but upon appeal to the House of Lords the dismissal was reversed, and the Court of Chancery was directed to state a case for the opinion of the court of King's Bench, but it has never been ascertained what ultimately became of the case (*i*). The case, however, has frequently been cited as an authority that a feme covert may exercise such a power (*k*). In one case (*l*), Lord Hardwicke said, "*It has been determined in this court that a feme covert can execute a power, as in Travel v. Travel, and in Rich v. Beaumont, where the Lords sent a case to B. R. for their opinion, which they never did before:*" and in another case, it is expressly stated, *arguendo* (*m*), that a case was sent from the Court of Chancery for the opinion of *B. R., where it was held a good appointment*. But, whatever was the decision in this case, the law is now clearly settled that a *feme covert* may execute a power given to her whilst sole.

In *Peacock v. Monk*, Lord Hardwicke doubted whether

(*h*) 3 Bro. P. C. 308.

(*k*) See 3 Atk. 711; *Downes v.*

(*i*) 4 Vin. Abr. 168, pl. 26;

Tempeson, 4 Russ. 334.

22 Vin. Abr. 277, pl. 47; 3 Bro.

(*l*) See 2 Ves. 191.

P. C. 308.

(*m*) 2 Ves. 64; and see 1 Ves. 303, 305.

ther an heir at law of a woman would be bound by a mere agreement entered into before marriage between her and her husband, that she might dispose of her estate notwithstanding her coverture (*n*). But in *Wright v. Englefield* (*o*), Lord Northington held, that the wife might execute her power in the same manner as if she had a power over a legal estate; and his decree was affirmed in the House of Lords. In this case, indeed, the legal estate was, at the time of the articles, outstanding in trustees (*p*); but Lord Northington appears to have grounded his decision on the fact, that the execution of the power was in favour of children; and, therefore, there was a meritorious consideration. In a case which occurred a few months before (*q*), where the wife had the legal estate vested in herself, but had by articles a power to dispose of it, which she executed in favour of a natural son, and then joined with her husband in levying a fine to other uses, Lord Northington held the execution of the power to be void, and that the estate passed by the fine, and the court could not lend its aid, *because there was no meritorious consideration*.

Lord Northington, however, was not correct in holding a consideration to be necessary. The true principle on which equity ought to lend its aid is, that the agreement having been made on marriage, the husband would be compelled to make a legal settlement. Accordingly, in *Rippon v. Dawding* (*r*), Lord Camden held, that

(*n*) 2 Ves. 191; and see 2 Bro. 467; see Ambl. 474. 2 Eden, C. C. 544. 221, and the Editor's note.

(*o*) Ambl. 468.

(*r*) Ambl. 565. 1 Powell, Contr.

(*p*) *Wright v. Lord Cadogan*, 73; and see 2 Term Rep. 695; Bro. P. C. 156. 2 Eden, 239. *Dillon v. Grace*, 2 Scho. and Lef.

(*q*) *Bramhall v. Hall*, Ambl. 456; *George v. —* Ambl. 627.

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under an agreement entered into previously to marriage, a devise by a *feme covert* seised of the legal estate was valid, and he would not enter into the consideration of the objects in favour of whom the estate was devised. He said it was a mistake to call it a question between volunteers. The agreement was made on marriage, and the wife might have compelled the husband to join with her in a fine; and he thought the case was governed by *Wright v. Cadogan*, although the legal estate was vested in the wife.

But where the agreement is, that the wife may dispose of the estate by will, a will made before the marriage, although subsequently to the agreement, will be revoked by the marriage, unless expressly authorized by the articles to be made before marriage (s); it will not however be inferred that the power was only to be executed in the event of the wife surviving the husband, from the circumstance that it was to be executed by will only, although a *feme covert* cannot make a proper will (t).



An infant cannot, at common law, alien his estate, unless by force of a custom; but he, like a *feme covert*, may at common law do any act where he is a mere instrument, or conduit-pipe, and his interest is not concerned (u). Upon the same principle it would seem to follow, that an infant may execute a power *simply* collateral, deriving its effect from the statute of uses.

Dyer,

(s) *Hodsden v. Lloyd*, 2 Bro. C. C. 534; *Doe v. Staple*, 2 Term Rep. 684; see particularly p. 697.

(t) *Driver v. Thompson*, 4 Taunt. 294.

(u) See 3 Atk. 710.

Dyer, in his reading on the statute of wills, says, that if a man makes his will, and wills that *J. S.* who is within age, shall have the disposition of his land, that is good. The same law is where a woman covert hath such authority.

And it has been thought that an infant may execute even powers appendant and in gross. The case of *Hollingshead v. Hollingshead* (*w*) is, as reported, an authority that way. An infant, tenant for life, with a power of jointure upon his marriage, covenanted to settle lands on his wife, and afterwards died without having made any jointure, and equity made good the jointure, which, as the facts are stated, could only be on the principle that the infant had a disposing power. But the late Lord Alvanley seemed to think that the infant had done some act after he came of age to confirm the jointure (*x*): And in a case at the Rolls in the year 1738, the Master of the Rolls said, that the case of *Hollingshead v. Hollingshead* was an idle case, and not law (*y*) (1). In the great case of *Hearle v. Greenbank* (*z*), both the counsel and the Court said repeatedly, that there was no case in which it had been decided that an infant could execute a power appendant or in gross.

(*w*) 2 P. Wms. 229. 1 Stra. 486, pl. 3; and see Lord Kil-
604. Gilb. Eq. Rep. 168. 4 Bro. murry v. Dr. Grey, 2 P. Wms.
C. C. 466, cited. 671, cited; explained in 3 Atk.

(*x*) See 4 Bro. C. C. 466. 713.

(*y*) *Colton v. Hoskins*, Rolls, (z) 3 Atk. 695. 1 Ves. 298.
21 March 1738. 16 Vin. Abr.

(1) I have not been able to find any case on this point in Reg. Lib. The point probably arose incidentally in a case of *Colton and Newland*, which appears from the registrar's book to have been before the Master of the Rolls, in Hilary Term 1738.

Lord Hardwicke said, that the applying for several private acts of parliament to enable infants to execute powers given to them, showed the sense of mankind in that respect; and he held, decidedly, that a power to a feme covert, an infant, to appoint an estate, notwithstanding her coverture, did not authorize her to appoint the estate during her infancy, as it was a power to be exercised over her own inheritance. Lord Hardwicke, in this case, showed not only that the power could not be legally executed during the donee's infancy, but that the testator did not intend that it should be, as he gave it expressly during coverture, but not during infancy, and *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*. From this it has been inferred, that Lord Hardwicke was of opinion that such a power might, by express words, be given during infancy; but it is manifest, that he merely intended to show, that, even if such was the doctrine, it would not apply to the case before him. It would be a bold decision, that an infant may have a power of disposition over an estate through the medium of the statute of uses. Before the statute, it is clear that an infant could not alien a use limited to him, that is, could not direct his trustees to convey the estate to a third person. In that respect equity followed the law. Now the statute only operates upon what were uses at the time it passed. A power *not* simply collateral is a beneficial right to direct the trustee to convey the estate to whom you shall appoint. This direction an infant cannot give by reason of his non-age. Therefore, the appointee never gains a use, or equitable right, upon which the statute can operate. The law is already carried to its utmost limit in the power given to femes covert, and the disability, of

of an infant is much stronger than that of a married woman.

Upon the whole it should seem that an infant cannot exercise a power over *real estate*, unless, it be a power *simply* collateral, but as to personalty, clearly he may exercise a power over that, at the age at which by law he may dispose of personalty to which he is absolutely entitled (z).

(z) *Hearle v. Greenbank*, *ubi sup.*

SECTION II.

OF THE WORDS OF THE INSTRUMENT CREATING THE POWER.

I. IT is unnecessary to observe, that a power to be executed by the survivor of two persons cannot be executed by the one first dying (a). Lord Thurlow has even decided that such a power cannot be executed by the two persons during their joint lives (b). A power in a will, in case either of two trustees should decline to act, to the *survivor* of the trustees, to appoint new trustees, authorizes the *continuing* trustee to appoint new ones; but if both refuse to accept the trust, they cannot exercise the power (c).

Formerly, where a power was given to executors to sell, and one of them *refused* the trust, it was clear that the others could not sell. But the statute of 21 Hen. VIII, c. 4, provided, that where lands are willed

(a) *Bishop of Oxon v. Leighton*, 2 Vern. 376.

(b) *Mac Adam v. Logan*, 3 Bro. C. C. 320.

(c) *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 405.

willed to be sold by executors, and part of them refuse to be executors, and to accept the administration of the will, all sales by the executors that accept such administration shall be as valid as if *all* the executors had joined (*d*). But although one refuse, the others, it was said by Coke, could not sell to him, because he is still party, and privy to the will (*e*). That however has been over-ruled (*f*).

In such cases the executors may, at law, sell to a trustee for themselves, or may sell to one of themselves, and an appointment accordingly cannot be impeached at law (*g*). Whether such an appointment can be supported in equity must depend upon the circumstances under which the sale was made.

It is regularly true at common law, that a naked authority given to several cannot survive. Therefore, if a man devise his lands to *A* for life, and that after his decease, the estate shall be sold by the executors, naming them, as by *B* and *C* his executors, or by *B* and *C*, who are not named executors, in that case, if one of them die during the life of *A*, the other cannot sell, because the words of the testator would not be satisfied (*h*). The same doctrine seems to apply to powers operating under the statute of uses, for in a case where *cestui que use* in fee before the statute of uses willed that his feoffees *A*, *B*, and *C*, should suffer his wife to take the profits

(*d*) See 6 Term Rep. 396. *Denne v. Judge*, 11 East, 288; *Gilb. on Uses*, p. 128, and n. (4). stated in that case were so stated in order to raise every question.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 113 a.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 113 a; see Mo. 61, pl. 172; and see Wilm. 49;

(*f*) *Mackintosh v. Barber*, 1 Bing. 50.

and *Peyton v. Bury*, 2 P. Wms. 626; *Attorney-General v. Gleg*,

(*g*) S. C. *The conveyances* 1 Atk. 356.

profits for her life, and that after her decease the premises should be sold by his said feoffees, one of the feoffees died, and then the wife died, and the question was, whether the survivors could sell, and it was ruled that they could not (*i*).

But where the words of the testator can be satisfied, a court of law will relax this rule. Therefore, if three or more executors are appointed, and the devise is, that the estate shall be sold by the executors generally, there the survivors may sell, because the plural number of executors remains (*k*). And this was decided in a case where a man appointed that his sons-in-law generally should sell the land, and before the time of sale arrived one of them died, it was adjudged that the sale by the survivors was good, because they were named generally by his sons-in-law; and the words of the will in a benign interpretation were satisfied in the plural number, although they had but a bare authority; but if they had been particularly named, then the survivors could not have sold (*l*).

In a case in *Dyer* (*m*), where two executors were appointed, and the devise was, that the executors should sell, and one died, it was the opinion of Anderson, Windham, and Rhodes, that the survivor could not sell: *Dyer* resolves the same case in his reading on the statute of wills: "A man willeth that his executors shall sell his lands for the payment of his debts; they

(*i*) *Dy.* 177, p. 82; and see 118 a; *Cro. Eliz.* 26; 1 *Leo.* 285; § *Leo.* 106; *Mo.* 147; *Stile v. Tomson*, *Dy.* 210.

(*k*) *Co. Litt.* 3 a; see *Dy.* *Dy.* 177, side note to pl. 32.
177, pl. 32; *Garbland v. Mayot*,
2 *Vern.* 105.

(*m*) *Dy.* 210, side note to pl. 8;
and see *Goulds.* 2. S. C.

(*l*) *Vincent and Lee*, *Co. Litt.*

they all die but one; he maketh the sale; the vendee shall not have the land; contrary the law if to the executors to be sold;" and there are other authorities to the same effect (*n*). But cases are not wanting on the other side of the question: and in the case of *Houell v. Barnes*, although it was holden that the executors took an authority only, yet Jones, Crooke, and Barkeley, determined that the survivor could sell (*o*). But Jenkins thinks that this case depends upon the executors not being at first named by their proper names; and that they took *qua* executors. He gives it as his opinion, that if a devise be that *A* and *B*, the executors, shall sell certain land, and near the end of the will the testator also names them executors, if the one dies the other may sell, for the interest is annexed to the executorship by this repetition in the will (*p*). Mr. Hargrave has endeavoured to establish that where the power is given to *executors*, or to persons *nomi-*
natim in *that character*, the survivor may sell, as the power is given to them *ratione officii*; and as the office survives, by parity of reason the authority should also survive (*q*). And the liberality of modern times will probably induce the courts to hold, that, in every case where the power is given to *executors*, as the office survives so may the power. We shall hereafter see that

(*n*) *Lock v. Loggin*, 1 And. 145; see *Jenk. Cent.* p. 44.

(*o*) *Houell v. Barnes*, Cro. Car. 382, 1 Jo. 352, pl. 3, nom. Barnes' case; *Anon.* 2 Leo. 220, pl. 276; *Milward v. Moore*, Sav. 72; and see *Anon.* Dy. 371 b. pl. 3.

(*p*) See *Foone v. Blount*, Cowp. 464.

(*q*) N. (2) Co. Litt. 113 a; but see *Pow. Dev.* 302-310. Where, however, the two questions, viz. where executors take a fee, and where if they take only an authority, it will survive, appear to be confounded.

that it is well established, that equity will interpose to prevent the consequences arising from the extinction of the power. As the law now stands, it seems,

1. That where a power is given to two or more by their proper names, who are not made executors, it will not survive without express words :

2. That where it is given to three or more generally, as to " my trustees," " my sons," &c. and not by their proper names, the authority will survive whilst the plural number remains :

3. That where the authority is given to " executors," and the will does not expressly point to a joint exercise of it, even a single surviving executor may execute it ;
But,

4. That where the authority is given to them *nominatim*, although in the character of executors, yet it is at least doubtful whether it will survive.

I shall close this subject with Sir Edward Coke's advice, to give the authority to the executors or the survivors, or survivor of them, or to such or so many of them as take upon them the probate of the will, or the like (*r*).

In a late case (*s*), where a power of sale was reserved by a settlement to three trustees, *and their heirs*, and there was a power to appoint new trustees, it was held that two surviving trustees could not execute the power, although the money was directed to be paid to the trustees, or the survivor or survivors of them, or the executors, administrators or assigns of such survivor (*I*).

Where

(*r*) Co. Litt. 113 a ; see 1 Barn. & Ald. 608 ; see Hall v. Townsend v. Whalley, Mo. 341, Dewes, 1 Jac. 189, and Bradford Cro. Eliz. 524. v. Belfield, 2 Sim. 264, & *qu*.

(*s*) Townsend v. Wilson,

(*I*) As to powers to *consent*, see post, ch. 5, sect. 3.

Where three different classes of trustees were appointed by will for three different purposes, first, R. Sharp, and R. L. Rice, as to 1,000 *l.*; then as to the rest of the personal estate, Mary Sharp, R. Sharp, and G. A. Davis; and then as to the real estate, R. Sharp, and G. A. Davis; and the will then contained a power, that in case either of the testator's said trustees, R. Sharp and R. L. Rice, so far as applied to the trusts reposed in them respectively, or the said Mary Sharp, R. Sharp, and G. A. Davis, so far as applied to the trusts reposed in them respectively as aforesaid, should happen to die, or desire to be discharged from, or neglect or refuse, or become incapable, to act in the trusts thereby in them reposed, before such trusts should be fully performed or determined, in such case it should be lawful for new trustees to be appointed: It was held that these words plainly denoted that the two first trustees were to be distinguished as a separate class, and the second sentence, which applies to the other three, had the same confined meaning; the whole power, therefore, was given to the persons named in classes, and no power at all was given to the third class, who were not named (*t*).

II. It sometimes happens that a testator directs his estates to be sold for certain purposes, without declaring by whom the sale shall be made. In the absence of such a declaration, if the fund be distributable by the executor he shall have the power by implication.

In a case in the year-book, 15 H. 7 (*u*), it was said by Rede, Tremail, and Frowik, that if a man make his

(*t*) *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 405; and see *Smith v. Leigh*, 6 Moore, 214.

(*u*) Appendix, No. 1.

his will, that his land, which his feoffees have, shall be sold and aliened, and does not say by whom, then his executors shall alien, and not the feoffees; and the reporter observes that Finieux, in a manner affirmed this the day before, although he made no observation on the rule at the time it was pronounced by the other Judges. Conisby said, that the feoffees shall alien this, [at that time, of course, the fee was in them,] for they have the confidence placed in them; but this was denied; for executors have much greater confidence placed in them than the feoffees have; for the money to arise by the sale of the executors shall be assets in their hands, and therefore they shall sell.

In a case in the 16 Eliz. (w), a man devised his lands to his wife for life; and because he was in doubt whether he should have issue or not, he further willed by his will, that if he should not have any issue by his wife, that then after the death of his wife the lands should be sold, and the money thereof coming distributed to three of his blood, and made his wife and another his executors, and died. The executors proved the will. The other executor died, and the wife sold the lands; and it was the opinion of Wray and Southcote, Justices, that the sale was good, although it be not expressed in the will by whom the land should be sold; for the monies coming of the sale are to be distributed by his executors to persons certain, as legacies, and it appertains to executors to pay the legacies, and therefore they shall sell, &c. as, if a man willeth that his lands shall be sold, and that the monies coming thereof shall be disposed of for the payment of his debts,

(w) 2 Leo. 220, pl. 276.

debts, now the executors shall sell the lands, for to them it belongs to pay debts. Also they held that the lands should be sold in the life of the wife, otherwise they could never be sold, and also the surviving executor shall sell the lands, because the authority doth survive.

The same point was decided the same way, in a case in the 23rd of Eliz. (x), a man excepted out of a devise his manor of *R*, which "he appointed to pay his debts," and made two executors, and died; one of the executors died, the other proved the will, and sold the manor, and by the opinion of the court the sale was valid, for such was the intention of the testator, and not to leave the reversion to his heir, but to trust his executors with the sale for the speedy payment of his debts.

And in one case Mr. Justice Wyld conceived that the executor of the executor might sell, which opinion appears to be well founded, because the chain of representation was not broken; and the intent was, that the power should be executed by him to whose hands the money was to come (y).

In the famous case of *Pit v. Pelham* (z) the testator appointed his wife sole executrix. His land at Blandford, which was his wife's jointure (being the land in question), he confirmed unto her; and *after her death* he appointed it to be sold, and the purchase-money to be divided between his wife and three nephews, one of whom was his heir at law; and he gave the share of any of his nephews dying in his wife's life-time to a stranger.

The

(x) Anon. Dy. 371 b. pl. 3;
see 1 And. 145, 146; and see
Tenant v. Brown, 1 Cha. Ca. 180.

(y) 1 Cha. Ca. 178.
(z) 1 Cha. Ca. 176; see Ben-
tham v. Wiltshire, 4 Madd. 44.

The persons entitled to the purchase-money sold their interest, and then the executrix died, leaving executors; and a bill was filed to compel the heirs of the testator to convey to the purchaser. The Lord Keeper called in Twisden and Wyld, J. to his assistance. Twisden doubted that the executors of the executor cannot be compelled to sell in this case, *the sale not being to be made till after the death of the executor*. Wyld was of opinion that the executor of the executor could sell. A trial was ordered in the Common Pleas, in a feigned action, on two points, first whether Jane, the executrix, had power, and could by the will have sold the lands; secondly, whether a sale by her executors be a good sale; and after several solemn arguments the court gave judgment unanimously in the negative on both points, and thereupon the Lord Keeper dismissed the bill, but his decree was reversed in Dom. Proc. (a).

In Levinz, it is said that the Lord Keeper held the will void, because it was not said by whom the sale was to be made, but that the House of Lords decided, upon the advice of the Judges, that the heir should sell; for when no person is appointed to sell, it must be intended that he shall sell who has the estate, which is the heir. Levinz mentions the case in the year-book, and he refers the rule there to cases where the sale is for payment of debts.

Levinz however does not appear to be warranted in his conclusions. It is well settled, as we have seen, that the executors, where no contrary intention appears, shall sell, as well where the money is to be applied for payment of debts, as where it is given in the nature of legacies,

(a) 1 Lev. 304.

legacies, and is distributable by the executors. There are many cases to which the supposed rule by the Lords could not apply.—For example, a power of sale to pay legacies, without naming any person to execute it, with a devise of the estates in strict settlement in default of and until execution of the power. There the estate would not go to the heir; and, speaking generally, it would be inconsistent to give the power to him, because he may not be capable of executing it; whereas the testator has reposed confidence in his executor, and chosen a person capable of exercising any power which might be given to him. The case of *Pitt v. Pelham* did not, it is conceived, over-rule any of the former cases on this point. There was no ground in that case to give the power to the executrix, because upon the whole will taken together it is clear that the power did not arise until her death, and the power could not by implication be given to her executors, because she had no authority vested in her which they could claim as representing her, and the purchase-money was not thrown into the general mass of the testator's personal estate, or given as legacies, so as to bring it within the grasp of her executors as personal representatives of the original testator. The power therefore was void at law, for want of a person to execute it, and Lord Keeper Bridgman followed the law, and held the heir not bound to make good the omission in equity; but this, and this only, was over-ruled in the House of Lords. There was no other point to decide upon. Besides, the question as to the power did not arise, for a sale under the power was not required, but only a conveyance to clothe the purchaser of the equitable interests with the legal estate.

This, it is clear, could not have been effected under the power if it even had been vested in the executors of the executrix.

It appears therefore, to be settled (I), that a power in a will to sell or mortgage, without naming a donee, will, if a contrary intention do not appear, vest in the executor, if the fund is to be distributable by him either for the payment of debts or legacies ; and it seems that whilst the chain remains unbroken, the power, until exercised, will go from him to his executors.

And if the produce of the real estate is blended with the personal estate, the power to sell will vest in the executors by implication (b).

It remains only to observe, that where the power is given to executors they may exercise it, although they renounce probate of the will (c).

But where a testator bequeathed an estate to his wife
for

(b) Tylden v. Hyde, 2 Sim. pendix, No. 3. See Keates v. Burton, 14 Ves. jun. 434.
& Stu. 238.

(c) See the case in H. 7. Ap-

(I) The following case I extracted from an abstract of a title : A testator directed that after payment of his debts, legacies, and funerals, all his freehold and copyhold estate, called Clavering Farm, should, as soon as might be after his decease, be sold, and that the money arising thereby, and the profits thereof in the mean time should be considered as part of his personal estate ; and he appointed executors, who proved the will. The estate was directed to be sold, and the testator's heir at law was to convey the same, pursuant to 7 Ann., enabling infant trustees to convey. Rowley v. Rowley, Nov. 1731, Ch. The case is not an authority. It is clear that the heir was not a trustee within the statute of Ann. In words the power was not to arise until "the debts, legacies, and funerals" were paid.

for life, and directed that after her decease the estate should be sold to the highest bidder by public auction, and the money arising from such sale to be disposed of amongst certain persons named in his will, and he appointed his wife and another person executors, it was held that the power was not given by implication to the executors, because they had nothing to do with the produce of the sale, nor any power of distribution with respect to it (*d*).

Whether a power extends to all the persons entitled under the instrument creating it, or only to some in particular, depends not upon the place where the power is inserted, but upon the fair construction of the whole instrument taken together (*e*).

(*d*) *Bentham v. Wiltshire*, the Rolls in *Patton v. Randall*,
4 Madd. 44 ; the same point was 1 Jac. & Walk. 189.
decided by the late Master of (*e*) See 2 Str. 961 ; 12 East, 445.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE TRANSFER OF POWERS.

SECTION I.

OF THE TRANSFER OR DELEGATION BY THE ACT OF THE DONEE.

IN considering this branch of our subject, we may inquire, 1st, Whether a power is transferable by the act of the donee of the power; and, 2dly, in what cases it is transferred or executed by force of particular acts of parliament, or by act of law.

And first, where a man has only a particular power, as a power to lease for life or years, he cannot make a lease by letter of attorney by force of his power (*a*), because it is not a lease of the land, but a declaration of the prior use; and the lessee comes in by the original agreement under the first settlement. The power is in such case personal to the owner of the land, for it refers to the first settlement (*b*).

So,

(*a*) Lady Gresham's case, before Wray and Anderson, Ch. Jus. 9 Rep. 70, a. cited; 2 Rol. 393, agreed. See Attorney-General v. Gradyll, Bunb. 29;

but note, that it was not necessary to decide this point; and see Orby v. Mohun, 2 Vern. 542.

(*b*) See Palm. 436.

So, wherever a power is given, whether over real or personal estate, and whether the execution of it will confer the legal or only equitable right on the appointee, if the power repose a personal trust and confidence in the donee of it, to exercise his own judgment and discretion, he cannot refer the power to the execution of another, for *delegatus non potest delegare*. Therefore, where a power of sale is given to trustees or executors they cannot sell by attorney (*c*). So, where a father had a power of appointment to his children over a real estate, and he delegated the power to his wife, Lord Hardwicke said that this must be considered as a power of attorney, which could be executed only by the husband, to whom it was solely confined, and was not in its nature transmissible or delegatory to a third person (*d*). Again, where personal estate was given to such charitable use as *A* should appoint; and he directed the money to be applied as *B* should appoint, Lord Hardwicke held the delegation void (*e*). So, where a testator gave his wife a power to appoint personalty amongst their children, and she delegated this power by her will to others, Sir Thomas Clarke determined that the delegation was void (*f*); and the point has been so decided by Lord Rosslyn (*g*). On the same ground, a person whose consent is made requisite to the due execution of

(*c*) Combes's case, 9 Rep. 75 b.

(*d*) Ingram v. Ingram, 2 Atk. 38; and see Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Scho. and Lef. 330.

(*e*) Attorney-General v. Berryman, 2 Ves. 643, cited; and

see Doyley v. Attorney-General, 4 Vin. Abr. 485, pl. 15.

(*f*) Alexander v. Alexander, 2 Ves. 640.

(*g*) Bristow v. Warde, 2 Ves. Jun. 336.

of a power, cannot authorize another as his attorney to consent to any execution of it (*h*).

It is frequently contended in practice, that a donee of a power cannot execute a deed of appointment by attorney. But the Cases by no means authorize this position. They merely establish that the donee cannot delegate the *confidence and discretion* reposed in him to another. Where the deed of appointment is actually prepared, or the donee points out the precise appointment which he is desirous should be made, there no confidence, no discretion, is delegated. The appointment is in every respect an exercise of his own judgment; and there cannot be any reason why he should not be permitted to execute the *deed* of appointment by attorney. The contrary doctrine would lead to great inconvenience. Where, however, a particular mode of execution is required, it would be difficult to support an execution by attorney.

Here we must be careful to distinguish cases where the power is originally authorized to be executed by the donee of the power and *his assigns*; for in those cases where the power is annexed to an interest in the donee, it will pass with it to any person who comes to the estate under him, although there are twenty mesne assignments; and whether the claimant is an assignee in fact, or an assignee in law, as an heir or executor (*i*). In like manner the donee of a power not annexed to an interest may delegate the power by virtue of an *express authority* in the deed by which it was created (*k*).

(*h*) *Hawkins v. Kemp*, 3 East, 338, 339; 1 Freem. 476. 2 Jo. 410. See *Attorney-General v.* 110. 2 Show. 57.

Scott, 1 Ves. 413.

(*k*) See *Palliser v. Ord*, Bunb.

(*i*) *How v. Whitfield*, 1 Ventr. 166.

In a late case, where the trust was to dispose of the property unto such of the relations and kindred of the testator, in such manner, &c. as his executors should think proper, leaving it to the discretion of them, and the heirs, executors, and administrators of the survivor of them, the trustees died, and the survivor devised all the trust-estates to *A* and *B*, and made them executors, as to the personal part of the property; and it was contended that they might execute the power. The Master of the Rolls decided the contrary. He said, that wherever a power is of a kind that indicates a personal confidence, it must *primâ facie* be understood to be confined to the individual to whom it is given, and will not, except by express words, pass to others, to whom, by legal transmission, the same character may happen to belong. The power was not appendant to the estate; by itself it was incapable of alienation; and it was only *quasi persona designata* that it could go to the heir. The devisees did not answer that description. The power, therefore, was not vested in them (*l*).

Where the power is tantamount to an ownership, and does not involve any confidence or personal judgment, it may be executed by attorney in the same manner as a fee-simple may be conveyed by attorney. Thus, when the statute of 1 Rich. III. gave *cestui que use* power to dispose of the legal estate, it was determined that he might execute his power by attorney (*m*). It appears

(*l*) *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. Jun. 27. cited *ibid.*; and see *Warren v. Arthur*, 2 Mod. 317, and

(*m*) *Anon. Dy.* 288, a. pl. 30; *Combes's case*, 9 Rep. 75, b. and *Bishop of London v. Kellet*,

appears to be on the same ground, that where an estate is limited generally to such uses as a man shall appoint, he may limit it to such uses as another shall appoint. The power is equivalent to the fee-simple, and is merely a species of ownership, the delegation of which involves in it no breach of trust, or dereliction of personal judgment. The consideration of this point will be resumed in a future page (*n*).

Where a power which cannot be transferred is delegated, and estates are limited over in default of any appointment by the person to whom the power is wrongfully delegated, the delegation is simply void, and the estates limited over take effect immediately (*o*).

(*n*) *Vide infra*, ch. 5, sect. 1.

(*o*) *Ingram v. Ingram*, 2 Atk. 88, *vide infra*, ch. 9, sect. 8.

SECTION II.

OF THE TRANSFER OR DELEGATION BY ACTS OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ACT OF LAW.

BY the common law, the King was not entitled to conditions vested in persons attainted, nor were they forfeited by any act in which they were not expressly named, for by the general words of all hereditaments they would not pass, although clearly hereditaments (*a*).

(*a*) See *Marquis of Winchester's case*, 3 Rep. 1.

But by the 33 H. VIII. c. 20. (I) the benefit of rights, entries, and conditions, was expressly given to the Crown: that is, the land itself was not given, but only the *benefit* of the condition, by which the land might be reduced into the possession of the party attainted had he not been attainted (*b*).

The distinction established upon this legislative provision appear to be, that where the power is inseparably annexed to the person or mind of the donee, it will not be forfeited to the Crown by his attainder; but where the thing to be done is a mere ministerial or formal act, not inseparably annexed to the person or mind of the donee, but which may be performed by one person as well as another, the power will go to the Crown.

Thus, in Dacre's case, where a grant was revocable, upon a mere tender of 5*s.* it was resolved that such a condition was given to the King (*c*). But if the power is required to be executed under the proper hand, or,
which

(*b*) See 1 Hale, P. C. 244, (*c*) 17 Eliz. adj. cited by
s. 4; 2 Hawk. P. C. 453, s. 26. Popham, Leo. 169.

(I) By the 7th Ann. c. 21, after the decease of the Pretender, no attainder for treason was to prejudice the right and title of any person, other than the right of the offender during his life. [For the history of this statute see York on Forfeiture, and 4 Black. Com. 384.] By the 17th Geo. II. c. 39, the operation of the act of Anne was suspended till the death of the Pretender's sons. If these acts had ever operated, they might have occasioned some very nice questions on the doctrine discussed in the text. But by the 39th Geo. III. c. 93, the act of Anne was wholly repealed.

which is the same, under the hand of the donee (*d*), or any other mode is pointed out to the performance of which the mind or hand of the donee himself is required, the power is not forfeited by his attainder. The difficulty is to apply this rule to the cases which arise.

In *Hardwin and Warner* (*e*), a power of revocation was given to Sir William Shelley, upon tender to the feoffees of a gold ring, or a pair of gloves of the value of 12 *d.* or above, or the sum of 12 *d.*, he the said Sir William, *tunc declarante et expressante*, that the tender was with intent to make void the feoffment. The case was decided against the Crown, first in the Exchequer, and then in the Common Pleas; but it appeared that the Attorney-General confessed judgment in the Exchequer, for (as it was asserted) a good fee; and then when he was Chief Justice of the Common Pleas he was unwilling to contradict his former confession. The difficulty in this case was considerable. When the

case

(*d*) Duke of Norfolk's case, 564, 608, 644, 763, 7 2; 7 Rep. 13, a, cited; *Smith v. Wheeler*, 1 Ventr. 128; 1 Lev. 279; 1 Mod. 16, 38; 2 Keb. 102; 2 Roll. 393; Palm. 429; Noy, 79.

(*e*) 1 Jo. 134; Latch. 25, 69,

(I) This case of *Smith v. Wheeler* was first heard in error when Kelynge was Chief Justice, who remarked, that "if this way be taken, a man may commit treason pretty cheaply." See 1 Mod. 40, and see 2 Keb. 645. And Kelynge deterred Serjeant Maynard from pleading against the Crown according to his retainer, by putting it upon him at his peril, on forfeiture of his patent! The case arose upon an act of attainder similar to the Act of Hen. VIII.

case was argued in B. R. it was admitted on all hands, that if a tender of a ring, &c., only had been required, the benefit of the power would have been forfeited, and it was also conceded, that in every case of a tender there must be a declaration, although not expressly required by the power. Whitlock and Jones, on these grounds, held that the words *ipso declarante* were only what the law would have implied, and *expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur*. On the other hand, Crew, Chief Justice, and Dodridge (I), held that the power was inseparably annexed to Sir William's person. They with great reason took a distinction between a general declaration implied by law, and a special declaration like this, which they thought was *personal* to Sir William Shelley.

In a subsequent case a decision was pronounced, which savours but too much of the despotic times in which it was made. I allude to Englefield's case (f). In a settlement made by Sir Francis Englefield on his nephew, it was expressed, that because his nephew was an infant, so that his proof was not then seen, and because his uncle did not think convenient to settle the inheritance in the nephew absolutely, so long as the uncle should live, without a bridle to restrain him, if after he should be prodigal, or should be given to intolerable vices:

(f) 7 Reports, 78; Mo. 303, 4 Leonard, 135, 169, and other the best report; Popham, 18; books.

(I) Palmer's is perhaps the best report of this case; and he says that Randall agreed with Crew and Dodridge: but however this may be, the judgment of C. B. was of course affirmed.

vices: Therefore it was provided, that if the uncle by himself, or by any other during his life, delivered or offered to the nephew a gold ring to the intent to make void the uses, that then all the uses should be void. Manwood, Chief Baron, and Clerke and Gent, Barons, held that the power was forfeited by the attainder of Sir Francis. They said that the whole force and effect of the condition did consist in the tender of the ring, and that the reason and the cause which moved and induced him to have the said power and bridle in himself, was *not any parcel of the proviso, but a flourish and preamble*, and nothing was parcel of the condition, but that which came after the proviso, and that was the tender of the ring. Sir Edward Coke reports, that the counsel for the defendant, (of whom he was one), were dissatisfied with this decision, and their advice was to bring a writ of error; but in order to set the question at rest, an act of Parliament was immediately passed to establish the forfeiture, which plainly evinces that the court-party was resolved to obtain the estate, whatever might be the law on the question. The Act (*g*), after reciting the attainder and the conveyance, with the proviso, enacted, that the Queen was lawfully entitled to take advantage of the proviso, in the same form as Sir Francis might have done, and that the proviso was well performed by the Queen's commission (*h*).

These cases, however, cease to be important at the present day, as questions of a similar nature never arise. Happily the nation is no longer rent by those intestine

(*g*) 35 Eliz. c. 5.

(*h*) Hale, P. C. 245.

intestine struggles which lead men of property to incur the guilt of treason. The practice of requiring a tender of money, gloves, &c., or the performance of any act which could, by the greatest stretch, be construed as not inseparably annexed to the mind or hand of the donee of the power, has been long since entirely discontinued; and instead thereof, it became usual to require the power to be executed by the donee, by writing under his hand, to which certain other solemnities were in general required; and this is the mode in which powers are reserved at the present day. Now such powers, as we have seen, are not forfeited, under the existing laws, by attainder for treason; and it can scarcely be supposed that penalties will ever be attached to treason by the legislature, which the court dared not to impose in the worst of times.

Where the power is given to the Crown, the ability to perform it is also given as incident to it. The King may commission another by letters patent to perform the act, and upon performance of it the old uses determine without office found (*i*).

But even where the benefit of the power is given to the King, it must of course be executed during the life of the original donee of the power, for with his death the power ceases.

Thus we have seen how tender the law is in these cases, and that powers annexed to the mind or hand of the donee do not pass to the Crown, notwithstanding the express words of the statute of Henry VIII.

But where the King's debtor has a power of revocation

(*i*) Englefield's case, *Hardwin v. Warner*, *ubi sup.*

tion for his own benefit, whatever are the ceremonies required to its execution, and although he die without executing the power, the land may be extended for the debt by virtue of the King's prerogative. The Judges have in all times been studious to advance the remedy for the recovery of the King's debts, for (as Dodridge observed) it is for the increase of his treasury, and the treasury is the King's strength, and the King's strength is *vinculum pacis* and *nervus belli*, the overflowing fountain of his beneficence and benevolence (*k*).

So where the donee of a power of revocation commits a contempt against the King's prerogative, the lands may be seized in the same manner as if he had executed the power for his own benefit. Thus, where a man having a power to revoke a settlement went abroad, and the King sent his privy seal to him, requiring him to return into the realm, which he refused to do, upon oath of the fact made by the messenger by whom the privy-seal was sent, process was issued against the terre-tenants, and judgment was given that they should forfeit the lands for the contempt (*l*) (I).

In the Act 41 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 26, for the relief of Insolvent Debtors, after reciting that many persons who might be entitled to claim the benefit of the Act
were

(*k*) Sir Edward Coke's case,
2 Roll. 294, Godb. 289.

(*l*) Sir Robert Dudlie's case,
2 Roll. 304, cited.

(I) That is, till the return of the person committing the contempt, when he is liable to fine and imprisonment. See William de Brittain's case, Dy. 128, b. pl. 61, cited. The Fugitive's case, Dy. 375, b. pl. 21 ; 1 Hawk. P. C. pa. 59, s. 4.

were seised and possessed of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, to hold to such debtors for the term of their natural lives, with power of granting leases and taking fines, receiving small rents on such estates for one, two, or three lives in possession or reversion, or for some number of years determinable upon lives, or had powers over real or personal estate which such debtors could execute for their own advantage, it is enacted, that all the powers of leasing such hereditaments, and all other such powers as aforesaid, over real and personal estate, which were or should be vested in any such prisoner or prisoners as aforesaid, were thereby vested in the assignees of his estate, to be by such assignees executed for the benefit of all the creditors of such prisoners. And in the general Act (53 Geo. 3, c. 102,) the assignee of the insolvent's property is empowered to execute any power vested in or created for the use or benefit of such insolvent (*m*). And after reciting, that a prisoner who might be entitled to and claim the benefit of the said Act, might be seised and possessed, or entitled to lands, tenements or hereditaments, to hold to such prisoner for the term of his life, or other limited estate, with power of granting leases, or might have powers over real or personal estate which such prisoner could execute for his or her own advantage, and which said powers ought to be executed for the benefit of the creditors of such prisoner, in every such case all powers of leasing, and such other powers as aforesaid, over real or personal estate, which are vested in any such prisoner, are by the Act vested in the assignee of the real and personal estate of such prisoner,

(*m*) Sect. 18.

prisoner, to be by such assignee executed for the benefit of the creditors (*n*).

In the Act 1 Geo. 4, c. 119, s. 12, for the relief of insolvent debtors, after reciting that many persons who might claim the benefit, or be brought within the operation of the Act, were seised and possessed of lands, tenements and hereditaments, to hold for the term of their natural lives, with power of granting leases and taking fines, reserving small rents on such estate for one, two, or three lives in possession or reversion, or for some number of years determinable upon lives, or had powers over such real or personal estate which such prisoners could execute for their own advantage, and which said powers ought to be executed for the benefit of the creditors of such prisoner, it is enacted, that in every such case all and every the powers of leasing such lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all other such powers as aforesaid over such real or personal estates which are or shall be vested in any such prisoner as aforesaid, shall and are thereby vested in the assignee or assignees of the real and personal estate of such prisoner, by virtue of the said Act, so far as the prisoner could by law vest such power in any person to whom he might lawfully have conveyed such property, to be by such assignee or assignees executed for the benefit of all and every the creditors of such prisoner as aforesaid.

In the 43 Geo. 3, c. 75, s. 3, in relation to the estates of lunatics, after reciting that many persons found lunatic, or of unsound mind, as in the Act is mentioned, may be seised and possessed of freehold and copyhold lands,

(*n*) Sec. 26 ; and see 54 Geo. 3, c. 23.

lands, tenements and hereditaments, either for the term of their natural lives, or for some other estate, with power of granting leases and taking fines, reserving small rents on such leases for one, two, or three lives in possession or reversion, or for some number of years determinable upon lives, or for terms of years absolutely, it was enacted, that in every such case all and every power of leasing such lands, tenements and hereditaments, which is or shall be vested in such person so found lunatic, or of unsound mind, having a limited estate only, shall and may be executed by the committee or committees of the estates of such person, under the direction and order of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper, or Lords Commissioners for the custody of the great seal of the United Kingdom, and of Ireland respectively, being duly intrusted by virtue of the King's sign-manual with the care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estates of such persons ; and such lease or leases so to be executed by the same committee and committees, under and by virtue of such order, shall be as good and effectual in law as if the same were executed by the said person so found lunatic, or of unsound mind, in his or her sound mind.

And here we must notice the case of a power of appointment vested in a bankrupt. The statute of 13th Elizabeth, c. 7, sect. 2, enables the commissioners to dispose of any estate, for such use, right or title as such offender then shall have in the same, "which he may lawfully depart withal." And the statute of 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, sect. 1, directs the bankrupt laws to be expounded most favourably for the relief of creditors. We have already seen that a power is a mere right to declare the

trust of the estate, upon which declaration the statute of uses immediately operates. It is therefore clearly a use, interest, or right, which the bankrupt *may lawfully depart withal*; and there is considerable ground to contend that the bargain and sale of the commissioners should have the same operation as a due execution of the power by the bankrupt whilst solvent would have had; but Lord King is said to have held, that in the case of a tenant for life, with power to charge 100 l., the power was not such an interest as would pass to the assignees (*o*). And in a case where an estate was settled on the father for life, remainder to the son in fee, and a power was given to the father to raise 5,000 l. for his children, or for the benefit of creditors, or any other purpose, and the father became a bankrupt, it was held that the power did not pass (*p*). In a late case, where a bankrupt had a general power of appointment, it was not contended that the power was executed by the bargain and sale, but it was prayed that the bankrupt might execute the power in favour of the creditors. The bankrupt demurred, and Lord Eldon allowed the demurrer. His Lordship held, that he had no power to compel the execution by the bankrupt of the power (*q*). He was not called upon to say whether the power was executed by the bargain and sale; but his opinion appears to have been, that the power did not vest in the assignees; and upon a bill filed by the assignees

against

(*o*) See 2 Ves. 3.

(*p*) Assignees of Griffith v. Griffith, cor. Chief Baron; Car-mar. 2d Sept. 1818.

(*q*) Thorpe v. Goodall, 17 Ves. jun. 388, 460. 1 Rose, 40. But

in this case no appointment was necessary, the bankrupt was tenant for life, remainder to such uses as he should appoint, remainder to the heirs of his body. This remainder coalesced with

against the purchaser in the same case, the Vice-Chancellor was of that opinion (*r*).

This point is put at rest by the 6th Geo. 4. c. 16, s. 77, which enacts that all powers vested in any bankrupt which he might legally execute for his own benefit (except the right of nomination to any vacant ecclesiastical benefice) may be executed by the assignees for the benefit of the creditors, in such manner as the bankrupt might have executed the same.

the life-estate *sub modo*, that is, subject to the powers, and consequently the bankrupt was tenant in tail. The bargain and sale barred the estate-tail and

remainders over, and also destroyed the power; and so it has since been held.

(*r*) *Thorp v. Frere*, V. C. M. T. 1819.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE EXECUTION OF POWERS.

WE now enter on a large field of inquiry. I propose to consider, 1. The mode in which a power ought to be executed, particularly with reference to the statute of uses. 2. By what instruments it may be exercised, where the power is silent in that respect. 3. Where conditions or restrictions required or annexed to the execution of powers are duly complied with. 4. At what time a power may be executed, which will involve the consideration of partial executions. 5. Where a power is well executed, although not referred to, and the donee has not an *interest* in the estate. 6. What is deemed an execution of a power where a man has both a power and an interest. 7. What qualifications may be annexed by persons executing powers ; and, 8th and lastly, The effect of the execution.

SECTION I.

OF THE EXECUTION OF POWERS, PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE STATUTE OF USES.

FIRST then, we must bear in mind that a power is a mere right to limit a use. Now the statute, as we have seen, executes only the first use, or, as it is usually
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expressed,

expressed, a use upon a use is void. This rule therefore renders it indispensably necessary to appoint *immediately* to the person intended to take, unless the parties are desirous that he shall not have the legal estate; for if the estate should be appointed to *A*, to the use of *B*, *A* would be the person to whom the use would arise under the original seisin; and by force of the statute the legal estate would be vested in him; then the use to *B*, being limited to arise out of the use to *A*, would be void at law, although good as a trust in equity. To apply this point to practice, let us suppose an estate to stand limited to such uses as *A* shall appoint by deed, to be executed in the presence of, and attested by, two witnesses, and that *A* is desirous of conveying the estate to such uses as *B* shall appoint. The appointment should run thus (I): Now this indenture witnesseth, That in consideration, &c. and pursuant to, and by force and virtue, and in exercise and execution of the power or authority to him the said *A* for this purpose given or limited by the hereinbefore in part recited indenture, [the deed creating the power, which should always be recited], and of every or any other power or authority in any wise enabling him in this behalf, he the said *A*, doth by this present deed, by him sealed and delivered in the presence of and attested by the two credible persons whose names are intended to be hereupon indorsed, as witnesses attesting the sealing and delivery of these presents, by him the said *A*, direct,

(I) See a precedent of such an appointment at length, Appendix, No. 8.

A, direct, limit, and appoint, That all that [parcels and general words], shall henceforth remain and be to the use of such person or persons, &c. as *B* shall appoint in the usual manner. By this mode, the estates which may be created by *B*, under the power vested in him, will at once, by force of the statute of uses, attract the original seisin; and, we shall hereafter see, take effect in the same manner as if they were expressly limited in the deed creating the power. But if the appointment had been made to *B* and his heirs, to the uses, the statute would instantly vest the legal estate in *B*, and the intended uses would be mere trusts in equity.

In *Rich v. Beaumont* (*n*), a question arose upon the doctrine under discussion, which ought not to be passed unnoticed. By a settlement, an estate was vested in trustees in fee, upon trusts, but the wife had a general power of revocation and appointment, which she exercised by will, and devised the estate to her son and husband, and then "she ordered and directed, that her trustees, or such of them as should be living named in the settlement, should convey their trust estate to such uses, and for such persons as were named in her will." Upon a bill filed in equity by the husband, to confirm the appointment, and obtain a conveyance of the legal estate, Lord Chancellor King dismissed it, and as against the trustees with costs, his Lordship declaring, that if the husband had any title to the premises in question, his remedy was proper at law, and not in equity. From this decree there was an appeal to the

(*n*) 3 Bro. P. C. 308.

House of Lords; and for the appellant it was insisted, that by the clause in the will, directing the trustees to convey the estate to the uses of the will, she expressly declared her intention to be, that the legal estate should remain in the trustees. And that if the will was construed to enure as a revocation of the legal estate out of the trustees, rather than as a declaration of the trusts of that estate, the same would, by such construction, be made to enure contrary to the express words thereof, and contrary to the manifest intention of the party therein declared. For the respondent, it was insisted, that if the will was a good revocation, the uses limited to the trustees were revoked, and consequently their legal estate was taken away and vested in the appellant, and then there was no foundation for his applying to a court of equity to have a conveyance from the trustees. The House of Lords reversed the decree, and ordered a case to be referred to the Court of King's Bench for their opinion, "Whether the trusts limited by the will be uses executed, or trusts." It does not appear what the opinion of the Judges on this point was. There can, however, be little doubt but that in this respect they agreed with Lord Chancellor King. Where the legal estate is required to be in trustees, to preserve contingent remainders, &c. a clause like that in the above will may well be holden to operate as an appointment to the trustees; and then the persons beneficially entitled will take mere trust-estates; but where, as in the above case, the effect of giving the legal estate to trustees, would merely be to make a conveyance from them necessary, the first appointment ought certainly to be deemed a limitation of the use, so as to carry the legal

legal estate ; and the subsequent clause may be struck out as repugnant or superfluous.

It will be collected from the precedent in a preceding page, 1st, that the deed executing the power should be expressed to be in exercise of it ; 2dly, of every other authority enabling the donee in that behalf ; and, 3dly, that it should be shown in the body of the deed that the formalities required to the execution of the power are complied with. Every well-drawn deed of appointment embraces these three points ; the first clearly evinces the intention of the person executing the power, which is particularly necessary where he has an interest as well as a power ; the second guards against any misrecital of the deed creating the power, and in some cases has reached powers which have been understood to be extinguished ; and the third affords internal evidence of the ceremonies having been complied with. And, moreover, the attestation indorsed on a deed executing a power should always state precisely that the formalities were attended to. How far these circumstances are absolutely essential to the valid execution of the power will appear hereafter (o).

Where a man has both a power and an interest, for example, a general power of appointment, with the fee, or any less estate in default of appointment he is constantly made not only to exercise his power, but also to convey his interest. This may appear to be unnecessary, as the execution of the power divests the estates limited in default of its execution ; but it is done in most cases, to guard against the power having been suspended or

(o) As to the first and second, see *post*, s. 6 ; and as to the third, see *post*, s. 3.

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destroyed, in some, to guard against any defect in the creation of the power. The correct mode of effecting this is, first, to exercise the power, and limit the estate to the uses afterwards declared : and then, by a separate witnessing part, to convey the estate to the intended uses. Indeed this should always be done where the fee-simple is intended to be conveyed to uses, although, as we shall hereafter see, if the estate be limited and appointed, granted and released to *A*, to the uses, the courts will endeavour to construe the conveyance a release, and to consider the words of appointment as mere surplusage, in order to effectuate the intention (*p*). This, however cannot be done where the conveying party has not the fee in default of appointment.

Where it is intended to vest the fee-simple in the party to whom the appointment and release are made, although it would certainly be an inartificial mode of conveyance, yet a deed, in which the appointment and release were blended, would effectually vest the fee in the appointee and releasee, and be entirely free from objection. But although it is usual not only to exercise the power, but also to convey the interest, yet even a purchaser would not be entitled to require a conveyance of the interest, limited in default of appointment, unless it could be conveyed without a fine, or common recovery. There are many cases in which a purchaser is compelled to take an estate merely under an execution of a power, as where, in default of appointment, the estate is limited in strict settlement.

The usual limitation to bar dower is to such uses as
the

(*p*) *Vide infra*, sect. 6.

the purchaser shall appoint; and in default of appointment, to him for life, remainder to a trustee and his *heirs* during the life of the purchaser, in trust for him (I), remainder to the purchaser in fee. This limitation

(I) Instead of limiting the estate to the trustee and his *heirs*, it is sometimes limited to him, his *executors and administrators*, it being understood that executors or administrators may take as special occupants. Lord Hardwicke always treated this point as clear; *Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin*, 2 Ves. 61; *Williams v. Jekyll*, 2 Ves. 681; *Westfaling v. Westfaling*, 3 Atk. 460; 7 Ves. jun. 446, cited from Lord Hardwicke's notes; and Lord Eldon has expressed the same opinion; see *Ripley v. Waterworth*, 7 Ves. jun. 425. But in the case of *Campbell v. Sandys*, 1 Sch. and Lef. 281, Lord Redesdale said, that the old authorities seemed the other way, and if the case were before him, he should feel great difficulty in determining according to the apparent opinion of Lord Hardwicke. Lord Redesdale, in support of his opinion, referred to two cases stated in Ro. Abr. tit. Occupant (G.) 2 and 3; the first of which is reported in *Dyer*, 328, b. pl. 10, and in Leonard's third volume, p. 35, by the name of Lord Windsor's case, and is stated by Rolle as a determination, that if a lease be made of land to a man and his executors *pur autur vie*, the executor shall be special occupant, although it be a freehold. He also referred to Comyn's Digest, Estates, F. 1, tit. Occupant, where the case in *Dyer* is stated as a decision, that the executor shall not have the land as special occupant, for an occupant has the freehold, which an executor cannot take; and Comyn also refers to the second case stated by Rolle, as an authority for this point. "That case," my Lord Redesdale added, "Which was long subsequent to the case in *Dyer*, is certainly in conformity to the opinion of Comyn; and according to *Salter v. Butler*, Moore, 664, Cro. Eliz. 901, Yelv. 9; and the law seems to have been understood by Peere Williams, 3 P. W. 264, note D. as so settled, though Peere Williams does not appear satisfied with it."

Now it is not too much to say, that no point is in practice considered

tation has two objects ; the one to enable the purchaser, by an exercise of his power, to convey the estate without

sidered more clear than that an executor or administrator may take a freehold estate as special occupant. The contrary opinion seems to have arisen from the case of a corporeal hereditament, of which there may be an occupancy, and the case of an incorporeal hereditament, as a rent, of which there cannot be any occupancy, having been confounded. Rolle seems to have drawn a just conclusion from the case in Dyer and Leonard. It appears to have been taken for granted in that case, that an executor might be a special occupant, but there the tenant *pur autur vie* had made a lease ; and the question was, whether the *lessee* should not be occupant. In the next case stated by Rolle, the determination was, that of a freehold *rent* the executor could not be special occupant. Lord C. B. Comyn without doubt confounded these cases ; for, in support of his position, that an executor cannot take a freehold as special occupant, he refers at once to the case in Dyer, and the last case in Rolle, whereas that case turned upon a corporeal, this upon an incorporeal, hereditament : no two cases can be more distinct. The reason stated by Comyn, "that an occupant has the freehold, which an executor cannot take," is copied from Rolle's last case ; but there the reason is, "because that *that* [viz. the *rent*] is a freehold, which cannot descend to the executor," and not that a freehold generally may not be taken by an executor as special occupant. The case of *Salter v. Butler*, which is referred to by Comyn and by Lord Redesdale, was also the case of a rent, and there the claim was by an administrator, and the rent was granted to the intestate, his executors and assigns, so that he could not claim as an occupant, because the interest was not capable of occupancy, not by the grant, because he was not an assignee. As to Peere Williams, he simply refers to the second case in Rolle, to show that an executor cannot be a special occupant of a rent, although he seems to think that upon principle, an executor might be a special occupant of even a rent as well as an heir ; so that if his opinion should be thought to bear upon the point, it is in favour of the executor's ability to take as special occupant.

Lord

out the concurrence of his trustee, and the other by interposing the limitation to the trustee, to prevent the fee from vesting in the purchaser in default of appointment, (for it was formerly doubted whether a right of dower attaching on the inheritance could be defeated by the execution of the power) (*q*), and, at the same time, to leave no legal estate outstanding, when the object for which it was created has ceased to exist (*r*). When the owner sells, although it is clear that by virtue of his power he may convey the fee to the purchaser, yet I may say that it is almost the universal practice of the Profession, not only to make the vendor exercise his power, but also to make the vendor and his trustee convey their interests in default of appointment. Sometimes

(*q*) Vide *infra*, s. 8. (*r*) See n. (I) to Gilb. on Uses, p. 321.

Lord C. B. Gilbert has taken the precise distinctions on this head, for which he refers to Rolle's Abridgment, and the case in Dyer. That learned writer lays it down as clear, that an executor may take a freehold as special occupant: for though it be a freehold, which in course of law would not go to executors, yet they may be designed by the particular words in the grant to take as occupants; and such designation will exclude the occupation of any other person, because the parties themselves, who originally had the possession, have filled it up by this appointment. But, he adds, that if a *rent* be granted to *J. S.* and his executors, during the life of *B.*, by the death of *J. S.* the rent is determined, because the executors cannot take as special occupants, since the nature of the thing lying in agreement is not capable of occupation; nor can they take by the grant, because then they must take as representatives, which they cannot be of a freehold; and the law will not permit people at their pleasure to vary the course of descent. Bac. Abr. tit. Estate for life, s. 3; and see *Favery v. Dyer*, Ambl. 140.

times a difficulty arises in procuring the concurrence of the trustee; and if the purchaser is satisfied that the power was well created, and is in existence, he may safely dispense with his concurrence. But if this be not the case, the purchaser ought to insist on the trustee joining, because the entire fee-simple could not be gained without a conveyance from him. Besides, it might turn out that the owner had destroyed his power, and forfeited his life-estate; in which case the freehold in possession would be vested in the trustee, and an ejectment could not be maintained under a conveyance in which he did not join. Whether a purchaser is in all cases entitled to insist upon the concurrence of the trustee is, perhaps, not a clear point. In a case nearly similar to this, in the year 1748, Mr. Marriott and Mr. Wilbraham thought that the purchaser could not insist upon the concurrence of the trustee, but this appears to have proceeded, in a great measure, from their opinion, that in the case before them the limitation to the trustee was contingent. Mr. Booth thought the limitation a vested remainder; and he considered the trustee to be a necessary party to join in the conveyance to the purchaser. He said, although it were true, that if the vendor's power remained entire, untouched, unextinguished, or suspended, then the use might well enough arise to the purchaser; yet he might venture to affirm he never saw a deed settled with good advice, but what not only contained an appointment in virtue of the power, but also a grant by way of conveying the estate and interest of the vendor, and all claiming under or in trust for him. The parties agreed to be bound by Mr. Filmer's opinion; and he thought with Mr. Booth,

that

that the purchaser was entitled to require the concurrence of the trustee, who accordingly joined (*s*).

In a preceding page I put the case of an estate being conveyed to such uses as *A* shall appoint, and of his desire to convey the estate as *B* shall appoint. Perhaps there is no conveyancer to whom, in the early part of his professional life, a doubt has not presented itself in regard to the validity of such an appointment. Two objections have been made to it which have come within my observation; the one, that it is contrary to a known principle that a power cannot be delegated; and the other, that it is a new attempt at a perpetuity. Both these objections are easily answered. As to the first, the rule that a power cannot be delegated, is not, as we have seen, a general inflexible rule, but is simply a regulation, that a *confidence* reposed in one cannot by him be delegated to another (*t*). This rule, therefore, is inapplicable to the case before us. For no *confidence* was reposed in *A*, but the estate was, merely for his own convenience, conveyed to such uses generally as he should appoint. In regard to the second objection, the limitation has no greater tendency to a perpetuity than a simple conveyance in fee. Under the power in question, the donee may tie up the estate for exactly the same period, but not longer than he could were he seised in fee. This will be explained hereafter (*u*). To recur once more to the *nature* of powers, let us put the same case *before* the statute. *A* seised in fee, in trust to dispose of it as *B* shall direct; *B* directs *A* to dispose of it as *C* shall direct. To this no objection can

(*s*) 2 vol. Ca. and Opin. 29,
and MS. in *tot. verbis*.

(*t*) Vide *supra*, ch. 4, sect. 1.

(*u*) Vide *infra*, ch. 2, sect. 1.

can possibly be framed. Then comes the statute, which does not operate with effect till the last power is exercised. When *B* exercises his power, it in truth operates as a transfer of his equitable estate or right, and the seisin originally created (whether it remain in *A*, or be *in nubibus*, or in *terra incognita*, or in *custodia legis*) waits until estates are raised by *C*'s power; and when this last power is exercised, and not till then, the statute transfers the legal estate.

In well-drawn deeds, in which powers of sale and exchange, and of appointment of new trustees of real estate are inserted, it is usual to give the trustees of the powers an express authority to revoke the old uses, and to appoint such new uses as will effectuate the intention of the parties, and the declaration for this purpose cannot be too general. Therefore, in the power of sale, it should not be declared that the trustees shall appoint to the purchaser in fee, as a doubt might be entertained by some, whether it warranted an appointment to uses to bar dower; but the trustees should be authorized to limit such uses as will carry the contract into execution. It is not however necessary to give *express* powers of revocation and new appointment; for, whatever be the form in which a power of sale is given, it will operate as a power of revocation and new appointment, and may be executed accordingly. Thus, it was clearly holden by the Lord Keeper, in the Bishop of Oxford *v.* Leighton, that a direction, that a releasee to uses in a settlement should convey to such uses as *A* should appoint, amounted to a power of revoking and limiting new uses, although the proviso was unskilfully penned (*x*).

All

(*x*) 2 Vern. 367, *supra*, ch. 2.

All old powers of sale and exchange merely express that the trustees may sell or exchange the land, and do not give express powers of revocation and new appointment. Sometimes the trustees are made merely to "appoint and make sale of," or to "appoint and sell" the lands to the uses: the words of the power being followed with the addition of the word *appoint*; and sometimes they are made to expressly revoke the uses of the settlement, and then to appoint to the new uses. Either mode will effectuate the intention. The latter is sometimes objected to by unskilful persons, as not authorized by the power; but to this objection the Bishop of Oxford's case is a decisive answer. The same observations apply to powers to appoint new trustees.

The power of appointing new trustees usually inserted in settlements, directs, that upon the appointment of a new trustee all such conveyances, &c. shall be executed as will effectually vest the estates in the old and new trustees to the uses of the settlement; and declares, that every new trustee when appointed shall have the same powers, &c. as if nominated in the deeds. Now, it seems quite clear, that no more was originally intended by this power than that the trustees to preserve contingent remainders should transfer the estate limited to them for that purpose (which is a vested (*y*) remainder), or any other estate actually vested in them, to the new trustees, who would be enabled to exercise the different powers of sale and exchange, &c. created by the settlement, under the express direction contained in the deed, that every new trustee should have the same powers as the old trustee had. But it has become usual
to

(*y*) See *Dormer v. Fortescue*, Willes, 327.

to consider it essential that the new trustees should have a seisin to serve the uses in the same manner as the old trustees had, although it does not always happen that the trustees of the powers are the persons seised to the uses, nor is it at all necessary that they should be. To raise this new seisin two deeds are necessary ; by the first, the uses of the settlement must be revoked, and the estate appointed to a stranger in fee, and the old trustees must join in conveying the estate to him, and then the stranger must re-convey (which he may do by indorsement) to the uses of the settlement, in the same manner as if the new trustee's name had been inserted therein. The power of revocation and new appointment is considered to be clearly implied by the declaration in the power, and supposing no such power to exist, yet the estates to preserve contingent remainders are effectually vested in the old and new trustees by the actual conveyance. This mode assumes that there is a seisin in the releasees to serve the uses, and that that seisin is transferable, for otherwise it would not be necessary to defeat the old uses, and raise a new seisin in the old and new trustees to serve them. If it ever should become necessary to decide the point, there is little doubt but that it will be determined, 1. That the power only meant that the estates actually vested in the trustees shall be transferred to the old and new trustees, which may be done by one deed operating under the statute of uses : 2. That they may then exercise the powers created by the settlement : and, consequently, 3. That there is no seisin in the trustees to transfer, and therefore the revocation and appointment is nugatory and of no effect. Of course these observations do not apply to
a case

a case where the fee-simple is vested in the trustees. In that case, clearly, one conveyance only is necessary. The old trustees may convey by lease and release to the new trustee, to the use of himself and the old trustees in fee, upon the trusts.

Admitting that the usual power of appointment requires the seisin (if there be any) in the old trustees, to be vested in the new trustees, it will not be denied by the most strenuous supporters of this doctrine, that this ceremony is not necessary where the power expressly negatives that construction: the powers in the settlement, it is quite clear, may be executed by a person not having any seisin vested in him to serve the uses; therefore, to prevent the necessity of this artificial, circuitous mode of appointing new trustees, it might be advisable to expressly declare in the deed creating the power, that upon the appointment of any new trustee the estate of the trustees to preserve contingent remainders shall be conveyed to the continuing and new trustees; and that every new trustee may act in the execution of the powers, without being invested with the seisin (if any) in the old trustees to serve the contingent or future uses. The usual power of revocation and new appointment introduced into this power of appointing new trustees is, however, to be preferred, as its operation is now generally known: a circumstance which is in practice of infinitely greater importance than the expense of an additional deed.

The distinctions taken in a preceding chapter, between powers deriving their effect from the statute of uses and common-law authorities, will have led the reader to observe, that the observations in the opening of this chapter,

chapter, as to the necessity of appointing to the uses at once, do not apply to common-law powers.

Where the power is given by will, without a seisin to serve the estates to be created, it is a mere common-law authority; and it should therefore seem that an appointment by virtue of such a power to *A*, to uses, would not of itself vest the legal estate in *A*, but would give the legal estate to the real objects of the appointment; for the question is free from the technical objection of a use upon a use, and the single point to be ascertained is the intention. The appointment merely operates as the designation of a person to take under the will, a devise to him, by which, either directly, or through the medium of a devisee to uses, would have given him the legal estate according to the intention of the testator. But where the power is given through the medium of a devisee to uses, if it should be thought that it operates under the statute (*z*), the appointment must receive the same construction as an appointment under a like power created by *deed*. Powers under wills and deeds are both distinguishable from a power to convey an estate under a letter of attorney. The estates raised by the execution of a power (whether it be created by deed or will) take effect as if limited in the instrument creating the power. A devise of an authority is within the statute of wills (*a*), and when the authority is exercised the estates created by it come in lieu of the authority. In the case of a deed creating a power, the seisin or interest to serve the estates is actually raised by the deed itself, and the estates limited under the power accordingly derive their essence from that seisin; but in the case of a common
letter

(*z*) Vide *supra*, p. 129.

(*a*) *Townesend v. Walley*, Mo. 341.

letter of attorney, no seisin is created, nor does the *estate* pass by or by virtue of the power, which merely authorizes the attorney to *convey* the estate in the name of the principal. The conveyance is, in fact, the deed of the principal, and it is considered as executed by him. It is therefore necessary that the deed should be an operative, independent, and substantive conveyance. If it be a feoffment, it must be accompanied with livery of seisin; if it be a bargain and sale, it must be enrolled; and if it be a release, it must be grounded on a bargain and sale for a year under the statute, or a lease at common law with actual entry. And the land may consequently be conveyed to one to uses, and the statute will execute the uses. The estates created will depend simply on the instrument in which they are contained, although the deed itself depends for its validity *as a conveyance* upon the letter of attorney, by virtue of which it was executed; for the power must be produced before the deed can be read in a court of justice (*b*). And we may here dismiss the consideration of letters of attorney with this one observation, that the deed must be executed in the name of the principal; but where that is done, it is immaterial whether the attorney place his own name first or last. Therefore, an execution thus, “for *A. B.* (the principal), *C. D.* (the attorney), *L. S.*” is valid (*c*).

It is usual to declare in powers of revocation and new appointment, that the donee may revoke, and by the *same*, or any other deed, appoint new uses; but it is clear, that without this provision, a power of revocation and new

(*b*) *Johnson v. Mason*, 1 Esp. Rep. 89.

(*c*) *Wilks v. Backs*, 2 East, 142.

appointment may be executed by the same instrument, unless the deed creating the power expressly require distinct deeds. The former uses cease *ipso facto* by the revocation, without entry or claim (*d*). The instrument is, in construction of law, first a revocation of the old uses, and then a limitation of the new uses (*e*). Nor is this the only case in which the law adjudges priority in distinct parts of one and the same deed. It is upon this principle that a lease and release in the same deed, although certainly a very informal conveyance, has been several times ruled to be a good conveyance, for priority shall be supposed. We have seen that every power is, in effect, a power of revocation and new appointment; and it is, therefore, in many cases of absolute necessity that the powers should be allowed to be executed by the same deed.

Where it is intended not to make an irrevocable appointment, an express power of revocation should be reserved in the deed executing the power; if it be omitted, the appointment cannot be revoked (*f*).

(*d*) See *post*, sect. 8.

(*e*) Digges's case, 1 Rep. 164—6 resol. S. C. Mo. 603; Co. Litt. 237 a.

(*f*) *Vide infra*, sect. 7.

SECTION II.

OF THE INSTRUMENTS BY WHICH A POWER
MAY BE EXECUTED.

WHERE a power is given generally, without defining the mode in which it must be executed, it may be exercised either by deed or will; and as the operation of the instrument will simply be to declare the use, to serve which he must assume that a sufficient estate is already legally created, an estate of freehold may be limited without livery of seisin, a bargain and sale for a year, or an actual entry by the appointee; nor is it necessary that the power should be executed by *deed*, a simple note in writing, even unattested, would be a good execution of the power (*a*). So whether it be a common-law authority given by will, or a power operating under the statute of uses, it may be executed by feoffment (*b*), covenant to stand seised (*c*), lease and release (*d*), or lease and release and fine (*e*). But although all these modes are effectual, yet they are improper appointments. They do not operate as a feoffment, covenant to stand

(*a*) *Saunders v. Owen*, 2 Salk. 1141; and see *Wykham v. Wykham*, 11 East, 458.
467; and see 3 East, 440.

(*b*) *Daniel v. Upley*, Latch. 9, 39. 134; 1 Jo. 137. (*d*) *Dyer v. Awsiter*, 1 P. Wms. 165, cited 10 Mod. 34, nom.

(*c*) *Stapleton's case*, cited by Hale, Chief Justice, 1 Ventr. 228; *Dame Hasting's case*, Raym. 239; 3 Keb. 511, cited *Gier v. Osseter*; *Dighton v. Thomlinson*, 1 Com. 194, 1 P. Wms. 149.

(*e*) *Vide supra*, p. 68.

S. C. Right v. Thomas, 3 Burr.

seised, lease and release, or fine ; but as an appointment of the estate, or direction or declaration of use under the power. Therefore, if a power under the statute is, for instance, executed by lease and release, upon which uses are declared, the releasee will be invested with the legal estate by force of the statute, and the real objects of the deed will take mere trust-estates.

Although where a power is not restrained to be executed by deed, &c. it may be executed by a simple note in writing, yet, if the power relate to *real* estate, and the donee exercise it by *will*, the will, it is said by most writers, must be executed as a proper will, and must consequently be attended with the solemnities required by the statute of frauds.

The cases cited for this position are Longford *v.* Eyre (*f*), and Wagstaff *v.* Wagstaff (*g*); but, in the last of these cases the trust was for *A*, his heirs and assigns, *or to such person or persons as he or they should direct*; and Lord Macclesfield held this to be no more than a common trust of lands in fee-simple, for the last words were no more than what was implied before, and *expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur*. And in the first of the above cases the power was expressly required to be exercised by “*will*,” or “writing in the nature of a *will*,” which words are construed to mean such a will as is proper for the disposition of lands within the statute of frauds ; and I have not met with even a *dictum* in the books that where a power is given generally, and without reference to any instrument, a will made in execution of it must be treated as a proper will of real estate. It seems, indeed, once to have been
holden,

(*f*) 1 P. Wms 740.

(*g*) 2 P. Wms. 258.

holden, that if a power, although not required to be so, was executed by bargain and sale, the deed must be enrolled as a proper bargain and sale ; but Lord Chief Justice Hale was decidedly against this construction (*h*). His is certainly the better opinion. And, in regard to a *will*, it would be rather a refined distinction, that the power may be executed by a simple note in writing unattested ; but that if it be thrown into the shape of a will, it must be executed in the same manner as a proper will of land. It must be admitted, that a power may be given to appoint real estate by will without any witness (*i*) ; and it would, therefore, be a great stretch to hold that three witnesses are necessary in the case under discussion.

(*h*) *Ingram v. Parker*, Raym. 239 ; 3 Keb. 511, 538 ; 1 Vent. 290, 291.

(*i*) *Vide supra*, ch. 2, sect. 1.

SECTION III.

OF THE COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS ANNEXED TO A POWER.

WE now come to the cases in which particular circumstances are required to attend the execution of the power : these are generally, first, a particular instrument ; secondly, a particular mode of execution ; and, thirdly, conditions not strictly relating to the instrument, as the consent of third persons, tender of money, or the like.

Where forms are imposed on the execution of a power, it is either to protect the remainder-man from a charge in any other mode, or to preserve the person to whom it is given from a hasty and unadvised execution of the power. In each case the circumstances must be strictly complied with : in the first, it would be in direct opposition to the agreement, to consider the estate charged when the mode pointed out is not adhered to (*a*); in the second, to dispense with the solemnities and forms required to attend the execution of the power, is to deprive a man of the bridle which he has thought proper to impose on his weakness or frailty of mind, in order effectually to guard himself against fraud and imposition (*b*). Besides, the circumstances required to the execution of a power are perfectly arbitrary, and (except only as they are in fact required) unessential in point of effect to the validity of any instrument by which the power may be exercised. This was laid down and admirably enforced by Lord Ellenborough, Chief Justice, in the great case of *Hawkins and Kemp* (*c*). There the terms of the power required that the revocation should be by deed or instrument in writing, executed in the presence of, and attested by, three credible witnesses, and enrolled in one of his Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminster, and with the consent and approbation of Hawkins's wife, his father, father-in-law, and also of several trustees, being in all nine persons. The Lord Chief Justice said, that every one of these required circumstances was in itself perfectly arbitrary, and (except only
as

(*a*) See 7 Ves. jun. 506.

(*c*) East, 410; see *Rex v.*

(*b*) 3 Cha. Cha. 66. 107; and see *Piggot v. Penrice*, Com. 250. *Inhab. of Anstrey*, 6 Mau. and Selw. 324.

as it was, in fact, required) unessential in point of effect to the legal validity of any instrument by which the old uses should be revoked, or new uses declared. It was in itself immaterial whether the instrument or writing, purporting so to revoke and declare the uses, should be by deed ; whether such deed should be executed in the presence of what and how many witnesses ; whether it should be afterwards attested by the witnesses, and ultimately enrolled in any Court of Record ; and whether it should be sanctioned by the consent and approbation of the several trustees named for that purpose. It might (if it had so pleased the parties creating the power) have been done by any writing of the persons so authorized, unsealed, unattested, unenrolled, and unsanctioned, by any consent or approbation whatsoever. If these circumstances were unessential and unimportant, except as they were required by the creators of the power, they could only be satisfied by a strictly literal and precise performance. They were incapable of admitting any substitution, because these requisitions had no spirit in them which could be otherwise satisfied ; incapable of receiving any equivalent, because they were in themselves of no value.

If, therefore, a writing is required, a disposition by parol will be invalid, although the property might by law be so disposed of (*d*). If the power is required to be executed by deed to be enrolled, the deed must accordingly be enrolled ; if a particular court be named, that court must be resorted to (*e*). If the consent of particular

(*d*) *Thruvton v. Attorney-General*, 1 Vern. 340.

(*e*) *Digges's Case*, 1 Rep. 173.

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particular persons be required, their consent must be obtained (*f*). If two witnesses are required one will not do ; if the witnesses are to be of the rank of noblemen, commoners will not satisfy the words (*g*). If sufficient subsidy-men be required as witnesses, sufficient and credible persons who are not subsidy-men will not be good witnesses (*h*). If a seal be required, an instrument under hand only, will be an invalid exercise of the power (*i*). If the instrument is to be signed, it cannot be executed otherwise (*k*) (I) ; and if signature and sealing be required, an instrument unsigned will not be valid although sealed (*l*). If notice is required to be given, the execution of the power will be void if
notice

(*f*) *Hawkins v. Kemp*, 3 East, 410 ; and see *Mansell v. Mansell*, Wilm. 36.

(*g*) *Bath and Montague's case*, 3 Cha. Ca. 55. 2 Freem. 193, affirmed in Dom. Proc.

(*h*) *Kibbet v. Lee*, Hob. 312 ; see 3 Cha. Ca. 90.

(*i*) *Dormer v. Thurland*, 2 P. Wms. 506.

(*k*) *Birde v. Stride*, Bridg. 21, cited.

(*l*) *Thayer v. Thayer*, Palm. 112 ; *Blockville v. Ascot*, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 659, side-note.

(I) The statute of frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 5,) requires wills of lands to be in writing, and *signed* by the devisor. Upon the authorities, it is a question whether *sealing* is not *signing* (*Lemayne v. Stanley*, 3 Lev. 1 ; *Lee v. Libb*, 1 Show. 69 ; *Warneford v. Warneford*, 2 Str. 764 ; *Smith v. Evans*, 1 Wils. 313 ; *Grayson v. Atkinson*, 2 Ves. 454 ; *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Dick. 225, 1 Ves. jun. 11 ; see 2 Bla. Com. 306 ; Dougl. 244, 2d edit. ; note, *Dime v. Munday*, Sid. 362, was before the statute). But, without question, if the point should ever call for a decision, it would, in conformity to the express words of the statute, and the general opinion of the Profession, be holden that sealing is not signing ; see *Morison v. Turnour*, 18 Ves. jun. 175.

notice be not given accordingly (*m*). And so in every case that the ingenuity of man can devise, the terms of the power must be complied with.

But where the appointment is to a charity, any writing, however informal, as an execution of the power, is good as an appointment within the statute of charitable uses (*n*); for this statute supplies all defects of assurance which the donor was capable of making (*o*). The intent of the statute, it has been said, was to make the disposition of the party as free and easy as his mind, and not to oblige him to the observance of any forms or ceremony (*p*). By an act of George the Second (*q*), gifts to charitable uses are required to be made by deed indented, sealed, and delivered, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, twelve months at least before the death of the donor, and the deed must be enrolled in the Court of Chancery within six calendar months after it is executed. Now this act can no more be considered as a repeal of the statute of charitable uses than the statute of frauds can of the statute of wills. And it therefore still seems, that if in an appointment the solemnities imposed by the act of George the Second are attended to, the gift will operate as an appointment under the statute of charitable uses, although the instrument is not executed in the manner required by the instrument creating the power. But as the act of
George

(*m*) *Ward v. Lenthal*, 1 Sid. 143.

(*n*) 43 Eliz. c. 4; *Piggot v. Penrice*, Com. 250; *Prec. Cha.* 471.

(*o*) *Attorney-General v. Burdet*, 2 Vern. 755.

(*p*) *Attorney-General v. Rye*, 2 Vern. 453.

(*q*) 9 Geo. II. c. 36.

George applies as well to appointments under powers as to original conveyances, if the donee wish to appoint to charitable uses, although under the *power* he might appoint by a simple note in writing unattested, yet he must conform to the directions of the act.

But to return, the rule that every circumstance required to the execution of a power must be strictly attended to, is so clear and plain a rule, that we might here dismiss this part of our subject, were there not many cases in which *particular expressions*, imposing restraints on powers, or modes of executing them, have received a judicial exposition. I proceed, therefore, to consider these cases in the order before proposed; and although the courts cannot *dispense* with the form prescribed, yet we shall find that they in general incline to put a liberal construction on the words of the power.

And first as to the instrument.—If a *deed* is expressly required, the power cannot be executed by will.

This was decided by Sir Joseph Jekyll in the case of *Woodward v. Hasley* (*r*) (I), in which a power of revocation

(*r*) Rolls, Feb. 1727, MS.

(I) According to the Registrar's book the power was, "by any deed or deeds in writing, under his hand and seal, and sealed and delivered by him in the presence of three or more credible witnesses, to revoke, make void, alter, or change, any of the uses, &c. therein limited; and by the same deed or deeds, or any other deed or deeds, in writing, under his hand and seal, and by him sealed and delivered in the presence of three or more credible witnesses, to limit new uses." It is said in Mose. 46, that the Master of the

cation by *deed* sealed and delivered was holden not to be well executed by a will, although sealed and delivered; and the decree was affirmed by Lord Chancellor King, who said, that *factum* was a technical word, and as well known in the law as a fine or recovery, and that a will could not be a deed. The same point was decided in the case of the Earl of Darlington v. Pulteney (s), in which the former case was not cited. Lord Mansfield took up the question in the same way. He said that the power was emphatically reserved to be executed by "deed." Now, the word deed, in the understanding of law, has a technical signification to which a will is in no respect applicable. This opinion was given upon a case sent out of the Court of Chancery, and Lord Chancellor Bathurst decreed, according to the certificate of the Court of King's Bench, that the power was not well executed.

And the converse of the foregoing proposition holds equally true: a power to be executed by *will* cannot be executed by any act *to take effect in the life-time of the donee*

(s) Cowp. 260, confirmed by Doe v. Lady Cavan, 5 Term Rep. 567; 6 Bro. P.C. by Toml. 175; and see Bushell v. Bushell, 1 Rep. Temp. Redesdale, 96; 4 Taunt. 297.

Rolls held the will to be a revocation, but the Registrar's book, in this respect, agrees with the above note; Reg. Lib. B. 1727, fo. 212. Upon the appeal to the Chancellor, he directed the point to be tried at law in an action of ejectment, Reg. Lib. B. 1727, fo. 353. In the next year, upon the plaintiff's petition, this order was directed to be entered, Reg. Lib. B. 1728, fo. 454. I searched to the end of the year 1731, without meeting with any further trace of the cause.

donee of the power. This was laid down by Lord Hardwicke in the case of *Whaley v. Drummond* (*t*). He said, that where a power is given to charge an estate by will, the person having the power cannot execute it by any act in his life-time. But the mere circumstance of the estate being limited to *A* for life, and “after his death,” or “then” to be at his disposal, will not, by implication, restrain the execution of the power to a will (*u*); although it has been recently decided that a devise to the testator’s wife for her life, and also at her disposal *afterwards* to *leave* it to whom she pleased, gave her a power of disposition by will only, by reason of the word *leave*, which was not properly applicable to a disposition by deed (*x*).

In a recent case, Thomas Grace by his will gave to his wife Mary Grace 4,000 *l.* or whatever surplus might arise after the moiety left to his two minor children, subject to a proviso therein contained, (that is to say) that she should enjoy the interest thereof for her natural life, and dispose of the same to such of her children which he should leave as she should *devise* and think proper. It was insisted that the power was confined to a will. In favour of the contrary construction, *Thomlinson v. Dighton*, 1 P. Wms. 149; *Anon.* 3 Leo. 71, c. 108; *Goodtitle v. Otway*, 2 Wils. 6; Lord Ormond’s case, Hob. 348, were relied upon, and the case was distinguished from *Doe and Thorley*, 10 East, 438; and the

(*t*) Ch. Easter Term, 1745, MS. Reg. Lib. B. 1744, fo. 150; see *Reid v. Shergold*, 10 Ves. jun. 370; *Anderson v. Dawson*, 15 Ves. jun. 532. See and consider *Heatley v. Thomas*, ib. 596.

(*u*) *Anon.* 3 Leo. 71; *Thomlinson v. Dighton*, 1 Com. 194. 1 P. Wms. 149; *ex-parte Williams*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 89.

(*x*) *Doe v. Thorley*, 10 East, 438.

case was decided accordingly. Sir William Grant was clearly of opinion that the power was not confined to a will. If the bequest had been to her for life, and then to devise as she might think proper, there the word devise would have admitted but of one sense; but here it is as she shall dispose, which admits of two constructions, and this means as she should think right. Suppose you translate devise, as she shall bequeath by will; how then would it read? To dispose thereof as she shall bequeath by will and think proper, therefore she has a general power (*y*).

A power to appoint by will, *or otherwise*, will of course authorize an appointment by deed (*z*). So where the bequest was of personal property to the separate use of the wife, for life, and after her death to such persons as she by any will, *or appointment*, to be by her signed and sealed in the presence of one or more witness or witnesses, should appoint, and in default of such will or appointment over, it was held that she might appoint by deed (*a*).

But under a power to appoint by deed or will so as in every such deed a power to revoke by deed was contained, the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion, although it was not necessary to decide the point, that an appointment by deed, with a power of revocation by deed *or will*, was not authorized by the power. This seems to deserve re-consideration, because the donee might re-
serve

(*y*) *Grace v. Wilson*, Rolls, MS. Oct. 1811.

(*a*) *Wells v. Faron*, V. C. 27 Nov. 1818, MS. the cause stood

(*z*) *Irvin v. Farrer*, 19 Ves. 86; and see *Van v. Barnett*, ib. 110.
over on another point.

serve a power to revoke by deed or will, although not authorized to do so by the instrument creating the power. The original power was to appoint by deed or will. The donor appears only to have been anxious that an irrevocable appointment should not be made. The power of revocation reserved was only tantamount to the original power. The donee might, without doubt, have in several ways effectuated the same object. She might have appointed by deed to such uses as she should appoint by will, with a power in the deed to revoke by deed. She might have appointed by deed to herself absolutely, with a power to revoke by deed, and of course she could devise her interest, and the will would be operative if the appointment to herself remained unrevoked by deed. The power which she reserved was the same thing in effect (*b*).

In favour of the intention, a settlement to the use of a man's will might, perhaps, be construed to mean not simply a disposition by testament, but any disposition by deed or otherwise. This question arose in the reign of James the First, upon a dispute between the Earls of Ormond and Desmond, who bound themselves in a penalty of 100,000 *l.* each to abide by the King's award. The case was simply this : The then late Earl of Ormond suffered a recovery of certain estates *to the use of his last will*. By writing under his hand and seal he declared that the recoverors should stand seised to certain uses. The question was, whether he could revoke the uses. The case was referred to the two Chiefs, Montague and Hobart, and Justice Dodridge. They all agreed, that the fee resulted to the Earl in the meantime.

(*b*) *Phillips v. Phipps*, V. C. M. T. 1818. MS.

time. And Montague appears to have thought that the settlement took effect out of his interest, and not as an execution of his power; and he accordingly held that it was not revocable. Hobart and Dodridge, on the contrary, held that the instrument operated as an execution of the power, and that the uses were always revocable, because they were grounded upon the recovery, which was to the use of his will, which was always subject to change. Secondly, they held, that the recoverers were seised to the use of his last will, *which was not to be understood a testament only, but to be extended unto any other voluntary disposition or gratuity whatsoever*. However, upon this difference of opinion, the King took the opinion of some of the other Judges, who agreed with Montague, and so the point in question was not decided (c).

The point in the foregoing case is not likely to arise at this day, because uses are generally declared in a more formal manner. And it is clearly distinguishable from a power to appoint *by* will, for in this case the word "will" evidently points to the instrument; but in Lord Ormond's case the declaration to the use of the Earl's will was considered to mean rather the mind of the donee than the instrument by which his intention was to be expressed. But even if it should be so considered, yet as the law now stands, unless the execution was testamentary, it should seem that it could not be revoked without an express power reserved.

However, it is clear, that even where a power is required to be executed by "the will," or "last will and

(c) Earl of Ormond's case, Hob. 348; see 3 Cha. Ca. 64. 190; and *Shepherd v. Spencer*, 1 Keb. 821.

and testament," of the donee of the power, an instrument, although sealed and delivered as a deed, will, if testamentary in its nature, be a good execution of the power.

Thus, in a case in *Dyer* (*d*), where the uses of a recovery were declared to be, to perform the will of the person who suffered the recovery, he executed the power by a deed indented and sealed, the question was whether he could change the uses. *Dyer* and other Judges held that he might well alter his will, for the deed was *quasi* a will, which is changeable. In this case, therefore, the point was taken for granted. Lord Chief Justice Treby, in adverting to the case, said that the instrument was a will; for though it were in the form of an indenture between several parties, yet when he says he wills so and so, after he had recited a power to declare by will, this must be taken for a will, or it is no execution of the power (*e*). And it is now well settled by a series of decisions, that if the instrument executing the power is in its nature testamentary, the mere circumstance of its being in the form of a deed upon stamps, and sealed and delivered in the usual way as a deed, will not prevent it from operating as a will (*f*) (I).

Moore,

(*d*) Anonymous, *Dyer*, 314, a 1 Mod. 117; *Habergham v.* Vincent, 2 Ves. jun. 204; and pl. 97.

(*e*) See 3 Cha. Ca. 86; and see *Devereux v. Moor*, 1 Keb. 697; *Trimmer v. Jackson*, see ib. 64.

(*f*) *Hixon v. Wytham*, 1 Cha. 4 Burn's Eccle. Law, p. 130, Ca. 248; *Greene v. Proude*, cited.

(I) In the *Attorney-General v. Bartlett*, 3 Price, 368, three Judges against Wood, B. held that a voluntary deed, assigning

Moore, in his celebrated argument in Lord Buckhurst's case (*g*), cites Lord Awdley's case in a manner which has induced an inference, that a power to be executed by will cannot be exercised by an instrument in the shape of a deed. The case is reported in Dyer (*h*), and in Leonard (*i*). A recovery was suffered by Lord Awdley to the use that the recoverors should perform his will; he afterwards, by deed, directed them to stand seised to certain uses, amongst others, to make an estate to him and his wife in tail. And it was determined, after great consideration, that the use was not changed, for this could not be his will to take effect by his death, *because it appeared the estate was to be executed in his life-time*. Lord Awdley's case, therefore, merely proves what has been already stated, that the act must be testamentary, or the execution of the power is void.

Where a person is tenant for life, with a power to appoint the inheritance by *will* only, and is desirous to sell the fee-simple, he may convey to the purchaser for a long term depending on his life, and exercise the power

(*g*) Mo. 515, 516.

(*i*) 2 Leo. 159; 4 Leo. 166.

(*h*) 166 a. 324 b. pl. 37.

210.

leasehold and personal estate, under which the grantor was entitled for life, with a power of revocation, and which he confirmed by his will, was a testamentary instrument within the stamp-act. The opinion of the Profession is undoubtedly with Mr. Baron Wood. The case must be referred to its particular circumstances. It cannot be denied that a man may make a valid voluntary settlement by deed to avoid the payment of the legacy-duty, reserving to himself a life-estate, and a power of revocation, and of course his subsequent ratification of the settlement by his will cannot give the settlement a testamentary operation.

in the purchaser's favour by will, and covenant not to revoke it. The title of course will be incomplete during the vendor's life, as he may choose to revoke the will, and drive the purchaser to his remedy under the covenant: so he may revoke the will by a clandestine act, and leave no assets to answer the breach of covenant. But if a purchaser be willing to incur the risk, no objection can be raised to the execution of the power should it ultimately take effect. It is a mistake to call it an execution by deed, for the donee has still full power to revoke the will: the performance of the covenant cannot be enforced, but damages only can be recovered for a breach of it.

Although a will is not a good execution of a power to be executed by a *deed*, yet where in the instrument creating the power, words are thrown in by a general comprehensive sense, as "writing," or "instrument," the court will take advantage of them in favour of the intention, and deem a will within the meaning of the power, although in vulgar acceptation the words point to a deed. This was admitted by Lord Mansfield in Lord Darlington's case.

The leading case on this point is *Kibbet and Lee*, reported by Lord Chief Justice Hobart. There a power of revocation in a settlement was required to be executed "by writing under his hand and seal, and by him delivered in the presence of three credible witnesses," and *then, and from thenceforth*, the uses shall be void. The donee of the power revoked the settlement by *will* under his hand and seal, and by him delivered in the presence of four witnesses. Hutton, Justice, held, that the words were to be understood of a deed, according to

to vulgar speech, and the rather, because in such clauses the last will is especially mentioned; but Hobart, Chief Justice, Warburton and Winch, Justices, determined that the will was good, because the revocation was to be taken liberally, and the execution of it favourably; and they held, that if the words, "then, and from thenceforth," were repugnant, they were surplusage, and of no force (*k*).

This doctrine was carried to its utmost extent in a leading case in the House of Lords (*l*). The power was to revoke by *any writing* under the hand and seal of the donee, attested by two or more credible witnesses, and by the *same, or any other deed* to limit new uses. This power was exercised by will in writing under the donee's hand and seal, and attested by the proper number of witnesses. And in favour of the execution of the power it was insisted, that to confine the execution of the power, as if designed to be by deed only, by reason of the latter words in the proviso [*by the same, or any other deed*], and to infer from thence, that the *writing* expressly mentioned in the former part of the power, and referred to even in this latter branch of it, must be *only* such a writing as was in point of law a *deed*, would be to make a construction of the power directly contrary to the former part, which enabled her to revoke the old uses *by any writing*, as well as to the latter part of it, which enabled her to appoint new uses by the same [*writing*], and would be to defeat and take away the operation of

(*k*) Hob. 312; S. C. Litt. Rep. v. Fowke, 4 Bro. P. C. 523; see 218, cited, nom. Hubbard's case; Doe v. Holloway, 1 Stark. 431; and see ib. p. 111; and see Tylley Edwards v. Edwards, 3 Madd. v. Peirce, Cro. Car. 376. 197; 1 Jac. 335.

(*l*) Countess of Roscommon

plain and clear words by implication and inference only. And the Judges delivered their opinion, that *this writing* was a good execution of the power ; and a decree was made accordingly. The power, therefore, was read as if it had expressed that new uses might be limited by the same [writing], or any other deed.

Nor will the circumstances of the power being given to two, and the survivor of them, vary the construction in regard to the survivor's right to appoint by will, although the power could not have been executed by will during the joint lives of the parties (*m*).

In treating of the instrument by which a power may be exercised, it is necessary to consider in what cases the power, although in one clause, gives distinct authorities.

In the case of Fitzgerald and Fauconberge (*n*), a settlement was made by Fowler, and the recital expressed the intention of the settlor to reserve power to himself to alienate the estate, &c. and in the deed was a proviso that the settlor might grant, sell, or demise the estate at his pleasure, *or* by any deed or writing under his hand and seal, &c. revoke the old uses and declare new ones, and several particular powers were given to him, to the execution of which witnesses, &c. were required. Fowler afterwards conveyed the estate without observing the solemnities required by the latter part of the first proviso. And it was, after great consideration, determined by the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and Reynolds, Chief Baron, that Fowler had under the proviso two distinct powers, one to sell the estate without observing any formalities, the other to revoke and declare

(*m*) Burnet v. Mann, 1 Ves. 187.

(*n*) Fitz. 207 ; see Wright v. Barlow, *infra*, s. 2.

declare new uses in the manner required by the latter part of the power. The decree was, after a hearing of four days, confirmed by the House of Lords, upon the opinion of six Judges against Mr. Justice Fortescue(o). The Judges delivered their opinions *seriatim* (p); and notwithstanding the opinion of the majority of the Judges, it was (as appears by the manuscript account of the judgment indorsed on the printed (q) cases) moved to reverse the decree; but upon the question being put, the motion was negatived by 22 against 13.

This was certainly a very particular case; but it may be considered an authority to this extent, that where two powers are given in the same clause, both enabling the same act, and the second power is introduced by the disjunctive conjunction "or," and the circumstances required to the execution of the power are in the latter part of the proviso, and do not expressly refer to the former part, the powers are distinct, and the first may be exercised by even a simple note in writing unattested. It is evident, that upon principle, the case is much stronger where the words of the clause authorize *distinct* acts; as where the first is to jointure, and the second to revoke the uses. It was one circumstance, perhaps, in the above case in favour of the construction which the proviso received, that the solemnities *preceded* what was deemed the second and a distinct power. The case would have been less strong had the solemnities imposed been inserted at the latter end of the entire proviso.

. And here we may notice a case where the proviso was,

(o) 3 Bro. P. C. 543.

(q) See printed cases, Dom.

(p) See Journ. Dom. Proc. Proc. 1730, c. 42.

vol. 18, p. 624.

that the donee might by his own proper hand-writing, to be written or indorsed on the indenture, revoke the uses therein, and the court denied that the revocation ought to be by writing on the indenture, and held, that it might be by other writings as well as indorsement (*r*). There appears, however, to have been considerable difficulty in the way of this decision.

But where only one power is given, and it is authorized to be executed by different instruments, although the ceremonies required to the execution are not stated after each instrument, yet they will relate to both. This is the case of *Dormer and Thurland* (*s*). There a power was given to be executed "by his last will, or any writing purporting to be his last will, under his hand and seal, attested by three or more credible witnesses." The power was exercised by a will duly executed according to the statute of frauds, but it was not *sealed*. Lord Chancellor King held, that the will was a good one, the power being in the disjunctive; but a case was referred to the Judges of the King's Bench, who determined that the will was void as a charge, for want of being sealed, and consequently that the power was not in the disjunctive. Lord Mansfield, in adverting to this case (*t*), said, that "Lord King was of opinion, that it was a good execution of the power, because by *will*, and I own I should incline to that opinion." But as we have seen, the question was, whether the will ought not to have been sealed; for if the power required that solemnity, the power being
executed

(*r*) *Lestrangle v. Temple*, 1 Keb. 357.

(*s*) 2 P. Wms. 506; see *Jones v. Clough*, 2 Ves. 365.

(*t*) *Cowp.* 268.

executed by *will*, could not vary the case. In the case of Ross and Ewer (*u*), the case of Dormer and Thurland was recognised and acted upon as an authority. The power in this last case was to appoint "by her last will and testament in writing, or other writing, under her hand and seal, to be attested by two or more credible witnesses." And Lord Hardwicke held, that the latter words in the clause, "under her hand," &c. were referrible as well to the will as to the other writing. However, in the case of Doe *v.* Morgan (*x*), where the power was to appoint "by deed, or will, signed in the presence of three witnesses," it was not necessary to decide the point, and the cases bearing upon it were not cited; but Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice, in delivering judgment, said, that if it were material to decide that point, he should think that an appointment by *deed* would have been good, though not executed in the presence of three witnesses, and that that number of witnesses only applied to an appointment by will. And in Moreton *v.* Lees (*y*), where the power was "by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, to be by him duly signed, sealed and executed, or by his last will and testament in writing, to be by him signed, sealed, published and declared in the presence of three or more credible witnesses," it was held that an execution by deed was valid, although not attested by three witnesses. The distinction between the cases of Dormer and Thurland, and Ross and Ewer, and the case of Moreton *v.* Lees, is this: In those cases

(*u*) 3 Atk. 156.

(*x*) 7 Term Rep. 103.

(*y*) C. P. Lancaster March

Ass. 1819, decided upon a

special case reserved, before

Richards, C. B. and Wood, B.

at Serjeant's Inn.

the *will* was the first instrument referred to, and it was a reasonable presumption that the three witnesses were intended to be required to the execution of the will ; but in *Moreton v. Lees* the deed was the first instrument mentioned, and the solemnity of three witnesses is not often imposed on an execution by deed, and the words in that case were satisfied by referring to the will which *immediately* preceded them.

In *Hardin v. Warner*, where the power was to revoke upon tender of a gold ring, or a pair of gloves of 12 *d.* price, or 12 *d.* in money, it was held that the price of 12 *d.* extended to the gloves only (*z*), on the ground, it seems, that it could not be presumed that a ring is of so small a value as 12 *d.* for it imports value in itself (*a*).

We may here observe, that where several modes of executing a power are stated, the donee may, in the absence of a direction to the contrary, execute it in which of the ways he pleases. Thus, where a power was, that a wife might make a will in the presence of the husband, unless he refused, or in the presence of *J. S.*, or two such persons as she should appoint, it was determined to be in the wife's election to execute in which of the three ways she chose (*b*). And yet, certainly, the power seems to have implied that the wife should not execute in the presence of *J. S.*, or the other persons, unless her husband refused to permit her to execute in his presence.

We shall hereafter see that a person executing a power may declare that it shall not take effect till a certain

(*z*) *Noy*, 79 ; see 1 *Jones*, 134 ; *Palm.* 429 ; 2 *Roll. Rep.* 293. (*a*) *Palm.* 431 ; see *Wright v. Barlow*, *infra*.
(*b*) *Harris v. Bessie*, 1 *Keb.* 348.

certain act is done. Upon this principle a power given to be executed by a single instrument as a deed, may be executed by several assurances, for where the instrument is executed with the formalities required by the power, and refers to some future act to be done to complete the execution of the power, as a fine to be levied, neither the deed nor the fine by *itself* can operate as an appointment; not the deed, because that would be contrary to the intention of the person executing it; and certainly not the fine, as that would be contrary to the words of the power; yet taken both together the power will be duly executed, *quæ non valent singula, juncta prosunt*. This is the Earl of Leicester's case before noticed (c). And on the same principle it is, that a fine first levied, and then a deed declaring the uses of it, will be deemed an execution of the power where the deed is executed in the manner required by the power. This we have seen was decided in the case of Herring and Brown (d). It is, however, to be observed, that the case did not decide that a declaration of uses at any time after the fine will prevent the forfeiture, and operate as an execution of the power. Indeed Mr. Justice Withers, who was the only Judge of the King's Bench that held the power was not destroyed, expressly said, that "the fine and deed should be considered as one conveyance in favour of common assurances, *where the distance of time is not apparently long*." Where it is recited in the deed, that the fine was, at the time of levying thereof, intended to enure to the uses expressed, it

(c) *Vide supra*, p. 68.

v. Turton, Cro. Car 472; and

(d) *Sup.* p. 70, and see Snape

see 2 Freem. 118.

it seems that no party to the deed, nor any one claiming under him, can insist upon the forfeiture, as the deed would operate as an estoppel. But as against strangers, it is conceived, that it would be left to a jury to say, whether the fine was or was not levied to the uses subsequently declared. This observation has been already made (e).

Both in the Earl of Leicester's case, and Herring and Brown, the deed and fine were considered as one assurance, and such was the intention of the parties (f). The principle of these cases cannot be applied to a case where there is first a *defective* execution of a power, and then a further execution, which is also defective, but which was intended to be a complete and valid execution, although in the *two* instruments taken conjointly, the directions of the power are strictly complied with. This was decided in the case of Hawkins and Kemp (g). There the deed executing the power was required to be enrolled, and a deed was accordingly executed and duly enrolled, but was a defective execution of the power in other respects; a further deed was then prepared, by which, after reciting that doubts had arisen as to the former execution, the power was duly executed. In the body of the last deed the intention to enrol it was stated, but it never was actually enrolled. It was insisted that the two deeds together operated as an execution of the power, but Lord Ellenborough, in delivering, the opinion of the court, said, that in this case *there was no intent*

(e) *Sup.* p. 70.

(f) See *Doe v. Whitehead*, 2 Burr. 704; *Hurd v. Fletcher*, Dougl. 45.

(g) 3 East, 410; and see *infra*, s. 2; and see *Sloane v. Cadogan*, App. No. 24, to *Treat. of Purchases*, 6th Edit.

intent that the two deeds conjointly should revoke the uses, and that the enrolment of the first should be applied to or be in any way connected with the second. On the contrary, the last deed in the body of it takes notice of the enrolment, as an act *to be done* in respect to the *then executing deed*, thereby not only adverting to the *necessity* of actual enrolment, but *virtually* disclaiming the benefit (if indeed in any shape such benefit could have been derived from it) of the enrolment of the former inefficacious deed of revocation and appointment.

It was sufficient for the determination of the court, in the preceding case, to show that the parties did not intend the deeds to operate as one assurance. But it is evident that the court considered it doubtful whether, *in any shape*, they could be so construed. And the better opinion is, that they could not ; for the distinction appears to be, that for several instruments to constitute one assurance, such must be the intention of the parties at the perfecting of the *first* assurance ; and that an intention to refer a subsequent assurance to a prior one, where such intention did not exist at the execution of the first assurance, will not be effectual. Thus, in Seymour's case (*h*), where a tenant in tail conveyed by bargain and sale, and afterwards levied a fine to the bargainee, it was determined that the fine did not work a discontinuance, because it did not appear that any fine was intended to be levied at the time of making the bargain and sale ; whilst, on the contrary, in Doe v. Whitehead (*i*), where there was a covenant in a release from a tenant in tail, to levy a fine to the use of the releasee, the fine and release were holden to be but *one* assurance, and

(*h*) 10 Rep. 95.

(*i*) 2 Burr. 704.

and consequently the fine operated as a discontinuance. The same principles appear to apply to the case under consideration.

II. I come now to consider the mode in which the instrument is required to be executed. It has already been observed, that in general, every circumstance required to attend the execution of the instrument must be duly complied with. But there are few cases in which the courts require any thing beyond the strict letter of the power; therefore, where a writing under hand and seal is required, it need not be delivered (*k*), although writings signed and sealed are usually delivered also; so where the deed is required to be *duly* attested, an attestation by one witness will satisfy the words (*l*).

In a late case (*m*) it was decided, that under a power over a leasehold estate, to be executed by a will *duly executed and attested*, a will not signed, sealed or attested, was not a good execution. One witness would have been sufficient.

The mode in which the instrument is to be executed is mostly expressed, but sometimes implied; expressed, as that it shall be signed in the presence of two witnesses; implied, as where a power is given to appoint an estate generally by deed or will, without defining the manner in which it is to be executed, or even expressing that

(*k*) Carter v. Carter, Mose. 369. (*m*) Sanders v. Franks, 2 Madd. 147; Willan v. Lancaster, 3

(*l*) Poulson v. Wellington, 2 Russ. 108.
P. Wms. 533.

that it shall be duly or legally executed ; it is implied that the deed or will shall be executed in the manner prescribed for the execution of deeds and wills by the common and statute law. Therefore, if the power be executed by deed it must have a seal, as that is of the very essence of a deed. If the instrument be a will, and the subject of the power be personal estate, it may be executed by a mere paper writing, without signature or attestation, in like manner as a proper will of personalty ; and even if it be required to be duly executed, yet it should seem that there need not be any witness to it (*n*). So if the property be real estate the will must be executed with the solemnities required by the statute of frauds, because it is within all the inconveniences of the statute. And the case is stronger where it is required to be *duly* executed, as the donor must be understood to have referred to some known rule, which, as he himself has mentioned none, can be no other than the rule of law, and that the statute of frauds has furnished us with (*o*). However, the law is clear in both cases, and the same rule applies where the power is given to be executed by “any writing in the nature of a will,” for those words mean the same as a will (*p*).

But the case of Jones and Clough, before Sir John Strange, is considered as an exception to this rule : the decision in effect is, that where a person *creates* a charge on his estate, but gives another person the power of appointing

(*n*) See 2 Ves. 367.

(*o*) Per Lord Hardwicke, 9 Mod. 485.

(*p*) Longford v. Eyre, 1 P. Wms. 740 ; Casson v. Dade, 1 Bro. C. C. 99 ; Duff v. Dalzell,

1 Bro. C. C. 147 ; and see Wagstaff v. Wagstaff, 2 P. Wms. 258 ; Wilkie v. Holmes, 9 Mod. 485 ; 1 Dick. 165 ; 1 Rep. Temp. Redsdale, 60, n ; Jones v. Clough, 2 Ves. 365.

appointing it, although the power is required to be executed by will *duly executed*, yet it need not be executed in the manner prescribed by the statute of frauds (I). This distinction, however, would, if adhered to, be in many cases very refined, for in no case does a will executing a power operate as a proper will, but merely as a direction of the use, and the estate passes by force of the instrument under which the power was created. This will be explained hereafter. The case before Sir John Strange was a case of compassion; and it is not easy to discover whether he founded his decree on the ground of the power being duly executed, or of its being a proper case for equity to aid the defective execution of the power.

However, where the power embraces both real and personal estate, and is, according to the requisition of the power executed by will, although the will is not executed in the manner required by the statute of frauds, yet it will be a good appointment so far as it relates to the personalty (*q*).

Of the *effect* of a *will* executed under a power, I shall hereafter have occasion to speak.

In

(*q*) Duff v. Dalzell, 1 Bro. C. C. 147.

(I) According to Lib. Reg. this was a very particular case. By the agreement which gave the power, the parties contemplated that the security for the money was to be raised not by the will, but by *trustees*, who were by the agreement empowered (according to the words of the instrument) to grant, mortgage, lease, set, or otherwise dispose of the estate to any person for raising the money. The money had been actually advanced by a mortgagee, who had a subsisting legal term. The point in the text was not raised by the answer, nor does it appear upon what ground the case was decided. Reg. Lib. A. 1750, fo. 624.

In *Sprange v. Barnard* (*r*), a feme covert had a power of appointment over personalty by *will*, to which by the words of the power a *seal* was required (*I*). She first wrote her will on unstamped paper, and then thinking it to be material that her will should be upon stamps, she wrote it on stamped paper, and afterwards fixed the two papers together with a wafer, and had it witnessed according to the power. And Lord Kenyon, then Master of the Rolls, held the stamp to be equivalent to a seal, without having, he said, recourse, to the wafer, which annexed the stamped paper to the former. It may, however be doubted whether either the stamp or the wafer could consistently be deemed a seal within the meaning of the power. The stamp is a mere regulation of the revenue to prevent fraud ; and it has been very properly determined that the revenue laws ought never to be held to operate beyond their direct and immediate purpose, to affect the property, and vary the rights of parties, not within the intention of the act (*s*). The wafer was merely to keep the two papers together. Neither the stamp nor the wafer were affixed with an intention

(*r*) 2 Bro. C. C. 585.

(*s*) *Buckmaster v. Harrop*, 7 Ves. jun. 345.

(*I*) This is according to Mr. Brown's report, and he could scarcely have inserted the words by mistake ; but as the case stands in Lib. Reg. it was a power by any writing under her hand and seal, attested, &c. " or by her will in writing, or any writing purporting to be her will." No solemnities appear to have been required to the execution of the power by will. And if this were so, the question must have been, whether the ceremonies prescribed in the clause, applied to a will as well as to a writing *inter vivos*. Reg. Lib. B. 1788, fo. 354.

intention to *seal* the will. Sealing is essential to a *deed*; and it is quite clear that neither the stamps on the parchment, nor the annexation of the deed by means of a wafer to another deed, would be equivalent to sealing. And when sealing is required to an instrument executing a power, it must be understood to mean such a sealing as is required, where a seal is by law essential. This is clearly proved by the cases before mentioned as to the execution of wills. But sealing is a solemnity which by this decision may be completely evaded. The principle applies equally to a *deed* executing a power as to a will. Now the common law will not inquire into the consideration of a *deed*, because of the solemnity and deliberation with which it is perfected. For, first, there is the determination of the mind to do it, and upon that the party causes it to be written, which is one part of the deliberation; and afterwards he puts his seal to it, which is another part of deliberation; and lastly, he delivers the writing as his deed, which is the consummation of his resolution (*t*). This shows the importance which the common law attaches to the ceremony of sealing. But it is not necessary that an impression should be made with wax or with a wafer. If the seal, stick, or other instrument used, be impressed by the party on the plain parchment or paper, with an intent to seal it, it is clearly sufficient; and therefore where the instrument is a deed, and on proper stamps, and it is stated in the attestation to have been sealed and delivered in the presence of the witnesses, it will, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to have been sealed, although no impression appear on the parchment

ment or paper. This, I am told, Lord Eldon decided when in the Common Pleas. But in Sprange and Barnard, Lord Kenyon rested his decision on the single circumstance of the deed being upon stamps.

Where signature is required, the mere incapacity of the donee to comply with the requisition, as where he has the gout in his hand, will not, it seems, excuse the non-performance of the condition (*u*); but where the donee cannot write, whether by reason of sickness or ignorance, it should seem that his mark would be equivalent to signing his name. This has been determined upon the statute of frauds, which requires the *witnesses* to wills of lands, to attest and *subscribe* the will: yet it has been held that an attestation signed by a marksman is sufficient (*x*). And it seems equally clear that a mark by the testator himself would be equivalent to signing his name, although the statute expressly requires a signature. So it seems that a man may stamp his name, which will be tantamount to a signature (*y*). And in a recent case, upon the statute of frauds, Lord Eldon thought that if a man is in the habit of printing his name instead of writing it, he may be said to *sign* by his printed name as well as his written name (*z*).

If the instrument is required to be signed *in the presence of witnesses*, and the donee do not comply with the requisition, the power will be badly executed.

(*u*) Blockvill v. Ascott, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 659.

(*x*) Harrison v. Harrison; Addy v. Grix, 8 Ves. jun. 185, 504; and see Lemaine v. Staneley, 1 Freem. 538; and Hudson's case, Skin. 79.

(*y*) See Lemaine v. Staneley, *ubi sup.*

(*z*) Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & Pull. 239; and see Jones v. Dale, *infra*.

Thus in the case of *Jones v. Dale* (a), in an indenture to lead the uses of a fine, there was a power of revocation, and the trustees were to be seised to the use of such persons, &c. as the party should by deed or will, to be subscribed and sealed in the presence of three witnesses, appoint. The jury found that the testator made his will, written with his own hand, and that he declared to the witnesses, that the whole was so written; but he only sealed and delivered, and did not sign it in the presence of the three witnesses. It seems that the testator did not subscribe his name, except by writing the attestation, in which was his own name. The case was very fully argued. The court were of opinion against the will, although it was adjourned. Raymond, Chief Justice said, that this was not a good will within the statute of frauds, being not signed by the deviser in the presence of three witnesses; and so held in *B. R. between Lee and Libb. Carthew* (b). The power ought to be strictly pursued. Reynolds said, that in this case, sealing and signing are different acts; both which must be done to perfect the act. He agreed, where an act by construction and operation of law amounts to a performance of the thing to be done, there it need not to be so strictly pursued. If in this case the testator had wrote the attestation in the presence of three witnesses, or he had usually stamped his name, and he had stamped it, he believed it might have amounted to subscribing. Probin, Justice, said, that by this power there are two acts to be done, and the Jury have

(a) May 1728, MS. from some notes in Lincoln's-Inn Library, *vide infra*, *M'Queen v. Farquhar*.

(b) This opinion has been since overruled.

have found that one of them was not done, and therefore the power not well executed. Reynolds said saying and doing a thing is not the same thing, and his saying he had writ it himself won't amount to a subscribing in the presence of three witnesses, as the power requires.

Powers were formerly, in most instances, required to be executed "by writing under the hand and seal of the donee, and attested by two or more witnesses"—in some instances, the instruments executing the power were required "to be signed and sealed by the donee, in the presence of and attested by two or more witnesses." The common form of an attestation to a deed has always been, "sealed and delivered by the party, in the presence of us," to which memorandum the witnesses set their names. *Signing* is not essential to the validity of a deed, although *sealing* is. This accounts for the omission of the word *signed* in the above form; and even now, that all deeds are signed as well as sealed, the old form is retained. In requiring a deed exercising a power to be under the hand and seal of the donee, and attested by witnesses, it was not intended to impose any new form of execution or attestation, but merely to render it necessary, that the instrument should be duly executed, and attested, in the common form, by the number of witnesses required. This is proved by two circumstances: the one, that the words in question are in all the old common forms of powers of nearly every description in a conveyancer's office, and were inserted, in settlements and wills, as a *common form*, without any

special instruction ; the other, that although such words were daily inserted in instruments, and nearly all the titles in the kingdom were affected by the question, yet the common attestation of “sealed and delivered” was still adhered to; and it was never considered, until very recently, that it was essential to insert the word *signed* in the attestation.

After the point was raised, the opinion of almost every man of eminence at the bar was, that the objection was not well founded. This was the opinion of a learned Lord, who has since filled one of the highest judicial situations.

The first case which occurred on this point came before Lord Eldon. There the deed executing the power was required to be signed in the presence of witnesses, but they were not required to attest the signature, and the word *signed* was omitted in the attestation ; but in the body of the deed actually executed it was stated to be signed by the donee, in the presence of the witnesses, according to the power. Lord Eldon said, that upon the question, whether after execution it ought to be taken, that he did sign in the presence of the witnesses attesting the sealing and delivering, there would be a miscarriage in a Judge directing a jury, if that fact was found, not to presume that the deed was signed in the presence of the same witnesses as it professed to be. That attestation therefore, he added was good (c).

Lord Eldon has since observed, that he thought the case rightly decided. That was the case of powers to be

(c) *M'Queen v. Farquhar*, 11 Ves. jun. 467.

be executed in the presence of witnesses; and in one instance, with this further requisite expressed, to be attested by witnesses. The power actually exercised by the deed, upon which the question arose was to be exercised in the presence of witnesses, but was not required expressly to be attested by witnesses. The deed said to be an execution of the power upon the face of it, was expressed to be executed in the presence of the witnesses; and so far from determining that attestation of the sealing was an attestation of the signing, his lordship had merely said there would be a miscarriage in a Judge if he did not direct the jury to presume that the deed was signed, as it professed to be on the face of it, in the presence of the witnesses who attested the sealing and delivering; a way of putting it, that, so far from deciding, expressly avoided the question, whether attestation of the sealing and delivering is to be taken as attestation of the signing also.

A case lately arose, in which the power was required to be executed "with the consent of Thomas Wood the elder, and Thomas Wood the younger, testified by any writing under their *hands* and seals, *attested* by two or more credible witnesses (*d*).” The power had been exercised with the proper consents, but the attestations contained the words *sealed and delivered* only; but the witnesses, after the death of one of the consenting parties, executed a memorandum on the deed, certifying that the deed was signed as well as sealed by the parties in their presence. Lord Eldon, assuming that the attestation should have contained the word signed, expressed

(*d*) Wright v. Wakeford, 17 Ves. jun. 454.

a strong opinion that a subsequent attestation would not do, upon the ground, that where a deed of this sort gives a power, the execution of that power is a limitation of a use, and unless the use arises at the time when the power is executed, upon ordinary principles it does not arise at all. His lordship said that he did not agree with the proposition that the writing is the thing to be attested. In the case of an execution by will of a power in the ordinary words, "by his deed sealed and delivered in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, or by his last will attested," &c., it is not the will that is attested, but the act of the testator, and that necessary act is to be found in the statute of frauds, requiring not merely that the instrument shall be executed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, but that it shall be attested and subscribed by them. Two acts are therefore required; one that he shall subscribe in their presence; the other, that they shall attest that he has done so (*e*). Assuming then, that the deed, in order to be a good execution of the power, must be a writing not only sealed and delivered, but also signed, if it is required that both should be attested, an attestation is required of two acts in their nature different; and if a signature is actually found at the bottom of the deed, and the jury will find that act as done in the presence of witnesses, his lordship did not say that would not do; but if attestation at the time is required, it cannot be presumed, where there is no signature, though the signature which

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(*e*) But it is decided that a testator need not sign in their presence, see *infra*.

is there may be presumed to have been in the presence of witnesses not appearing to be so. If therefore the real meaning of this power is, that there shall be an attestation upon the instrument of the signing as well as the sealing, and there is upon the instrument no such attestation, it is not a case for the presumption of a jury that the act was done which appears not to have been done ; but as this is a case of great importance, it is a proper subject for the decision of a court of law ; and his lordship accordingly directed a case to the court of Common Pleas.

The Judges of the Common Pleas, after. it is understood, considerable fluctuation of opinion, returned two certificates—Lord C. J. Mansfield being of opinion that the power was duly executed, and the other three Judges being of a contrary opinion. The Chief Justice was of opinion, that though the form of attestation did not contain in it the word “signed,” the witnesses must be understood to have attested the signing as well as sealing of the deeds by the two Woods. The omission of the word “signed,” he thought immaterial, and he also thought that the subsequent attestation would supply any defect in the former, because when the Woods signed in the presence of the witnesses, they did all that was to be done by them, and they could not afterwards rescind or annul it, and no rule required that the attestation should be immediately written at the time of the execution of the instrument. The other three Judges considered the question to depend simply on the true construction of the terms of the power ; and they thought that the signature by the parties was not comprehended in the words made use of in the attestation,

and that the subsequent attestation did not cure the defect (*f*).

The Lord Chancellor, upon these certificates being returned, of course dismissed the bill, which was for a specific performance against a purchaser. It was not necessary for his Lordship to give an opinion on the question.

The same point afterwards came before the Court of King's Bench. A power to two persons was required to be exercised "by any deed or writing under both their hands and seals, to be by them duly executed in the presence of and to be attested by two or more credible witnesses (*g*).” The body of the deed executing the power stated that it was “under the hands and seals of both the donees, attested by and duly executed in the presence of the two credible persons whose names are thereupon indorsed as witnesses thereto.” The attestation contained the words “sealed and delivered” only, but the witnesses, by a subsequent attestation, certified that the deed was signed as well as sealed in their presence. The Court of King's Bench held that the power was badly executed.

In a still later case (*h*), the court of King's Bench expressed their intention to adhere to their former decision, without again entering into the question. The power was “by deed or deeds, writing or writings, under her
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(*f*) 4 Taunt. 213; see the certificates, Appendix, No. 9.

(*g*) Doe v. Peach, Easter Term, 1814, MS. Reader, for the person claiming under the power, Denman, contra; 2 Maul. and Selw. 576.

(*h*) Wright v. Barlow, 18th Nov. 1814, MS. Sugden, for the person claiming under the power, Holroyd, contra; 3 Maul. and Selw. 512; and see Moodie v. Reid, 1 Madd. 516; Nougham v. Sandys, 2 Sim. 95.

hand and seal, *attested* by two or more credible witnesses, or by her last will and testament in writing, or any writing purporting to be her last will and testament, to be by her signed, sealed, and published, in the *presence* of three or more credible witnesses," to charge the estate with 4,000 *l.* to be paid as the donee "by the same deed or deeds, writing or writings, or last will and testament, or writing purporting to be her last will and testament," should appoint. And for more effectually securing the charge, she was authorized "to limit and appoint" the estate (generally) to trustees for a term. The deed was signed by the donee of the power in the presence of the witnesses, but the word signed was not contained in the attestation. The case was directed by the Master of the Rolls. Lord Ellenborough, upon the general point being pressed, stated that the Court would, if it were wished, turn the case into a special verdict, so that it might come before the twelve Judges; and his Lordship said, that he could not say to what decision the Court might come with the assistance of the other judges. The Court of King's Bench, on the 2d February, 1815, certified that "they were of opinion that the aforesaid power given to the said Elizabeth Barlow was not duly and effectually executed by the said indenture of the 20th of January 1781." The certificate was signed by Lord Ellenborough, C. J. Mr. Justice Le Blanc, and Mr. Justice Bayley. The case will probably be carried farther.

In the case of *Moodie v. Reed*, a power to be executed by will, or any writing or appointment in nature of a will, to be signed and *published* in the presence of and attested by two or more credible witnesses, was held
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to be not well executed by a will signed by the donee, and attested thus, "witness *B. H.* and *J. H.*;" although the testatrix told each of the witnesses that that paper was her will. But then the last words of the will were, "These my last bequests *signed* by me, &c." and then the word witness, and the names of the witnesses, followed. And the decision proceeded on the ground that a will as such does not require publication. Lord C. J. Gibbs held that *the witnesses had clearly attested the signing*, but that there was no attestation of the publication (*i*).

In *Stanhope v. Keir* (*j*) the power was to be executed by the donee's last will and testament, or any codicil or codicils to the same, signed and published by her, in the presence of and attested by three or more credible witnesses. She made her will which concluded thus: "And this is my last will and testament, made and signed in the year 1818, on the 19th of November, at Gravesend, *Eugenia Keir*, (L. s.) In the presence of;" and then the names of the three witnesses followed. The Vice-Chancellor held that the power was not well executed. The argument, that the declaration with which the will concluded was in effect a publication as well as a signing, and that the witnesses by adding their names to this declaration, attested both facts, his Honor said, supposed the witness to be acquainted with the contents of the will. He could not assume more from this attestation than that the witnesses saw the testatrix sign the instrument.

The objection to the common attestation cannot, it is apprehended,

(*i*) 7 Taunt. 355; 1 Madd. 516.

(*j*) 2 Sim. & Stu. 37; and *qu.*

apprehended, be sustained upon the literal construction of the words. According to their literal construction the power is duly executed. The instrument is under the hand and seal of the party, and it is attested by the number of witnesses required: And this is all that the parties intended. The words "under the hand and seal attested," &c. are, as I have already observed, in nearly all the old common forms. They were never inserted with a view to alter the established form of attestation.

The three Judges who certified against the validity of the subsequent attestation in *Wright and Wakeford*, grounded their opinion in part upon its being the usual and common way of attesting the execution of all instruments requiring attestation, to make it a part of the same transaction with the execution of the deed. The same ground would uphold the common attestation as a due execution of the power, for unquestionably that has always been the usual and common way of attesting such instruments.

The power only contemplates the common mode of executing a deed, viz. signing and sealing by the party, and attesting by the witnesses. The requisition in these cases is, that the deed shall be *attested*, but it does not require that the witnesses shall sign an attestation. According to the *words*, an attestation by witnesses of the execution would be sufficient, although they should not sign a written memorandum of the fact. Now it was decided in the late case of *M'Queen v. Farquhar* (*k*), that where the witnesses are not required to attest the facts, a written attestation by them, containing the words "sealed and delivered" only, does not exclude the presumption

(*k*) *Supra*.

sumption that it was also signed in their presence. The same reasoning must lead us to the conclusion, that a voluntary written attestation, in the above cases, must receive the same construction. The witnesses are not precluded from proving, or a jury from presuming, that the deed was signed, as well as sealed and delivered in the presence of the witnesses. If the word attested is, in favour of the common understanding of mankind, to be considered as requiring a written attestation, the same favourable construction must of necessity hold the words sealed and delivered, in the attestation, to be a sufficient compliance with the power.

Suppose the memorandum to have been, "Witness," "Witnesses," "Witnessed," "Attested," or the like, could it be contended, if the deed *was* executed in the manner required by the power, that the witnesses were precluded from proving the facts by their attestation? (1) And if a general attestation, *not stating the precise acts done in their presence*, would not exclude the proof of their having been done, it must be conceded, that it is not essential for the witnesses to sign a memorandum containing all the facts which they attest. If this be not essential, upon what ground can the common form exclude the proof of the deed having been signed in their presence, when it is perfectly settled, that where witnesses are not bound to sign an attestation, an incomplete statement in a memorandum signed by them will not exclude the proof or presumption of their having attested the act which they have omitted to state? For in the latter case the argument against the attestation is as forcible as it is in the former. "You, the witness,
having

(1) See and observe *Moodie v. Reid*, cited *supra*.

having only stated that you witnessed the sealing and delivery of the deed, cannot now be permitted to prove, nor can a jury presume, that you also witnessed the signing of it."

It is also open to contend, that there is no substantial difference between a power to be executed in the presence of witnesses, and a power to be executed in the presence of and *attested* by witnesses. In the former case, it is of course implied that the witnesses must attest the act to be done, for otherwise the requisition would be nugatory. Now this is all which is required in the latter case. The witnesses are not required to attest *and subscribe a memorandum of attestation*, but merely to attest the execution of the instrument.

At all events, where the deed is stated in the body of it, to be executed and attested in the manner required by the power, the attestation coupled with the body of the deed, appears to be a sufficient compliance with the power. The attestation in practice is always considered a part of the deed. *It is counted in as part of the instrument, and the stamp-duty is paid on it.* It is a part of the same transaction, and it is difficult to comprehend upon what rule of law it can be considered independently of the instrument. Such a construction, it must be admitted, is a forced one, and it defeats instead of supporting the intention of the parties. It is true, that until the execution of the deed, the body of it can only state prospectively what is intended to be done; but the moment the deed is perfected, it contains a solemn averment of the fact. It stands on the same footing with the words of conveyance in the deed. Although they import a present operation, yet they are not called
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into action until the deed is executed. The memorandum of attestation ought to be construed, together with the body of the deed, as a full statement of all the facts.

The writer was one of those who, before the decision in *Doe v. Peach* was pronounced, thought that even if the general rule was to prevail, yet that case would form an exception out of it. This opinion was founded on the statement in the body of the deed that the solemnities were complied with, and also on the particular words of the power. It was required to be under the hands and seals of the donees, "to be by them duly *executed* in the presence of, and to be attested by two or more credible witnesses." It *was* under their hands and seals, and it was duly executed by them in the presence of, and attested by, two witnesses. The power did not seem to require that the attestation to the deed should contain the word signed: It appeared rather to intend that the deed should be executed and attested in the common way. It was to be under the hand and seal of the party, and its due execution was to be attested by two witnesses. There seemed therefore to be a fair opening for considering this case as not within the authority of *Wright and Wakeford*; but it was decided to be obnoxious to the same rule.

The strong ground however against the rule has not yet been stated. It is the construction which the statute of frauds has received. By that statute it is enacted that all devises shall be in writing, and signed by the testator, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor, by three or four credible witnesses. These words are very forcible, for as the attestation and subscription are required to be made by
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the witnesses in the presence of the devisor, it was clearly intended that the will should be signed by him in their presence, and the witnesses are expressly required to subscribe in the presence of the testator. It has, however, been decided, first, that the devisor need not sign in the presence of the witnesses (*m*); secondly, that the subscription of the witnesses to an attestation, which only contains the words "sealed and delivered by," &c. is sufficient (*n*); and, thirdly, it has in three different cases (*o*) been holden, that although the fact of the subscription of the witnesses, in the presence of the testator is omitted in the attestation, yet if the witnesses be dead, and their hands proved in common form, it is evidence to be left to a jury, of a compliance with all the circumstances. And yet it was contended that the hands of the witnesses could only stand to the facts they had subscribed to. Verdicts were given in favour of the wills; and, indeed, it seems clear, that in every case of this nature, free from any particular suspicion, a jury would find the solemnities adhered to.

There is certainly no distinction between a power to be executed by will, and a power to be executed by deed, in regard to the rule, that the solemnities required must be adhered to. In *Dormer v. Thurland* (*p*), where the power was by will, or any instrument in the nature of a will, under hand and seal, attested by three witnesses, it was considered that an execution according to the statute

(*m*) *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Ves. Jun. 11; *Addy v. Grix*, 8 Ves. Jun. 504; and see *Dormer v. Thurland*, 2 P. Wms. 506; *Westbrook v. Kennedy*, 1 Ves. and Bea. 362.

(*n*) *Trimmer v. Jackson*, 4 Burn's Eccl. Law, 130.

(*o*) *Hands v. James*, Com. 531; *Croft v. Pawlet*, 2 Stra. 1109; *Brice v. Smith*, Willes, 1.

(*p*) 2 P. Wms. 506.

tute of frauds would be a sufficient compliance with the power, with the addition of sealing. And it seems clear, that if a power were given to be executed by will *in the words of the statute*, the courts could not decide that an execution sufficient within the statute was not a due exercise of the power. If any distinction is to be made between the cases, the statute ought to receive a strict construction rather than a private power. Every argument which can be urged upon a private power applies more forcibly to the statute. The legislature, in order to prevent frauds and perjuries, prescribed a new rule, which ought to have been strictly followed, whereas the powers in question were merely intended to follow the established practice, and not to introduce a new one.

In deciding upon the due construction of the statute of frauds, the Judges did not attempt to cut down its provisions, but construed them according to the intention of the legislature ; and although one learned judge thought that the witnesses should attest the signing by the testator, yet that was overruled. It was also held, that an attestation containing the words *sealed and delivered*, was sufficient ; and it was said that this was grounded on the inconvenience that might arise in families, from having it known that a person had made his will. The inconvenience which a contrary decision upon private powers has occasioned in families, shows how strongly the same rule was called for in regard to them. The statute of frauds does not, like the common powers, merely require an attestation, but it expressly requires an attestation *and subscription*, and yet the subscription, as we have seen, need not contain all the facts which the witnesses attest. It is nevertheless held, that
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in the case of a private power, a subscription, although not required by the power, excludes the proof or presumption of the witnesses having attested any act which is not stated in the attestation ! The statute too, in express words, requires that the witnesses shall attest and subscribe *in the presence* of the testator. It is, however, settled that the *attestation* need not state that fact. The Judges have said that the witnesses ought to set their names as witnesses in the presence of the testator ; but it is not required by the statute that this should be taken notice of in the subscription of the will ; and whether inserted or not, it must be proved. If inserted, it does not conclude, but it may be proved contra ; then if not conclusive when inserted, the omission does not conclude that it was not so.

If we compare the common power upon which it is held, that the attestation must contain the word signed, with the words in the statute which have received a contrary construction, we shall at once see how difficult it would be to attempt to reconcile the cases.

The words of the statute.

Devises to be "in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, [or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction] and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the said devisor, by three or four credible witnesses."

The words of a common power.

"By deed or writing under his hand and seal, attested by two or more credible witnesses."

The common power requires much less than the statute. Let us suppose that a power was given to be executed by *will, in the very words of the statute*, could the courts put a different construction on *those very words* to that which they have already received? The answer is obvious. Suppose a power to be in the *very words of the statute*, but the word writing to be used generally, and not to be confined to a will. It is settled, that such a power may be executed by deed or will. If a will, attested so as to satisfy the statute, would be a good execution of the power, could it be contended, that a deed executed under the same power, in the attestation to which the word signed was omitted, is a bad execution of the power? And if such powers must be held to be duly executed, upon what ground can a power to be executed by writing, under hand and seal, and attested by witnesses, be considered to require the fact of signature to be inserted in the attestation?

It seems impossible to reconcile the cases. If the recent decisions are to stand, all the decisions on the statute of frauds to which I have adverted, and which have so long been held sacred, will in effect be overruled. If, however, the decisions on the statute should be deemed to rule the case under consideration, not only would contrary decisions on the same words be avoided, but the daily contracts of mankind would be upheld according to their intention, and the bounty of testators would flow in the channel in which it was intended to go. In this case the courts have not to struggle with the words in order to support the execution of the power. But if even the words were hard to manage, yet the general opinion of the Profession, under which men have

so long been induced to act, would seriously call on the courts to struggle with the words, and make them bend to that construction which they have in practice so long received.

The alarm, which the decision in the cases above considered spread through the country, induced the legislature to pass an act to amend the law in this respect (*q*).

It is intitled, "An act to amend the laws respecting the attestation of instruments of appointment and revocation, made in exercise of certain powers in deeds, wills, and other instruments." It received the royal assent on the 30th July, 1814. It recites, that powers, authorities and trusts, were in many cases required to be executed by deeds or instruments signed by or under the hands of the persons executing the same; or persons consenting to or directing acts respecting such powers, authorities and trusts, were frequently required to signify such consent or direction by deeds or instruments signed by them, or under their hands; and that it had been the ordinary practice, in the memorandum of attestation of deeds, to express the facts of sealing and delivery only; and that doubts had arisen respecting the validity of deeds or instruments so attested and requiring signature, although the same must have been actually signed by the person, whose signature was required thereto, and the titles of many purchasers, and of other persons claiming under such instruments, might be

(*q*) 54 Geo. 3, c. 168. Mr. Preston's Act.

defective for want of the insertion of the word "signed," or some word to that effect, in the memorandum of attestation thereof. And it recites, that it was expedient that the titles of purchasers and other persons should not be disturbed, merely on account of the omission to express the fact of signature in the memorandum of attestation of any such deed or other instrument already made: it was therefore enacted, that every deed or other instrument, already made with the intention to exercise any power, authority, or trust, or to signify the consent or direction of any person whose consent or direction might be necessary to be so signified, should (if duly signed and executed, and in other respects duly attested) be from the date thereof, and so as to establish derivative titles, if any, of the same validity and effect, and no other, at law and in equity, and proveable in like manner as if a memorandum of attestation of signature, or being under hand, had been subscribed by the witness or witnesses thereto; and the attestation of the witness or witnesses thereto, expressing the fact of sealing, or of sealing and delivery, without expressing the fact of signing or any other form of attestation, should not exclude the proof or the presumption of signature.

And it was enacted, that the act should extend and be construed to extend to all deeds and other instruments already made in exercise of powers, authorities, and trusts, of sale, exchange, partition, selection, nomination, discretion, leasing, jointuring, raising portions, and other charges, and for appointing new trustees, and other powers, authorities and trusts whatsoever, or made for evidencing assent, consent, request, direction, or any
other

other like circumstance in reference to the execution of any such powers, authorities, or trusts.

But it is provided, that the act should not extend to revive or give effect to any appointment, revocation, or other assurance theretofore made, as far as the same had been avoided by entry or claim, or by suit at law or in equity, or by any other legal or equitable means whatsoever; nor should the act affect or prejudice any suit at law or in equity, then depending, for avoiding any deed or other instrument of appointment, revocation, or assurance. And it is also provided, that if any person who had made any such entry or claim, or who had brought any such suit, or had defended any suit for the purpose of avoiding any such appointment, revocation, or other assurance, should release the benefit of the same entry, claim, suit, or defence, within six calendar months next after the passing of the act, then such entry or claim, or suit or defence, should not prejudice or avoid any such appointment, revocation, or other assurance, but every such appointment, revocation, or other assurance, should be and remain in force under the act, as if no such entry or claim had been made, or suit brought or defended (*r*).

And it is lastly provided, that nothing in the act contained should extend to affect any question respecting any instrument not within the provisions of the act, and which might want any formality in the attestation of any witness or witnesses thereto, but such instrument should have the same force and effect as it might have had if the act had not been made.

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(*r*) See *Nougham v. Sandys*, 2 Sim. 95.

The above act, which it will be observed was passed after the decisions were pronounced in Wright and Wakeford, and Doe and Peach, still treats the points as only doubtful, and it recognizes the established practice in these cases to be, to express the facts of sealing and delivery only in the memorandum of attestation.

It is much to be regretted that the measure was not made at once a complete remedy for the evil which it professed to cure. Every sound principle of legislation required that the act should be prospective. The act, however, was limited in its progress through parliament, to a retrospective operation. The question therefore must still frequently occur in regard to future executions of powers. To prevent its recurrence as much as possible, every conveyancer should expunge from his common forms any expression which may be considered to require the word signed to be inserted in the attestation; and solicitors should *in every case* make the attestation "signed, sealed and delivered." If the latter precaution were generally adopted the old form would be forgotten, and the question would never arise.

The act only extends to a defective attestation of signature, and therefore, where the attestation noticed the signing, but omitted the sealing, which was required by the power to be attested, the power was, upon the foregoing authorities, held to be badly executed, and the case was not considered to be within the act (s).

There are many cases which fall within the exceptions in the act.

The amendments in the act, in its progress through
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(s) Doe v. Pierce, 6 Taunt. 402.

the Lords, appear to have been made without sufficient consideration. In point of fact, the preamble, as amended, never once hits the case upon which the doubt hinges, but throughout states a case upon which no doubt is entertained. The doubt was not whether powers required to be executed by deeds signed would be well executed where the attestation only expresses the facts of sealing and delivery; but whether such powers would be well executed where they were required to be executed by deeds signed *and attested* by witnesses. This mistake in the preamble may be thought to render it questionable, whether the enacting part of the statute applies to the right case, particularly with reference to the last proviso in the act, which also is an amendment, but which however I do not profess to comprehend.

All difficulties would be obviated by a decision of the twelve judges against the validity of the objection, or by a simple act of parliament, repealing the present one, and declaring that instruments executed under powers shall be as operative, although the attestation contains only the words sealed and delivered, as they would be if the word signed was added. This would not render it unnecessary, where the circumstances called for it, to prove that the instrument was signed in the presence of the witnesses. Such a provision therefore would work no injustice (I).

It

(I) The Author has framed a bill which is now pending in Parliament (having been read a first time) which enacts, "That every deed or other instrument hereafter to be executed with the intent to exercise any power or authority or trust, or to

It is usual in powers to say that they may be executed in the presence of a given number of witnesses, or more, but this is unnecessary : no objection can be raised to the deed executing the power, although it is attested by a greater number of witnesses than was in strictness necessary.

It is clear that where an instrument executing a power is required to be executed in the presence of two or more witnesses, and nothing is said about their attesting the execution, the power will be duly executed, although the witnesses do not subscribe the attestation indorsed, or some of them do, and others do not. This was decided in the case of Sayle and Freeland (*t*). And, by analogy to the decisions upon the statute of frauds, it should seem that in the absence of an express requisition, that the witnesses shall all attest the instrument

(*t*) 2 Ventr. 355 ; 2 Ch. Rep. 110 ; 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 345.

signify the consent or direction of any person whose consent or direction may be necessary to be so signified, shall if duly executed according to the power, and attested by the number of witnesses required by the power, although the attestation signed by the witness or witnesses shall not state the compliance with the terms of the power, be of the same validity and effect, and no other, at law and in equity, and proveable in like manner as if a full and proper memorandum of attestation had been subscribed by the witness or witnesses thereto ; and the attestation of the witness or witnesses thereto in general terms, or merely expressing the fact of one ceremony having been performed, without stating the other or others, or whatever the form of the attestation may be, shall not exclude the proof or the presumption of the ceremonies to which the witnesses were required to subscribe, an attestation having been actually performed."

ment at the same time, they may attest it at different times (*u*).

It has been decided, that under the provisions of the statute of frauds a blind man's will need not be read over to him in the presence of the attesting witness. This decision would apply to a similar case under a power (*x*).

Where trusts are raised with a power of revocation in the settlor, the settlement will not be defeated by the mere act of the trustee re-conveying to the settlor; to effectuate a revocation the terms of the power must be complied with, although the settlement was merely voluntary (*y*).

It is here material to observe, that, generally speaking, every formality required to the execution of the power, must be perfected in the life-time of the donee of the power, although it is external, or *dehors* the deed. Thus, in *Hawkins v. Kemp*, where the deed was required by the power to be enrolled, the deed in the body of it expressed that it was intended to be enrolled, but it was not enrolled till after his death. It was insisted, that the enrolment would make the deed good by relation, and that there was nothing personal in it; but the court, in an elaborate judgment, held, that the enrolment could not be made against the consent of the donee of the power, and must of necessity be made during

(*u*) *Cook v. Parsons*, Prec. Cha. 184; *Lodge v. Jennings*, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 255; *Jones v. Lake*, 2 Atk. 176, n.; *Grayson v. Atkinson*, 2 Ves. 454; *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Ves. jun. 11; See 3 Cha. Ca. 82, 90.

(*x*) *Longchamp v. Fish*, 2 New Rep. 415.

(*y*) *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. jun. 656. *Ruth v. Seymour* 4 Russ. 263.

during his life, as it was one of the circumstances required to the due execution of the power. The Lord Chief Justice observed, that the question was not so properly a question of *relation*, as whether *the enrolment could have any effect without the donee's authority*, which necessarily determined with his life (*z*). In *Wright v. Wakeford*, and *Doe v. Peach*, we have seen that it was held that the attestation could not be amended after the death of the party executing the power.

III. I proceed to consider the conditions required not relating to the instrument.

Where a man has, under distinct settlements, distinct powers to appoint new uses, or to revoke the old uses, of two distinct estates, on tender upon each appointment or revocation of any given sum of money, as 5*s.*, and he tender one sum of 5*s.* only, and then exercise both powers, the execution of both will be deemed void, although the two estates were settled to the same uses, and the tenders were to be made to the same persons (*a*); but it seems to have been thought, that where the powers require the performance of any other act than the payment of the money, the performance of one single act would be sufficient (*b*). It is evident that no general rule

(*z*) 3 East, 410; and see 372 a, p. 9. 1 Leon. 89. 9 Rep. Digges's case, 1 Rep. 173. 106 b. Mo. 261.

(*a*) Gresham's case (I), Dy. (b) See Dy. 372 b.

(I) This case is differently stated in Moore. It is there stated, that each of the powers required a tender of 10*s.* and that the donee actually tendered 20*s.*; but the doubt was, whether a tender of the two sums in one entire sum would do. Dyer, Leonard, and Coke however, state the case as in the text.

rule can be laid down on this subject. If, indeed, a man have several distinct powers of revocation over different estates, upon riding to York, the performing the journey once may well extend to all the powers. But if the conditions were, that he should provide a gown for some poor woman, several distinct gifts would evidently be requisite; this however, it may be said, is money's worth.

Where a tender of a sum of money is required to the valid execution of a power, it is highly desirable that the fact of the tender should be stated in the deed executing the power, and that the person to whom the tender is made should acknowledge it by indorsement on the deed; for although the fact *may* be proved by parol evidence, yet in some cases it might be difficult to establish it to the satisfaction of a jury (c). The practice, however, of requiring money to be tendered, is now become obsolete, but the observation applies with equal force to every other external circumstance required to the execution of a power.

Although money is required to be tendered *at a particular place*, yet a tender in the absence of the person to whom it ought to be made, and without notice having been given to him of the time when the tender would be made, is void (d). But where a certain place and day is limited for the tender, the person to whom it is to be made must attend at his peril (e). Where no time is limited, notice ought to be given to the person by whom
the

(c) See *Arundel v. Philpot*, 3 Cha. Ca. 70, 108, cited 2 Vern. 69; *Lock v. Norborne*, 3 Mod. 141.

(d) *Lady Burg's case*, Mo. 602.
(e) *Burrough's case*, Dy. 354 a. pl. 32; and see 3 Cha. Ca. 67.

the tender is to be received, that it will be made at such a time, and he should be required to be there to receive it; and then, if at the time appointed a tender be made, although he absent himself, it is a good performance of the proviso (*f*).

But although the tender is required to be made at a given place, yet it seems that a tender *at any other place*, and an acceptance of it by the person to whom it is to be made, will be valid even at law (*g*), unless the tender is to be made to a stranger, and not to a privy to the deed; in which case it seems that the strict letter of the condition must be complied with (*h*).

Where a tender is required to be made to a man or his heirs, if he die, leaving an infant heir, the tender may be made to the infant, of whatever age he may be. And although the infant be a female, and the wife of the deceased be ensient at her husband's death, and should afterwards be delivered of a son, yet that will not invalidate the prior tender to the daughter, who was heir *pro tempore*. Where the tender is required to be made to a man or his *assigns*, and the estate is limited to him and his *heirs*, the heir is the proper person to receive the tender. These three points appear to have been decided by Allen's case in *Curia Wardorum*, in the 11th of Jac. I. (*i*).

Where the consent of any person is required to the execution of the power, that, like every other condition, must be strictly complied with (*j*).

And if the person whose consent is essential, die
before

(*f*) 8 Rep. 92 b.

(*h*) See 3 Cha. Ca. 68.

(*g*) *Thorne v. Newman*, 2 Cha.

(*i*) Ley, 57.

Rep. 37; and see 3 Cha. Ca. 68, 108.

(*j*) *Simpson v. Hornsby*, Prec. Cha. 452; vide *supra*.

before the execution of the power, and without having assented, the power is gone, although his death was the act of God (*k*). So where the consent of several persons is required, the death of one of them destroys the power, for the consent of the survivors will not satisfy the words of the power (*l*). But the intention of the parties will be observed, however informally it be expressed. Therefore, where a power of revocation was given in a marriage-settlement to two persons, with the consent of their wives, if they or either of them were then living, a revocation, with the consent of the surviving wife, was held sufficient, although the power did not expressly say that the consent of the survivor should be valid (*m*). And in one case, where a father by his will gave a power of jointuring to an improvident son, *with the consent of his trustees*, both of whom were of an advanced age, the court appears to have been of opinion, that in favour of the intention the consent of the heirs of the trustees would be valid; and that the will was to be read as if he said “with the consent of the trustees *and their heirs* ;” and as the persons were several, and the consent was personal, they thought the expression would be equivalent to saying “with consent of both while they live, but when one die, that consent shall devolve upon his heir; the heir of the dead trustee shall consent, as well as the surviving trustee: one may abuse the power; I will supply

(*k*) *Danne v. Annas*, Dy. 219, pl. 8; and see *Mansell v. Mansell*, Wilm. 36.

Alwaters v. Bird, vide *supra*, ch. 3, sect. 2.

(*m*) *Savil v. Stirling*, Shep.

(*l*) *Atwaters v. Birt*, Cro. Eliz. 856; S. C. Noy, 38, nom.

Touch. 526; S. C. 2 Ro. 178, nom. *Gardner v. Savill*.

supply the loss of one by his heirs, and the loss of both by the heirs of both (*n*).” It was not, however, necessary to decide either of these points.

In *Lord Mordaunt v. the Earl of Peterborough* (*o*), the Earl had a power of revocation, with the consent of the Countess, in writing. She was a party to the deed, which was necessary in order to save her jointure. and she sealed it; but the conveyance was not said to be by her assent, nor was any mention made of it in any other clause; and the Court conceived this not to be a sufficient revocation. The point, however, did not call for a decision; but this case enforces the necessity of stating accurately in the deed executing the power the compliance with every circumstance imposed on the execution of it.

Where a person's consent is required to the execution of a power he cannot delegate the confidence reposed in him. This was one of the points in the case of *Hawkins and Kemp* (*p*). The power was to be executed with the consent of several persons. One of these persons being abroad gave a letter of attorney to the donee of the power, to consent to his own revocation of the power. And this part of the case was abandoned, as the court intimated a decided opinion against it, on the ground, that it would operate as a total destruction of the check intended by requiring the personal approbation of the trustees.

Where trustees had power in a marriage-settlement,
with

(*n*) *Mansell v. Mansell*, Wilm. 1 Barn. & Ald. 608. *supra*, 169.
36; and see *Hewit v. Hewit*, (o) 3 Keb. 305.
Ambl. 508; *Townsend v. Wilson*, (p) 3 East. 410.

with the consent in writing of the wife, to raise 1,500 *l.* for the husband, and they raised the money without a written consent, it was held, that a subsequent regular consent, by which the wife declared that the sale was with her full consent, was not valid, and the trustees were compelled to refund the money (*q*).

It appears scarcely necessary to observe, that when a trustee is authorized to consent to a revocation he will not be guilty of a breach of trust by giving his consent accordingly, unless he act fraudulently (*r*); nor will a court of equity control his discretion. Thus, where in a marriage-settlement it was provided, that if the husband, his heirs, executors, or administrators, with the approbation and good liking of two trustees, should settle lands of 80 *l.* per annum to the same uses, then that settlement should be void: the eldest son and heir applied to the trustees to consent that on settlement of an estate of equal value the former should be void; the trustees would not consent; without which the revocation would not be good in point of law: a bill was brought to compel their consent, and Lord Hardwicke held that it could not be done, and that a bill of that kind against trustees who had a discretionary power to consent or not was never admitted (*s*).

We may close these observations upon consent with the case of *Hutcheson v. Hammond* (*t*), where a testatrix gave a fund to *A* for life, and after his decease to his daughter, and willed, that if she *in the life-time of*
her

(*q*) *Bateman v. Davis*, 3 Madd.
98.

(*r*) *Reresby v. Newland*, 2 P.
Wms. 93.

(*s*) *Brereton v. Brereton*, 2 Vea.
87, cited.

(*t*) 3 Bro. C. C. 128.

her father should marry without his consent, then he should have a power to appoint the fund to whom he pleased ; the daughter married in her father's life-time, *with his consent*, and it was determined that by this one consent the power was wholly gone.

We have still to consider those cases where the conditions imposed, although, like the former, not relating to the instrument, are yet in many respects distinguishable from them. I allude to powers to be exercised only in the event of another estate proving deficient to answer certain charges, or another estate being first settled to the same uses, or the like. And as these conditions consist not merely of form, but are of the very essence of the gift or reservation, they perhaps more than any other require a strictly literal performance.

Therefore, where a power was given to trustees to sell for the purpose of raising as much money as the personal estate should prove deficient in paying debts, it was decided by Jones, Croke, and Barkeley, Justices, that the condition was a precedent condition, and that the power would not authorize a sale unless there was an actual deficiency, and then so much only of the estate could be sold as was sufficient for the payment of the debts, and consequently, that the amount of the debts and the value of the personal estate ought to be shown, so that the court might judge whether the condition was performed or not (*u*). Great difficulty frequently arises in practice from powers like this, as it is difficult to satisfy

(*u*) *Dike v. Ricks*, Cro. Car. Aston, 2 Cha. Ca. 115, 221, as 335; *Wm. Jones*, 327; 1 Ro. Abr. explained, Treat. Purch. 6th 329, pl. 9; 3 Vin. Abr. 419, pl. 9; edit. p. 514; and see *Bowman* and see *Popham v. Hubert*, 1 v. *Mathews*, For. Exch. Rep. Cha. Ca. 280; and *Culpepper v.* 163.

satisfy a purchaser of the deficiency, and the actual extent of it. It should, therefore, in these cases invariably be provided, that the power shall *quoad* a purchaser be well executed, although there be no deficiency, and that he shall not be bound to inquire into or ascertain whether there actually be any deficiency (*x*).

So where a power of sale was given to trustees, *so as that* (*y*) the money was paid to them, and laid out in other lands to the like uses, it was held that the power was not well executed, as the money was not paid to the trustees, and laid out accordingly (*z*). The court considered that the trustees had only a power of sale *on condition* of re-investing the money in the purchase of another estate. In this case, however, the purchaser's agent was privy to a fraudulent disposition of the purchase-money, and knew that it was not intended to lay out the purchase-money according to the proviso. Where the transaction is fair, and a power is given by the settlement to the trustees, to give receipts for the purchase-money, which are declared to be discharges, it seems clear that the purchaser could not be affected by a misapplication of the money, after having obtained a proper receipt for it from the trustees. The opposite rule would in effect strike this clause out of the deed. The point was accordingly so decided in the late case of *Roper v. Halifax* (*a*).

Again, where a power of revocation was given with
the

(*x*) See Treat. Purch. 6th edit. p. 515.

Stanhope's case, Bac. Law Tracts 233.

(*y*) See Lord Chancellor Bacon's argument upon *ita quod*, or *so that*, in powers. Sir John

(*z*) *Doe v. Martin*, 4 T. Rep. 39.

(*a*) Appendix, No. 4, MS.

the consent of trustees, *so that* at or before the revocation other estates were assured of equal or better value to the like uses, it was considered clear, that if an *equitable* estate had been conveyed, the power would have been badly executed *at law*, but whether in equity was doubted; and it was also thought that a purchaser of the settled estates would have been bound to have shown the value of the substituted estates (*b*).

And in a case where a power of revocation was given, *so as* at the time of such revocation he settled other lands free from incumbrances of as good or better yearly value, Lord Hardwicke was clearly of opinion that the power of revocation was not well executed, as the substituted estate was not of equal value, and was charged with an incumbrance (*c*).

These cases should not be dismissed without an observation on the impolicy of the settlements upon which they arose; they tend only to expense and trouble in practice, as a purchaser could not in general be compelled to complete his purchase without the sanction of a decree in equity, and there are few cases in which he could be advised to accept the title without a decree. It would be much better wholly to omit a power of sale in a settlement, than to fetter its operation by requisitions like these. The *usual* power of sale is exactly adapted to effectuate the intention of the parties: the trustees are authorized, with the proper consents, to sell the estate absolutely, and are directed to lay out the money in the purchase of other estates; but this is not made a condition affecting the execution of the power, but on the

(*b*) Cox v. Chamberlain, 4 Ves. jun. 631.

(*c*) Burgoigne v. Fox, 1 Atk. 575.

the contrary the trustees are authorized to give receipts to the purchaser, which it is declared shall exonerate him from seeing to the application of the money ; and they are empowered to lay out the money at interest, until invested in the purchase of an estate. This plan has been adopted from a conviction of the mischievous tendency of other modes.

Where a condition is imposed merely with a view to ascertain the annual value of the property to be appointed, if the circumstances to which the condition refers do not exist, the donee may appoint property of the actual annual value prescribed (*d*).

(*d*) *Lidwell v. Nolland*, 1 Bligh, 99.

SECTION IV.

OF THE TIME AT WHICH A POWER MAY BE EXECUTED, AND OF PARTIAL EXECUTIONS.

IT comes in order to consider at what time powers may be executed, and in what cases partial and repeated executions may be made.

And, first, it may be remarked, that although a power is given generally, yet the courts, or at least equity, will not permit it to be exercised before the time in which it was the intention of the parties that it should be executed. Thus, where portions for younger children were to be raised *at such times* as the father should direct, and he having a daughter fourteen years of age, directed the trustees to raise the portion *immediately*. The daughter died under age, and the father claimed her portion as administrator ; Lord Thurlow said, “ The meaning of a charge for children is that it shall take place when it shall

be wanted. It is contrary to the nature of such a charge to have it raised before that time. And although the power is in this case to raise it when the parent shall think proper, yet that is only to enable him to raise it in his own life if it should be necessary. It would have been very proper to do so upon the daughter's marriage, or for several other purposes, *but this is against the nature of the power.*" And the bill was dismissed (a).

If a power be given to a person to make a lease, &c. six months, or any other given time before his death, the power may be executed at any time, although it be not six months before his death, but a month, a week, or a day, for the duration of his life cannot be known (b).

So where a power was given by a settlement to a married woman, *in case of the death of her husband in her life-time*, to charge the estate with a sum of money, and she executed the power in the life-time of her husband; and afterwards survived him; it was first determined by the Court of King's Bench, and then by the Court of Chancery, that the power was well executed (c). This case is an authority, that where a power is authorized to be executed in a contingent event, it may be executed before the happening of the contingency. The words of the power seemed to make the happening of the contingency a precedent condition. It runs thus: that if the said J. S. (the husband) shall happen to die, and M. (his

(a) Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour, 1 Bro. C. C. 395; and see 11 Ves. jun. 479, S. C. cited by Lord Eldon, who said the daughter was consumptive.

(b) Harris v. Graham, 2 Ro. Abr. 247, pl. 6.

(c) Countess of Sutherland v. Northmore, 1 Dick. 56, S. C. 3 Vin. Abr. 427, pl. 8, nom. Sclater v. Travell; see Doe v. Tomkinson, 2 Mau. and Selw. 165; Dalby v. Pullen, 2 Bing. 144; and 9 Moore, 300.

(his wife) shall him survive, and there shall be no issue of the marriage living at the death of *M*, then and in such case it shall be lawful for her, at any time or times during her life, by any deed, &c. to charge the estate. Now it was of necessity that she should be allowed to execute the power after the death of her husband, although there was issue, but no such necessity existed during his life. In a case before Lord Thurlow (*d*), where a power was given to the survivor of two persons, and they executed a joint appointment, he held it bad.

Where, previously to marriage, an agreement is made *generally* that the woman may dispose of her property, she cannot after the agreement, and *before* the marriage, make a binding will, unless expressly authorized to do so (*e*).

Sir Edward Coke lays it down as clear, that where there is a devise to *A* for life, and that after his decease the estate shall be sold, the sale cannot be made during *A*'s life, but must wait till his decease. Mr. Hargrave justly observes, that this is a doubtful point upon the authorities (*f*). There was a case before Lord Hardwicke in which he expressed an opinion on this question, which appears to have been overlooked. I allude to *Uvedale v. Uvedale* (*g*), where the devise was to the wife for life, and after her death the testator willed that the same should be sold; and Lord Hardwicke said, that

(*d*) *Mac Adam v. Logan*, 3 Bro. C. C. 310, *vide supra*. (*f*) See note (2) to Co. Litt. 113 a.

(*e*) *Hodsden v. Lloyd*, 2 Bro. C. C. 534; *Doe v. Staple*, 2 Term Rep. 684. The marginal abstract of the case in *Brown* is inaccurate. (*g*) 3 Atk. 117; and see *Anonymous*, 2 Leo. 220, pl. 276.

the words *after her decease* were not put in to postpone the sale (I). However, in a late case before the Court of Exchequer (in which the case of *Uvedale and Uvedale* was cited), where the devise was to *A*, the testator's wife, for life, and after her decease a power to trustees to sell, and pay the money amongst the children of *B*, who had an infant child then living, the Court held that a sale could not be made till after the widow's decease (*h*). The bill was an amicable one, and was filed by the widow against the trustees and the infant for an immediate sale, but after two arguments the Court dismissed the bill. Where the parties beneficially entitled are adult, and the fee is devised, a sale may of course be made with their concurrence, during the life of the tenant for life. The purchaser would obtain the legal estate, and the *cestuis que trust* would be bound by the sale. But even if the parties are adult, yet where a power only is given, the title cannot be accepted unless the person in whom the fee is vested till appointment will convey the estate to the purchaser; for until the death of the tenant for life, the power, according to the case in the Exchequer, does not arise, and consequently cannot till then be executed.

In a recent case, a mother was tenant for life, with remainder to her daughter in tail. In pursuance of a decree, on the daughter's marriage the estates were to be settled to the husband for life, with the usual remainders over, with powers of sale and exchange. The mother joined in the recovery and settlement, and the estates were limited

(*h*) *Meyrick v. Coutts*, Excheq. 8 July 1806, MS.

(I) But the estate was sold under the widow's bill as a specialty creditor.

limited *to her for life*, remainder to the husband for life, with remainders over according to the decree; and a power of sale was inserted at any time during the lives of the husband and wife, and the survivor, with their, his, or her consent. The estates were sold in the life-time of the mother; and it was objected, that the power could not be executed until after her death; but the Master of the Rolls decreed the purchaser to take the title (i).

Sometimes a power is given to a person on default or failure of his issue, and it becomes doubtful at what time the issue must fail in order to give effect to the power. In *Holt v. Burleigh* (k), in a strict settlement, a power was given to the wife to sell the estate if she should survive her husband, *not having issue, or without issue of their two bodies*. The husband died, leaving issue, and that issue died without leaving issue in the life-time of the wife: and it was determined, that the wife might sell the land; although it was insisted, that the husband leaving issue, the wife did not survive her husband, *not having issue, or without issue*, and therefore the power never took effect.

The Lord Chancellor said, that there was no occasion in this case to make any artificial construction of the proviso, for that the words thereof fell in naturally with the meaning of the parties, and gave her a power to sell when the issue failed; for where an estate is made to a man and the heirs of his body, and if he die without issue, or without heirs of his body, the remainder over, this is a good limitation wherever the issue

(i) *Fry v. Fish*, Rolls, 5th August 1811, MS.

(k) *Prec. Cha.* 293, S.C. 2 Vern. 651.

fails; though in that case if he leaves issue he cannot properly be said to die without issue. But this is a much stronger case, for death is a single act, and to be performed but once, and though the issue dies without issue, a year after, you cannot say he died without issue, because he actually left issue; and yet a limitation over in such a case is good: but here, surviving is a continuing act, and she survives her husband as much a year after his death as she did the first moment; and therefore if the issue fails during her life she actually survives without issue, or not leaving issue, because the issue fails during her survivorship, which continues after the failure of issue; and this is the plain and natural meaning of the words, and agrees with the intention of the parties, which was to give her the disposal of so much lands, in case the issue to be provided for by the settlement failed.

In a more recent case, where the estate was limited to the children of the marriage in fee, and in default of *such issue*, to the use of such person as the wife should appoint, the wife executed the power, and left a son living at her death; and it was decided that the appointment was void (*l*); but the Court appear to have thought, that if the wife had survived her son the power would have arose. This was a liberal construction in favour of the power; for it is settled, that *issue*, in a case like that, means *child*, and therefore it might be thought that the birth of a child at once prevented the power from arising, and that his death the next hour would not revive it.

It frequently happens, that powers are given to parties
to

(*l*) Doe v. Denny, cited in 2 Wils. 337, reported in Say. 295.

to be exercised by them when in the actual possession of the estate. In some cases it would be desirable that the power should be given so as to enable the party to execute it, although his remainder has not fallen into possession, and, at the same time, so as not to accelerate the charge under the power (*m*). Sometimes when a person in remainder has been desirous to execute his power as if in possession, it has been attempted to put the party in a situation to do so, by accelerating the possession of his estate. Mr. Butler observes, that, in one case, it is clear that this will answer the object intended; that is, where *A* is tenant for life, with the immediate remainder (without any limitation to trustees) to *B* for life, with a power for *B* to jointure when in possession. Here, if *A* surrenders to *B*, *B* is to all purposes in possession of the estate, and, therefore, in a situation to exercise his powers. But he adds, that where there is an intermediate estate this never can be relied on. If it is expressed in the deed, as it is generally is, that it shall be lawful for the party to exercise the power when in possession, under the limitations, and there is a limitation to trustees to preserve the contingent remainders, the first tenant for life can in no wise put the second tenant for life in possession of the estate but by an actual conveyance of his life-estate; consequently the party will then be in possession, not by virtue of the limitations of the deed, but by the act of the first tenant for life. For, instead of being tenant in possession for his life only, as he would be if he was in possession under the limitations in the deed, he is tenant in possession for the life of another person, with a remainder for his own life;

so

(*m*) See note to Co. Litt. 271 b. s. 3.

so that he has two estates which are perfectly distinct, and under the limitations of the settlement he is only tenant for life in remainder. Where these words, therefore, are inserted, it seems clear that the party is not in possession within the words or meaning of the deeds, and consequently not in a situation of exercising his power. Where these words are not inserted, it may be contended that they ought to be implied (*n*).

Now, there seems ground to contend, that even where there is no limitation to trustees, the power cannot be duly exercised. The question is not, whether in strictness of law the tenant is after the surrender in possession under the limitations, which he clearly is, but, whether the testator intended that the power should be executed in the given event. It is, in truth, a simple fraud on the remainder-man. Suppose *A* to be tenant for life, remainder to *B* for life, remainder to *C*, with a power to *B* to jointure when in possession. It seems clear that the testator could only mean, that *B* should exercise his power on the death of *A*, or forfeiture of his estate, that is, he can be only considered to have contemplated the determination of the estate by the act of God (death), or the act of the law (forfeiture). But if *A* surrender to *B*, who exercises his power, and then *B* die in the life-time of *A*, the estate will go to the remainder-man charged with the jointure; whereas, without the assistance of *A*, the estate could not have been charged by *B* in his (*A*'s) life-time. It may be said, that the possession of *C*, the remainder-man, is accelerated, inasmuch as if no surrender had been made, he would not have been entitled to the possession till the death

(*n*) Co. Litt. 271 b. note (1) s. 3.

death of *A*; but this argument leaves the testator's intention behind, and makes it a mere question of loss and gain. And if we look at the question in that light, we shall find that surrenders of this kind are made for the express purpose of charging the remainder-man's estate, so that he is never benefited by the arrangement. A lease is granted previously to the surrender, in order to secure the profits to the tenant for life who surrenders. To hold, therefore, this to be within the words of the will or settlement, is to authorize the tenant for life in possession, and the next remainder-man, to commit a fraud on the other remainder-men. These observations appear to apply as well to a power under a settlement as to a power under a will, for in both the intention of the donor of the power is equally to be attended to.

Since these observations were written, a case arose, where an estate was settled to a father for life, with an immediate remainder to his son for life, with remainders over, with a power to the father *during his life and after his decease*, to the son during his life, to lease. The father conveyed his life-estate to the son, who during his father's life-time exercised the power of leasing; and the Court of King's Bench held the lease to be void (*o*).

Powers of appointment and revocation need not be executed to the utmost extent at once, but may be executed at different times over different parts of the estate, or over the whole estate, but not to the full extent

(*o*) *Coke v. Day*, 13 East, 118.

extent of the power. Digges's case (*p*) is an authority, that under a power of revocation the uses of part of the land may be revoked at one time, and of part at another, and so of the residue, until the uses of all the land are revoked. So where a man has a general power of appointment, he may execute it at several times, and appoint an estate for life at one time, and the fee at another time (*q*). And the same of a power of revocation (*r*). So powers of jointuring, &c. may in like manner be executed at different times, provided that the party do not in all the executions exceed the limits of the power (*s*). In a case (*t*) where a power was given to raise such sum or sums of money, not exceeding 200 *l.* for their two daughters, as *A* and his wife should appoint, the Lord Chancellor said, it was insisted to be a power to appoint by parcels at different times, by virtue of the words *sum or sums* of money. But he was of opinion that was not the construction; they could not do so. It was a discretionary power, not to raise by parcels, but to raise any given sum, not exceeding 200 *l.*; as suppose 100 *l.* or 150 *l.*, and if they jointly had appointed any sum, the survivor could not add to or alter it.

And in *Simpson v. Paul* (*u*), where a sum of money was settled upon the children of the intended marriage, in such shares as the husband and wife, during their joint

(*p*) 1 Rep. 173; and see Sir Richard Lee's case, 1 And. 67, and Co. Litt. 237 a.

(*q*) See *Bovey v. Smith*, 1 Vern. 84.

(*r*) See *Snape v. Turton*, Cro. Car. 472; and *Bullock v. Thorne*, Mo. 615.

(*s*) *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 Atk. 561; *Zouch v. Woolston*, 2 Burr. 1136; 1 Blackst. 281; and see *Doe v. Milborne*, 2 Term Rep. 721.

(*t*) *Brown v. Nisbett*, 1 Cox, 13, *sed qu.*

(*u*) 2 Eden, 34.

joint lives, or in default thereof, the survivor of them, should appoint; and the husband and wife, upon the marriage of a daughter, appointed 2,000 *l.* to the daughter, as her share of the settled sum, Lord Northington held, that the wife, who survived her husband, could not increase the share. His reasoning, however, is not satisfactory; the power in the survivor, according to the general opinion, extends over the whole of the fund which remains unappointed. It was admitted that the joint appointment did not prevent a further joint appointment.

In *Sumpton v. Sir Andrew Jenner* (*x*), a power was given to a feme covert, and it was to be by her *sole only and single* act and deed sealed, which Maynard insisted could not be *iterato*; but the Court resolved that these words meant, without joining of the husband only.

These are cases where the power is really but partially executed by the first appointment; but a power, although exhausted at law, may be but partially executed in equity. Thus, if a man having a general power of appointment, or of revocation, appoint to one in fee by way of mortgage, the power is wholly executed at law; but as equity considers a mortgage merely a security for the debt, in equity it operates as a partial execution only (*y*). And whatever may be the form of the instrument, if it be in effect simply a mortgage, it will operate merely as a revocation *pro tanto*. But where there is not only a mortgage, but an ulterior disposition inconsistent

(*x*) 2 Kéb. 261.

141, 182; *Lassells v. Lord Corn-*

(*y*) *Perkins v. Walker*, 1 Vern.

wallis, Prec. Cha. 232.

97; *Thorne v. Thorne*, 1 Vern.

consistent with the former, it will operate even in equity as a total appointment or revocation, unless there be a declaration that it shall be an appointment or revocation only *pro tanto*. The case of Fitzgerald and Fauconberge(*z*) does not go farther than this. There, under a general power of revocation, William Fowler conveyed the fee to trustees to raise and pay debts. And after payment thereof, that they should pay the overplus, and re-convey the estates unsold, to him, or to such persons, &c. as he should, by any deed or writing, under his hand and seal, attested by two or more credible witnesses, appoint. And by a deed of even date, he reserved power to revoke the conveyance. It was determined, that the former settlement was wholly revoked. The Court admitted the authority of the cases before cited as to mortgages; but they determined, that Mr. Fowler's intention was to do an act inconsistent with the former settlement, *and to put the estate into a new channel*. Indeed, the mode of directing the disposition of the residue, but more especially the power of revocation reserved, strongly indicated an intention wholly to revoke the old settlement. The principle must be the same as is applied to revocations of devises by mortgages, &c. And it is clear, that a mere conveyance to a trustee in fee, in trust to sell, and pay debts, with the ultimate trust for the settlor, is, like a mortgage, only a revocation *pro tanto* of a prior will(*a*). But where the equity of redemption or residuary interest is settled differently, or a different power of disposition is reserved over it, even equity will hold the mortgage or conveyance a total revocation.

(*z*) Fitzg. 207.

2 Freem. 117; Ogle v. Cooke,

(*a*) Lady Vernon v. Jones, 2 Bro. C. C. 592, cited.

vocation. Upon the same principles the cases of Perkins and Walker, and Fitzgerald and Fauconberge, may well stand together. Nor does it appear to be material in these cases, whether the mortgage is made to the person seised of the estate subject to the power of revocation, or to a stranger (*b*).

(*b*) Thorne v. Thorne, 1 Vern. 5 Ves. jun. 656, which over-
182; see Peach v. Phillips, ruled Harkness v. Bayley, Prec.
2 Dick. 538; Baxter v. Dyer, Cha. 514.

SECTION V.

WHAT AMOUNTS TO THE EXECUTION OF A POWER
WHERE THE DONEE HAS NOT AN INTEREST IN THE
ESTATE, AND THE POWER IS NOT REFERRED TO.

WHERE a man has a power to limit uses, and no power to convey the land, if he convey or devise the land generally, and the circumstances required to the execution of the power as to subscription, witnesses, &c. are observed, the conveyance or devise shall enure as a limitation of the use, because otherwise it would be void (*a*).

So if a man having several *powers*, but no *estates* actually vested in him, make a general disposition which can only take effect as an execution of at least one of the powers, it shall be deemed an execution of all the powers;

(*a*) Sir Edward Clere's case, S. C. affirmed upon error; Cro.
6 Rep. 17 b; S. C. Mo. 476, Eliz. 877; Cro. Jac. 31; Hus-
nom. Worme v. Webster, ib. 567, sey's case, cited, ib.; and see
nom. Parker v. Sir Edward Clere, 12 Mod. 469.

powers (*b*); or if a particular disposition be made, it will be deemed to be in exercise of such of the powers as authorize the act (*c*). The like construction will be made where the instrument is expressed to be in pursuance of his power generally, without referring to one in particular (*d*).

On the same principle it is, that where a man has a power of revocation, and does an act which can operate only as an exercise of it, and all incidental circumstances prescribed by the proviso are observed, the act shall accordingly be deemed an execution of the power, although no reference whatever is made to it, and there is not any express signification of the intent to determine and disannul the estates which will be defeated by the execution of it (*e*); *quia non refert an quis intentionem suam declaret verbis, an rebus ipsis, vel factis*.

And although the revocation is required to be made in *express words*, yet an instrument disposing of the estate to different uses, although not referring to the power, or expressly declaring an intention to revoke, will operate as a revocation (*f*) (I). This decision appears to

(*b*) Countess of Roscommon v. Fowke, 4 Bro. P. C. 523.

(*c*) Fitzgerald v. Fauconberge, Fitz. 207.

(*d*) Udal v. Udal, Al. 81.

(*e*) Scrope's case, 10 Rep. 143 b; 2 Ro. Abr. 262 (C) pl. 1; and see Frampton v. Frampton, as it is said accordingly, 6 Rep. 144 b.; see the case in Mo. 735;

Snape v. Turton, Cro. Car. 472; Deg. v. Deg. 2 P. Wms. 405, Sel. Cha. Ca. 44; Fitzgerald v. Fauconberge, Fitzg. 107; Roscommon v. Fowke, 4 Bro. P. C. 523; and see George v. Lousley, 8 East, 13.

(*f*) Guy v. Dormer, Raym. 295; and see 3 Cha. Ca. 91.

(I) Mr. Powell, Pow. p. 115, says, that this point happened not to be

to be founded upon solid principles, for the words of the instrument which operate the revocation are *express words*, and do by law amount in themselves to a revocation.

But although a man may execute a power without reciting or taking the slightest notice of it, yet it is necessary that he should mention the estate or interest which he disposes of: he must do such an act as shows that he has in view the thing of which he had a power to dispose (*g*).

This question mostly arises upon wills. It is firmly settled, that a mere general devise, however unlimited in terms, will not comprehend the subject of the power unless it refer to the subject, or to the power itself, or generally to any power vested in the testator (*h*) (II), or unless

(*g*) See 1 Atk. 560; 2 Bro. Atk. 558; *ex-parte* Caswell, 1 C. C. 303; 3 Ves. jun. 301; Atk. 559; *Andrews v. Emmott*, Lowson v. Lowson, 3 Bro. C. C. 2 Bro. C. C. 297 (I); *Buckland v. Barton*, 2 H. Blackst. 136; *Blake v. Bunbury*, 1 Ves. jun. 525; *Ball and Beatty*, 77. *Maples v. Hales v. Margerum*, 3 Ves. jun. Brown, 2 Sim. 327. 299; *Langham v. Nenny*, 3 Ves.

(*h*) *Moulton v. Hutchinson*, 1 jun.

be material, as the event of this case would have been the same whether the revocation had been good or not. The case, however, appears to have depended on this point solely. There was a term of five years, which the jury found had expired. Perhaps Mr. P. was led to think that this referred to a fine levied, and that a title was gained by non-claim.

(I) In *Standen v. Standen*, Lord Rosslyn endeavoured to refer the decision in *Andrews* and *Emmott* to the particular circumstances of the case, but it appears to have been decided on a broad general principle.

(II) In the case of *Churchill v. Dibben*, it appears by the

unless some part of the will would otherwise be inoperative, as, if the subject of the power be real estate, and the donee make a general devise of all his real and personal estates, and has *no real* estate, there the estate subjected to his appointment will pass (*i*). So if the testator has a power of appointment over freehold and copyhold estates, and is seised of other freehold estates, and devise all his freehold and copyhold estates without reference to the power, the copyholds will pass, but not the freeholds within the power (*k*). The point, however,

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|---|---|
| jun. 467 ; Croft v. Slee, 4 Ves. | P. C. by Toml. 193(I); see Deg |
| jun. 60 ; Nannock v. Horton, 7 | v. Earl of Macclesfield, Sel. Cha. |
| Ves. jun. 398 ; Bennet v. Abur- | Ca. 44 ; Morgan v. Surman, |
| row, 8 Ves. jun. 609 ; Bradby v. | 1 Taunt. 289 ; Wallop v. Lord |
| Westcott, 13 Ves. jun. 445 ; Doe | Portsmouth, App. No. 9, MS. |
| v. Bird, 11 East, 49 ; Lowes v. | Jones v. Curry, 1 Swan. 66 ; |
| Hackward, 18 Ves. jun. 168. | 1 Wils. Ch. Rep. 124. Hougham |
| (<i>i</i>) Standen v. Standen, 2 Ves. | v. Sandys, 2 Sim. 95. |
| jun. 589, affirmed in Dom. Proc. | (<i>k</i>) Lewis v. Lewellyn, 1 Turn. |
| nom. Standem v. Macnab, 6 Bro. | 104. |

Registrar's book, that in a settlement, a term of 500 years was created upon trust to raise 1,000 *l.* and pay the same as Elizabeth Brown, the intended wife should by deed or will appoint, and in default thereof to be paid to her executors or administrators. By her will she gave some estates which she had power to dispose of to different persons, and after giving some pecuniary legacies, she "gave all the rest of her goods, chattels, estates, and estate whatsoever, undisposed of," unto *A*, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns. It was declared by the decree, that as to this sum of 1,000 *l.* the said testatrix having made no particular appointment thereof, the same will belong to the defendant, her executor. Reg. Lib. A. 1753, fol. 252 ; and see *Tempest v. Sabine*, App. No. 10, MS.

(I) Lord Rosslyn's argument in this case, as to the power being tantamount to an actual interest, was not called for, and has not been acted upon in subsequent cases. See *Bradley v. Westcott*, 13 Ves. jun. 445 ; and see 8 Term Rep. 122.

however, as to the freeholds was not argued. In *Walker v. Mackie*, where a bequest of bank stock was held to amount to an execution of a power over three per cent. stock, as the testatrix had not any other stock whatsoever, it was held, that under general words, a leasehold estate subject to the power also passed, because she gave all her property, except 50 *l.* of her bank stock, which exception proved her intention to give the property over which she had a power. The testatrix was also tenant for life of both the properties (*l*).

In *Nowell v. Roake* (*m*), where one moiety of an estate was settled by the testatrix to her husband for life, remainder to herself for life, remainder to such uses as she should appoint by deed or will, and for want of such appointment, to the children of the marriage, with remainders over, and the testatrix afterwards bought the other moiety, which was conveyed to her in fee, and she had no other real estate, it was held in the Court of Common Pleas that a devise by her of all her freehold estates to one for life, on condition that out of the rents thereof he should from time to time keep such estates in proper and tenantable repair, with remainders over, passed the entirety of the estate, that is, operated at once as an execution of her power over one moiety, and a devise of her interest in the other. The Court relied upon the general intention, and laid some stress upon the condition to keep the estate in repair, as the devisee could not keep an undivided moiety in repair. This decision, however, was reversed in the court of King's

(*l*) 4 Russ. 76 ; and see *Grant v. Lynam*, 4 Russ. 292.

(*m*) 2 Bingham. 497, and 10 Moore, 113.

Bench (*n*), and that reversal was affirmed in the House of Lords (*o*). And in the later case of *Napier v. Napier* (*p*), before the Vice-Chancellor, where a testator had only lands in fee in five parishes, and in three other parishes had only lands over which he had a power of appointment, and in another parish had lands in fee, and also lands over which he had a power of appointment, and devised to his only son in fee all and singular his manors, &c. in the nine several parishes which he named in his will, it was holden; 1. That the lands in fee in the five parishes passed; 2. That the lands subject to the power in the three parishes also passed, on the ground that the will as to the three parishes would otherwise be wholly inoperative; 3. That the lands in the other parish, of which the testator was seised in fee, also passed, and satisfied the words of the will; and therefore, 4. That the lands in the same parish, over which the testator had only a power, did not pass. The Court thought that the latter point, if unprejudiced by decision, would present very great difficulty; but considered the question as decided by *Lewis v. Lewellyn*, above quoted.

It was strenuously argued that the case of *Lewis v. Lewellyn* was not an authority on this point, as the question was not argued, and that in the principal case there was a clear reference to the testator's power, for the devise of the lands in the three parishes could only operate under his power, and the devise of the lands under the five by force of his interest. This will, therefore, had a mixed operation. Upon precisely

(*n*) 5 Barn. & Cress. 720.

(*p*) 1 Sim. 28.

(*o*) 6 Bing. 475.

cisely the same principle the devise as to the ninth parish might at once operate on both descriptions of property. There was no solid ground of distinction. The argument, however, did not succeed.

And where a person had power to dispose of certain lands, and money to be laid out in land, and was seised of two freehold houses, and devised all and every her freehold messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments to trustees to sell for the purposes in the will, it was held that the houses would satisfy the terms of the will, and it could not be inferred from the use of those terms that the testatrix meant to execute the power: and the circumstance that the personal estate and the produce of the two houses were not sufficient to answer the purposes of the will was considered of no weight (*q*).

In *Adams v. Austen* it was decided that a general devise, after describing a particular estate, of all other the manors, messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments whereof she had power to dispose, was not a good execution of a power to appoint monies which were to arise from the sale of an estate (*r*).

But slight circumstances will not amount to a sufficient indication of the intention: where the power is given to the husband after the death of his wife, and he makes a general disposition, to take effect after his wife's death, that will not of itself be deemed evidence of his intention to execute the power (*s*): if the subject of the power be three per cent. consols, and the testa-

(*q*) *Hoste v. Blackman*, 6 Madd. 191.

(*r*) 3 Russ. 461.

(*s*) *Andrews v. Emmott*, 2 Bro. C. C. 297; *Bennet v. Aburrow*, *ubi sup.*

tor give some three per cent. consols as pecuniary legacies, the stock subject to the power will not, on that ground alone, pass (*t*): the instrument being executed in the manner required by the power goes for nothing (*u*); nor can the Court act on the fact of there not being sufficient to pay legacies given by the will without the property over which the testator had a power of disposition (*x*); nor is it material, according to some authorities, that the precise sum over which the power rides is given, and there is no other fund (*y*). This is the strongest instance of the rule that can be put, if such be the law. Parol evidence cannot be received of the testator's intention to exercise his power (*z*).

If an estate be settled to uses with a power of revocation, and afterwards another estate be devised to the uses declared by the settlement of the settled estates, an execution of the power of revocation in the settlement will not affect the devise by reference to the estate in the will (*a*).

So, where a man having several powers refers to some, and executes them formally, that is an argument against any other power being executed by general comprehensive

(*t*) *Nannock v. Horton*, *ubi sup.*
 (*u*) *Andrews v. Emmott*, 2 Bro. C. C. 297.

(*x*) S. C.

(*y*) *Jones v. Tucker*, 2 Mer. 533; see *Jones v. Curry*, 1 Swan. 66; 1 Wils. Ch. Rep. 24; *Webb v. Honnor*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 352; and see *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Mer. 437, which is directly contrary to

Jones and Tucker. Forbes v. Ball has been followed in *Lownds v. Lownds*, 1 You. & Jerv. 445.

(*z*) *Moulton v. Hutchinson*, 1 Atk. 58; *Standen v. Standen*, 2 Ves. jun. 589.

(*a*) Per Lord Eldon, in *Jones v. Wilkinson*, Linc. Inn Hall, 22d June 1813, MS.

comprehensive words in the same instrument (*b*). And it has been determined, that a devise of lands, *not now in settlement*, will not pass lands settled with a power of revocation (*c*), because the estate is properly under settlement, though subject to be revoked.

In a late case, where by fine the wife's estate was conveyed to such uses, intents and purposes as she should appoint by any deed under her hand and seal, properly witnessed, whether covert or sole, she joined with her husband in a bond and warrant of attorney to secure a debt, and separate judgments were accordingly entered up against them. The question was, whether the power was executed. Lord Redesdale said, that it is not necessary that the instrument, to operate under the power, should recite the power, or refer to it in any manner in the execution of it; but if a person having such a power does an act with all the solemnities required, and which can have no effect but by virtue of the power, the act is taken to be done in execution of the power. Suppose the demand here made had been made, not by the executors of Dillon the husband, but by the creditor: suppose the question to have arisen between the creditors and Mrs. Dillon, she still living; the question might thus be put to her; "Did you, Mrs. Dillon, join in executing this bond as a security to a creditor for this sum of money?"—"Yes."—"For what purpose did you execute it?" There could be no purpose suggested but the purpose of securing the debt

(*b*) Attorney-General *v.* Vigor, & Stu. 477; and consider the 8 Ves. jun. 256; see Maundrell case.
v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. jun. 246; (*c*) Litton *v.* Falkland, 2 Vern.
 and see Trollope *v.* Linton, 1 Sim. 621.

by charging the estate. She had a power of charging the estate by deed under seal, and here is a deed under seal executed by her, and purporting to bind her as far as she could be bound. Is not that an instrument executed by her according to her power of charging? (*d*) (I).

It was, however, unnecessary to decide the point, nor could the instruments, it should seem, be deemed a good execution of the power. It would charge any separate property, and so far it would answer the purpose intended; if she had no such property, it would of course be inoperative; but that is not a sufficient reason why it should be deemed an execution of the power: the question in these cases is, whether such an intention appears that the instrument should operate as an execution of the power as a judge can act upon, not whether it would be desirable that the creditor should have a security on the subject of the power. If the power was executed in the above case, it would not be a greater stretch to hold that a bond by an insolvent, on his death-bed, executed by accident, according to a power which was vested in him, operated as an execution of the power, because otherwise it could not have any operation.

(*d*) *Dillon v. Grace*, 2 Scho. & Lef. 456; see *Martin v. Mitchell*, 3 Swanst. 413.

(I) *Read Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 190: the bond did not, as was supposed, operate as an execution of a regular power of appointment, but merely bound her separate estate, she being, as to that, a feme sole. *Heatley v. Thomas*, 15 Ves. jun. 596, is a case of the same description. The settlement was held to be *generally* to the wife's separate use: see 1 Ves. & Bea. 122, 123. In *Bulpin v. Clarke*, 17 Ves. jun. 365, which is a strong case, the property was in effect settled to the wife's separate use.

tion. All the cases appear to be against the inclination of the Court in the case under consideration ; although, indeed, Lord Clare is reported to have *thought* that a judgment confessed by a person having power to charge the lands with money he might have occasion to borrow, was an execution thereof ! (e).

However, where a man makes a voluntary settlement, and reserves a power to himself, it will, it seems, be construed liberally, and the courts will be anxious to seize on any words which may be deemed an execution of the power. Thus, in the case of *Maddison v. Andrew* (f), in a voluntary settlement, the grantor limited a term to trustees, with power to charge 1,000 l. The settlor made his will, and *charged* all his real and personal estate with his debts and legacies. Lord Hardwicke held that the power was executed, as it was to be construed, liberally. And, as to the execution of it, the donee had used the word *charge*, which was the word in the power, and it was only a shadow of a difference that he had charged all *his* estate, whereas this was before settled to uses, for these powers to the owner were to be considered as part of the property (g). It should be observed, that this case has never been adverted to in the subsequent cases. It appears to draw a distinction as to the nature of the power which it would be difficult to support ; the argument as to the words “ his estate,” would apply with equal force to every residuary disposition ; a construction which Lord Hardwicke himself expressly over-ruled (h). But the case seems

(e) *O'Hara v. Browne*, 2 Ball & Beatty, 41, cited.

(f) 1 Ves. 61.

(g) Lib. Reg. B. 1747, fol. 119.

(h) *Ex-parte Caswell*, 1 Atk,

559.

seems to depend upon its own particular circumstances. By the Registrar's book it appears that the power was "by deed or writing to *limit* any part of the premises for raising any sum of money in his life-time, not exceeding 4,000 *l.*; or in case such sum should not be raised in his life-time, and he should die unmarried, without issue, then he should have power by will to *charge* any part of the premises with the payment of any sum or sums of money not exceeding 1,000 *l.* to any person or persons as he should appoint." He was tenant for life under the settlement. The variation in the phraseology of the power was certainly remarkable (*i*).

The case of Probert *v.* Morgan, as it is reported in Atkins, also seems an authority that a power to charge a sum of money on an estate is well executed by a general charge in a will of a sum of money on the *testator's* estates. But it appears by the Registrar's book that the question did not arise in that case. A term was limited to trustees, to raise 2,000 *l.* and pay it as Probert should direct; and his three sisters afterwards became entitled to the reversion in fee of the estate in equal thirds, which reversion was formerly vested in Probert himself. Probert by his will charged all his real estate with 1,000 *l.* "*to be paid by his three sisters out of their respective shares of his estate.*" This, therefore, was a direct reference to the fund subject to the power, and it was impossible to doubt that the power was duly executed (*k*).

In a late case at the Rolls (*l*), where it was contended
that

(*i*) Lib. Reg. B. 1747, fol. 119. No. 24, to Treat. of Purch. 6th

(*k*) Reg. Lib. B. 1738, fol. 310. edit.

(*l*) Sloane *v.* Cadogan, App.

that a general bequest by Mr. Cadogan included property over which he had only a power, and consequently defeated a gift in the settlement to Lord Cadogan in default of appointment, it was admitted in the argument that in general a sweeping disposition, however unlimited in terms, would not include property over which the testator had merely a power, unless an intention to execute the power could be inferred from the will. But it was said that great Judges had disapproved of that rule. Lord Alvanley, in *Langham v. Nenny* (*m*), wished that the rule had been otherwise; and that it had been held that a general disposition would operate as an execution of the power; and in *Nannock v. Horton* (*n*), Lord Eldon said, that he was not sure that the rule as now established did not defeat the intention nine times out of ten. In favour of the rule, it had been said that to overturn it would be to destroy the distinction between power and property. That was denied. The marked and only material distinction between power and property is, that in case of absolute property, although the party make no disposition of it, yet it will descend to his representatives; whereas a person must actually execute his power, or the fund will go to the person to whom it is given in default of appointment. But why should not the same words operate as an execution of the power which would pass the absolute interest? Where is the distinction as to the purposes of disposition between a general power like this and the absolute interest? If the solemnities required by the power are adhered to, it would startle a man of common sense, not versed in legal subtleties, to understand so refined a distinction.

(*m*) 3 Ves. jun. 467.

(*n*) 7 Ves. jun. 391.

a distinction. As therefore the rule stood upon no principle, and had been regretted by great Judges, the Court would be anxious to distinguish cases, and not to consider every case within this general rule. Now there was not a single case in the books which governed the present. It was a peculiarly strong case. The gift to the Earl in default of appointment was without consideration, and the parties had a power of revocation. The persons who prepared the settlement did not understand the distinction between power and property. They gave the money to such persons as Mr. C. should appoint, and in default of appointment, to him and his assigns. There the power was merely nugatory ; it was not larger than the gift, nor different from it in effect ; besides, the property moved from Mr. Cadogan ; the settlement as to the Earl was merely voluntary ; and the power was part of Mr. Cadogan's old dominion, and consequently the execution of it must receive a favourable interpretation. In this respect it was said that all the cases were distinguishable : *Moulton v. Hutchinson* (*o*), *Andrews v. Emmott* (*p*), *Buckland v. Barton* (*q*), *Croft v. Slee* (*r*), *Nannock v. Horton* (*s*), and *Bradley v. Westcott* (*t*) were all cases where the power was given by one person to another, and could not be compared to the present, where the power was reserved by the party over his own property. There were two cases, it was admitted, where nearly the same circumstances did occur, *Ex-parte Caswell* (*u*), *Bennet v. Aburrow* (*x*). But the first case came on merely upon a petition, and Lord Hardwicke said,

(*o*) 1 Atk. 558.

(*p*) 2 Bro. C. C. 297.

(*q*) 2 H. Blackst. 136.

(*r*) 4 Ves. jun. 60.

(*s*) 7 Ves. jun. 391.

(*t*) 13 Ves. jun. 445.

(*u*) 1 Atk. 599.

(*x*) 8 Ves. jun. 609.

said, he would not say what his opinion would be, if it came on upon bill and answer. Besides, Lord Hardwicke over-ruled this case by a later determination. In the last case the property in default of appointment was given to the next of kin, which might be thought to distinguish it from the present. But if there was no authority against the plaintiff, there were two very considerable cases in her favour. The first was *Maddison v. Andrew* (y). There a man made a settlement, reserving to himself power to charge, limit, or appoint the estate, with any sum not exceeding 1,000*l*. By his will, without making the slightest reference to his power, he gave some legacies, and then charged all his estate with the payment of his debts and legacies. Lord Hardwicke held, that the power was part of the old ownership, and that it was but a shadow of difference that he had charged all *his* estate, whereas that was before settled to uses, for these powers to the owner were to be considered as part of the property. Now this was precisely the present case; and to decree against the plaintiff, the Court, it was strongly insisted, must over-rule Lord Hardwicke's decision. The other case was *Standen v. Standen*. It was impossible to read that case without seeing that Lord Rosslyn would have decided it on the ground of the power being equivalent to the ownership, even if the circumstance had not occurred to which the decision was generally referred, that the testatrix had no real estate except what was subject to the power; and yet in that case the power was a gift by a will from a husband to his wife, and was not a part of the donee's old dominion.

On

(y) 1 Ves. 57.

On the other hand, it was argued, that to hold the will to be an execution of the power would be to overrule all the cases on residuary bequests. The case of *Maddison v. Andrew* decided nothing more than that where a man had a general power of appointment the fund should be subject to his debts, which had been long the law of that court; but the Master of the Rolls observed, that there, as in the case before him, the estate was settled subject to the power; at any rate then, it was said, that case was not now an authority.

The Master of the Rolls held that the will did not amount to an execution of the power. The circumstance of the attestation had been held not to be material, and it was now settled that a general disposition would not include property over which the party had only a power, unless an intention appear.

SECTION VI.

WHAT AMOUNTS TO THE EXECUTION OF A POWER
WHERE THE DONEE HAS AN INTEREST IN THE
ESTATE.

THE questions on this head arise either where the estate is conveyed generally, or where the use is appointed under the power, and also the estate is conveyed by force of the interest. First, it is well settled, that where a man has both a power and an interest, and does an act generally as owner of the land, without reference to his power, the land shall pass by virtue of his ownership. He has an estate grantable in him, and also a power to

limit

limit a use ; and when he grants the land itself, without any reference to his authority, it implies his intent to grant an estate as owner of the land, and not to limit a use in pursuance of his power. Nor, according to one of the points resolved in Sir Edward Clere's case^(a), is it an objection to this construction that *all* the land cannot pass unless the instrument be construed as a limitation of the use. At that time tenures *in capite* prevailed, and only two thirds of land holden by that tenure could be devised. The Judges resolved, that if a man conveyed the land to such uses as he should appoint by will, the use resulted to him, and he was seised in fee in the mean time ^(b): and, that if he devised the land *generally*, his will should not operate as an appointment, but as a devise of his interest, and consequently the devise would be good for two parts only, and void for the third ; for, as owner of the land, he could not dispose of more, and his devise should be of as much validity as the will of every other owner having land held *in capite* ^(c).

This question, however, cannot arise in the same shape at the present day, as the ancient incidents to tenures *in capite*, so little consistent with the commercial polity of the present age, have been long abolished. But it may occur in this way,—an estate may be settled to such uses as a man shall appoint, and in default of appointment as to *part* to himself, and as to the *residue* to strangers, and then he may make a general disposition. And, notwithstanding Sir Edward Clere's case,
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(a) 6 Co. 17 ; and see Brown v. Taylor, Cro. Car. 38.

(b) See Brand's case, Ley, 39.

(c) See Parker v. Kett, 12 Mod. 469 ; Wagstaff v. Wagstaff,

2 P. Wms. 258, 2d point.

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an intent, apparent upon the face of the instrument, to dispose of *all* the estate, would be deemed a sufficient reference to the power to make the instrument operate as an execution of it, inasmuch as the words of the instrument could not otherwise be satisfied. In the case of *Thomlinson v. Dighton* (*d*), Lord C. J. Parker observed, that in Sir Edward Clere's case it was resolved, there, where according to the way the parties intended the conveyance would have no effect at all, that there it should pass another way ; but where, should the estate pass the way the parties intended, the conveyance would have some effect, though not all that was intended by the parties, there it should pass no other way than the parties designed. But this point has since been carried much farther, as that, where it would have some effect, but not all intended by the parties, there, to the end that the main design of the parties may be observed, the estate shall pass in another way than the parties intended. For example : Suppose a woman seised of an estate for life, with a power to make a lease for three lives, or twenty-one years ; she marries ; and then she and her husband join in making the lease, and the husband and wife both die before the lease is expired : here, though the husband in right of his wife, and she in her own, are possessed of an estate for life, and therefore can, as owners, make a lease, and there appears no intention of the parties (imagining perhaps that they should have outlived the lease) that this lease should be made by virtue of the power, yet because the lease, supposing it made by them as owners, cannot have all the effect the parties intended, (for some it would have, viz. it would be

d) See 10 Mod. 36 ; and *Blake v. Marnell*, 2 Ball & Beatty, 35.

be a good lease during the lives of the husband and wife,) yet because it cannot have all, it shall be esteemed made by virtue of the power.

In the case of King and Melling rather a curious point arose.—A man was devisee under a will, with a power to jointure. He suffered a recovery to the use of himself in fee, and afterwards covenanted to stand seised to the use of his wife, for her jointure. The judges were divided whether the devisee took for life or in tail, but they held, that supposing the power not barred by the recovery (which they thought it was), yet the covenant would not operate as an execution of it; for as the devisee had got a new fee, though it were defeasible by him in remainder, yet the covenant to stand seised should enure thereupon, and the use should arise out of the fee: he was seised in fee, and the jointure was made without any reference to his power (e).

But where the disposition, however general it may be, will be absolutely void if it do not enure as an execution of the power, effect will be given to it by that construction. This was the *point decided* in Sir Edward Clere's case. There, Harwood the settler had by an act in his life-time disposed of two parts of the land; over the other part he had a general power of appointment by will, with remainder in default of appointment to himself in fee, and he devised this portion generally. Now the land being holden *in capite* he could not devise this third as owner of the land, and therefore it was solemnly decided that the will ought to operate as an execution of the power. Upon the principle of this decision, it should seem, that if a man having a general

(e) 1 Ventr. 214. 225.

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power of appointment, with a limitation to himself in fee, in default of appointment were to convey the estate generally by an instrument not adapted to pass his interest (as a bargain and sale unenrolled, or a release to a stranger without a previous lease for a year), and which would be totally inoperative as a conveyance of the interest, the instrument would be held to operate as an execution of the power, although the authority should not be referred to, either expressly or by implication.

On the above principle it is, that where a man has both a power and an interest, and he creates an estate which will not have an effectual continuance in point of time if it be fed out of his interest, it shall take effect by force of the power (*f*). As, where a tenant for life, with power of leasing, grants a lease for a term absolute, without referring to or mentioning his power, the lease, if it be supplied out of his interest, would expire with his life, and it shall therefore operate as an execution of the power (*g*). So where a tenant for life, with a power to borrow a sum of money, granted a rent-charge generally, as a fund for payment of the debt, it was deemed an execution of the power, and not a grant out of his interest; because it might not be effected during the life of the grantor (*h*). But if a lease comprise fee-simple estates, as well as estates subject to the power, it seems a nice question, whether the deed shall enure by fractions, so as to be a lease
out

(*f*) See Roger's case, cited by Hale, Chief Justice, 1 Ventr. 228: Earl of Leicester's case, 1 Ventr. 278.

(*g*) Campbell v. Leach, Ambl. 740; and see 10 Mod. 36.

(*h*) Blake v. Marnell, 2 Ball & Beatty, 35.

out of the interest as to the fee-simple lands, and an appointment as to the rest (*i*).

It is *intention* then that in these cases governs : therefore, where it can be inferred that the power was not meant to be exercised, the court cannot consider it as executed (*k*). Thus, if a man having several powers over different estates, and also interests in them, should recite the power over one estate, and execute it in a formal manner, and then recite, not that he has a power to appoint the other estate, but that he is seised in fee of it, and accordingly convey his interest in it by lease and release, the latter estate would be held to pass out of his interest, and not by force of his power, simply on the apparent intention not to execute the power (*l*).

In a recent case, where a man and woman, under a settlement made after their marriage, had a joint power of appointment, it appeared that they were not legally married, and thereupon they agreed that the settlement was void, and the woman, whose estate it was, made a new settlement on their being legally married. The man joined in the second settlement for the purpose of making a tenant to the precipe for the life of the woman. It was decided, that notwithstanding the first settlement was executed under a mistake, it was valid in law, and that the second settlement should not enure as an execution of the joint power in the parties,

(*i*) See *Bibell v. Dringhouse*, Mo. 645.

(*k*) See *Brookman v. Hales*, 2 Ves. & Bea. 45 ; *Walker v. Laxton*, 1 Jou. & Jerv. 557.

(*l*) See *Maundrell v. Maundrell*, 7 Ves. Jun. 567 ; 10 Ves. Jun. 246 ; see 6 East, 105, 106 ; and see *Adney v. Field*, Ambl. 654.

although it could not otherwise have any operation, because it was considered clear that the parties did not intend to execute their power(*m*); and yet it is observable that their intention was to make a new settlement; and although they treated the first as void, yet they recited an intention not merely to rescind, but to revoke the deed; and in the witnessing part of the second deed they directed, limited, and appointed, as well as granted, the estate, and the limitation in the premises appears to be to the releasee and his heirs generally, with the usual words of 'all their estate,' although the habendum is to him and his heirs for the life of the lady.

Where trusts are raised with a power of revocation, the settlement will not be defeated by the mere act of the trustee re-conveying to the settlor(*n*).

So where an executrix, who was tenant for life of a college-lease under the will, with a power to appoint the estate by deed or will, with a gift over in default of appointment to a stranger, renewed the leases at her own expense, it was held that the renewals did not operate as an appointment in her own favour. It did not appear whether she had executed counterparts of the leases. But if she had been tenant for life only, the renewal of the leases would after her death have enured to the benefit of the devisee in remainder; and it was held that the renewals, supposing counterparts were executed, could not amount to an appointment by her in her own favour; for acts of ownership by a tenant for life, with a power, do not make him owner, unless

(*m*) Boughton v. Sandelands, 3 Taunt. 342.

(*n*) Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. Jun. 656.

unless they are such acts as are prescribed by the power for vesting the property (o).

On the other hand, where the instrument is expressly said to be in pursuance of the power, and it is clearly the appointee's *intention* upon the face of the instrument to take the estate by force of the power, although the appointor has also an interest in the land, and the power is badly executed, and so no estate raised, yet his interest shall not come in aid, at least not to the prejudice of the appointee, as where it would operate the surrender of an existing beneficial interest in him. Thus, if a tenant for life, with a power of leasing, refer to his power, and in execution of it grant a lease to a person having an existing valid lease, although the power prove to be badly executed, yet the new lease shall not, as between the lessee and the remainder-man, be construed to have enured out of the estate for life of the lessor, because under that construction the existing valid lease would be merged by a surrender in law, to the prejudice of the lessee (p).

But if a testator exercise a power by will, and it turn out that the power was either not well created (q), or was defeated by the happening of a contingent event subsequently to the will (r), the deviser's interest at the time of the will, although contingent and not vested, shall come in aid of his disposition; for in a will

(o) *Brookman v. Hales*, 2 Ves. 1 Cha. Ca. 8, 9.
& Bea. 45.

(p) *Roe v. Archbishop of York*, 6 East, 86. (r) *Cross v. Hudson*, 3 Bro. C. C. 30; and see *Savile v. Blackett*, 1 P. Wms. 777; *Mose*, 167 cited; *qu.* & see p. 91 *supra*.

(q) *Dobbins v. Bowman*, 3 Atk. 408; see *Goring v. Bickerstaffe*,

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will there are no particular words required to pass the estate; but any words that show the intention of the testator are sufficient; and although only the power is expressed to be exercised, yet the words plainly manifest that the testator intended that the devisee should have the estate (*s*).

But here it may be observed, that where a man has a power to charge estates, which power he afterwards discharges, and a similar power is reserved to him over other estates, if the first power is executed by will before the raising of the second power, the will cannot be deemed an execution of the second power, although it be re-published subsequently to the creation of that power, for the will speaks only of the first power, which was as much gone as if it had never existed (*t*). And it seems doubtful whether the second power would have been executed if it had even embraced the same estate as the first power.

A fine levied of an estate by a testator after having devised it, revokes his will; and it has been determined, that although the uses of the fine are declared to be as the testator shall by deed or will appoint, yet the prior will cannot stand (*u*). The point was not agitated whether the prior will might not operate as a declaration of the uses of the fine. This would have got rid of the
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(*s*) *Dobbins v. Bowman*, *ubi supra*; and see *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jun. 204.

(*t*) *Holmes v. Coghill*, 7 Ves. Jun. 499, 12 Ves. Jun. 206; see *Lane v. Wilkins*, 10 East 241; *Hamilton v. Royse*, 2 Scho. & Lef. 315; *Cadogan v. Sloane*

Ap. No. 24 to Treat. Purch. 6th edit.; *Fox v. Gregg*, Duchy Court of Lancaster, 1814, App. No. 12; and *Powell v. Loxdale*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 291.

(*u*) *Doe v. Dilnot*, 2 New Rep. 400.

the difficulty of the will operating as a *devise* after the fine. Hussey's case (*x*) decided that a feoffment after a will, to the use of such persons, and for such estates, as the testator had declared by his will, bearing date, &c. was a revocation of the will, and yet that the revoked will was sufficient to declare the uses of the feoffment. The decisions on surrenders of copyholds, to such uses as the surrenderor *shall* appoint by will, may be considered to render *Doe v. Dilnot* not easily distinguishable from Hussey's case (*y*). It is not denied that the will was revoked. The question is, whether the revoked will would not operate as a good declaration of the uses of the fine.

And here we may notice a recent case, where a man having children by a first marriage made his will, and then upon his second marriage settled his *personal* estate on himself for life, then to raise 100 *l.* for his wife, and then to apply the personalty as he by deed or will *should* appoint, and in default thereof unto his issue; it was determined, upon the apparent intention, that the prior will was wholly revoked (*z*).

II. We now come to the cases where not only the use is appointed under the power, but also the estate is conveyed by force of the interest. The rule appears to be, that the instrument shall be construed either an appointment, or a release, as will best effect the intention of the parties.

(*x*) Mo. 789.

(*z*) *Leigh v. Norbury*, 13 Ves.

(*y*) See *Spring v. Biles*, jun. 340.

1 Term Rep. 435, n.

parties. This is established by the case of *Cox and Chamberlain* (a). A man having a general power of appointment, with a limitation in default of appointment to himself in fee, by lease and release, in pursuance of all powers in him vested, did grant, bargain, sell, alien, remise, release and confirm, limit, declare, and appoint, the estate to trustees to uses. If the deed operated as a conveyance of his interest, then the title was good; but if it operated as an appointment, the legal estate vested in the trustees; the intended uses were mere trust-estates, and the title was, under the circumstances, bad. Lord Alvanley held, that the instrument operated as a conveyance of the interest. He said it would be monstrous to hold, that where there is a power and an interest, and the act being equivocal, it is doubtful whether he acted under the one or the other, the court should adopt that which would defeat the instrument. He therefore considered the words of the appointment as nugatory.

It must be admitted, that in this case Lord Alvanley considered the act as more properly a release than an appointment; and it does not, therefore, directly decide, that where there is (as is usual) *first a formal appointment*, and then a release, the instrument shall, in favour of the intention, be held to operate simply as a release. On the one hand it may be said, that the instrument cannot operate both as an appointment and release; and, therefore, the courts may well give it that operation which will effect and not destroy the intention of the parties. And this is clearly the better opinion. But, on the other hand, it may be insisted, that where the power

(a) 4 Ves. jun. 631; and see *Doe v. Keir*, 4 Mann. & Ry. 101.

power is formally exercised, the release is thrown in merely by way of further assurance, and that too great a latitude of construction will only lead to carelessness in practice. .

The great difficulty in the cases under discussion is to discover what is the intention of the parties, a question upon which the most enlightened minds must frequently differ. Thus, the late case of *Roach v. Wadham* (b), appears to be in opposition to the case of *Cox and Chamberlain*, although in both cases the court professed to go upon intention.

The case is shortly this: An estate was conveyed to one Coates, his heirs and assigns, to hold unto the said Coates, his heirs and assigns, to the use of such person or persons, for such estates, &c. as Watts the purchaser should by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, under his hand and seal, to be by him duly made and executed in the presence of, and attested by, two or more credible witnesses; or by his will, &c. limit, direct, or appoint, give or devise the same. In default of such direction, &c. to the use of Watts, his heirs and assigns, for ever. By this deed a perpetual rent was reserved to the vendors, and Watts covenanted with the vendors for payment of it. Afterwards, by indentures of lease and release, Coates (by direction of Watts) did (according to his estate and interest) bargain, sell, and release, and Watts did grant, bargain, sell, alien, release, ratify, and confirm; and also limit, direct, and appoint the estate in question, *and all his estate, right, &c.* therein, unto Wadham and Stevens (purchasers of the estate), and Powell a trustee to bar dower, to hold unto Wadham

ham, Stevens, and Powell, their heirs and assigns, to the use of Wadham, Stevens, and Powell, and the heirs and assigns of Wadham and Stevens for ever, as tenants in common, in trust, as to the estate of Powell, for Wadham and Stevens, their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common, subject to the perpetual rent. And covenants were inserted from Wadham and Stevens to Watts, to pay the rent, and indemnify him from it, but Wadham did not execute the deeds.

The question was, whether the estate conveyed to Wadham and Stevens, and their trustee, was derived out of the interest of Watts, so as to make them liable in an action of covenant for the rent as his assignees, or whether the estate took effect under his power, in which case it was admitted they were not bound by the covenants entered into by Watts. It was contended by the counsel, that the power was merged in the fee; but that position was abandoned upon its being stated that the judgment at the Rolls in the case of *Maundrell v. Maundrell* was reversed (c). The single point then was, whether the instruments operated as an execution of the power, or a conveyance of the interest. And it was determined, that they operated as an exercise of the power, and consequently that the purchasers from Watts were not liable to an action of covenant for non-payment of the perpetual rent. The Court said, "It ought to appear very clearly from the deeds, that the conveyance, or the covenants therein, could not take effect unless it operated as a conveyance out of the interest, and not by way of appointment, in order to induce the court to determine, that where the trustee to uses in
a conveyance

(c) Vide *supra*, Chap. I. sect. 5. VI.

a conveyance releases to a purchaser it shall not operate as an appointment. Had it been the intention of the parties that the estate which Wadham was to take should be derived out of the interest which Watts had, it would have been wholly unnecessary that Coates should have been a party to the deed, his being made a party to it shows that something was to be taken by way of appointment; and if any thing, there is nothing from whence there can be collected an intention that less than the whole should pass by those means, the reason for which is obvious, as it might prevent such objections to the title as might be made if it were derived immediately from Watts."

It had, as we have seen, been already settled by Lord Alvanley, in *Cox v. Chamberlain*, that where a person has both a power and an interest, and the instrument is adapted to convey the interest, and the intention of the parties will be best effected by that construction, such a construction shall prevail, although words of appointment are used. This decree of Lord Alvanley has ever since been deemed an authority, and been acted upon in practice. The principal argument in *Roach v. Wadham* was, that Coates, the trustee, as he was termed, joined in the conveyance. But it should seem that Coates had no interest whatever in the estate in question. He was a mere conduit-pipe, a releasee to uses, in whom not even Lord Chief Justice Dyer's *scintilla* (which Chief Baron Periam, in *Chudleigh's* case, likened to Sir Thomas More's Utopia) remained an instant. The concurrence of Coates, therefore, was perfectly nugatory, and only evinced the unskilfulness of the person who prepared the deed. If, indeed, Coates had actually had
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any estate, his concurrence under the circumstances of
this case must have 'afforded decisive evidence that
Watts did not intend to exercise his power. If the case
be divested of this circumstance, the question depends
solely on the intention of the parties. It might be urged,
that the intention of the parties required the instruments
to operate as a conveyance of Watts's interest, were it
only to make the purchasers liable to an action of cove-
nant as assignees of Watts, for the recovery of the rent.
Such a construction would have enabled, and cer-
tainly have induced, the persons entitled to the rent to
bring their action against the actual terre-tenant, and
not against the original covenantor, which would have
prevented the circuitous remedy that the decision will
compel the parties to resort to. This construction, it
might be said, was imperiously called for in this case,
inasmuch as Wadham had not executed the deeds, and
consequently was not bound by *covenant* to indemnify
Watts against the rent. It might also be insisted, that
the conveyance being by lease and release, was strong
evidence of the intention of the parties, as the lease for
a year was unnecessary if Watts intended to exercise
his power. Where a man has both a power and an in-
terest, and it is intended to exercise the power, and also
convey the interest, the appointment is almost invariably
made by a distinct witnessing part, which precedes the
release. The deviation from the usual form in the pre-
sent case is evidence that it was not the primary inten-
tion of the parties to exercise the power.

To the foregoing reasons another may be added, which
seems more conclusive. By the conveyance it is evident
that the parties wished to prevent a right of dower from
attaching

attaching in their wives, and at the same time to keep the inheritance in themselves. This intention would have been effected by construing the instruments as a conveyance of Watts's interest, and appears to have been defeated by the construction adopted. *For as the deeds were holden to operate as an execution of the power, the habendum to the purchasers and their trustees vested the fee in them, and the subsequent limitation to the purchasers and the trustees, and the heirs and assigns of the purchasers, was void at law, as a use upon a use, and was good only as a trust in equity.*

In the late case of *Wynne v. Griffith (d)*, an estate had been limited to such uses as H. Roberts and his wife, Mary Roberts, and Catherine Roberts should appoint. In default of such appointment, to such uses as the other three, if they should survive Catherine Roberts, should appoint. In default of such appointment, as to part to Catherine for life, and as to all, (subject to her life interest in part,) to such uses as Humphrey should appoint, and in default of appointment to him in fee. All the four joined in a marriage settlement by lease and release, and by the release they granted, bargained, sold, released and confirmed, directed, limited and appointed unto four other persons, (in their possession by virtue of the lease for a year, &c.) the estate in settlement, to hold the same to them, their heirs and assigns, to the same uses, &c. as the estate then stood limited to, till the marriage, and after the marriage to uses in strict settlement with regular limitations to the trustees to procure contingent remainders, and with a limitation of a term of

500 years

(d) 3 Bing. 179.

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500 years to them. It was held that the last mentioned deed operated as a conveyance of the interest and not as an execution of the power. It will be observed, that Catherine and Humphrey could convey the fee without reference to the power, and that neither of the powers could be increased without the concurrence of both or one of them, and consequently after the conveyance of their estate, the powers never could be increased. The *intention* required that the deed should not operate as an exercise of the power in the four, because the old uses until the marriage would have changed their character and become merely equitable, and the intended uses after the marriage would also have been equitable. As, therefore, two of the conveying parties had the fee in them, the deed in favour of the intention was held to operate as a conveyance of the interest. Upon the case coming on at the Rolls, upon the certificate of the Common Pleas, it was argued that by giving effect to the instrument as an execution of the power, H. Roberts's wife might have become dowable contrary to the intention, and thereupon a case was sent to the Court of King's Bench, who concurred in the judgment of the Common Pleas (e), and upon the case coming back again, the purchaser was decreed to specifically perform the agreement.

In *Farmer v. Bradford* (f), William Peek settled an estate on his niece's marriage, to himself for life, remainder to a trustee for 500 years, remainder to such persons as William Peek should by deed or will appoint, and in default of appointment, to himself in fee.

(e) 5 Barn. & Cress. 923; and see 1 Russ. 283.

(f) 3 Russ. 354.

fee. The trusts of the 500 years term were to raise 1,000 £. after Peek's death for the benefit of the intended husband and wife and their issue, with a trust (in an event which happened) for such persons as Peek should by deed or will appoint; and in default of appointment, to the representatives of the intended wife. After the event happened, upon which Peek's power over the 1,000 £. was to arise, he made his will and devised his estates at Lushill (the property settled) and all other his real estate to a nephew in fee, and gave him the residue of his personal estate, and appointed him executor. It was held that the will operated strictly as a devise of the estate in fee under the testator's interest, and not as an exercise of the powers; and therefore that the 1,000 £. was receivable against the devisee, and would go as directed in default of appointment.

Where a person having a particular estate and also a power, makes a disposition containing words both of appointment and conveyance, yet it shall not operate as an appointment, and also as a conveyance against the intention of the party executing the instrument. Thus, in *Langley v. Brown (g)*, under a settlement previously to an intended marriage, the estate was limited to the intended wife for life, then to her in tail, remainder to her appointment generally; in default of appointment, to her in fee. She, before marriage, by an instrument in pursuance of her power, did appoint, limit, give and grant the estate and the reversion thereof *expectant upon her death*, to her intended husband in fee, *who was in possession*, chargeable with monies to be paid *after her decease*. Lord Hardwicke appears to have considered that

that the instrument might have operated both as an appointment of the remainder, and as a release of her estate, so as to create a base fee, the grantee being in possession: but he ruled otherwise, as the grant was intended only to take effect *after her death*, and not to pass any estate in possession.

SECTION VII.

OF THE QUALIFICATIONS WHICH MAY BE ANNEXED TO THE EXECUTION OF POWERS BY THE DONEES THEREOF.

A DONEE of a power may limit the event upon which the deed executing the power shall take place. Therefore, if a power be given to be executed by deed inrolled in any court, the donee may direct the deed executing the power to be inrolled in some particular court, and until it is so inrolled the execution of the power will be imperfect (*a*). So, if he declare that when *A* doth pay 10 s. the settlement shall be revoked, there it is not singly the deed nor payment, but both, that complete the revocation (*b*). And in like manner he may covenant to levy a fine, or suffer a recovery, with an intent to revoke the power; and although neither of them is necessary, yet the power will not be well executed till the fine is levied, or the recovery is suffered (*c*). Hobart, Chief Justice, even laid it down, that a verbal declaration, that the execution of the power shall not take effect till a particular time, is good (*d*); which, it should

(*a*) Digges's case, 1 Rep. 173.

(*b*) 3 Keb. 511; Raym. 239.

(*c*) Earl of Leicester's case, 1 Ventr. 278.

(*d*) Kibbet v. Lee, Hob. 312.

should seem, may be supported on the same principle that deeds in general may be delivered as escrows.

Under a power of appointment the donee may either appoint absolutely, or may reserve a power of revocation, although not expressly authorized to do so by the deed creating the power (*e*), and such a power may be reserved *toties quoties* (*f*), and the new power of revocation need not be attended with the same solemnities as the first power (*g*).

And where even a particular power is given to two persons, or *the survivor of them*, with or without power of revocation, they may execute a *joint* appointment, and reserve a power to the *survivor* to revoke. The argument against the validity of the power of revocation to the survivor was, that the parties could not intend that a joint appointment should be defeated by any but a joint revocation (*h*).

In *Ponsonby v. Ponsonby*, before Lord Manners, 1821, MS. father and son suffered a recovery of a settled estate, to such uses as they should jointly appoint. They exercised the power by settling the estate to uses in strict settlement, and reserved a power of revocation to themselves, and to the son, if he survived. He did survive, and appointed the estate to himself in fee, and devised it; and the bill was filed to have his charges on it raised. The estate, which was of great value,

was

(*e*) *Adams v. Adams*, Cowp. 651; *Earl of Cardigan v. Montague*, App. No. 13, see Becket's case, *infra*.

(*f*) *Lady Hastings's case*, 3 Keb. 7.

(*g*) *Winstandley's case*, 3 Keb. 7, cited; and see S. C. cited, 2 Keb. 270.

(*h*) *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 1 East, 442, 7 Ves. jun. 382; see *Brown v. Nesbitt*, 1 Cox, 43.

was sold under the decree, and the purchasers objected that the power of revocation to the son alone was not well reserved. The Master reported in favour of the title, and the Lord Chancellor confirmed the report. The joint power was, in this case, tantamount to the fee. It is not like the case of a power to appoint to particular objects.

It has been determined, that under a power to husband and wife, a will by the husband, indorsed by the wife after his death, expressive of her approbation of the disposition thereby made, and her confirmation of it, would not do ; because being a will revocable by the husband at any time, even if the wife had at the moment subscribed a ratification of it, it could not be an appointment under the power, because it would reserve a power of revocation to one of the two parties, as the husband might revoke his will, but his wife could not (*i*).

A *will* is always revocable, and, therefore, where the power is executed by will, an express power of revocation need not be reserved (*k*). But where the power is executed by *deed*, unless a power of revocation is reserved in the deed, the appointment cannot be revoked (*l*) ; no, not even if the original power expressly authorize the donee in the most unlimited terms to appoint and to revoke his appointments from time to time ; for the law will not endure a prospective power like this, but on every execution a new power of revocation must be reserved. This was solemnly decided in
the

(*i*) *Bushell v. Bushell*, 1 Rep.
T. Redesdale, 90.

(*k*) *Vide infra*, Sect. 8.

(*l*) *Hatcher v. Curtis*, 2 Freem.
61. *Worrall v. Jacob*, 3 Mer.
256.

the case of *Hele v. Bond*, by Lord Chancellor Harcourt, and all the Judges of England (*m*), and finally in the House of Lords. The Court of King's Bench, upon a case referred to them by the Lord Chancellor, held the second execution void. Lord Harcourt decreed accordingly; and upon an appeal to the House of Lords all the Judges were ordered to attend at the hearing of the cause in the House of Lords, which they did; and the Judges of the King's Bench declaring that they were still of the same opinion, the Justices of C. B. and the Barons of the Exchequer, by King, C. J. delivered their opinions to be, that the power of revocation in the deed of the 16th March, 1684, [the first settlement] was no other than the common power of revocation, expressing that particularly, and in many words, which the law is now settled to imply in every power, viz. That the party revoking may, if he thinks fit to reserve such power, revoke those new uses and limit new ones, and so on *toties quoties*, and that this might probably be inserted in special words in this power, because when the power of revoking the new uses and limiting other uses came to be first a question in Beckett's case, 10 Ja. I. in 2 Rol. Abr. 262. (B) 2, and Lane's Rep. 118, it was doubted whether such new power could be reserved in the second deed, unless specially reserved in the first deed, though the law is now settled to be otherwise; and that therefore this power is to receive this construction, that the party might revoke the new uses if in the deed of such revocation he would reserve

(*m*) *Hele v. Bond*, Prec. Chan. case than any in print, App. 474; 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 342; S. C. No. 6. MS. See a fuller note of this

a new power; and so *toties quoties*; and that in this case, Sampson reserving no new power of revocation in the deed of the 5th October, 1687, he had executed the first power, and settled the estate to the uses of the deed of 5th October, 1687, which he could not afterwards change or alter; which opinion, being in effect the same with that of the Chancellor and the Judges of the King's Bench, the Lords did affirm the said decree (n).

This decision appears to have been founded on the anxiety of the Courts to restrain the reservation of such powers, and to assimilate powers to conditions at common law, which they do not resemble. It is impossible to frame any objection upon principle to a general power of revocation in the first deed, embracing all future executions: the power is only tantamount to what may still be done by repeatedly reserving new powers of revocation.

In a case before Lord Hardwicke a point nearly similar arose. By a settlement, powers of appointment were given to a woman; and at the end of the settlement it was declared that every appointment made by her by virtue of the powers in the deed, might from time to time be revoked, and a new appointment made. She made an appointment, without reserving a power of revocation, and then executed another appointment. It was insisted, on the authority of *Hele and Bond*, that the second appointment was void. There was not, however, any occasion to give a determinate opinion on this point; but Lord Hardwicke, in giving judgment, said, that he was very doubtful whether the case of *Hele and Bond* would govern the present, though he inclined

(n) MS. Rep. in Lincoln's-Inn Hall.

inclined at first that it would. In the present case, he said, there were two powers *in the very creation*; a power to appoint uses, and a power to revoke uses. Now the power to appoint uses was executed by the first deed, but the power of revocation was not executed till afterwards; then the question would be, whether both might not be executed once, as they seemed to be distinct and separate powers. In *Hele and Bond*, he added, the power of revocation was executed; and the doubt was, whether the uses could be revoked *toties quoties*, without reserving a power of revocation (o). The very same point arose in a case before the determination of *Hele and Bond*, but it was not necessary to decide it. The case was not referred to in *Langley and Brown*. The reporter says "it was touched, whether the uses limited according to the power were revocable by the proviso, and Mainard said it might be a question."

Now it appears to be quite impossible to support this distinction. Lord Hardwicke distinguished the case before him from *Hele and Bond*, because there the power of revocation, he said, was executed; and the doubt was, whether the uses could be revoked *toties quoties*, without reserving a power of revocation, while in his case there were two distinct powers, namely, a power to appoint uses, and a power to revoke the uses so appointed. The precise point, however, was actually decided by the cases of *Hele and Bond*. Some *dicta* represent that case as having been decided on the ground that the power was merely tantamount to the usual power of revocation and limitation of new uses, and certainly that, as we have seen, was the true ground

(o) *Langley v. Brown*, 2 Atk. 195.

of the decision: the Judges were of opinion that a power could not be originally reserved to revoke uses to be subsequently appointed; but they never denied that *in words*, three distinct powers were reserved; viz. 1st, a power to revoke the original uses; 2d, a power to appoint new ones; and, 3d, a power to revoke such new uses. The Judges of B. R. certified "that *the power of revocation and limitation of new uses* in the first settlement was fully executed by the first appointment; and that the *further power in the settlement to revoke any new limitation or appointment* was void in the creation as to such uses as should be afterwards newly limited, unless a power of revocation should be again expressly reserved." The point therefore doubted in *Udal and Udal*, and *Langley v. Brown*, was the very question decided in *Hele and Bond*. The cases cannot be distinguished. But we must not confound these cases with those upon powers of sale and exchange, or partition, for there, the uses limited under powers previously executed, are not *revoked*, but simply *transferred* to the estate bought or taken in exchange, or upon a partition (*p*).

It is generally thought that the reservation of a power of revocation only will not enable the donee to revoke the old uses, and also to appoint new ones (*q*). Mr. Powell in one place states clearly that in such case new uses may be declared (*r*), whilst in a subsequent page he enters into a long discussion to prove the contrary (*s*).

Becket's

(*p*) See *Earl of Uxbridge v. Bayly*, 1 Ves. jun. 499. There appears to have been no foundation for the argument that the charge in this case was revoked.

(*q*) 2 Vol. Cas. & Opin. p. 97,

2 Trea. Eq. p. 163, 2d Edit. Fonblanq. n. *ibid.* and 4 Cruise's Dig. 232, s. 18.

(*r*) Pow. Powers, 244.

(*s*) *Ib.* 272.

Becket's case, which is the first in the books apparently on this subject, is thus stated in Lane (t) (I): "R. B., seised of lands in fee, levies a fine, &c. and declares the use to be to himself for life, and after to T. B. with power of revocation, and to limit new uses; and if he revoke, and not declare, then the use shall be to the use of himself for life, and after to Henry Becket, [and then by a subsequent deed, R. B. revoked the first deed, and limited new uses], with power in that indenture also to revoke and limit new uses, and that then the fine shall be to such new uses, and no other; and after, by a third indenture, he revoked the second indenture, and declared the use of the fine to be to the use of himself for life, and after to Henry Becket in tail, the remainder to T. B." The question was, whether the third indenture was a good revocation and limitation. It is evident that there is a chasm in the statement of the facts: I have attempted to fill it up with the words between crotchets. It appears clearly, from the judgment of the Court, that there was a second indenture executed, which also contained a power of revocation and limitation of new uses. Bromley and Altham, Barons, thought that the new uses were well raised by the third indenture, and they relied on Digges's case. Snig, Baron, held the contrary, as the first deed ought to authorize *all* the declarations on the fine; and he said, "*that such an indenture to declare uses upon uses was*
never

(t) Lane, 118; see ib. 91.

(I) Mr. Powell does not refer Becket's case to the true ground of the decision. In stating Baron Snig's argument, he omits the only part of it from which that Judge's opinion can be collected.

never made, and it would be mischievous to declare infinite uses upon uses." And Tanfield agreed with Snig, but on a different ground ; he appears to have thought that the power to limit new uses was not well pursued, as he had *declared*, but not *limited* new uses. It seems quite clear, that the point under consideration did not arise in this case, for the power in the second indenture actually authorized a new limitation of uses ; the question simply was, whether such powers could be reserved from time to time (I). This is proved by Rolle's report of the same case, which is in these words : " If a man suffer a recovery, and limit the uses by indenture, with a power of revocation and limitation of new uses, and afterwards by another indenture he revokes and limits new uses, with like power of revocation and limitation of new uses, this second power of revocation and new limitation of uses is good, for all rise out of the recovery, which is the foundation. Becket's case, *per curiam præter Snig (u)*." If further evidence were wanting, it is abundantly supplied by Lord Chief Justice Hale's argument in the case of Fowler and North (*x*). We may therefore dismiss Becket's case from our consideration ; it does not affect the question before us, and the point which was then doubted is now perfectly established.

The first case that appears to be in point is Ward and Lenthal (*y*):—A man levied a fine, with a power of revocation and limitation of new uses, and by a
second

(*u*) 2 Ro. Abr. 262, (B) pl. 2 (*y*) 19 Car. 2, 1 Sid. 343.

(*x*) 3 Keb. 7.

(I) In the judgment in *Hele v. Bond*, *supra*, p. 323, which I have lately obtained, the doubt is stated to have been, whether such new power could be reserved in the second deed unless specially reserved in the first deed.

second deed he revoked the uses, and made new limitations, with a power only to revoke; and by a third indenture he revoked the uses of the second indenture, and limited new ones. It became unnecessary to decide the point; but the Court is reported to have resolved, that where powers of revocation and new appointment are given, the donee may revoke and limit new uses *toties quoties*, and all the estates shall be raised out of the first seisin. But if in any indenture he reserve a power of revocation, and do not reserve a power expressly to limit new uses, he can only revoke, and cannot limit new uses by virtue of the estate first raised.

Now in this case we observe the resolution merely was, that where a deed is executed *under a power of revocation, reserved upon the execution of a former power*, no uses can be limited out of the old seisin, unless the deed creating such power of revocation also contain an express authority to limit new uses. This seems to depend upon the ground of the decision in Hele and Bond. But it is observable, that it is nowhere said that a power of revocation *in the original settlement* is not tantamount to a power of revocation and limitation of new uses.

In the case of Smith and Wheeler (z), Twisden, Justice, said, that whoever hath a power of revocation hath a power of limitation. In the case of Fowler and North (a), no decision was made; but Hale, Chief Justice, laid it down that a power of appointment might with power of revocation be executed *toties quoties*; and he said it was resolved before, upon as great a settlement as any subject in England had, *without any power to*

(z) 22 Car. 2, 2 Mod. 40.

(a) 24 Car. 2, 3 Keb. 7.

to limit new uses (I). Agreeably to this was my Lord Nottingham's judgment, when Lord Keeper (*b*), that a power of revocation in an original settlement enabled the donee not only to revoke the old uses, but to limit new ones; and on a subsequent hearing he declared himself clearly of the same opinion (*c*).

It remains to state an anonymous case in *Strange*. The case was this: *A* suffered a recovery to the use of himself for life, remainder to three persons successively in tail, remainder to himself in fee, with power to revoke the three remainders in tail; he accordingly revoked them, and by the same deed declared new uses in favour of the plaintiffs, without any words of conveyance, covenant to stand seised, or consideration expressed. The Court held, that the uses were not well raised, because the uses of the recovery were full before, and the power was only to revoke, and not to limit new uses (*d*).

This case does not appear to be in opposition to the decision of Lord Nottingham. It seems from the report, that *A* limited new uses out of the fee-simple generally, and certainly it cannot be contended that he could affect his life-estate or reversion without an express power, for the power of revocation did not extend to those estates, but only to the remainder in tail. The question

(*b*) 26 Car. 2, Anon. 1 Cha. Ca. 241; *S. C.* *Witham v. Bland*, 3 Swanst. 277.

(*c*) See *Colston v. Gardner*, 2 Chg. Ca. 46.

(*d*) Anonymous, 1 Str. 584.

(I) The same case is reported in 1 Ventr. 197, nom. *Sir Samuel Jones v. The Countess of Manchester*. Ventriss appears to have mistaken the arguments at the bar for the resolutions of the court, as will appear upon an attentive perusal of the reports.

question there must have been, not whether a power of revocation implied a power to limit new uses, but whether a power of revocation itself could be implied as to part of the estate in the land to which it did not expressly relate. Besides, as he reserved a partial power of revocation, and would after the revocation become seised of the entire fee-simple, and part of the fee could not be affected by a bare appointment, an intention appeared to reserve a power of revocation only, and not a power to limit new uses, which would not have answered the purposes of the settlement. This case is very distinguishable from a general power of revocation, extending to all the limitations in the settlement.

And here we must be careful to distinguish the case of *Atwaters and Birt (e)*. There it was declared, that upon the revocation the uses should cease, and the estate should remain to the use of the settlor and his heirs; and it was held, that after revocation he could not limit new uses out of the old seisin, as no one was seised to his use, and therefore no use could arise. No one can doubt the propriety of this determination: by the very terms of the settlement the seisin was exhausted in serving the use in fee, limited to the settlor, and consequently no use could be raised, except by an original conveyance. Whenever, therefore, it is declared, that upon the revocation the estate shall remain to the settlor in fee, it cannot be contended that he has a power to limit new uses.

The result of the authorities appears to be,

1st, That in a deed *executing* a power, a power of revocation and new appointment may be reserved, although

(e) Cro. Eliz. 856.

although not expressly authorized by the deed *creating* the power (*f*). And that such powers may be reserved *toties quoties* (*g*).

2d, That where an appointment under a power is made by deed, it cannot be revoked unless an express power be reserved in the deed by which the power is executed: a revocation will not be authorized by a general prospective power in the deed *creating* the first power (*h*).

3d, That although in the *original* settlement a power of revocation only be reserved, yet a power to limit new uses is implied, and may be executed accordingly (*i*), unless a contrary intention can be collected from the whole settlement (*k*), or the estate is expressly limited to other uses (*l*). But,

4th, That every power reserved in a deed *executing* a power will be strictly construed, and therefore a mere power of revocation in such a deed will not authorize a limitation of new uses (*m*).

Upon the authority of Wall and Thurborne (*n*) an opinion has prevailed, that a power of revocation cannot be annexed to a power *simply* collateral. The wife had a power under her husband's will to appoint an estate amongst her daughters, and she executed the power with
power

(*f*) *Adams v. Adams*, Cowp. 651; see *Digges's case*, 1 Rep. 173, b.

(*g*) *Becket's case*, Lane, 118; *Hele and Bond*, Prec. Cha. 474; App. No. 6; 2 *Digges's case*, *ubi sup.*

(*h*) *Hele and Bond*, Prec. Cha. 474.

(*i*) *Fowler v. North*, 3 Keb. 7; Anon. 1 Cha. Ca. 242; *Colston v. Gardner*, 2 Cha. Ca. 46.

(*k*) Anon. Str. 584.

(*l*) *Atwaters v. Birt*, Cro. Eliz. 856.

(*m*) *Ward v. Lenthal*, 1 Sid. 343.

(*n*) 1 Vern. 355.

power of revocation, but never actually revoked the settlement. The book says, "as to the power of revocation, the case may be eased of that, for it was only an authority in the wife; and that being once executed, she could not reserve such power to herself." In the first place then it appears that the point did not call for a decision, and it is very far from clear that the *dictum* was not the argument of the counsel. Such a doctrine would be very inconvenient, and certainly cannot be considered as settled.

If a power require the deed of revocation and limitation of new uses to contain a power to revoke by deed, yet upon the execution of such reserved power of revocation the donee need not reserve another power to revoke (*o*).

In the case of *Young v. Cottle* (*p*), a man entitled to the office of Register of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, for the lives of himself and another person, who was a trustee for him, by deed appointed who should be Register after his death, and directed how the profits should be applied. By a later deed he made a different appointment. The first deed contained no power of revocation; but Lord Chancellor Cowper held, that it was only an authority, and therefore clearly countermandable by the second, and it was no more than if one should appoint his bailiff of his manor to pay one moiety of the profits to *A*, and the other moiety to *B*, which is countermandable at pleasure.

It should seem that the first instrument, although in the shape of a deed, was in its nature testamentary. It

(*o*) *Phillips v. Phipps*, V. C. (*p*) 1 P. Wms. 101.
M. T. 1818. MS.

It was too an original instrument which the Court considered countermandable, and not an instrument executed under a power.

In the late case of *Perrot v. Perrot* (q), a bond was given to pay 1,000*l.* to such person or persons as a woman by deed or will should appoint. An appointment was made by deed, without reserving a power of revocation, and a question arose whether it could be revoked. To show that it was not revocable some cases on voluntary settlements were cited, and it was said that it could make no difference in principle, whether the appointment were made out of the party's own estate or out of the estate of another; but Lord Ellenborough observed, that there is this difference, at least, that where a power of appointment is given to be executed by deed or will; as if done by will, it would be revocable by a subsequent will, it furnishes some ground for arguing, that the person who created the power meant to give the same power of revocation to the person who was to execute it, whether it was first executed by deed or by will; for alterations, by death or otherwise, amongst the subjects of appointment, might equally render it necessary or expedient. At the end of the argument his Lordship said, that the power was ambulatory during the life of the person who was to execute it: it was only required to be executed in form, by deed or will. He had no difficulty therefore in saying, that it might have been executed *toties quoties* by the one way or the other during the life of the donee of the power. In delivering judgment, his Lordship said that the Court expressed its opinion at the time, that as it was no part of the original plan

(q) 14 East, 423.

plan that an appointment once made should be irrevocable, as was obvious from the alternative power of appointing by will, which must be revocable, as well as by deed, *as the appointment did not necessarily work a transmutation of property as an appointment of land does* [the deed was revocable].

It was not however necessary to decide this point. The decisions as to the necessity of reserving a power of revocation in order to authorize a party to revoke an appointment by deed, have always been considered to apply to personal as well as real estate. An appointment of real estate by deed, without reserving a power of revocation, under a power to appoint by deed or will, is as obnoxious to the argument on the intention of the person creating the power as a similar appointment of personalty ; and although an appointment of personalty does not necessarily work a transmutation of property, neither in many cases does an appointment of real estate have that operation ; for example, in the numerous instances where the legal fee is in a trustee, and the appointment is only to operate on the equitable estate ; nor does an appointment ever so operate in the case of leasehold estates. Indeed, even as to real estate before the Statute of Uses, in no instance did the execution of a power operate as a transmutation of possession. Since the statute the possession is imbued with the quality, form, and condition of the use, and the property and quality of the use, as abstracted from the possession, still remain. Therefore, although an execution of a power over real estate may now work a transmutation of possession, yet the estate so created might be revoked
after

after the statute, if the use would have been subject to revocation before the statute ; but, as in the case under consideration, the use could not have been revoked before the statute, it cannot be revoked since. This, and not the change of possession, appears to be the true reason why a power over real estate executed by deed cannot be revoked, unless a power to revoke be reserved by the deed executing the power. The analogy, therefore, between powers over real, and powers over personal estate, cannot, it should seem, be destroyed upon the above principle ; and it is not, perhaps, at this day possible to contend that an appointment by deed shall be revocable because the donee might have appointed by will, which would have been revocable.

We shall have occasion in another place to consider what conditions may be annexed to estates limited under particular powers.

SECTION VIII.

OF THE EFFECT OF THE EXECUTION OF A POWER.

I PROPOSE to treat first, of the operation of the instrument executing the power ; secondly, of the manner in which the estates created take effect in regard to themselves ; and thirdly, of the effect of the execution of the power on the estates in the settlement.

First, then, with regard to the instrument : in whatever mode the power is exercised, whether by an act *inter vivos*,

vivos, a grant, bargain and sale, lease and release, covenant to stand seised, feoffment, or fine, or by a will, the instrument in every case operates strictly as an appointment or declaration of the use, and therefore, in consequence of the rule before noticed, that there cannot be a use upon a use, the bargainee, &c. takes the legal estate, the appointment being made to him; and if any ulterior use is declared, it operates merely as a trust in equity. It is, however, apprehended, that if the power be executed by way of covenant to stand seised, the use would vest in the person intended to take beneficially, and not in the covenantee.

But a *will* made in execution of a power has a peculiar operation; it not only operates as an execution of the power, but also in most respects partakes of the qualities of a *proper* will. We have seen, that if a power of revocation is not reserved in a *deed* executing the power, the instrument is irrevocable; but this does not hold good as to a *will*, for although in truth it is not strictly a will, but simply a declaration of use, yet it so far retains the properties of a will as to be ambulatory till the death of the testator, and consequently revocable without any express power reserved for that purpose (*a*). So such a will will be revoked by a covenant, amounting in equity to a conveyance, in the same manner as a proper will (*b*); but the will of a *feme covert*, made in execution of a power which could only be exercised by will, will not be revoked by

(*a*) *Hatcher v. Curtis*, 2 Freem. 61; and see 1 Ves. 139; 2 Ves. 77, 612; *Lisle v. Lisle*, 1 Bro. C. C. 533; *Lawrence v. Wallis*, 2 Bro. C. C. 319. (*b*) *Cotter v. Laver*, 2 P. Wms. 662; see *Treat. Purch.* 6th edit. p. 168, 169.

a deed executed during coverture, and after her will manifesting a different intention (c). But, generally, a will under a power will be revoked by any act amounting to a revocation in law of a proper will (d), or by cancellation, or any of the methods pointed out by the Statute of Frauds (e). Again, the appointment will lapse by the death of the donee in the testator's life-time (f); but although the appointee survive the testator, yet he will only take from the time of the testator's death (g). Of course, executors cannot take derivatively from the appointee, yet an appointment may be made to executors or administrators, who may be used in a will as distinct from the testator, and as persons designated to take in the event of the death of the appointee, in the testator's life-time (h) (I). So lapsed legacies of personalty will fall into the residue (i); nor in equity will the death of the appointee defeat

(c) *Eilbeck v. Wood*, 1 Russ. 564.

(d) *Reid v. Shergold*, 10 Ves. jun. 370; *Shove v. Pincke*, 5 Term Rep. 124; see *Ex-parte Lord Ilchester*, 7 Ves. jun. 348.

(e) 2 Ves. 77.

(f) *Oke v. Heath*, 1 Ves. 135; *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, 4 Ves. jun. 771; *Burgess v. Mawbey*, 10

Ves. jun. 319; *Earl of Salisbury v. Lambe*, Ambl. 385.

(g) *Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin*, 2 Ves. 61, S. C. MS.; *Southby v. Stonehouse*, 2 Ves. 616; *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, 4 Ves. jun. 771.

(h) *Burnet v. Helgrave*, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 296, pl. 2.

(i) *Oke v. Heath*, *ubi sup.*; *Falkner v. Butler*, Ambl. 514.

(I) This is the principle established by this case; but whether it was rightly applied to the facts in that case is another question. See *Oke v. Heath*, *Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin*, and *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, cited *sup.*

defeat a charge on the interest appointed to him in favour of a person who survives the testator (*k*).

The same latitude also is allowed in the terms of the devise as in the case of a proper will, but this doctrine must be discussed hereafter (*l*). The analogy has even been carried so far, that a limitation by will under a power, to the heir-at-law of the donee of the power, has been held to give him an estate by descent (*m*). This decision was made upon the known rule that a common devise in fee-simple to an heir-at-law gives him no estate at all, he being adjudged in by descent, and the determination that an appointment by will is subject to the same rules as a common devise. This, it must be allowed, was a very extraordinary decision. It may be right to hold that the *instrument* shall operate as a *proper* will, as to the words and general effect of it; but upon what solid principle a man can be held to take that by descent which never vested, or had a chance of vesting, in his ancestor, it is not easy to conceive. We may ask with Lord C. J. Willes, Will any one say that any thing can descend to the heir that did not vest in the ancestor? (*n*). The grounds of the determination were quite foreign to the question. The principle of the decision cannot even be supported by any plausible fiction, nor does policy require the adoption of it; for in the general run of cases it must be wholly immaterial whether the appointee take by descent or purchase. It should

(*k*) *Oke v. Heath*, *ubi sup.*; *chelsea*, 1 Blackst. 187. See
see *Taylor v. George*, 2 Ves. and *Langley v. Sneyd*, 3 Brod. &
Bea. 378. *Bing.* 243. 1 Sim. & Stu. 45,

(*l*) *Vide infra*, ch. 9, sect. 2. and 7 Moore, 165.

(*m*) *Hurst v. the Earl of Wir-* (*n*) Willes, 338.

should be observed, that in the case referred to the power was reserved to the person who made the settlement, and who was at that time seised in fee. It may not, therefore, be deemed a general authority, that in every case of a beneficial power the heir of the donee, being the appointee, takes by descent, although the donee himself never had any interest in the estate; nor indeed was it acquiesced in as an authority upon the point it professed to decide; for the decree of Lord Keeper Henley, in conformity to the judgment of the King's Bench, was appealed from to the House of Lords, and the appeal was afterwards compromised (*o*).

Where the will relates to personalty, it must be proved in the Spiritual Court. This has been determined even in regard to an appointment by the will of a *feme covert*, who cannot in the notion of law make a will (*p*), although a different opinion appears at one time to have prevailed (*q*). The Courts of Equity will not, however, at this day, read the appointment by will until it is duly proved as a proper will in the Spiritual Court, nor will the probate preclude the necessity of proving the instrument as an appointment, upon any claim under it in a Court of Equity (*r*).

We shall presently see that estates created by the execution of a power take effect as if created by the original deed; and, in general, a deed executing a power cannot be considered as a new alienation, or independent conveyance (*s*); but still there are cases in which

(*o*) 2 Burr. 882.

(*r*) Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves.

(*p*) Ross v. Ewer, 3 Atk. 156.

jun. 369.

(*q*) Daniel v. Goodwin, Exch.

(*s*) See Coke's argument in

T. T. 8 and 9 Geo. II. MS. App.
No. 14.

Lady Gresham's case, Mo. 261.

which a deed executing a power is for many purposes considered as a substantive independent instrument. Thus such a deed affecting an estate in a register county must be registered; it is within the mischief intended to be guarded against by the acts, as a purchaser could not otherwise discover whether the power has been exercised (*t*). So a deed executing a power over real estate has been deemed a *conveyance* within the statute of Elizabeth, so as to be fraudulent, because it was a conveyance (*u*.) So on an issue to try whether the plaintiff was entitled by two writings, or any other, purporting a will of J. S., and the evidence was of a feoffment to the use of such person as J. S. should appoint by his will; in which case it was contended that the devisees were in by the feoffment, and not by the will; the Court held that this was only *fictione juris*, for that they were not in *without* the will, and therefore that was the principal part of the title, and such proof was good enough, and pursuant to the issue, and a verdict was accordingly given for the plaintiff (*v*). So, although the estate did not originally belong to the donee of the power, and the estate created by the appointment is considered as limited by the deed creating the power, yet a person deriving title under an appointment is considered as claiming *under* the donee, within the meaning of a covenant by him for quiet enjoyment against any person claiming under him (*y*).

Where there is a power to appoint part of a settled fund,

(*t*) *Scrafton v. Quincey*, 2 Ves.
413.

(*u*) See 2 Ves. 65.

(*x*) *Bartlet v. Ramsden*, 1 Keb.
570.

(*y*) *Hurd v. Fletcher*, Dougl.
4.

fund, the execution of the power takes the part appointed entirely out of the settlement; although, therefore, the beneficial interest in it is not immediately disposed of, yet there can be no resulting trust for the benefit of any person under the deed creating the power (z). If the fund sustain a loss, the sum subjected to the power may be appointed, and the loss must be borne wholly by the persons entitled to the residue (a).

II. The estates created by the execution of a power take effect precisely in the same manner (with the exception which will shortly be noticed) as if created by the deed which raised the power. Thus, suppose a general power of appointment to be given to a man by deed, and he by virtue of his power limit the estate to *A* for life, with remainder to his children in strict settlement, these limitations will take effect as estates limited by the original deed, and in exactly the same way as they would have done had they been limited in that deed by the grantor of the power (b), in lieu of the power of appointment by force of which they were created. And it has been contended, that the acts done in consequence and by virtue of an authority, and pursuant thereto, are the acts of the old proprietor, *and of that day wherein he in virtue of his ownership delegated that authority*. But this Lord Hardwicke over-ruled. He admitted the principle, that where a person takes by execution

(z) *Mansell v. Price*, Rolls, MS. App. No. 15. see *Shelley v. Earsfield*, 1 Rep. Cha. 110.

(a) *Oke v. Heath*, 1 Ves. 135; (b) See *Middleton v. Crofts*, 2 Atk. 661.

execution of a power, whether of realty or personalty, it is taken under the authority of that power, *but not from the time of the creation of that power*. The meaning that the persons must take under the power, or as if their names had been inserted in the power, is, that they shall take in the same manner as if the power and instrument executing the power had been incorporated in one instrument; then they shall take as if all that was in the instrument executing had been expressed in that giving the power. So it is in appointments of uses. If a feoffment is executed to such uses as he shall appoint by will, when the will is made, it is clear that the appointee, *cestui que use*, is in by the feoffment, but has nothing from the *time of the execution of the feoffment* so as to vest the estate in him. The estate will vest in him according to the nature of the act done and appointment of the use from the time of the testator's death. This, therefore, is not a relation so as to make things vest from the time of the power, but according to the time of that act executing that power; not like the referring back in case of assignment in commission of bankruptcy, that is, by force of the statute, and to avoid mesne wrongful acts (c).

This doctrine, that the appointee takes under the original deed, is followed in all its consequences. Therefore, although a husband cannot at common law convey directly to his wife, yet he may make an immediate appointment to her (d); because her estate arises out of the

(c) Per Lord Hardwicke, *Southby v. Stonehouse*, ib. 610, accordingly.
Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin, 2 Ves. 61; and see (d) See *Latch*. 44; 2 Wils. 402.

the original seisin ; and for the same reason a wife may appoint immediately to her husband ; the principle is something similar to that which prevails in copyholds, where a surrender by the husband to the wife, or by the wife to her husband, is good (e).

So although a limitation to *A* for life by one instrument, and a limitation to his heirs, or heirs of his body, by another, cannot unite according to the rule in Shelley's case, yet a limitation to *A* for life by deed, and a limitation afterwards in his life-time to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, under an execution of a power of appointment contained in the deed creating the life-estate, will coalesce so as to give the inheritance to *A*. Perhaps the nearest case to this in the old books is Pybus and Mitford, where a limitation to the heirs of the body of *A* was held to unite with an estate for life which resulted to him by the same deed. Mr. Fearne, in his investigation of this point, considers it clear that the limitations will unite : he treats the deed executing the power as a branch of the original settlement, merely directing the operation of it, *quoad* the uses appointed, and consequently the limitations in such appointment are part of such settlement, and, by relation, virtually contained therein from the time of the appointment, only declared by way of reference to a subsequent specification thereof. He treats the rule in Shelley's case as requiring no identity of time in the declaring, but only of the instrument creating the two limitations ; and to show that the estates may vest at different times, he refers to the common case of an estate to two or more, for their lives, remainder to the
right

(e) See *Bunting v. Lepingwel*, 4 Rep. 29, a.

right heirs of the survivor of them, and the case put in 1 Inst. (*f*), that if lands be given to two during their joint lives, remainder to the heirs of him who shall die first, the heir will be in by *descent*, which are direct authorities that no identity in point of time of vesting of the two estates is requisite to the operation of the rule (*g*).

When these observations were made by Mr. Fearne, no judicial opinion had ever been delivered on the point, but in Venables and Morris (*h*) the very question arose. Under a settlement the husband was tenant for life, remainder to trustees and their heirs generally, to preserve remainders, with remainder (after several uses which never arose) to such uses as the wife should appoint. She appointed to the right heirs of her husband. The Court ultimately held that the *fee-simple* vested in the trustees, so that the estate limited under the power being merely equitable, could not unite with the limitation to the husband for life in the deed, which was a legal estate; but Lord Kenyon treated it as quite a clear point, that the appointment was to be considered in the same light as if it had been inserted in the original deed by which the power of appointment was created; and therefore he held, that if the limitation to the heirs of the husband had been a legal estate, it would have enlarged the estate in the ancestor, and given him a fee.

So, as a consequence of this rule, it has been determined, that where an estate was conveyed to such uses as *A* should appoint, and in default of appointment to himself

(*f*) 1 Inst. 378, b.

(*g*) Contingent Remainders, 99, 4th edition.

(*h*) 7 Term Rep. 342, 438.

himself in fee, yielding and paying a fee-farm rent, which he covenanted to pay accordingly, and afterwards, *by virtue of his power*, he conveyed the estate to a purchaser, such purchaser was not subject to the covenant for payment of the rent, for although the covenant ran with the land in the first instance, yet it ceased to do so in the hands of the purchaser, because he did not take the interest of the original grantee, but took as if the original conveyance had been made to himself (*i*). This decision leads to the observation, that wherever a purchaser is to enter into a covenant, which it is intended shall run with the land, the vendor ought to insist upon the purchaser taking a conveyance to himself in fee, and should not permit the estate to be limited to the usual uses (*k*) to bar dower.

Of course the beneficial interest a man takes under the execution of a power forms part of his estate, and is, like the rest of his property, subject to his debts; nor indeed, can an appointment be made so as to protect the funds from the debts of the appointee (*l*).

But equity goes a step farther, and holds that where a man has a *general* power of appointment over a fund, and he actually exercises his power, whether by deed or will, the property appointed shall form part of his assets, so as to be subject to the demands of his creditors, in preference to the claims of his legatees or appointees (*m*). But in order to raise this equity the
power

(*i*) *Roach v. Wadham*, 6 East, 289.

(*k*) See *Treat. of Purch.* 543, 544, 6th edit.

(*l*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640.

(*m*) *Lassels v. Lord Cornwallis*, 2 Vern. 465; *Prec. Cha.* 232; *Thomson v. Towne*, 2 Vern. 319; *Hinton v. Toye*, 1 Atk. 465; *Shirley v. Ferrars*, 2 Atk. 172; 2 Ves. 2, 8, 9; 7 Ves. jun.

power must be actually executed, for equity, as we shall hereafter see, never aids the non-execution of a power (*n*). And although creditors in these cases prevail over volunteers, yet if a party taking under a voluntary appointment sell to a person *bond fide* and for a valuable consideration, such person, in analogy to the decisions on the statute of voluntary conveyances, will be preferred to the creditors (*o*), as having a preferable equity to them.

III. Although every power operates as a power of revocation and new appointment (*p*), yet in order to enable us to consider accurately the effect of the execution of powers on the estates in the settlement, we must here distinguish three kinds of powers; viz. first, a power of revocation; secondly, a power of appointment with a limitation over in default of appointment; and, thirdly, particular powers in a settlement, as powers of leasing and jointuring.

And first, as to a power of revocation: Immediately upon the execution of it the ancient uses are determined, whether limited to a subject or to the King (*q*), without entry or claim, if the party who has the power is himself tenant of the freehold, as he cannot enter upon himself;

503, n. cited; *Bainton v. Ward*, 2 Atk. 172; 2 Ves. 2; 7 Ves. jun. 503, n.; *Lord Townshend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 1; *Pack v. Bathurst*, 3 Atk. 269; *Troughton v. Troughton*, 3 Atk. 656. *Jenney v. Andrews*, 6 Madd. 264.

(*n*) *Holmes v. Coghill*, 7 Ves. jun. 499; 12 Ves. jun. 206.

(*o*) *George v. Milbanke*, 9 Ves. jun. 190; *Hart v. Middlehurst*, 3 Atk. 377; see 1 Mer. 638, and *infra*, ch. 9.

(*p*) See *Tarback v. Marbury*, 2 Vern. 511.

(*q*) 1 Jo. 193.

self; and a claim is unnecessary; but it has been doubted whether a claim is not necessary where the revoker has no interest in the land (*r*).

Secondly, as to powers with estates limited in default of their being exercised. Immediately upon the execution of such a power the estates limited in default of appointment cease, and are defeated; and the estates limited under the power take effect from the time of the execution of the power, in the same manner as if they had been contained in the deed creating the power. The estates, however limited in default of appointment, are, as we have seen, vested estates (*s*). Therefore, where an estate is limited to such uses as a man shall appoint, and in default of appointment to him in fee, as he is seised in fee until appointment, his wife becomes dowable; and it was formerly doubted whether a subsequent appointment would drive out the wife's right of dower (*t*). It was to prevent this question from arising that in the limitations to bar dower an interposed estate was given, in default of appointment, to a trustee. There are few points upon which a greater difference of opinion has prevailed in the Profession. It was formerly much debated whether the fee was vested in the party, but that question is now at rest. Some opinions have taken a distinction between a limitation in default of and *until* appointment, and a limitation merely in default of appointment; in which last case, it has been contended, the fee does not vest; this doctrine, however, cannot be supported at the present day. It must be

(*r*) Digges's case, 1 Rep. 173, 5th resol.; Mo. 605; Co. Litt. 237, a; and see Vernon's case, Mo. 744.

(*s*) *Supra*, ch. 2, sect. 4.

(*t*) See n. (2) Co. Litt. 216, a.

be taken as a settled principle that the fee is vested in the husband, and the right of dower has attached. And the opinion of most of the eminent men of the times, and amongst them of the late Mr. Fearne, was, that the right of dower was defeated with the estate on which it attached by the execution of the power. Upon principle, it is difficult to frame a reason in favour of the right of dower; for although the estates limited by the execution of the power take effect only from the time of the execution of the power, yet the estates limited in default of appointment cease the instant before the new uses arise (I). Perhaps the doubt may have been raised on this ground, that as a conveyance of the fee would in fact destroy the power, a partial charge or right attaching on it, even by operation of law, must have the effect of defeating the operation of the power *pro tanto*. The opinions of the Judges on this point stand thus: In Cave and Holford, Mr. Justice Heath expressed an opinion, that the power would enable the donee to bar the claim of dower (u). In Cox and Chamberlain, Lord Alvanley spoke rather dubiously of the question. He said, that by the execution of the power the estate in fee might be superseded, "though perhaps not to bar dower." Lord Eldon appears to have thought with Mr. Justice Heath, that the appointment drove out all intermediate estates, and

(u) See 3 Ves. jun. 657.

(I) The doubt could scarcely be supported on *Buckworth v. Thirkell*, Coll. Jurid. 332, 3 Bos. and Pull. 652, n. if even that case itself had been rightly decided. See *Moody v. King*, 2 Bing. 447, and *qu.*

and the dowress could not sustain her claim of dower upon the new estate in the appointee of the power (*x*). In a later case Lord Eldon said, that notwithstanding his own opinion, if the point had arisen, he would have permitted the party to take the opinion of a Court of law upon it (I).

In the late case of *Moreton v. Lees* (*y*), the point was decided against the right of dower. The widow brought her writ of dower, and the defendants pleaded that the husband was only seised by virtue of a feoffment, dated 12th March, 1787, whereby the estate was granted to the husband and his heirs and assigns, to such uses as he should appoint by deed or will; and for want, or in default of, and in the mean time, and until appointment, to the use of the husband, his heirs and assigns for ever; and they also pleaded an appointment in fee by him; a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court, and the Court, upon argument, decided against the widow's right; and the point was decided the same way in the later case of *Ray v. Pung*, which sets the point at rest (*z*). The certificate in that case was confirmed by the Vice Chancellor.

Thirdly, in regard to particular powers in a settlement,

(*x*) See *Maundrell v. Maundrell*, 10 Ves. jun. 246. case before Richards, C. B. and Wood, B.

(*y*) *C. P. Lancaster*, March Assizes, 1819, upon a special (z) 5 Barn. & Ald. 561; 5 Madd. 310.

(I) The case of *Wilde v. Fort*, 4 Taunt. 334, may be treated as an authority in favour of the right of dower; but it is not stated, whether Halliday executed his power or conveyed his estate. If the latter, of course, the point did not arise.

ment, as powers of leasing, jointuring, charging with portions for younger children, selling and exchanging, &c. these we may consider under two views: 1st, with respect to the operation of the powers on the limitations in the settlement, and 2dly, in relation to their effect on each other. And, first,

I. It holds generally true, that a power to create leases, or any other estate to take effect in possession, will control and over-reach *all* the estates in the settlement (*a*). Thus, in a case (*b*) where lands were settled to *A* for life, then to trustees for a term, upon such trusts as *A* should direct, and then to uses in strict settlement, with a power of leasing to *A*; *A* first declared the trusts of the term for payment of his debts, and then granted a lease in exercise of his power. It was objected, that the estate was bound by the declaration of trust by *A*, and that he could not afterwards execute his power, so as to over-reach the term; but this was over-ruled, "for the term was originally subject to the power, being contained in the same deed, and he having exercised his power, the leases are precedent to the term, and control it."

So, in another case, where the settlement was to *A* for life, remainder to such woman as he should marry, for life, remainder to the first and other sons in tail, remainder to *A* in fee, with a power to him to charge portions for younger children, which he afterwards duly exercised; it was prayed that the remainder only might

(*a*) See the argument of Bridgman, Chief Justice, in *Bosworth v. Farrand*, Cart. 111; and see 2 Ro. Abr. 260, pl. 5; S. C.

Cro. Jac. 347. nom. *Fox v. Prickwood*.

(*b*) *Talbot v. Tipper*, Skin. 427. *Doe v. Thomas*, 9 Barn & Cress. 288.

might be charged with the portion; but the Court held, that the power and the charge made pursuant thereto did affect the wife's estate for life as well as the remainder; and that it was like a power of leasing, which over-reaches all the estates, for which reason they said it was usual to insert a proviso in such power of charging, that it shall not prejudice the jointure or other preceding estate (c).

Again, in the case of Mosley and Mosley (d), under a strict settlement by a father and his eldest son, terms of years were created to raise portions for the father's younger children. And *powers* were given to the son, subject to his father's life-estate, to direct portions to be raised for his younger children. These powers were executed, and the father's younger children insisted that their portions were a prior incumbrance, as they were created by the settlement which was executed long prior to the deeds executing the powers. But Lord Alvanley, then Master of the Rolls, held otherwise. He said, that the moment the power was executed it was as if in the original deed, and in that way it would stand now. This power was subject to the father's life-estate; therefore it must be taken as if made subsequent to the life-estate of his father. As soon as he has executed that power the term created by it comes in immediately after the estate of the father, before the other terms, but not before his life-estate. The charge, therefore, is the first incumbrance upon the estate. Suppose the power was not for a provision for younger children, but to secure a jointure to his wife; according to the defendants, that jointure would

(c) Beale v. Beale, 1 P. Wms. 244.

(d) 5 Ves. jun. 248.

would be postponed to his younger brother's fortunes. What pretence is there for that? The moment he raises the term, it is put in after the life of his father, to which the power is subject. He could not, he added, in point of conveyancing, put it in any where else.

In a late case, where there was a strict settlement, the ultimate limitation was to the use of the settlor in fee, "subject, nevertheless, and charged with the payment of 6,000 *l.* as he should appoint." It was insisted by the bill, but not relied upon in argument, that the power only operated as a charge upon the ultimate reversion. The Master of the Rolls held, that upon the true construction the reservation of the right to charge must extend to the estate in all the limitations of it, and not be confined merely to the reversionary interest limited to himself, over which he would have a disposing power at all events (*e*).

II. Where several powers have been given by the same deed, and two or more of them are executed, and no provision has been made in regard to their priorities, the intention of the settlement and the object of the powers must be the best guides to the construction. In the case of *Yelland and Ficlis* (*f*), Coke, Chief Justice, laid it down, that if one make a conveyance, with a power to make leases and a power of revocation, if he make a lease (I) he may afterwards revoke for the re-

(*e*) *Stackhouse v. Barnston, v. Graham*, 2 Str. 961; 2 Barn. 10 Ves. jun. 453; see *Forster R. R.* 341, 428.

(*f*) Mo. 788.

(I) Viner, who inserts this *dictum* in his Abridgment, after this word "lease," adds the words [of part] between brackets. There is no pretence, however, for this interpolation.

sidue. Indeed, it could not possibly be argued that the interest of a lessee, who is considered a purchaser *pro tanto*, would be defeated by the subsequent execution of another power by the lessor. It were not easy to lay down any abstract proposition on this head; but questions upon it seldom occur. The *dictum* in Moore is perhaps the only observation in the books on this point. The nature of the powers, in most instances, sufficiently points out the priority to which the estates created under them are entitled. Thus a power of sale must defeat every limitation of the estate, whether created directly by the deed, or through the medium of a power, except estates limited to persons standing in the same situation as the purchaser; for example, a lessee. As to powers executed in favour of the family, a jointure, whether created before or after a provision for the jointress's younger children, must of course take precedence of it; but they must both give way to a subsequent execution of a power to sell and exchange, or lease. It is usual, in most cases, to provide by the settlement for the priority of the several powers contained in it (*g*).

(*g*) See Sand. on Uses, 158—162, 3d edit.

CHAPTER VI.

OF EQUITABLE RELIEF IN FAVOUR OF DEFECTIVE EXECUTIONS OF POWERS.

SECTION I.

OF THIS RELIEF WHERE THERE IS A MERITORIOUS CONSIDERATION IN THE APPOINTEE.

WE have before seen that powers took their rise before the Statute of Uses, and were then sanctioned and protected by equity only ; nor did equity suffer the statute to deprive it of this valuable branch of its jurisdiction. At law, the omission of any circumstance required to the execution of a power was deemed fatal ; but equity, where there was a good or a valuable consideration, interposed its aid, and supported the defective execution of the power. Before the limits to this equitable relief were fully established, it was speciously argued, that although the circumstances required to a power must be observed at law, yet when a man hath a power over an estate, those circumstances are only a guard upon himself that he may not be surprised into a sudden disposition of it. But when deliberately and solemnly he hath done an act whereby he disposeth of this estate,

but there wants some little ceremony or circumstance, such as the not tendering 12 *d.* or the like, a court of equity ought to supply such a defect, to support this solemn intention to dispose of it; for, plain it is, he is not surprised into this act, and so the reason for those circumstances fails, and they need not be strictly observed. But to this it was answered and resolved, that powers were similar to conditions at common law; and as a man must perform a condition at common law to entitle him to re-enter, he must execute his power to entitle him to a revocation. And a court of equity can no more let a man in to defeat an estate upon a power of revocation, without a due execution of the power, than the common law could let in a man to defeat an estate upon a condition, without performance of the condition; or than a court of equity can permit a man to defeat a voluntary conveyance without a power of revocation; for it is all but a condition which must be performed, or no advantage taken of it; and a court of equity may do great things, but they cannot alter things, or make them to operate contrary to their essential natures and properties (*a*).

In modern times it has been contended, that whatever is an *equitable*, ought to be a *legal*, execution of a power (*b*); because, as Lord Mansfield observed, there should be a general rule of property; and if the courts of equity say, we will presume that where the execution is for a meritorious consideration, a strict adherence to the precise form was not intended, and therefore it is not

(*a*) See 3 Cha. Ca. 66, 67.
107, 108.

(*b*) Zouch v. Woolston, 2 Burr.
1136.

not necessary, the moment the same rule is fixed and adopted at law, every man who creates, and every man who is to exercise a power understands what he is to do (*c*); and he considered that where there is a meritorious consideration, it was not necessary even at law strictly to adhere to the precise form (*d*). The vice of this reasoning is, that equity itself does not hold the power well executed, unless the form is adhered to; but where the execution is for a meritorious consideration, compels the person seised of the estate in default of execution of the power to make good the defect—a jurisdiction which courts of law cannot assume, because they have no means of enforcing its observance. At the present day, however, Lord Mansfield's doctrine is completely exploded: equity alone can relieve against a defective execution of a power, and that only where there is a meritorious consideration in the person applying for the aid of the Court.

Sir William Grant, with his usual precision, strongly observed (*e*), that it is difficult to discover a sound principle for the authority which equity assumes for aiding a defective execution in certain cases. If the intention of the party possessing the power is to be regarded, and not the interest of the party to be affected by the execution, that intention ought to be executed wherever it is manifested; for the owner of the estate has nothing to do with the purpose; to him it is indifferent whether it is to be exercised for a creditor or a volunteer. But if the interest of the party to be affected by the execution is

(*c*) Cowp. 267.

(*d*) Ibid. 269.

(*e*) 7 Ves. jun. 506; and see

15 Ves. jun. 51.

is to be regarded, why, in any case, exercise the power, except in the form and manner prescribed? He is an absolute stranger to the equity between the possessor of the power, and the party in whose favour it is intended to be executed. As against the debtor it is right that he should pay (I). But what equity is there for the creditor to have the money raised out of the estate of a third person, in a case in which it was never agreed that it should be raised? The owner is not heard to say it will be a grievous burthen, and of no merit or utility. He is told the case provided for exists; it is formally right; he has nothing to do with the purpose. But upon a defect which this court is called upon to supply, he is not permitted to retort this argument, and to say it is not formally right; the case provided for does not exist; and he has nothing to do with the purpose. In the sort of equity upon this subject there is some want of equality. But the rule is perfectly settled, and though perhaps with some violation of principle, with no practical inconvenience.

Thus, then, the jurisdiction stands; and we may now inquire what amounts to such a consideration as will enable equity to interpose its aid in favour of a defective execution of a power.

I. In *Chapman v. Gibson* (f), Lord Alvanley laid it down that the execution of a power and a surrender of a copyhold go hand in hand precisely on the same ground, consequently the same relief is to be granted in cases

(f) 3 Bro. C. C. 229; and see 17 Ves. jun. 297.

(I) The question was, whether the Court would execute a power in favour of creditors.

cases of a defective execution of a power, and of the grant of a surrender of a copyhold; the aid of equity then will be afforded to a purchaser (*g*), which term includes a mortgagee and a lessee (I) (*h*), and to a creditor (*i*). The like aid will be afforded to a wife (*k*), and to a legitimate child (*l*); and although to constitute a valuable consideration *for a settlement* on a wife or child, it must be made *before* marriage; yet the marriage and blood are meritorious considerations, and claim the aid of a court of equity in support of a defective execution of a power in their favour (*m*), although the power was executed after the marriage.

But it has been decided that a defective execution of a power by a wife cannot be aided in favour of her husband (*n*), nor is the equity extended to a natural child;

(*g*) *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, 2 Freem. 257; *Anon. ib.* 224; 3 Cha. Ca. 68; *Cowp.* 267.

(*h*) *Barker v. Hill*, 2 Cha. Rep. 113; *Bradley v. Bradley*, 2 Vern. 163; *Taylor v. Wheeler*, 2 Vern. 564; and *Jennings v. Moore*, *ib.* 609; *Reid v. Shergold*, 10 Ves. jun. 370.

(*i*) *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, *ubi sup.* 3 Cha. Ca. 89; *Pollard v. Greenvil*, 1 Cha. Ca. 10; 1 Cha. Rep. 98; *Wilkes v. Holmes*, 9 Mod. 485; *Ithell v. Beane*, 1 Ves. 215; *Bixby v. Eley*, 2 Bro. C. C. 325; 2 Dick. 698.

(*k*) *Cowp.* 267; *Fothergill v.*

Fothergill, 2 Freem. 256; *Lady Clifford v. Earl of Burlington*, 2 Vern. 397; *Coventry v. Coventry*, 2 P. Wms. 222; and see *ib.* 705.

(*l*) *Sarth v. Lady Blanford*, *Gilb. Eq. Rep.* 166; *Sneed v. Sneed*, *Ambl.* 64; *Cowp.* 264, 265, cited; and see *Cowp.* 267.

(*m*) *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, 2 Freem. 256; *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 Atk. 561; *Churchman v. Hervey*, *Ambl.* 335.

(*n*) *Watt v. Watt*, 3 Ves. jun. 244; *Moodie v. Reid*, 1 Madd. 516; and see *Sargeson v. Sealey*,

2 Atk. 412.

(I) The cases in Italics were decided upon Copyholds.

child (*o*); nor, as it has at length been determined, to a grandchild (*p*), neither will it extend to a brother or sister even of the whole blood (*q*), much less of the half blood (*r*), nor to a nephew (*s*), or cousin (*t*), and *à fortiori*, it cannot be afforded to a mere volunteer (*u*).

We have seen that this equity extends to *creditors*; and where a man, having a general power of appointment, duly executes it in favour of a stranger, equity will lay hold of the funds in the hands of the appointee, for the benefit of the creditors of the person executing the power (*x*); but where the power is *not* executed, equity cannot assist the creditors (*y*). Upon this doctrine, Lord Erskine, in a late case, started an ingenious question, whether, if the power be informally executed in favour of a stranger, equity can first grant the relief at the suit of the creditors, so as to vest the fund in the appointee, and then convert him into a trustee of it for creditors; and he appeared to think that this might be done.

(*o*) *Fursaker v. Robinson*, Prec. Cha. 475; *Tudor v. Anson*, 2 Ves. 582.

(*p*) See *Kettle v. Townsend*, 1 Salk. 187; *Watts v. Bullas*, 1 P. Wms. 60; *Freestone v. Rant*, ib. 61, n; 3 Bro. C. C. 231; *Fursaker v. Robinson*, Prec. Cha. 477; *Tudor v. Anson*, 2 Ves. 582; *Chapman v. Gibson*, 3 Bro. C. C. 229; *Hills v. Downton*, 5 Ves. jun. 567; *Perry v. Whitehead*, 6 Ves. jun. 544; and see 1 Watk. Copyh. 136. 138.

(*q*) *Goodwyn v. Goodwyn*, 1 Ves. 228.

(*r*) *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 189; which overruled *Watts v. Bullas*, *ubi sup.*

(*s*) *Strode v. Russell*, 2 Vern. 621; *Marston v. Gowan*, 3 Bro. C. C. 170; and see *Piggot v. Penrice*, Com. 250.

(*t*) *Tudor v. Anson*, 2 Ves. 582.

(*u*) *Smith v. Ashton*, 2 Freem. 309; see 3 Cha. Ca. 113, 126; *Sargeson v. Sealey*, 2 Atk. 415; *Godwin v. Kilsha*, Ambl. 684; Reg. Lib. A. 1768, fol. 495.

(*x*) *Vide* ch. 5, sect. 8.

(*y*) *Vide infra*, sect. 3.

done (2). There is no authority however for this circuitous relief, and it may well be doubted whether it will ever be granted. Where the fund is *effectually* given to a stranger, equity considers him a trustee of it for the creditors, and the remainder-man has no ground of complaint, because the power is legally executed. Where a defect is supplied for the appointee, the relief has at least the merit of effectuating the intention of the person executing the power, although at the expense of the remainder-man; but if this relief should be afforded in favour of creditors, where the fund is not given to them, the same hardship would be imposed on the remainder-man, and at the same time the intention of the donee of the power would be defeated. Upon this head of equity it is clearly established that the interests of the remainder-man shall only be sacrificed to the intention of the donee of the power expressed in favour of a person from whom a valuable consideration moved, or in whose person a good consideration existed. The first point to be established is the intention of the person executing the power, which in this case is not merely wanting, but his intention expressly was, that his creditors should not have the fund. The common equity in favour of creditors, where the fund is given to others, does not arise until the power is legally executed. The limits of the law on this head appear to be contained in the decided cases.

Although the appointee may *primâ facie* be entitled to the aid of the Court (a), yet to prevail he must have
a preferable

(2) *Holmes v. Coghill*, 12 Ves. 281, cited; and see *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 Atk. 568.

(a) See *Shadwell's case*, 1 Ves.

a preferable *equity* to the person against whom he seeks the relief. Therefore, where a father agreed to settle an estate on his wife and children, but neglected to do so, and afterwards prevailed upon his eldest son, who was ignorant of the agreement, to settle the estate in a different way, whereby the father had a power of jointuring, which upon his second marriage he agreed to execute, the agreement after his death was decreed to be specifically executed by the son, who was the remainder-man under the settlement; but this decree was reversed in the House of Lords (b) (I). The son was seised of the legal estate, and he had as good an equity to retain the estate discharged of the jointure, as the wife had to have the defect supplied.

So, although there is a meritorious consideration in the appointee, yet if the donee of the power, after a defective execution of it, *legally* execute it in favour of a *bonâ fide* purchaser or mortgagee without notice, the Court

(b) *Jevers v. Jevers*, Dom. Proc. 1734.

(I) The principle in the text is clear, and *Jevers and Jevers* is stated in Gro. and Rud. of Law and Equity, p. 19, as having been decided on the ground of the fraud in the father; but from the printed cases it appears that the settlement was made in consideration of the son waving the agreement entered into upon his mother's marriage, and the bond for settling the jointure had no reference whatever to the power, upon which perhaps the case turned. However, the author of the above book, who lived in the time when the decision was made, most likely knew the ground to which the decision was generally referred. The above case is in 4 Bro. P. C. 199, by the name of *Ivers v. Ivers*, which difference arose from the printed cases. In the appellant's case, the cause is intitled *Jevers v. Jevers*; in the respondent's *Ivers v. Ivers*.

Court cannot interfere; for by the last execution the purchaser obtains the legal estate; and as he has equal equity with the first appointee, he cannot be disturbed. But if, previously to paying his money, or to the execution of the power, he has notice, either express or implied, of the prior appointment, equity will compel him, on the ground of fraud, to convey the estate to the first appointee, so as to make good the defect in the appointment to him (c).

And where trustees with a power of sale enter into a contract for sale of the estate, which would be deemed a breach of trust, equity will not only refuse to interfere in favour of the purchaser, but will, even at the suit of the *cestuis que trust*, restrain the trustees from executing the contract, and the purchaser will be left to his remedy at law (d).

So where a man, with a power of leasing for twenty-one years at rack-rent, agreed to execute a lease for twenty-one years, and a further lease for twenty-one years at any time during his life, consequently to execute a lease for twenty-one years, whatever might be the increased value of the property at the time of the lease granted; there were other points in the cause, but Lord Redesdale considered this to be an agreement to act in fraud of the power, and held that the purchaser was not entitled to a specific performance even *pro tanto*. He thought that courts of equity should never enforce such contracts, whether with a view to the party himself

or

(c) As to what amounts to notice, see Treat. Purch. 6th edit. ch. 17.

10 Ves. jun. 292; and see Stratford v. Lord Aldborough, 1 Ridg. P. C. 281; Brian v. Acton, 5 Vin.

(d) See Mortlock v. Buller,

Abr. 533, pl. 33.

or to the person entitled in remainder. In the first place, it is unconscionable in the tenant for life to execute such a lease, because it brings an incumbrance on the estate of the remainder-man, and puts him to litigation to get rid of it; and as to the tenant for life, it is compelling him to do what is to be the foundation of a future action for damages if he die before the twenty-one years. The Court will never do this, but will leave the party at once to bring his action for damages. And he also conceived that this sort of contract, obtained by a person who knew at the time the nature of the title, is unconscionable in him, as he makes himself a party knowingly to that which is a fraud on the remainder-man, and, under such circumstances, he has no claim to the assistance of a court of equity (*e*).

It seems, however, open to contend, that if the lessee is willing to take such a lease as the party can grant without risk to himself or injury to the remainder-man, equity must specifically perform the agreement *pro tanto* (*f*). But where the party cannot grant the lease required so as to bind the inheritance, the Court will not decree a specific performance by directing an invalid lease to be executed, which might encumber and embarrass those entitled to estates in remainder (*g*).

Upon this subject of equitable relief a question has often arisen, whether a party be entitled to the relief who
is

(*e*) *Harnett v. Yielding*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 549.

(*f*) See *Treat. Purch.* 6th edit. 193—269.

(*g*) *Ellard v. Lord Llandaff*,

1 Ball and Beatty, 241; and see *O'Rourke v. Percival*, 2 Ball and Beatty, 58; which was treated as a case of fraud.

is already provided for ; but it is well settled, that of the *quantum* of provision the parent or husband is the best judge (*h*). It has, however, been long *verata questio* whether a surrender can be supplied against *an heir totally unprovided for* (*i*). In *Chapman and Gibson*, Lord Alvanley considered that the heir could not be relieved against. The principle, he said, must be this ; that the testator being under an obligation to do an act, we will compel the heir to perfect it ; but we will not compel him to fulfil one obligation at the expense of another ; and if the testator has totally forgot to make any provision for his eldest son, this shall be an answer to the claim of the wife or other children. In a late case (*k*), Lord Rosslyn considered it equally clear that the Court could not enter into the question, whether the heir was or was not provided for ; but it was not necessary to decide the point. Lord Alvanley, however, did not subscribe to Lord Rosslyn's doctrine, but still retained his opinion that an heir could not be compelled to supply the surrender where he could show that the consequence would be (he being a son wholly unprovided for) that he would be compelled to fulfil the intention of his father in discharge of a moral or natural obligation in favour of a widow, or of his brothers or sisters, when it was manifest that he had neglected to discharge the obligation he was under of providing for him his eldest son.

(<i>h</i>) <i>Kettle v. Townsend</i> , 1 Salk.	(<i>i</i>) <i>Kettle v. Townsend</i> , 1 Salk.
187 ; <i>Andrews v. Waller</i> , 6 Vin.	187 ; <i>Hawkins v. Leigh</i> , 1 Atk.
Ab. 237, pl. 12 ; <i>Tudor v. Anson</i> ,	387.
2 Ves. 582 ; <i>Smith v. Baker</i> ,	(<i>k</i>) <i>Hills v. Downton</i> , 5 Ves.
1 Atk. 385 ; <i>Chapman v. Gibson</i> ,	jun. 557.
3 Bro. C. C. 229.	

son (*l*). This question, therefore, is still very doubtful; nor is it easy to conjecture which way it will be decided. Those who advert to principle will probably agree with Lord Alvanley, whilst those who regard practical inconvenience will coincide with Lord Rosslyn; for certainly endless difficulties will be introduced if the Court is to inquire into the circumstances of the heir-at-law.

It is clear, however, that this question can never arise where the heirs are persons for whom the testator is under no natural or moral obligation to provide, as, where the heir is a nephew, or niece (*m*), or sister (*n*). But if the inquiry is to be made, it should seem that a grandchild will be within the principle, although a surrender, or a defect in the execution of a power, cannot be *supplied* in his favour (*o*). Lord Rosslyn has decided that daughters are provided for when married (*p*); nor is it necessary that the heir should be *disinherited*, for if he is provided for, it is immaterial from whom the provision moved (*q*).

Important, however, as this question is, and frequently as it will probably arise on copyholds, yet it is a point that can seldom occur in relation to powers. For questions as to aiding defective executions of powers generally

(*l*) See App. No. 16, the observations of Lord Alvanley on Hills and Downton, written with his own hand; see Fielding v. Winwood, 16 Ves. jun. 90; Rodgers v. Marshall, 17 Ves. jun. 294.

(*m*) *Chapman v. Gibson*, *ubi sup.* *Smith v. Baker*, 1 Atk. 385.

(*n*) *Fielding v. Winwood*, 16 Ves. jun. 90.

(*o*) See *Rodgers v. Marshall*, 17 Ves. jun. 294.

(*p*) *Hills v. Downton*, 5 Ves. jun. 557.

(*q*) *Hawkins v. Leigh*, 1 Atk. 387; *Chapman v. Gibson*, 3 Bro. C. C. 229; *Pike v. White*, *ib.* 286.

rally arise upon particular powers in settlements, where the estate subject to the power is either settled on the heirs of the person creating the power, or on strangers : if it be settled on the heirs, then they are provided for under the settlement ; and if it be settled on strangers, *they* cannot require a provision ; so that in either case the defect may be supplied, although it should be determined that the relief cannot be granted against an heir totally unprovided for. Indeed, in the case of *Carter v. Carter* (*r*), Sir Joseph Jekyll, addressing himself to this point, said, that where a younger child comes into equity to have the want of a surrender of a copyhold supplied, he must be wholly unprovided for, or have but a very slight provision ; though there had been great variety of opinions upon this point, and where all the children have been well provided for, the Court has supplied the want of a surrender against the heir, because the father was the best judge in what manner to provide for his children ; and he believed Lord Cowper was the first who refused it, because the younger child was greatly provided for, and the heir had little or nothing ; *but he had never known this distinction made, or that the Court would enter into the consideration of it, where the younger child has applied to have a defective execution of a power made good.* It is impossible, however, to administer a different equity in these cases. They stand on precisely the same ground. We have Lord Alvanley's authority for this (*s*). The same doctrine was laid down by Lord Chancellor King (*t*), and adopted by Lord Camden (*u*). In

(*r*) Mose. 365.

(*s*) *Chapman v. Gibson*, 3 Bro. C. C. 229.

(*t*) *Cotter v. Layer*, 2 P. Wms. 623, third point.

(*u*) *Godwin v. Kilsha*, Ambl. 684.

In *Mac Adam v. Logan* (x), a power was given to appoint a fund amongst *such* child or children of the marriage as the donee should choose, and in default of appointment the fund was given to all the children equally. The power was defectively executed, as the appointment was not sealed according to the power; and Lord Thurlow, it is said, seemed to think that the want of a seal could not be supplied between persons having equal equities, though it might against an heir-at-law or remainder-man; but being all *children*, it was like a naked power. The case, however, was decided upon another ground: and it should seem that Lord Thurlow's opinion cannot be supported, for surrenders of copyholds and executions of powers in this respect go hand in hand; and it is well established, that as to copyholds, the same equity shall be administered against a younger son as against an eldest (y). Therefore, if the children are entitled in the same way as heirs in gavel-kind, the defect will be supplied in favour of any of the children, in the same manner as in common cases it would be supplied against the heir-at-law (z). So if the case before Lord Thurlow had turned on that point, the defect ought to have been supplied on precisely the same principle; the mere circumstance of all the parties being children was not material, for those to whom the fund was not appointed were *quoad* this relief remainder-men; and therefore, unless they were totally unprovided for, *and Lord Alvanley's opinion were*

(x) 3 Bro. C. C. 310.

(z) *Bradley v. Bradley*, 2 Vern.(y) See 2 Vern. 165; and 163; *Andrews v. Waller*, 6 Vin. Drake v. Robinson, 1 P. Wms. Abr. p. 237, pl. 12.

were to prevail, they ought to have been decreed to make good the defect. Lord Chief Justice Holt may be thought to have been of the same opinion as Lord Thurlow. In *Mountague v. Bath* (a) he put this case: A man settles *all* his estate upon his younger son for life, with a power to revoke; and then, by defective execution, he gives all the estate to his eldest son; is this a good revocation in equity? And he answered, No; for the one is as nearly related to the father as the other; the considerations are equal; the one is as much the son as the other, and therefore there is no great difference between them; and the younger son, who hath the estate by law, shall enjoy it, though afterwards it return back to him that was the eldest. Now as Holt put this case, it embraced *all* the ancestor's estate; so that if the defect had been supplied, the younger son would have been totally unprovided for; and this must have been the ground of Holt's opinion; for if his opinion were to be adopted as a general rule, it is evident that the Court would never supply a surrender against an eldest son in favour of younger children: indeed, the same argument precisely was formerly urged against supplying a surrender to the prejudice of an eldest son; it was insisted, that he was as nearly related as his brother, and having the law on his side, equity ought not to interpose (b); but this doctrine never gained a footing. In a very recent case, the equity was established in favour of an eldest against younger children (c).

(a) 3 Cha. Ca. 55; and see 2 Ves. 75.

(b) See *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, 2 Freem. 257.

(c) *Hume v. Rundell*, 6 Madd. 331.

If under an *equitable* settlement, a power of charging money for his own use be given to tenant for life, and he covenant to discharge the estate from certain incumbrances on it, it seems that an execution of the power for valuable consideration, *before breach of the covenant*, would be enforced in equity, although it should be afterwards broken; but it is doubtful whether this would be done if the covenant was previously broken, as the person lending the money ought to have inquired whether the covenant was performed; and, clearly, a person not actually advancing money on the faith of the power, but obtaining an execution of it after breach of the covenant, to patch up a former security, will not be entitled to the aid of equity against the remainderman who takes the estate charged with the incumbrances, of which it ought to have been cleared (*d*).

II. Having considered for whom a defect will be supplied, we must now consider in what cases it will be made good *with reference to the instrument*, merely premising, that where there are several defective executions, equity will supply the defect in the last, in order to effectuate the intent of the parties (*e*). And it is only necessary that the intention to execute the power should appear clearly in writing; whether the donee of the power only covenant to execute it (*f*), or by his will desire

(*d*) *Bradbury v. Hunter*, 3 Ves. jun. 187. 260.

(*e*) *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 Atk. 561.

(*f*) *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, *ubi sup.*; *Lady Beaufoy's case*, 2 Vern. 465, cited; *Alford v.*

Alford, 2 P. Wms. 230, cited; *Coventry v. Coventry*, Francis's Max. last case, 2 P. Wms. 222; Gilb. Eq. Rep. 160; 1 Str. 596; 9 Mod. 12; *Sargeson v. Sealey*, 2 Atk. 412; and see 15 Ves. jun. 173.

desire the remainder-man to create the estate (*g*); or merely enter into a contract, not under seal, to execute his power (*h*); or by letters promise to grant an estate which he can only do by an exercise of his power (*i*), equity will supply the defect. So, if in a deed appointing part of the estate to one of the objects, the donee recite that another of the objects is entitled to a particular share of the fund, that will be held a good appointment in equity, as it demonstrates an intention to give that share accordingly (*k*). So an answer to a bill in Chancery, stating that "he does appoint, and intends by a writing in due form to appoint," the fund in a particular manner, was held to be binding, although the power was required to be executed by writing under hand and seal attested by two witnesses (*l*). The Court considered the words *do appoint* as a present defective appointment, and that the words *intend to appoint* did not derogate from that actual appointment, or show that it would not avail, but only that he would afterwards execute it in the precise form. And where a man made a settlement of an estate to uses in strict settlement, and reserved a power by deed or will, executed in the presence of two witnesses, to appoint any of the lands for raising portions for his younger children, to be paid as he should by such deed or will appoint, and by the

(*g*) *Vernon v. Vernon*, Ambl. 1.

(*h*) *Shannon v. Bradstreet*, 1 Rep. Temp. Redesdale, 52; and see *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. jun. 292; and see *Coventry v. Coventry*, Max. Eq. per Sir Joseph Jekyll; *Blore v. Sutton*, 3 Mer. 237.

(*i*) See and consider *Campbell v. Leach*. Ambl. 740, App. No. 17.

(*k*) *Wilson v. Piggot*, 2 Ves. jun. 351.

(*l*) *Carter v. Carter*, Mose. 365; and see *Fortesque v. Gregor*, 5 Ves. jun. 558.

settlement *covenanted to do so accordingly*, this covenant was held to be an equitable execution of the power, although he died without doing any further act (*m*). This case evinces that the branch of equity on which it depended is not confined within very narrow bounds. And whatever solemnities are required to the execution of the power, yet a sale of the funds, and payment of the produce to the object of the power, at the request of the donee, is in equity tantamount to a valid legal appointment (*n*).

But to enable equity to relieve, there must, as in the case of a regular execution (*o*), be a sufficient reference to the fund to show the party's intention to execute the power, or the party must be in possession of no other fund upon which the covenant can operate (*p*).

If, however, a person having a power executes an instrument for valuable consideration, he is understood *in equity* to engage with the person with whom he is dealing to make the instrument as effectual as he has power to make it, and it shall have that effect, so far as the person executing it has power to give it effect; and
where

(*m*) Doctor Sarth v. Lady Blanford, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 166, cited.

(*n*) Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. jun. 357.

(*o*) *Vide supra*, ch. 5, sect. 5.

(*p*) Jackson v. Jackson, 4 Bro. C. C. 462; Hele v. Hele, or Elliot v. Hele, 2 Cha. Ca. 28, 29, 87; 1 Vern. 406 (I).

(I) In the report of this case in Vernon, the Chancellor takes up the objection as if the power was general, but this certainly could not have been an objection. It seems that it was the *covenant* which was general, and the covenantor had other lands besides those comprised in the power. Mr. Powell has noticed this inaccuracy, Pow. 183—187.

where the nature of the instrument is contrary to what the power prescribes, but that it demonstrates an intent to charge, it shall have the operation of charging in that form which the power allows (*q*).

Powers of jointuring, to be exercised when in possession, are frequently agreed to be executed by *remaindermen*, whose right of possession has not accrued, and equity will make good the appointment, if the party afterwards do actually come into possession (*r*).

In *Coventry v. Coventry* (*s*), where a devisee, with a power of jointuring to the extent of 500 *l.* a year, upon a treaty for marriage, by articles in consideration of a marriage portion, covenanted that he or his heirs would after the marriage, according to his power, *or otherwise*, convey and appoint estates of 500 *l.* per annum upon his wife for her jointure. A part of the estate was afterwards selected, and the appointment prepared and ingrossed, but never executed. And Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, the Master of the Rolls, Baron Price, and Baron Gilbert, held that the articles operated as a lien upon the estates selected, in the hands of the remainder-man, and that the defect ought to be supplied. They considered the words “*or otherwise*” as auxiliary to the real lien, viz. that if his power should happen to be insufficient to settle 500 *l.* a year, that then it should be done by some other means. It was true he had election to raise the jointure out of

(*q*) Per Lord Redesdale, 2 Ball and Beatty, 44.

(*r*) *Jackson v. Jackson*, *ubi sup.*; and see *Alford v. Alford*, 2 P. Wms. 230, where Francis

survived Thomas; see 4 Bro. C. C. 466; and see 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 63.

(*s*) *Coventry v. Coventry*, 2 P. Wms. 222, *et ubi sup.*

his own assets, or out of his power: but it seemed plain that he intended to raise it out of his power, and the deed prepared was sufficient to show that intention.

The same relief is afforded in cases where the power is actually executed, but lands to the value agreed to be settled by the articles are not comprised in the power. The wife will be relieved against the remainder-man to the extent of the deficiency (*t*), for articles are executory, and there is no difference between articles unexecuted *in toto*, or in part only; nor is it material in these cases that the appointee has taken a collateral covenant from the donee of the power that the lands are of the stated value (*u*).

If the husband is to become entitled to the wife's fortune in consideration of the jointure, and the wife cannot obtain the jointure, she will be entitled to retain her property against her husband (*x*): while the obligations of the husband remain unperformed, neither he, nor any person claiming under him, will be permitted to receive any part of the wife's fortune upon any other condition than that of making good the settlement (*y*).

Where the contract to execute the power is merely by parol, it seems that it will not bind the remainder-man, *although it is in part performed* by the intended appointee; as, where a lease is agreed to be granted by
parol

(*t*) *Marchioness of Blandford v. Duchess of Marlborough*, 2 Atk. 542.

(*u*) *Lady Clifford v. Earl of Burlington*, 2 Vern. 379. This case was not entirely approved of by the Master of the Rolls in *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, 2 P. Wms. 668,

but is confirmed by Lord Hardwicke's opinion in the *Marchioness of Blandford's* case.

(*x*) *Holt v. Holt*, 2 P. Wms. 648.

(*y*) *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. jun. 87.

parol under a power, and the lessee expend money in improvements during the life of the person who agreed to grant the lease (*z*). It is, Sir W. Grant observed, considered as a fraud in a party permitting an expenditure on the faith of his parol agreement to attempt to take advantage of its not being in writing. But of what fraud, he asked, is a remainder-man guilty, who has entered into no agreement, written or parol, and has done no act on the faith of which the other party could have relied? But if after his death the remainder-man, with full knowledge of the defect, lie by, and suffer the lessee to improve the estate by rebuilding or otherwise, equity will, on the ground of fraud, compel him to grant a new lease to the lessee (*a*). In 1781, Lord Kenyon gave an opinion, that a lease by *parol* from year to year, by tenant for life with a power, was, since the case of *Leach v. Campbell*, binding in equity on the remainder-man; and that consequently the executors of the tenant for life, who died in the middle of a half-year, were not entitled to an apportionment, but the rent would go to the remainder-man (*b*); he added, that he believed this point had been determined, and that some time ago he concurred with Mr. Dunning and Mr. Maddocks in an opinion to the effect of that he had then given. In a late case the very point arose, but it was not necessary to decide it (*c*). The opinion

(*z*) *Shannon v. Bradstreet*, *ubi sup.*; *Blore v. Sutton*, 3 Mer. 237.

(*a*) *Stiles v. Cowper*, 3 Atk. 692; *Blore v. Sutton*, *ubi sup.*; *vide infra*, sect. 2.

(*b*) This opinion is now printed, 1 Swanst. 351, n.

(*c*) *Billing v. Earl of Macclesfield*, Rolls, 5 Feb. 1807, MS.

of the Court, however, appeared to be, that the remainder-man was not bound by the lease, and therefore was not entitled to the rent. And it seems clear that the case will be so decided should it ever call for a decision. A mere tenant from year to year does not seem to come within the class of persons entitled to the aid of equity (*d*), although certainly in *Campbell v. Leach*, Lord Chief Justice De Grey said that such a tenant might be deemed a purchaser.

Since these observations were written, it has been decided that the lease is not binding on the remainder-man, and therefore the rent is apportionable (*e*).

And here it must be observed, that as a contract to execute a power will bind the remainder-man, so where it can be executed in his favour, as in the case of an agreement to grant a lease, or sell an estate, the Court will compel the execution of it on his behalf (*f*), although this seems formerly to have been doubted (*g*).

In

(*d*) *Vide post*, div. 111.

Sch. and Lef. 52; *Lowe v. Swift*,

(*e*) *Ex-parte Smyth*, 1 Swanst.

2 Ball and Beat. 529.

337, S. C. MS. *Clarkson v. Lord*

(*g*) *Stamford v. Omly*, 1 Rep.

Scarborough, 1 Swanst. 354, n.

T. Redesdale, 65, cited; and

Symons v. Symons, 6 Madd. 207.

Campbell v. Leach, Ambl. 749 (I).

(*f*) *Shannon v. Bradstreet*, 1

(I) In this case Lord C. J. De Grey, after holding that the *lessee* might enforce the contract against the remainder-man, is made to say, "And I do not know that the remainder-man could on his part enforce the contract of such tenant for life. I had at first some doubt of this point, but own myself satisfied by what was said in answer." In a late case Lord Redesdale said, that he suspected these additional words were not uttered by the Lord Chief Justice;

"

Shannon

In some cases this equity may be very beneficial to the remainder-man. Suppose a power to make a jointure not exceeding 1,000*l.* per annum, with a proviso, that if there were no execution of the power, and if the tenant for life should die leaving a widow, that she should have 500*l.* per annum ; and suppose a contract made upon the marriage of the tenant for life to charge 400*l.* for her under the power, which would be a less provision than she would have if the power had not been executed : Lord Redesdale, who put this case, conceived that the widow could not say she was not bound (*h*).

In none of the cases we have yet examined was the power attempted to be legally executed by a formal instrument, in the manner required by the power. The same relief, however, is granted, where an attempt is made to execute the power, but there is a defect in the mode of execution ; as, where the power ought to be executed by deed, but is executed by will (*i*), or the instrument

(*h*) 1 Sch. and Lef. 63, 64. Sneed, Ambl. 64, Cowp. 264,

(*i*) Tollet v. Tollet, 2 P. Wms. 265, cited (I).

489 ; Mose. 46, S. C. Sneed v.

Shannon and Bradstreet, *ubi sup.* It is evident, however, that they were ; and it seems clear that his opinion was exactly contrary to what it is stated to have been. It is manifest, from the frame of the sentence, that he said he did not know that the remainder-man could *not* enforce the contract. This will appear clearly on a perusal of the whole sentence in the report. The omission of the word *not* was probably an error of the press.

(I) This case stands thus in the Register's book : Power to husband and wife, or the survivor, by any *deed or deeds* duly executed to charge upon the lands any sums not exceeding 3,000*l.* The husband who survived, by his *will* declared that the 3,000*l.* charged upon

strument is required to be attested by three witnesses, whereas it is only attested by two (*k*), or the will ought to be under seal, but consists merely of notes in writing, which are found to be the will of the party (*l*); and although the subject of the power be real estate, yet this relief is afforded as well where the defective instrument is a will, as where it is an act *inter vivos* (*m*). It has, indeed, been lately contended that equity cannot relieve against a defective execution where it ought to be executed by will. It is amongst other arguments insisted, that if a power over real estate is to be exercised by will, inasmuch as there can be no will at all of such property unless it be perfected in the manner prescribed by the Statute of Frauds, if a will be made without being so perfected, it is as if the power were attempted to be executed by a *totally different instrument* from that to which it was expressly made subject (*n*). No authority is

(*k*) *Parker v. Parker*, Gilb. Eq. 273, 3 Keb. 551, 1 Cha. Ca. 263, Rep. 168; *Cotter v. Layer*, 2 P. Wms. 623; *Mose*. 227; *Sargeson*

v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 412; *Godwin v. Fisher*, 1 Bro. C. C. 367, cited, must be the same case as *Godwin v. Kilsha*, Ambl. 684, Reg. Lib. A. 1768, fol. 495; *Wade v. Paget*, 1 Bro. C. C. 363.

(*m*) *Wilkes v. Holmes*, 9 Mod. 485; 1 Rep. Temp. Redesdale, 60, n.; *Dick*. 105; and see 2 P. Wms. 228, *arguendo*.

(*n*) Rob. on Stat. of Frauds, 330.

(*l*) *Smith v. Ashton*, Finch,

upon the estate should be disposed of for his younger childrens' fortunes. They had portions out of other estates. The Lord Chancellor declared that the power was defectively executed by the testator's will, but that such defect ought to be made good in a Court of Equity; and that the said 3,000*l.* was well charged by the testator's will for the benefit of the said younger children. Reg. Lib. 1747, fol. 442, *Sneyd v. Trevor*.

is cited for this position, and perhaps the only one in the books is a *dictum* by Gilbert in Lady Coventry's case (*o*), who lays down the same rule in his *Lex Prætoria* (*p*). He says, that if the power be to be executed by a will in writing, there it must have the circumstances required by the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries to a will in writing that passes lands, because otherwise it is no will, and therefore cannot charge the lands as a will, since such wills are made void by the statute; and therefore the court of equity cannot break in upon those solemnities. But the authorities to which he refers do not bear him out, and the principal point was solemnly determined in the year 1752 by Lord Hardwicke, in the case of Wilkes and Holmes (*q*), where the power rode over real estate, and was expressly required to be executed by will duly executed. Lord Hardwicke, after time taken to consider, held that the defect might be supplied. He said, that where a will is to operate by way of appointment it takes no effect from the statute, though the rules prescribed by the statute might, as in the case before him, be arbitrarily inserted by the party; and that the appointee cannot claim under the will, but by the deed of settlement directing the execution of the power; which deed, together with the instrument executing the power, make in effect but one in raising the charge upon the land; but that in point of law the charge is created by the deed directing the execution of the power. The Statute of Frauds, he repeated, was entirely out of the question, except so far as it is the rule which the donee is directed to follow in the execution

(*o*) Fra. Max. p. 5.

(*p*) P. 301.

(*q*) Wilkes v. Holmes, 9 Mod.

485; 1 Dick. 165.

cution of the power. Lord Redesdale lately observed, that this case has been acted on ever since (*r*).

Nor is this equitable relief confined simply to defects in the instrument executing the power, for equity will in some cases relieve where a different kind of estate or interest is given than what is authorized by the power. But these cases must be considered in another place.

And equity will not only relieve against a defective execution of a power, but will, on the general rule, rectify a settlement itself where a mistake has been made in it, so as to render a power inoperative, or partly to defeat the intent of it, and parol evidence will be admitted to prove how the mistake arose (*s*).

The student will not fail to have observed, that in none of the cases stated was the intention of the person *creating* the power defeated. If the power be given to be executed by deed, to him it is immaterial whether it be executed by deed or will ; if three witnesses be required, to him it is unimportant whether it be executed in the presence of three or two, so *that the interest created is authorized by the power*, for equity will not relieve against the defect if the donee has been surprised into the act. But equity cannot uphold an act which would defeat the intention of the person creating the power. Thus in *Reid v. Shergold*, a devisee having a life-estate in a copyhold, with a power of appointment by *will*, sold and surrendered the estate to a purchaser, and

(*r*) 1 Sch. and Lef. 60.

(*s*) *Rogers v. Earl*, Treat. Purch. 155, 8th edit. stated from Reg. Lib.; and see *Prince and Green*, 3 Cha. Ca. 1, cited;

Countess of Oxford v. Lady Bruce, 1 Freem. 308, cited; *Scambler's case*, Toth. 166; and see *Wilmer v. Kendrick*, 1 Cha. Ca. 159.

and after her death the question was, whether the purchaser could be relieved against the defect. Lord Eldon determined that he could not. His Lordship said, "that the testator did not mean that she should so execute her power. He intended that she should give by will, or not at all ; and it was impossible to hold that the execution of an instrument or deed, which, if it availed to any purpose, must avail to the destruction of that power the testator meant to remain capable of execution to the moment of her death, could be considered in equity an attempt in or towards the execution of the power (*t*)."

The distinction between this case and the case of a power executed by will, though required to be executed by deed, is marked and obvious.

III. Here we must stop to inquire whether equity will in every case where there is a meritorious consideration, supply the defect, whatever be the *nature* of the power. It is well settled, that defects shall be supplied where the power is to jointure, to raise portions, to sell an estate, to revoke uses, or to appoint the estate itself generally ; and indeed the only doubt is, how far a defective execution of a power of leasing can be aided.

Thus far is clear, that in the construction of powers *originally* in their nature *legal*, courts of equity must follow the law, be the consideration ever so meritorious ; for instance, powers to a tenant in tail to make leases under the statute, if not executed in the requisite form,

no

(*t*) Reid v. Shergold, 10 Ves. jun. 370 ; see Stratford v. Lord Aldborough, 1 Ridg. P. C. 281.

no consideration ever so meritorious will avail. So with respect to powers under the civil list act, powers under particular family entails, as the case of the Duke of Bolton, &c. equity can no more relieve from defects in them than it can from defects in a common recovery (*u*).

The material question, however, to be considered, is, whether equity can relieve against a defective execution of the usual power of leasing in settlements. An opinion has very generally prevailed in the Profession, that, as Mr. Powell expresses it (*x*), "the lessee under the power must stand or fall by that title *only*, and if that will not bear him through, as *effectually* made under a complete and perfect execution of the power, the right of the remainder-man to possess the estate free from the lease will take place of the right of the lessee, as superior to it. For in this case the lessee has no claim to any equitable interposition in his favour, but must rest his title on the legal execution of the power." And this opinion seems, at first view, to derive some support from the case of *Temple v. Baltinglass* (*y*), where a bill filed to supply a defective execution of a power to make leases which had been held void at law, was dismissed with costs: but there appears to have been great lachess on the part of the tenant, and *some of the estates leased were not authorized to be leased by the power*. So in *Doe v. Sandham* (*z*), a lease under a power was set aside at law, because the power required

(*u*) Per Lord Mansfield, Cowp. 267; and see accordingly Anon. 2 Freem. 224.

(*x*) Pow. Powers, p. 389.

(*y*) Finch, 275; and see Pigot's case, Cary, p. 29.

(*z*) Doe v. Sandham, 1 Term Rep. 705.

quired the leases to contain *usual and reasonable* covenants, and a covenant was contained in the lease which the jury found to be an *unusual and unheard-of covenant* on the part of the lessor. The lessee filed his bill in the Court of Exchequer against the remainder-man, who had recovered at law, to have the unusual covenant struck out of the lease. But the bill was dismissed (*a*). It is now reported (*b*), and the following judgment was given by the Lord Chief Baron, which is not a satisfactory one. "This is a bill to reform a lease and bring it within the power, the lessor being no longer alive, nor any person capable of exercising the power, and the relief is asked against the reversioner. The power is to lease for not more than twenty-one years, inserting usual covenants; the lease made is with a covenant, 'that in case of fire the lessor shall rebuild, or the lessee may quit.' The question is, whether this is a usual and reasonable covenant? An ejectment has been brought, and the lessee is evicted on the ground that this is a covenant not usual and reasonable (*c*). Were the question open, it might be said, that if reasonable, though not usual, yet equity will support such a covenant; but we have no such jurisdiction, the question being precluded by the judgment at law; and there is no equity to interpose against the reversioner. One case has been decided, viz. *Campbell v. Leach* (*d*), where the term was mistaken and made longer than the power. I submit to the authority, but
I cannot

(*a*) *Sandham v. Medwin*, Excheq. 2 March 1789, MS.; in the Register's Calendar it stands, Hilary Term, 1789-90.

(*b*) 3 Swanst. 685.

(*c*) 1 T. R. 705.

(*d*) Ambl. 749.

I cannot extend the principle of the case, not agreeing to it or understanding it ; though if the principle was clear, the consequences should certainly be pursued ; and I understand the propriety of equitable relief in case of wives, children and creditors, in many instances. But this is not such a case ; this is the case of a purchaser with notice of the power under which the lease was granted against another purchaser, viz. the reversioner ; this is not like a case of forfeiture. If we are to interpose to expunge the objectionable covenant, (being in truth a part of the very contract originally made), there is no instance to be put in which we ought not to reform the wrong execution of a power. Perhaps there may be a right to compel a grantor to amend his own act, but not to prevent a reversioner from taking advantage of his legal title. Perryn, B. said *Campbell v. Leach* was to relieve lessees who had laid out great sums on the demised mines, and the Court there proceeded on prior authorities.”

On the other hand, in a case in 1698, the Master of the Rolls took this distinction, that where a lease is made purely voluntary, and no provision for a child, there, if the lease be not good at law, it shall never be made good in equity. But if a lease be made to a tenant at rack-rent without a fine, which is voluntary, yet if the tenant hath been at any considerable expense in building or improving, there the Court will supply the defective execution, but otherwise not (*e*). Now from this it is clear, that the Master of the Rolls was of opinion, that where the lessee was in *the nature of a purchaser*, he should be helped against a defective execution

(*e*) Anon. 2 Freem. 224.

execution of a power. There appears to be no ground for aiding a defect in favour of a mere tenant at rack-rent, although holding under a lease, much less can the relief be afforded to a tenant from year to year holding under a parol or even a written contract. The part performance of the agreement by taking possession, &c. is not material, because even if an actual lease had been granted, a defect in it could not have been supplied. The lessee paying the full value for the estate, and that only during his occupation of it, cannot be put on the footing of a purchaser, who would sustain an actual loss if equity were not to interpose its aid. But where the lessee has expended money on the estate, he becomes a purchaser of the interest granted to him, and may well be held entitled to the aid of equity (*f*).

In the great case of *Campbell v. Leach* (*g*), the facts of which it is not easy to collect from the report, under a power to lease in possession, a new lease was granted to a person during the continuance of a former lease to him and another. The former lease was abandoned, but not surrendered: it was agreed that the new lease was bad at law, and it was doubtful whether the best rent was reserved: the bill was filed to supply the defect against the remainder-man, by the lessee, who had been at great expense. The cause was heard before Lord Bathurst, assisted by Lord Chief Baron Smythe and Lord Chief Justice De Grey. The Lord Chief Baron said, the question arose upon the execution of a power, where courts of equity often interfere in behalf of creditors, purchasers, wife and children:

(*f*) *Vide supra*, p. 374, 375, the material facts stated from 376. Lib. Reg.

(*g*) *Ambl.* 740; *App.* No. 17.

the present was the case of a purchaser: the consideration moving from him was the money he had laid out. The objection was, that it was a lease in *reversion*, as there was a subsisting lease of the premises for some years then to come; but if such former lease was in fact given up at the time of this lease, as was alleged, it would, he said, be an answer; so that if the lease was fair in its execution as to the *quantum* of the rent reserved, he thought a court of equity ought to carry it into execution. Lord Chief Justice De Grey was of the same opinion. He said, that the power was of a mixed nature, not like a power of jointuring, or power for raising money. But this was for the benefit of the tenant for life and the remainder-man. *If executing the power was for the benefit of the remainder-man, it should receive a liberal construction; but if tenant for life invades the interest of the remainder-man in order to benefit his own only, it should have another construction.* Lord Bathurst being of the same opinion, reversed a decree at the Rolls against the lessee, and directed an issue to try whether the rent reserved was the best that could be gotten.

Now it is from this case that the rule may be extracted, and it seems to be this: that where there is no fraud on the remainder-man, as where the former lease is abandoned, although not actually surrendered, or there is merely a defect in the mode of the execution of the power; for example, only one witness where two were required, or a seal be wanting, or the like; in all these cases it should seem that if the lessee is in the nature of a purchaser, equity will relieve against the defective execution of a power; but

but where the best rent is not reserved, or a fine is paid contrary to the terms of the power, or the lease substantially commences *in futuro*, or the interest of the remainder-man is, in other respects, invaded, as in the cases of *Temple v. Baltinglass*, and *Sandham v. Medwin*, before cited, there it seems clear that equity cannot relieve (*h*); nor in these cases can any line be well drawn as to the *quantum* of excess, or defect in the execution of the power. Therefore a lease to commence the day after the date of the deed would be equally bad with a lease to commence at fifty years from the date (I).

The principle, that equity may aid a defective execution of a power to lease, derives great support from a case before Lord Chancellor Redesdale: a tenant for life, with a power of leasing, entered into a contract to grant a lease, and then died; and Lord Redesdale enforced the performance of the contract against the remainder-man. His Lordship very properly considered it as the case of a defective execution of a power, and he was of opinion that the power ought at least to be construed as liberally as a power of jointuring. He said that it was objected that a leasing power differs from all these cases of powers, and the difference is said to consist in this, that in the other cases the remainder-man has no interest in the mode in which the power is executed; that he claims nothing under it; but that under the leasing power he claims

(*h*) See *Stratford v. Lord Aldborough*, 1 Ridgw. P. C. 281.

(I) As to *excess* in the execution of powers of leasing, *vide infra*, ch. 9, sect. 8.

the rent reserved. Now on what ground can it be contended that that which is a mere charge upon a remainder-man is to receive a more liberal construction than what is not a mere charge upon him, but may be much for his benefit? In the case of powers to make leases at the best rent that can be obtained, it is evident that the author of the power looks to the benefit of the estate; and that the power is given for the benefit both of the tenant for life, and of all persons claiming after him; for where the tenant for life can give no permanent interest, and his tenant is liable every day to be turned out of possession by the accident of his death, it is hard to procure substantial tenants; and therefore it is beneficial to all parties that the tenant for life should have a power to grant such leases. It is evident that the occupying tenant can afford to give a better rent under such circumstances than if he were only to have a precarious tenure. This, therefore, is a power which is calculated for the benefit of the *estate*. Other powers, generally speaking, such as jointuring powers, and powers to make provisions for younger children, are calculated for the benefit of the *family*; they may be indirectly beneficial to the remainder-man, in some respects, but they are no direct benefit to him; nor can I conceive why these powers should be construed more liberally than powers to make leases, except where it is evident that such power is abused (i).

So in a case before Lord Kenyon, he said that a lease not being attested conformably to the power could not be supported in a court of law; yet even then, if
granted

(i) *Shannon v. Bradstreet*, 1 Sch. and Lef. 52.

granted for a valuable consideration, and merely defective in point of form, a court of equity would interfere, and direct a proper lease to be granted (*k*).

(*k*) *Doe v. Weller*, 7 Term Rep. 478; and see *Willes*, 176, 13 Ves. jun. 576.

SECTION II.

OF EQUITABLE RELIEF WHERE THERE IS NO MERITORIOUS CONSIDERATION IN THE APPOINTEE.

WE have hitherto confined ourselves to the consideration of the cases where there is a meritorious consideration in the appointee, but in some instances equity will relieve the appointee against the defective execution, although he is a mere stranger. This is generally on the ground of fraud. Thus, where the person interested in the non-execution of the power has the deed creating the power in his custody, and the donee of the power wishing to execute it sends for the deed, which the party refuses to deliver, and thereupon the donee does an act with an intent to execute the power, equity will uphold the execution, although defective, by reason of the fraud in the person who was to have the benefit of the original settlement(*a*). So equity would extend the same relief to a case where a wife having a power of revocation over an estate vested in her husband is desirous to exercise it, but the husband hinders any body from coming to her, or prevents the

(*a*) See 3 Cha. Ca. 67, 83, 84, 3 Cha. Ca. 69, cited; and see 89, 93, 108, 122; *Ward v. Booth*, Fort. 333.

On the ground of fraud also it has been decided, that although a power be defectively executed, and the Court cannot relieve the appointee, yet if the remainder-man, with notice of the defect, has lain by a considerable time, and suffered the appointee to expend money on the estate, and acquiesced in his title, equity will compel him to make good the defect (c).

But fraud being a thing odious, and never to be intended or presumed, must be strictly proved (*d*). Therefore in a case where a wife having a power of revocation over an estate vested in her husband, sent instructions to a solicitor to prepare a deed of revocation, and the solicitor, who was a friend of the husband's, communicated the instructions to him, although he was desired to keep them secret, and delayed perfecting the deed so long that the wife died before it was executed, the Court censured the solicitor for his conduct, but denied relief to the intended appointee, because no fraud was proved in the husband himself (*e*). Under this head of fraud we may rank surprise ; for to enable equity to relieve, the surprise must be such as is attended and accompanied with fraud and circumvention (*f*).

So it is said that a court of equity may relieve in the cases of accident or disability. Thus, in the Earl of Bath's

(b) **Piggot v. Penrice, Com.**
250. **Prec. Cha. 471.**

(c) *Stiles v. Cowper*, 3 Atk. 602; *Shannon v. Bradstreet*, 1 Rep. Temp. Redesdale, 52; and see *Anon. Bunb.* 53; *Strat.*

ford v. Lord Aldborough, 1
Ridgw. P. C. 281.

(d) 3 Cha. Ca. 85. 114.

(c) **Piggot v. Penrice, . Com.**
250. **Prec. Cha. 471.**

(f) 3 Cha. Ca. 114, 115.

Bath's case (*g*), where to the execution of the power six witnesses were required, and three of them were to be peers, the Duke of Albemarle, the donee of the power, afterwards went over to Jamaica, and it was said by Mr. Baron Powell, that in case the Duke had taken the deed over with him to Jamaica, and there had had an intention to revoke it, and had gone as far as he could to do it, had made his will, and had six witnesses to it, he believed it would be a good revocation in equity, though none of the witnesses were peers, because of the *disability* he would be under to have such witnesses (*h*). Lord Chief Justice Treby, and the Lord Keeper, appear to have entertained the same sentiments (*i*); and in a modern case, Lord Mansfield expressed himself of the same opinion (*k*). Lord Chief Justice Treby, in the Earl of Bath's case, said that the accident or impossibility of complying with the circumstances was another ground of relief in equity, when the donee hath a plain intention to do it; but then he must do all that he can, as the case of a man's being obliged to pay or tender money at such a place, and he falls sick, or lame, or bed-ridden, that he cannot go thither, and it is tendered by another by his order, or at another place, this being an act of God, he thought it would be a good performance of the condition (*l*). And Lord Chief Justice Holt considered *accident* a good ground of relief (*m*), as where the party was prevented by sickness.

Upon none of these points has there been any decision; but there is a case in which a deed executed under

(*g*) 3 Cha. Ca. 68.

(*h*) Ibid.

(*i*) Ibid. 90. 126.

(*k*) Cowp. 267; and see *Piggot v. Penrice*, Com. 256.

(*l*) 3 Cha. Ca. 89.

(*m*) Ibid. 108, 109.

a power was held to be badly executed for want of a signature (which was required by the power), *although the donee could not write by reason of the gout in his hand* (n). And notwithstanding the authority of the great personages by whom the foregoing *dicta* were pronounced, it may be doubted whether equity ought to relieve on the mere ground of accident or disability. How can it be ascertained that in the cases supposed the parties had not the sickness of the donee of the power, or his absence abroad, in their contemplation? These are circumstances of ordinary occurrence: from sickness few are exempt; and it might have been intended, that during the party's absence from his friends, or whilst his mind was enfeebled by illness, the power should not be executed.

II. The doctrine of election furnishes another principle in favour of the defective execution of a power, although there is no meritorious consideration in the appointee. The foundation of election is that no one shall claim under and in opposition to the same instrument. When a man claims under a deed, he must claim under the whole deed together; he cannot take one clause, and desire the Court to shut their eyes against the rest. There is a tacit condition annexed to all provisions of this nature, that the person taking do not disturb the disposition which his benefactor has made (o); and therefore the true rule following up the principle, should be forfeiture to the disappointed devisee, and not merely compensation. In many cases compensation could

(n) See *Blockville v. Ascott*,
2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 659, n. (b).

(o) *Streatfield v. Streatfield*,
For. 176.

could not be made, as in the instance of a field belonging to the adverse claimant given to a devisee, because it is in front of his house ; could compensation in that case be made with reference to the power in the owner of the land to render the house not fit for habitation? If compensation be the rule, there are but few cases in which the testator's intention will be effected. If the value of the property given to the party who is put to his election be less than the value of his property given to a third person, or only equal to it, the party would in ordinary cases elect to take against the will. If the property even be greater, the party having a right to elect would of course, in every case where he was desirous to retain his own property, or to disappoint the intention of the testator, or the hopes of his devisee, elect to take against the will, and pay a compensation to the disappointed devisee out of the testator's own property, which he (the party electing) takes under the will. This clearly is not effectuating the testator's intention, for he did not intend that the disappointed devisee should have the value of the subject of the gift paid to him ; his meaning was to vest in the party the property devised to him ; and to secure the acquiescence of the person really entitled to such property, he makes another provision for him. If forfeiture in favour of the disappointed devisee be the rule, the testator's intention will in most cases be fulfilled ; and if the intention be not effectuated, at least the testator will not have made a provision contrary to his intention for a party who elects to disappoint his will ; and the disappointed devisee will take that provision which the testator thought would

would be a sufficient inducement to the party electing to acquiesce in the dispositions made by the will (*p*).

The doctrine applies even to interests of persons under disabilities, as infants and married women ; nor is it material whether the interests are immediate, remote, contingent, of value, or not of value (*q*) ; and the rule applies as well to copyhold as to freehold estates (*r*), and to deeds as well as to wills (*s*). But we must be careful to distinguish cases of express conditions, which clearly are not cases of election.

It is well established, that an heir shall be put to his election where the estate is devised to him, although by the rule of law the devise is inoperative, and he takes by descent ; as, if a man being seised of some lands in tail, and also of others in fee, devise the intailed lands to his youngest son, and the fee-simple estate to his eldest, who is issue in tail ; the devise to the eldest is void, and he takes by descent, yet nevertheless he shall be put to his election (*t*). So where he and other co-devisees elect to take against the will, the whole goes to the disappointed devisees (*u*). In the discussion of *Thellusson v. Woodford*,

(*p*) But see, *n.* to 1 Swanst. 433 ; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 656. 1 Jac. 317. 2 Mer. 86 ; *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. 359 ; 1 Jac. 505.

(*q*) 2 Ves. jun. 560. 696, 697 ; 3 Ves. jun. 385 ; *Ardesoife v. Bennet*, 2 Dick. 463. (*t*) *Noys v. Mordaunt*, 2 Vern. 581 ; *Anon. Gilb. Eq. Rep.* 15 ; *Welby v. Welby*, 2 Ves. and Bea. 187 ; see *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. jun. 369 ; and see *White v. White*, 2 Dick. 522 ; *Reg. Lib. B.* 1775, fol. 650-655.

(*r*) *Rumbold v. Rumbold*, *Wilson v. Mount*, 3 Ves. jun. 65. 191 ; *Pettiward v. Prescott*, 7 Ves. jun. 541. (*u*) *Gretton v. Haward*, 1 Swanst. 409.

(*s*) *Moore v. Butler*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 249 ; *Green v. Green*,

v. Woodford, Sir Samuel Romilly put it as a doubtful point, whether the heir must elect where a legacy is given to him, and an estate to a stranger, and after the will a recovery is suffered by the testator, whereby the will is revoked, and the estate descends to the heir, and he thought that the heir could not be put to his election; but Alexander, who was on the other side, thought it was a case of election, as was, he said, every case in which you can look at the will. The point, however, seems very doubtful, for notwithstanding that the testator intended the estate to go to the devisee, yet *the will being revoked as to the devise*, although by construction of law, there seems to be no equity attaching on the conscience of the heir. Independently of the question of election, equity could not relieve the devisee against the revocation of the will.

Even where a devisee, by the effect of an election by another devisee to take against the will, himself takes an interest not intended for him by the testator, but which in part makes good the provision for him, he may still insist, against the party electing, to a satisfaction for the disappointment, *pro tanto*, of the devise contained in the will (*x*).

Where interests are given to a person, and to his children after him, the claim of the parent in opposition to the will will not bind the children, who may elect for themselves (*y*). In one case it seems to have been thought that an election could not be raised upon an estate settled with several limitations, on account of the confusion

(*x*) *Gretton v. Haward*, 1 jun. 623; see *Long v. Long*, Swanst. 409. 5 Ves. jun. 445.

(*y*) *Ward v. Baugh*, 4 Ves.

confusion which would ensue: the devise would sometimes be good, at other times not, as the devisee in remainder submitted to the will or not (*z*), but this objection is not now attended to.

At one period it was holden, that where a person *A* supposes he has lawful power to dispose of an interest, and this appears on the face of the will, it is not a case of election, as it could not be proved that he meant to dispose of the estate if he had known he had no power to dispose of it (*a*). This construction has, however, been very properly over-ruled (*b*), upon the ground of the danger of speculating upon what the testator would have done had he known the fact.

It follows, from these principles, that where a man having a power to appoint to *A* a fund, which in default of appointment, is given to *B*, exercises the power in favour of *C*, and gives other benefits to *B*, although the execution is merely void (*I*), yet if *B* will accept the gifts to him, he must convey the estate to *C* according to the appointment (*c*). So where a power is to appoint to two, and he appoints to one only, and gives a legacy to the other, that is a case of election (*d*). But where
there

(*z*) *Forrester v. Cotton*, Ambl. 388. and see *Doe v. Lord George Cavendish*, 4 Term Rep. 741,

(*a*) *Cull v. Showell*, Ambl. 727; *Wood. App.* note.

(*b*) *Whistler v. Webster*, 2 Ves. jun. 367. (*c*) *Whistler v. Webster*, 2 Ves. jun. 367.

un. 367; and see *Wright v. Rutter*, 2 Ves. jun. 673; *Rutter v. M'Lean*, 4 Ves. jun. 531; (*d*) *Wollen v. Tanner*, 5 Ves. jun. 218; see *Vane v. Lord Duncannon*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 118.

(*I*) This perhaps cannot properly be called a defective execution of the power, because *C* was not the object of the power, but it affects the remainder so as to put the party entitled to it to his election.

there is no other fund than that appointed, the doctrine of election, which depends upon compensation, cannot apply ; as where, under a power to appoint to children, the father appoints it improperly, any child may set it aside, although a specific part is appointed to him, for the doctrine of election can never be applied but where, if an election is made contrary to the instrument, the interest that would pass by it can be laid hold of to compensate for what is taken away ; therefore in all cases there must be some free disposable property given to the person, which can be made a compensation for what the testator takes away (*e*).

To raise a question of election, a clear intention to pass the particular estate must appear (*f*), and it must appear upon the face of the instrument ; it cannot be compelled on any thing *dehors* (*g*). But still extrinsic evidence has been allowed to show what the testator considered as *his* estate, and consequently to determine what passed under a general devise so as to put a party to his election (*h*).

In all the foregoing cases we cannot fail to have observed, that the interest did not pass by the instrument, but still some nice distinctions have been taken as to the legal capacity of the devisor, and the validity of the instrument

(*e*) *Bristow v. Warde*, 2 Ves. jun. 336.

(*f*) *Dashwood v. Peyton*, 18 Ves. 27 ; see 1 Bro. C. C. 492.

(*g*) *Stratton v. Best*, 1 Ves. jun. 285 ; *Finch v. Finch*, ib. 535 ; see *Judd v. Pratt*, 13 Ves. jun. 168.

(*h*) See *Pulteney v. Darlington*, 1 Bro. C. C. 223 ; *Pole v. Lord Somers*, *Druce v. Denison*, 6 Ves. jun. 309. 385 ; and see *Wright v. Rutter*, 2 Ves. jun. 673 ; *Rutter v. M'Lean*, 4 Ves. jun. 531 ; *Monck v. Lord Monck*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 298 ; but see *Forrester v. Cotton*, Ambl. 389.

instrument to pass the interest in case he had actually been entitled to it in his own right.

This doctrine was first discussed in a case of frequent reference (*i*). There an infant having personal estate, of which she had ability to dispose, and a power over a real estate, to which she was entitled in default of appointment, bequeathed the personalty to her only child, and appointed the estate to strangers. And Lord Hardwicke held the appointment to be void, and that this was not a case of election, because the will was void as to the real estate, on account, as he observed in another case (*k*), of her infancy; and he added, as it would if she had been a feme sole. *This was a disability in the person.*

Lord Hardwicke said, it was like the case where a man executed a will in the presence of two witnesses only, and devises his real estate from his heir-at-law, and the personal estate to the heir-at-law; this is a good will as to personal estate; yet for want of being executed according to the Statute of Frauds, is bad as to the real estate; and he said he should in that case be of opinion, that the devisee of the real estate could not compel the heir-at-law to make good the devise of the real estate before he could entitle himself to his personal legacy, because here was no will of real estate for want of proper forms and ceremonies required by the statute. This doctrine has been recognized and acted upon by Lord Alvanley (*l*), Lord Kenyon (*m*), and Lord

(*i*) *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 3 Atk. 695; 1 Ves. 298.

(*k*) 2 Ves. 14.

(*l*) *Ex-parte* the Earl of Chester, 7 Ves. jun. 372.

(*m*) *Carey v. Askew*, 8 Ves. jun. 492, cited by Romilly; and in the argument of Thellusson and Woodford, *infra*, MS.

Lord Eldon (*n*); for although the will cannot be read without the devise in it, yet, as Lord Alvanley correctly expressed it, a Judge can say, for the Statute of Frauds enables him, and he is bound to say, that if a man by a will unattested gives both real and personal estate, he never meant to give the real at all (*o*).

Lord Hardwicke, however, determined, that where an express condition is annexed to the personal legacy, the heir-at-law must make good the devise of the realty, or give up his legacy (*p*); and although this distinction has been constantly disapproved of, yet it has always been acted upon, and cannot now be disturbed (*q*) (I).

A point

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| <p>(<i>n</i>) <i>Sheddon v. Goodrich</i>,
8 Ves. jun. 431; <i>Ker v. Wauchope</i>, 1 Bligh 1; <i>Gardiner v. Fell</i>, 1 Jac. & Walk. 22.</p> | <p>(<i>p</i>) <i>Boughton v. Boughton</i>,
2 Ves. 12.</p> |
| <p>(<i>o</i>) <i>Buckeridge v. Ingram</i>,
2 Ves. jun. 666.</p> | <p>(<i>q</i>) <i>Carey v. Askew</i>, <i>Sheddon v. Goodrich</i>, <i>ubi sup.</i>; and <i>Thellusson v. Woodford</i>, <i>infra</i>.</p> |

(I) In *Thellusson's* case, Lord Erskine said the general case of election is good. As to the exceptions, an infant may bequeath his personalty, but not so as to his realty. An infant having real and personal property, and having both capacity and power to bequeath the personalty, gives the personalty under the idea that he can dispose of his realty; now I conceive, with submission, that the infant's will may be read. If I had originally had to decide this point, I would have held it a case of election; so of a feme covert, I want to know why the husband should not be put to his election; I cannot see the common sense of that exception, but I am bound by authorities; so where a will is executed in the presence of two witnesses, why should it be read so as to give the heir the personalty? I would never have given him the legacy. How pure the laws of England would be were it not for these subtleties! But I dare not decide this case against the authority of Lord Hardwicke: MS. In *Carey v. Askew*,

A point lately arose in the great cause of Thellusson and Woodford (*r*), which again called this doctrine into question. Thellusson, by his will duly executed to pass real estates, gave legacies to his heir-at-law, and directed that all contracts for the purchase of estates; which he should enter into before his death, should be completed by his trustees, who should stand seised thereof to the uses mentioned in his will. He did purchase estates, and did not re-publish his will. Some were actually conveyed to him, the contracts for others remained *in fieri*. The question was, whether the heir should be put to his election. The case was elaborately argued. The principal argument for the heir-at-law was, that there was no case in which the heir-at-law was put to his election as to estates which came to him as heir. This was strongly urged, and the case was distinguished from cases of express conditions; and it was neatly argued, that there were three requisites to a devise; 1st, age; 2d, possession; and 3d, three witnesses; and that any will in which any of these was wanting was void, and not a case of election. Well, here the second was wanting, and the question of election could not arise any more than if the deviser had been an infant. On the other side, it

(*r*) See 4 Ves. jun. 235-237.

Askew, as stated by Sir Samuel Romilly, Lord Kenyon said, he should have found it difficult to distinguish the cases; but he felt himself bound by Lord Hardwicke's decision, although he thought Boughton v. Boughton wrong. It was settled that the heir could not be put to his election without an express condition, and you cannot *presume* a condition. Express conditions were not like this case. MS.

it was insisted, that there being no disability in the person of the devisor, this was a case of election. Suppose a legacy to be given to a stranger, and a legacy to the heir, and a devise of the stranger's estate to a third person; that, it was said, was a case of election. Then suppose the testator to purchase the estate, how, it was asked, could that be said not to be a case of election. Lord Chancellor Erskine determined that the heir should be put to his election (*s*), and his decree has been affirmed in the House of Lords (*t*).

A person is never put to his election till the funds are clearly ascertained, so that he may know exactly what he is to receive as a compensation for that which he gives up (*u*); and the party may file a bill to have the state of the fund ascertained (*x*). Where the state of the fund is free, and the party has acquiesced a long time, he will be held to have elected, although he has not expressly done so (*y*); but where the fund is embarrassed, a long acquiescence has been held not to bind the claimant (*z*), and *à fortiori*, the mere receipt of gifts under the will for a short period will not have that effect (*a*); and where a widow

(*s*) *Thellusson v. Woodford*, Aug. 1806, MS. 13 Ves. jun. 209. *ubi sup.* *Ardesoife v. Bennet*, 2 Dick. 463.

(*t*) *Rendlesham v. Woodford*, 1 Dow, 249. (*z*) *Beaulieu v. Lord Cardigan*, Ambl. 533, 6 Bro. P. C. 232; see 1 Ves. jun. 172. 336;

(*u*) *Wake v. Wake*, 1 Ves. jun.; and see 2 Ves. jun. 370. *Yate v. Mosely*, 5 Ves. jun. 483, 484.

(*x*) *Butricke v. Broadhurst*, 1 Ves. jun. 171; 3 Bro. C. C. 88. (*a*) *Wake v. Wake*, 1 Ves. jun. 335; *Rumbold v. Rumbold*, 3 Ves. jun. 65; see *Stratford v. Powell*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 1.

(*y*) *Butricke v. Broadhurst*, *Powell*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 1.

released her dower, and elected to take under her husband's will, and the provision for her was afterwards claimed by creditors, she was allowed to resort to her dower, notwithstanding her election (*b*).

If the party has mortgaged the interest he takes in his own right, and then is suffered to elect to take under the will, the mortgage must be satisfied out of the interest provided for him by the will (*c*).

Where the claimant is an infant, or feme covert, it is usually referred to the master, to see which is most for their benefit, to take under or against the will, but where the interest given by the will is manifestly a better interest, no reference will be made (*d*).

Where a person elects to take in opposition to the will, the interest given to him will be applied in compensation of the disappointed devisees (*e*). But the estate thus taken in opposition to the will of course vests in the party, with all the legal consequences attached to it. Thus where a tenant in tail devised away the estate, and gave the issue in tail, who was a married woman, and also her husband, other benefits by his will, she elected to take her estate-tail in opposition to the will, but her husband of course took under the will, then his wife died, and he entered as tenant by the curtesy; and it was contended, that as he took under the will, he could not claim in opposition to it; but it was ruled, that his wife took the estate with all its legal incidents, and that consequently he was entitled

(*b*) *Kidney v. Cousmaker*,
12 Ves. jun. 136.

(*c*) *Rumbold v. Rumbold*,
3 Ves. jun. 65.

(*d*) *Wilson v. Lord John Townshend*, 2 Ves. jun. 693.

(*e*) See before, and *Anon. Gilb. Eq. Rep.* 15; *Ward v. Baugh*, 4 Ves. jun. 627.

tled to be tenant by the curtesy in right of *her* seisin, although he claimed under the will in his own right (*f*).

In a case where the income of a Scotch heritable bond and other property was given to the widow for life, and she was entitled to right of terce in the bond, and a case of election being raised by the will, the heir elected to take the bond against the will, by which the income intended for the widow under the will was diminished, still as she elected to take under the will, she was held bound to bring in her terce as part of the testator's estate (*g*).

Closely allied to election is the doctrine of satisfaction : Where the interests of the objects of the power are satisfied by the donee of the power, their claim on the fund ceases (*h*). As this question, however, seldom arises upon powers, and the doctrine of satisfaction is already discussed by other writers, I shall not stop to inquire what is in equity deemed a *satisfaction*. But it may be remarked that, as in cases of election, so in cases of satisfaction, parol evidence is admissible to show that the testator considered the property subject to the power as part of his own property (*i*). And to create a case of satisfaction, a gift must move from the person himself. Therefore, if a man having a charge on his estate, and also a power over his wife's estate,

(*f*) *Lady Cavan v. Pulteney*, 2 Ves. jun. 698 ; *Folkes v. Ves. jun.* 544 ; 3 Ves. jun. 384 ; see *Brodie v. Barry*, 2 Ves. and Bea. 127. *Western*, 9 Ves. jun. 456, see *post* ; *Savage v. Carroll*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 265.

(*g*) *Reynolds v. Torin*, 1 Russ. 129. (*i*) *Hinchliffe v. Hinchliffe*, 3 Ves. jun. 516 ; and see *Druce*

(*h*) *Smith v. Lord Camel-* *v. Dennison*, 6 Ves. jun. 309.

both in favour of his child, appoint a sum to be paid to the child out of his wife's estate, in satisfaction of the charge on his own, the declaration as to the satisfaction will be entirely void (*k*). Satisfaction can never be presumed where the intention of the donor is expressly stated, as where a man by his will appoints a portion under a power, and gives an annuity out of his own property to the same child, and then upon marriage gives the child a portion, which he declares to be in satisfaction of the annuity given by the will, no presumption of satisfaction can be raised as to the portion appointed under the power (*l*).

(*k*) *Roberts v. Dixall*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 668, pl. 19. See the case in ch. 9, s. 3, *infra*.
 (*l*) *Burgess v. Mawbey*, 10 Ves. jun. 319.

SECTION III.

OF NON-EXECUTION.

SOME of the cases in the preceding section are, in strictness, cases of non-execution, where the remainderman is compelled to make good the disposition, on the ground of fraud or election; but putting aside these cases, although equity will, as we have seen, in favour of a purchaser, creditor, wife or child, supply the defective execution of a power, yet it is an immutable rule, that a non-execution shall never be aided (*a*). It is

(*a*) *Arundell v. Philpot*, 2 2 P. Wms. 228, n. Wilm. 23; Vern. 69; *Tomkyn v. Sandys*, *Bull v. Vardy*, 1 Ves. jun. 272.

is no ground for relief that the party intended to exercise his power, but was prevented by sudden death (*b*). We have seen, that where a man has a general power of appointing a fund, and he exercises the power in favour of a volunteer, equity will, in exclusion of the appointee, seize upon the fund as assets for the payment of the debts of the person executing the power, but if the party will not execute the power, the Court cannot compel him to do so, nor can it affect the fund subject to the power in favour of the creditors, for that would be against the nature of a power which is left to the free will and election of the party to execute it or not, for which reason equity will not say he shall execute it, or do that for him which he does not think fit to do himself (*c*). This may seem rather a refined distinction, but it is well established (*d*).

But in laying down this broad rule, we must be careful to distinguish between mere powers, and powers in the nature of trusts. The distinction between a power and a trust is marked and obvious. "Powers," as Lord C. J. Wilmot has said (*e*), "are never imperative: they leave the act to be done at the will of the party to whom they are given. Trusts are always imperative, and are obligatory upon the conscience of the party intrusted." But sometimes trusts and powers are blended; a man may be invested with a trust to be effected by the execution of a power given to him, which is in that case imperative; and if he refuse to

(*b*) See *Pigott v. Penrice*,
Com. 250; *Gilb. Eq. Rep.* 138.

(*c*) Per Master of the Rolls, in
Tollet v. Tollet, 2 P. Wms. 489.

(*d*) *Holmes v. Coghill*, 7 Ves.
jun. 499; 12 Ves. jun. 206;

Hixon v. Oliver, 13 Ves. 114.

(*e*) *Wilm.* 23.

execute it, or die without having executed it, equity, on the general rule that the trust is the land (*f*), will carry the trust into execution at the expense of the remainder-man, and without any regard to the person in whose favour it is to be executed, being a mere volunteer, and not a purchaser, creditor, wife or child. This is the case where a *power* is given by a will to trustees to sell an estate, and apply the money upon trusts. The power is in the nature of a trust. The legal estate, until the execution of the power, of course descends to the heir-at-law (*g*), and if the power be defeated at law by the death of the person to whom it was given, the legal estate would *remain* in the heir-at-law for his own benefit; but equity, acting upon the trust, will compel the heir to join in the sale of the estate for the purposes designated by the testator (*h*); and on the same principle, the same equity is extended to those cases, where, although in words a power is given, it never arises, because the testator has omitted to appoint some person to execute it (*i*).

In *Savage v. Carroll* (*k*), by articles previous to a marriage, for the strict settlement of an estate, it was agreed,

(*f*) See *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Blackst. 162, per Lord Mansfield. and see *Witchcot v. Souch*, 1 Cha. Rep. 97.

(*g*) *Warneford v. Thompson*, 3 Ves. jun. 513; *Hilton v. Kenworthy*, 3 East, 553; and see *Co. Litt.* 236 a. (*i*) *Hyer v. Wordale*, 2 Freem. 135, cited; *Locton v. Locton*, 2 Freem. 136; *Pitt v. Pelham*, 1 Cha. Ca. 176; 1 Cha. Rep. 149; 2 Freem. 134; 1 Lev. 304, which

(*h*) *Garfoot v. Garfoot*, 1 Cha. Ca. 35; *Gwilliams v. Rowell*, Hard. 204; *Auby v. Doyl*, 1 Cha. Ca. 180, cited, reported in 1 Cha. Rep. 89, nom. *Amby v. Gower*; was against the trust, but reversed in Dom. Proc.; and see *Carvill v. Carvill*, 2 Cha. Rep. 156.

(*k*) 1 Ball and Beatty, 265.

agreed, "that the settlement should contain a clause empowering the husband to charge 1,000*l.* for the younger children of the marriage." Lord Manners seemed to be of opinion, that if the Court had been called upon to direct the execution of a settlement pursuant to the articles, the Court would insert a clause to charge the estate as a provision for the younger children, with a power only to the father to apportion the shares.

The question, whether a power is simply such, or a power in the nature of a trust, frequently arises on a power to appoint to children(*l*). In *Brown v. Higgs* (*m*), Lord Eldon stated the principle of all the cases on this subject to be, that if the power is a power which it is the duty of the party to execute, made his duty by the requisition of the will, put upon him as such by the testator, who has given him an interest extensive enough to enable him to discharge it, he is a trustee for the exercise of the power, and not as having a discretion whether he will exercise it or not; and the Court adopts the principle as to trusts, and will not permit his negligence, accident, or other circumstances, to disappoint the interests of those for whose benefit he is called upon to execute it.

In *Harding v. Glyn* (*n*), Harding devised certain articles to his wife, "but did desire her, at or before her death, to give the same unto and amongst such *of his own relations* as she should think most deserving and

(*l*) See *Jones v. Clough*, 2 Ves. from the Register's book, 5 Ves. 367; and see 5 Ves. jun. 856. jun. 501; 8 Ves. jun. 571, from

(*m*) 8 Ves. jun. 574.

Mr. Joddrell's note. *Birch v.*

(*n*) 1 Atk. 469; S. C. stated Wade, 3 Ves. & Bea. 198.

approve of." The Master of the Rolls held this to be a trust for the relations in default of appointment. He said that it operated as a trust in the wife, by way of power, of naming and apportioning, and her non-performance of the power should not make the devise void, but the power should devolve on the Court.

So in (*o*) *Browne v. Higgs*, a leasehold estate was bequeathed to *A*; and after directing him to pay certain sums, the testator empowered him to employ the residue of the rent "to such children of my nephew Samuel Brown, as the said *A* shall think most deserving, and that will make the best use of it;" and this was considered, in default of appointment, as a trust for all the children. This decree was affirmed by Lord Alvanley, M. R., on a re-hearing (*p*), and also by Lord Eldon, upon an appeal (*q*), and has since been confirmed in the House of Lords.

But very nice distinctions are taken in these cases. Thus in the *Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin* (*r*), *A* devised a legacy of 30,000 *l.* to his wife for life, "and after her decease to be divided and distributed to and amongst such of his children, and in such manner and proportion, as she by any deed, &c. should direct and appoint, and for no other purpose whatever." Lord Hardwicke held it to be a mere power, and not a trust

(*o*) *Browne v. Higgs*, 4 Ves. jun. 708. 2 Bro. C. C. 588, and 4 Ves. jun. 792, n. (a); *Davy v. Hooper*,

(*p*) 5 Ves. jun. 495. 2 Vern. 665; 1 Bro. P. C. 351.

(*q*) 8 Ves. jun. 561; and see (*r*) *Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin*, 2 Ves. 61; 5 Ves. jun. 506, stated from Reg. Lib. S. C. MS. *Paul v. Compton*, *ibid.* 375; *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. jun. 319; and see *Madoc v. Jackson*,

trust for the children in default of appointment(s). He appears to have drawn a distinction between a bequest, "amongst my children as *A* shall appoint," which he considered as a trust, and a bequest amongst *such* of his children, &c. which he held to be a mere power. He considered the power in the principal case as given to secure her the respect of her children. In *Brown v. Higgs*, upon the appeal, Lord Eldon observed, that the *Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin* was certainly very difficult to reconcile with *Harding v. Glyn*, or with the case before him. But the question was not whether one case was to be reconciled with others, but whether all the cases had gone upon a principle which professed to save whole *Harding v. Glyn*. Lord Hardwicke, in the *Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin*, did not say that where there is a power, and it is made the duty of the party to execute it, and he would not execute it, in such a case this Court would not act; but he collected from the scope and object of the disposition in that case, taken altogether, the opinion, that it was a case in which the person having a power to dispose of the sum of 30,000 *l.* had a mere power, not clothed with any duty requiring her to execute it; and therefore as to what was not disposed of, the Court could not interfere (t). In another passage his Lordship said that the case of *Harding v. Glyn* could not be got rid of by saying it was a singular case, and that it was difficult to reconcile all subsequent cases with it; for that case had been treated as a clear authority

(s) And see *Bull v. Vardy*, 1 Ves. jun. 270; *Target v. Gaunt*, 1 P. Wms. 432.

(t) 8 Ves. jun. 569, 570.

authority, probably for the whole, certainly by his own experience, for a very considerable part of the time elapsed since that judgment was pronounced.

In the before-mentioned case of *Brown v. Higgs* one estate was devised “to one of the sons of my nephew, Samuel Brown, as he shall direct by a conveyance in his life-time, or by his will.” This point did not call for a decision, but Lord Alvanley seemed to think it a mere power. Lord Eldon’s opinion cannot be easily ascertained (*u*).

There is a class of cases where the bequest is considered not as a power in the nature of a trust, but as a power with a bequest over to the object of it, in default of appointment, by *implication*. In many instances it is difficult to distinguish the cases.

Thus, in *Mason v. Limbery* (*x*), a bequest to *A* for life, whom the testator “desired at his death to give it amongst his children, and the children of his said daughter, as he should think fit,” was holden by Lord Talbot to be a devise to the children in default of appointment, and the children were accordingly decreed to be entitled to the fund, although *A* died in the life-time of the testator. And there are other cases to the same effect (*y*).

(*u*) 8 Ves. jun. 576.

(*x*) T. Term, 1734, MS.

(*y*) *Davy v. Hooper*, 2 Vern. 665; *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57; *Hockley v. Mawby*, 1 Ves. jun. 143; *Morgan v.*

Surman, 1 Taunt. 289; *Witts v.*

Boddington, 3 Bro. C. C. 95;

5 Ves. jun. 503, stated from Lib.

Reg.; *Reade v. Reade*, 5 Ves.

jun. 744; *Longmore v. Broom*,

7 Ves. jun. 124.

CHAPTER VII.

OF RELIEF AGAINST THE ACTUAL EXECUTION OF POWERS.

SECTION I.

OF VOID EXECUTIONS BY THE GENERAL RULE OF LAW.

IN the last chapter we considered in what cases a *defective* execution of a power would be supported, and we are now to inquire in what instances the *actual* execution of a power may be set aside, although the solemnities required by the deed creating the power have been duly adhered to. This our present inquiry may be divided into two branches: 1. Where the instrument may be avoided at law. 2. Where equity only can relieve.

And first, an instrument executed under a power may be avoided at law on the same grounds as deeds in general may. To enter into the consideration of all the rules on this head would be an unpardonable digression; but their leading features, with reference to cases likely to arise upon the execution of powers, may, perhaps, without impropriety, be here stated. They form a link in the chain of our subject.

If,

If, then, an instrument be altered by rasure or otherwise, in a material part, by the person for whose benefit it was intended, the deed becomes absolutely void (*a*). The opinion formerly was that a rasure by *a stranger* would have the same operation (*b*): but it hath lately been very properly decided otherwise (*c*); for it should seem that the true ground of the rule is the fraud of the party interested. And since the Statute of Frauds (*d*) the mere cancellation of an instrument will not defeat the estate created by it (*e*); and even if the instrument would from its nature be revocable by cancellation, yet if the cancellation be made through a mistake in facts, or even, it is said, through *a mistake in law*, the mistake will annul the cancellation (*f*).

If a power be executed as a consideration for stifling a prosecution for perjury, the execution is merely void: *non est factum* may be pleaded to the deed at law, and the special matter given in evidence (*g*); although the opinion formerly was, that equity only could relieve where the consideration did not appear on the face of the deed. So an execution of a power, as an inducement to a woman to live with the party in a state of prostitution, is void (*h*); but where it is a compensation for the
loss

(*a*) Whelpdale's case, 5 Rep. 119, a.

(*b*) Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 27, a.

(*c*) Henfree v. Bromley, 6 East, 310; see French v. Patton, 9 East, 351.

(*d*) 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 3.

(*e*) M'Gennis v. M'Cullough, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 235; Roe v. Archp. of York, 6 East, 86; and

see Leach v. Leach, 2 Cha. Rep. 52, which was before the statute.

(*f*) Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East, 423; *sed qu.*

(*g*) Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347; and see Edgecombe v. Rodd, 5 East, 294.

(*h*) Walker v. Perkins, 3 Burr. 1568.

loss of virtue after cohabitation, or, as it is termed, *præmium pudicitiae*, the consideration is good, and the deed cannot be avoided (*i*), although the man was married at the time of the cohabitation, and the woman was aware of this fact (*k*), unless, according, as it should seem, to Lord Hardwicke's opinion, the woman was previously to the intimacy a prostitute (*l*); but in a later case, Lord Camden held clearly that there was no principle, even in equity, which says a man may not make a voluntary provision for a common prostitute, and he made a decision accordingly, in a case, the circumstances of which were well calculated to put the rule to the test (*m*); and Lord Camden's opinion has been confirmed by a decision of the Court of Exchequer (*n*). And in like manner the deed may be avoided whenever the consideration for executing it is such as the policy of the common law rejects, or as the statute law forbids.

If the deed be executed under duress, it is voidable, but not actually void; consequently the party may avoid it by special pleading, but cannot plead *non est factum*, and give the special matter in evidence (*o*).

There are only two other cases which I shall here notice—drunkenness and lunacy. As to drunkenness, the distinction seems to be, that the instrument cannot be relieved against, unless the party was drawn into drink

(*i*) *Marchioness of Anandale v. Harris*, 2 P. Wms. 432; *Turner v. Vaughan*, 2 Wils. 339; *Hill v. Spencer*, Ambl. 641.

(*k*) *Priest v. Parrot*, 2 Ves. 160; and see *Lady Cox's case*, 3 P. Wms. 340; *Knye v. Moore*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 61. S. C. 6 Barn.

& Cress. 133, nom. *Nye v. Moseley*.

(*l*) See *Clarke v. Periam*, 2 Atk. 333. 337.

(*m*) *Hill v. Spencer*, Ambl. 641.

(*n*) *Gray v. Mathias*, 5 Ves. jun. 287.

(*o*) See *Bull*, N. P. 172.

drink through the management or contrivance of him who gained the deed (*p*), in which case the deed is absolutely void, both in law and in equity, and consequently *non est factum* may be pleaded to it at law, and the drunkenness by the fraud of the plaintiff may be given in evidence (*q*).

As to lunacy, although the deed may be set aside by the committee of the lunatic, or by his heirs after his death; yet it is incontrovertibly established that the party himself cannot, after he has recovered his senses, plead his lunacy in avoidance of the deed (*r*). But a distinction has been established by the case of *Yates v. Boen* (*s*), which does not appear to have been attended to by writers on this subject, although they refer to the case. To debt upon articles the defendant pleaded *non est factum*, and upon the trial offered to give the lunacy in evidence. The Chief Justice thought it ought not to be admitted, upon the rule in *Beverley's* case, that a man shall not stultify himself; but on the authority of *Smith v. Carr*, 5th July 1728, where Chief Baron Pengelly in the like case admitted it, and on considering the case of *Thompson v. Leach*, the Chief Justice permitted it to be given in evidence, and the plaintiff upon the evidence became nonsuit. Now the history of the revolution in this branch of law is this: when *Beverley's* case was decided, it was holden that deeds executed by lunatics were voidable only, but not actually void, and therefore they

(*p*) *Johnson v. Medlicott*, 3 P. Wms. 131, n. which is opposed to *Pitt v. Smith*, 3 Camp. Ca. 35; *Fenton v. Holloway*, 1 Stark. 126; see *Butler v. Mulvihill*, 1 Bligh, 137.

(*q*) *Cole v. Robbins*, Bull, N. P. 172.

(*r*) *Beverley's* case, 4 Rep. 123, b.; *Stroud v. Marshall*, Cro. Eliz. 398.

(*s*) *Yates v. Boen*, 2 Str. 1104.

they could only be set aside by special pleading, and by the rule of law the party could not stultify himself. And Mr. Justice Blackstone, following the old rule, has laid it down that deeds of lunatics are avoidable only, and not actually void (*t*). But in *Thompson v. Leach*, this distinction was solemnly established, that a feoffment with livery of seisin by a lunatic because of the solemnity of the livery, was voidable only; but that a bargain and sale, or surrender, &c. was actually void (*u*). This, therefore, was the ground of the decision in *Yates v. Boen*. When the Chief Justice remembered that an innocent conveyance, or a deed by a lunatic, was merely void, he instantly said that *non est factum* might be pleaded to it, and the special matter given in evidence; and this applies strictly to deeds executing powers. But in the case of a feoffment with livery of seisin, the rigorous rule of law still prevails, and the party cannot stultify himself.

(*t*) 2 Comm. 291.

(*u*) Comb. 468.

SECTION II.

OF VOID EXECUTIONS IN EQUITY ONLY.

BUT there are some cases which a court of law cannot reach. This happens where the power is duly executed according to the terms of it; but there is some bargain behind, or some ill motive, which renders the execution fraudulent, and will enable equity to relieve. It were difficult to draw the precise line between the jurisdiction of law and equity on this head. The substantial ground upon which equity maintains almost an exclusive jurisdiction.

diction in cases of fraud is, that it is enabled to mould and cut down the fraudulent instrument according to good conscience; whereas a court of law, if it take conuzance of the subject, must entirely defeat the instrument: it cannot maintain the execution, so far as it is within the meaning of the power, and set it aside so far only as it is a fraud on the authority; but where the execution is altogether a fraud on the power, it may be asked, why, if you can once attack a deed executed under a power on the ground of fraud, may not that fraud be established at law as well as in equity? For this the case of *Collins v. Blantern* (*a*) is a strong authority. It is not impossible that it may be established, that whatever is a totally *fraudulent* execution of a power may be taken advantage of in either court. It has never been decided that a court of law cannot enter into the consideration of the fraud; and until *Collins v. Blantern* was decided, it was the general opinion that a court of law would not advert to a consideration unless it appeared on the face of the instrument. In the case of *Butcher v. Butcher* (*b*), a question arose, whether, under a power to appoint to children, equity could relieve against an appointment under which a share merely illusory was given to one child. The Master of the Rolls said, in terms, the power, though limited as to objects, is discretionary as to shares. A court of law says, no object can be excluded; but there it stops. It does not attempt to correct any the extremest inequality in the distribution; and yet if that is a fraudulent execution of the power, why is it not void at law? A fraudulent act
has

(*a*) *Collins v. Blantern*, 2 Wils.
347.

(*b*) *Butcher v. Butcher*, 9 Ves.
jun. 382; and see 1 Burr. 125.

has no more validity in a court of law than in a court of equity; and if it is not a fraudulent execution, upon what principle does a court of equity deny it effect? It is sometimes said, this court interferes for the purpose of carrying into effect the intention of the party creating the power, who must have meant that each object should derive the same real benefit from the execution of the power. Now, every instrument must receive the same construction from every court. Whatever is its true meaning must be its meaning every where. If then the true meaning of the power, however discretionary in terms, be, that each object shall have what is called a substantial share, it is not executed according to its true meaning, and therefore is not well executed by an appointment that does not give to each object a substantial share. A court of equity may, in the exercise of its own particular jurisdiction, supply defects in the execution of a power. But I cannot understand how the question, whether a power is well or ill executed, can receive different determinations in different courts. If it is not executed according to its true import, how can a court of law say it is well executed; and if it is executed according to its true import, how can a court of equity say it is ill executed?

Upon questions like that in the last case, the jurisdiction exercised by equity is infinitely more strong than the common relief in case of fraud. If a man, having a power to appoint to *A* or *B*, appoint to *A*, in consideration of a sum paid by him, equity will relieve against the fraud, and the courts of law would refuse to interfere, on the ground that they have not the same means of enforcing the discovery of fraud, and of relieving

against it. But where, as in *Butcher v. Butcher*, a man has a power over a fund, which it is admitted will at law enable him to give any share, however trifling, to one party, and he *without fraud* exercise that power accordingly, equity, by interposing its authority, actually puts a different construction on the instrument to what it must receive in a court of law ; and yet if a power gives a clear right to appoint to several persons, or to any of them exclusively of the others, equity can grant no relief against the *bona fide* exercise of it in favour of some of the objects, excluding the others. But however strange this doctrine may seem, it is well established that where the power does not authorize an exclusive appointment, equity will relieve against any appointment of an illusory share,' although this relief is now very confined (c).

I now proceed to state the cases of fraud in which equity has relieved: If a person, having a power of jointuring, execute it in favour of his wife, but it is agreed between the parties that the wife shall receive part only of the jointure for her own benefit, and that the residue shall be applied for the husband's benefit, equity will set aside the execution of the power so far as it is in favour of the husband himself, on the ground of its being a fraud on the power and those creating it (I). And no confirmation by the wife after the death
of

(c) *Vide infra*, ch. 9, s. 4.

(I) The late Mr. Justice Ashurst, when at the bar, said, *arguendo*, "Fraud, particularly in the case of powers, is cognizable in a court of law; *Lane v. Page*, T. 27 Geo. 2, B. R. A power given for one purpose shall not be exercised for another, though within the letter

of the husband will avail; the ground of relief is the fraud on the remainder-man (*d*).

So if there is a power to make a jointure under restrictions, as 100 *l.* a year for every 1,000 *l.* and the husband himself advance a sum of money in order colourably to enable him to make the larger jointure, the Court will reject such part as is more than proportional to the real fortune (*e*). But in these cases equity will not set aside the whole settlement, but merely that part which is infected with fraud (*f*).

Again, where a father, having an exclusive power of appointing to children, with the consent of a trustee, prevailed on the trustee to join in appointing the estate to the youngest son, by representing the eldest as undutiful and extravagant, upon a bill by the eldest son to set aside the appointment, it was decreed accordingly, upon

(*d*) *Lane v. Page*, Ambl. 233.

—Note, this was a case of rank fraud; see Appen. No. 18; the facts stated from Reg. Lib. *Aleyn v. Belchier*, Reg. Lib. A. 1757, fol. 432(B); App. No. 19, 1 Eden, 132; see *Daubeny v. Cockburn*, 1 Mer. 626.

(*e*) See Ambl. 235. 239.

(*f*) *Lane v. Page*, *Aleyn v. Belchier*, *ubi sup.* *Palmer v. Wheeler*, 2 Ball and Beatty, 18; see *Daubeny v. Cockburn*, 1 Mer. 626.

of the power," 1 Blackst. 619. If the court of King's Bench held the execution bad in *Lane v. Page*, that case would be an important authority with reference to the doctrine discussed at the opening of this section. No notice is taken in Reg. Lib. of any proceedings having been had at law; and from the circumstance of the plaintiff at law having been also plaintiff in equity, it would seem that he did not prevail at law. I have searched for the case in the King's Bench without success.

upon proof of the plaintiff being dutiful, and not extravagant, and that the father had misrepresented him; and although the trustee's evidence was admitted, yet Lord Hardwicke refused to admit the father's evidence to prove the plaintiff's undutifulness and extravagance. The power was treated as a trust to be executed with discretion; and the father being charged with a breach of trust, could not be allowed himself to prove the undutifulness and extravagancy of his son, upon which the cause depended (*g*) (I).

So if a parent, having a power to appoint the estate unto any of his children, exclusively of the others, appoint to one, upon a bargain made beforehand with that child, that he shall pay a consideration for it, equity will relieve against the appointment (*h*) *in toto* (*i*); the same relief would be administered even against a purchaser, if he had notice of the fraud; and even if he had not notice of the fraud, yet if he has not the legal estate, he cannot protect himself in equity. The payment of a money consideration cannot make a stranger become the object of a power created in favour of children.
He

(*g*) *Scroggs v. Scroggs*, Ambl. 272, App. No. 20; the facts stated from Reg. Lib.

(*h*) See 1 vol. Ca. and Opin. 34; and see 1 Ves. jun. 310.

(*i*) *Daubeny v. Cockburn*, 1 Mer. 626.

(I) In this case, the reporter says, that *Sir Geo. Downing v. Bagual*, 6th and 7th July 1753, was cited for the plaintiff. The case, however, does not relate to the question, and must have been cited merely to show the effect of concealment. The case is in Reg. Lib. A. 1755, fol. 95. The facts in the Register's book led me to discover that the case is reported by Ambler himself, by the name of *Downing v. Townsend*, 280. 592.

He can only claim under a valid appointment executed in favour of some or one of the children (*k*). This is a point which daily arises in practice. The parent first sells the estate, and then executes an appointment to one child, in order to enable him to make a title; and in many instances purchasers are justly alarmed, lest, if there should be any underhand agreement, the transaction itself would be deemed notice of the fraud. But where the money is paid to the father and son, and there is nothing to show that the son was not to receive his due proportion of it, the purchaser may safely complete his contract, unless he has notice of some underhand agreement. This was decided in the late case of *M'Queen v. Farquhar* (*l*), where, under an exclusive power of appointment, a father appointed to one son in fee, and then the father, and his wife and the son, joined in conveying to a purchaser, and the money was expressed to be paid to them all. The title was objected to on the ground of an opinion, by which it appeared, that the father first sold the estate, and then the appointment was devised to make a title, and the purchase-deed recited that the contract was made with the father and son. It was insisted, that if the father derived any benefit from the agreement, or even made a previous stipulation that his son should join him in a sale, which there appeared the strongest reason to apprehend, it would have been a fraudulent execution. But Lord Eldon over-ruled the objection, as it did not appear that the estate sold for less than its value, or that the son got less than the value of his reversionary

(*k*) Per Master of the Rolls, (*l*) *M'Queen v. Farquhar*, 11
1 Mer. 638. Ves. jun. 467.

interest, but merely that he, as the owner of the reversion, acceded to the purchase.

In a recent case in Ireland, where, under an exclusive power, the estate was appointed to the eldest son, in order to procure him to join with his father in securing a debt of the father's on the estate, which he accordingly did, and the equity of redemption was immediately re-limited to the father for life, remainder to the son for life, remainder to his issue in strict settlement, remainder to the other sons of the marriage, remainder to the father in fee, Lord Manners treated the whole transaction as a fraud on the power. The appointment in favour of the son was made for the purpose of enabling him to join in securing the father's debts upon the lands, and the creditors had clear notice of the fraud committed in the execution of the power. His Lordship therefore set aside the mortgage (*m*).

In the above case, the estate, in default of appointment, was limited to the eldest son, his heirs and assigns; so that if no appointment had been made, he would have taken the estate. The father lived eight years after the appointment. The son died within a few months after his father, leaving an infant heir, by whom the bill was filed. It was objected, that the son, being a *particeps criminis*, the plaintiff deriving through him, was not entitled to relief, and that length of time was also an objection to the relief prayed. But Lord Manners decided otherwise: he observed, that it was impossible to say that the son, acting under the influence of parental authority, and imposed upon as he had been

(*m*) *Palmer v. Wheeler*, 2 Ball and Beatty, 18; see *Davis v. Uphill*, 1 Swanst. 129.

been by these several deeds, drawn in the same office, executed at the same time, and perfectly known to the mortgagees, had been guilty of any fraud towards them. The father, armed with parental authority, and possessing such a power over the property, had acquired an irresistible influence and dominion over the son, which he used and exerted to procure these improvident deeds. Was not this oppression? Was not this fraud? And had not the mortgagees notice of it? As to the acquiescence, what had the son but a reversion expectant on his father's life-estate? And during his father's life he was under the influence of the same authority, and could not be expected to take any step in assertion of his rights. Then had such a length of time elapsed as amounted to that degree of laches which should prevent the Court from interfering? It appeared that both father and son died in the same year, within a few months of one another; during the father's lifetime the son could do nothing useful; and his Lordship, therefore, could not say that the son was barred by acquiescence; *à fortiori* length of time did not operate against the plaintiff, as yet a minor.

So where a party, taking under a power, has notice of an agreement for valuable consideration not to execute the power, or of what is tantamount to such an agreement, equity will relieve against the execution. Thus, in the case of *Scrope v. Offley* (*n*) (1), a tenant

(*n*) 4 Bro. P. C. 237; see 2 Atk. 567; 2 Burr. 1145.

(1) In Barnard's Rep. Cha. 112, it is said, that the covenant in this case was construed to be a release. But however this may be, the principle in the text is clear.

for life, with a power of jointuring, conveyed the estate on his marriage, as if he was seised in fee, and covenanted against incumbrances done or *to be done*. He afterwards married a second wife, and after marriage limited a jointure to her by virtue of his power, *she having notice of the first settlement*: and Lord Chancellor King relieved against the execution of the power, at the suit of the issue of the first marriage, and his decree was affirmed in the House of Lords.

But the most remarkable instance of the interference of equity remains to be stated. The precedent was established by Lord Keeper Wright, in the case of *Chadwick v. Doleman* (o). A power was given to a parent, tenant for life, to appoint a sum of money for younger childrens' portions, to be raised after his death, which in default of appointment was to be equally divided amongst them, and the estate itself was settled on the *first* and other sons in tail. There being several younger children of age, the father appointed the money amongst them, and gave a particular sum to his *second* son, who was of age, and under a treaty of marriage. This son afterwards became eldest son, and as such entitled to the estate itself, and thereupon the father made a new appointment of the portion given to him. The Lord Keeper admitted that the second son, at the time of the appointment, was a person capable to take, and was a younger child within the power of appointing; but was of opinion that this was a defeasible appointment (as he was pleased to term (I) it),

(o) 2 Vern. 528; see *Driver v. Frank*, 3 Mau. & Selw. 25; *Windham v. Graham*, 1 Russ. 331.

(I) This is the expression of Vernon, the Reporter, from which it should seem that he did not approve of the decision.

it), not from any power of revoking, or upon the words of the appointment, but from the capacity of the person. He was a person capable to take at the time of the appointment made, but that was *sub modo*, and upon a tacit or implied condition that he should not afterwards happen to become the eldest son and heir; so that he had, as it were, only a defeasible capacity in him, and he decreed accordingly. He added, that although the appointment had been made in consideration of marriage, it would have been the same thing.

Lord Talbot appears to have approved of the foregoing decision (*p*); and in a case before Lord Hardwicke (*q*), he entirely adopted it. He said, that Lord Cowper [*qu. Wright*] went plainly on this; he (Lord Cowper) found it established by the precedents and authorities of this Court, that the words ‘younger children’ had received a prodigious latitude of construction to answer the occasions of families and intent of the parties, often construing an eldest daughter to be a younger child, that is, carrying the words very much out of the natural, into a foreign and remote sense, to answer the intent: and he found it determined, that an only daughter, though not younger in comparison with another, should be considered as a younger child where a provision was made for the younger children, and no other provision, and the estate limited to go over; and there have been cases where a younger son becoming an eldest, under certain circumstances, has been considered as an eldest, to exclude him from the benefit of the portion; and therefore the rule laid down by Lord Harcourt,

(*p*) See *Jermyn v. Fellows*, For. 93.

(*q*) *Teynham v. Webb*, 2 Ves. 198.

Harcourt, in *Beal v. Beal* (*r*), has been, that younger children shall be considered such as do not take the estate, are not the head and representative of the family : Lord Cowper having found this, from thence inferred a tacit condition, that the capacity of being a younger son should continue until the time of payment came, and therefore made that determination, though the father had actually executed his power. Taking it *in abstracto*, merely as an execution of a power, it could not possibly be maintained upon the general rules ; but the ground Lord Cowper went on was, that the continuing of the capacity to the time of the provision taking effect in point of payment, was a tacit or implied condition going along with the appointment.

Lastly, if a power be exercised in consideration of the appointee procuring a marriage between the person executing the power and another person, the execution will be set aside (*s*).

(*r*) 1 P. Wms. 451.

book 1, ch. 4, s. 10, and notes.

(*s*) *Stribblehill v. Brett*, Prec.

Williamson v. Gihon, 2 Scho. &

Cha. 165 ; 2 Vern. 445, reversed

Lef. 357.

in Dom. Proc. ; see 1 Fonbl.

CHAPTER VIII.
OF RELIEF AGAINST POWERS.

SECTION I.

OF THE RELIEF AFFORDED BY THE 27 ELIZ. C. 4,
AGAINST POWERS OF REVOCATION.

WE have seen in how many instances the *erecution* of powers will be relieved against ; we are now to proceed a step farther, and to inquire in what cases powers themselves will be set aside. I do not here speak of a power void in its very creation, as where the object of it is a perpetuity, or of a power not well created, but of powers well created, and which may, in the first instance be legally executed ; and this relief is given by the statute of 27 Eliz. c. 4, whereby it is enacted, that if any person or persons shall make any conveyance, gift, grant, demise, limitation of use or uses, or assurance of, in, or out of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, with any clause, provision, article, or condition of revocation, determination or alteration, at his or their will or pleasure, of such conveyance, assurance, grants, limitations of uses, or estates, of, in, or out of the said lands, tenements, or hereditaments,

hereditaments, or of, in, or out of any part or parcel of them, contained or mentioned in any writing, deed, or indenture, of such assurance, conveyance, grant or gift; and after such conveyance, grant, gift, demise, charge, limitation of uses, or assurance so made or had, shall demise, grant, convey, or charge the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any part or parcel thereof, to any person or persons, bodies politic and corporate, for money or other good consideration, paid or given (the said first conveyance, assurance, gift, grant, demise, charge, or limitation, not by him or them revoked, made void or altered, according to the power and authority reserved or expressed unto him or them, in and by the said *secret* conveyance, assurance, gift or grant), that then the said former conveyance, assurance, gift, demise, and grant, as touching the said lands, tenements, or hereditaments, so after bargained, sold, conveyed, demised, or charged against the said bargainees, vendees, lessees, grantees, and every of them, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, and against all and every person and persons which have, shall or may lawfully claim any thing by, from, or under them, or any of them, shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be void, frustrate, and of none effect, by virtue and force of the act; provided nevertheless, that no lawful mortgage to be made *bond fide*, and without fraud or covin, upon good consideration, shall be impeached or impaired by force of the act, but shall stand in the like force and effect as the same would have done if the act had never been made.

To understand the operation of this statute, we must consider, 1st, what instruments are avoided by it; and
2dly,

2dly, in favour of whom. And first it is to be observed, that the statute does not extend to particular powers, as a power to charge 2,000 *l.* on an estate of considerable value, for such a power is not a power within the words of the statute (being for a particular sum), to revoke, determine, or alter the estate (*a*).

But it is of course quite clear, that a settlement by which a power of revocation, or a power tantamount to it, is reserved to the grantor, is void against a subsequent purchaser (*b*), and no artifice of the parties can protect the settlement. Therefore, although the power be conditional, that the settlor shall only revoke on payment of a trifling sum to a third person (*c*), or with the consent of any third person, who is merely appointed by the grantor (*d*), in these and the like cases the condition will be deemed colourable, and the settlement will be void against a subsequent purchaser.

But where a settlement is made, with a power to the settlor to revoke, so as that the money be paid to trustees to be invested in the purchase of other estates (*e*), or to revoke with the consent of a stranger *bond fide* appointed by the parties, and his consent is made requisite, not as a mere colour, but for the benefit of all parties, the settlement will be valid, and cannot be impeached by a subsequent purchaser (*f*). This was determined

(*a*) *Jenkins v. Keymis*, 1 Lev. 150.

(*b*) *Cross v. Faustenditch*, Cro. Jac. 180; *Tarback v. Marbury*, 2 Vern. 510; see *Lane*, 22.

(*c*) *Griffin v. Stanhope*, Cro. Jac. 454.

(*d*) See 3 Rep. 82, b.; *Lavender v. Blackston*, 3 Keb. 526.

(*e*) *Doe v. Martin*, 4 Term Rep. 39.

(*f*) See *Leigh v. Winter*, 1 Jo. 411; and see *Lane*, 22.

determined in the case of *Buller v. Waterhouse* (*g*), which, however, Mr. Powell thought did not settle the point, because all the claimants under the conveyance were purchasers for a valuable consideration (*h*). But it seems quite immaterial whether the settlement is merely voluntary, or upon valuable consideration (*i*). The statute says, that all conveyances which the grantor has power to revoke shall be void against subsequent purchasers; and therefore if parties giving a valuable consideration for a settlement choose to permit the grantor to reserve a power to revoke the settlement, they must suffer for their folly. The grantor, by virtue of the power, may revoke the settlement; and if he sell the estate without revoking it, the statute makes it void. In fact, if we hold that settlements upon valuable consideration are not within this provision, we must at the same time admit that the Legislature did not intend to affect voluntary settlements unless they were actually fraudulent; for voluntary settlements are void against purchasers under the second section of the act. This clause, therefore, would, under the construction put upon it by Mr. Powell, have scarcely any operation.

If a man having a power at a future day to revoke a settlement made by him, sell the estate before the day arrive, the settlement will be void against the purchaser, at the time when the vendor, according to the terms of the power, might have revoked the settlement (*k*).

And a settlement made with power of revocation
will

(*g*) 2 Jo. 94; 3 Keb. 751; and
see acc. *Hungerford v. Earle*,
2 Freem. 120.

(*h*) Pow. on Powers, 330.

(*i*) See acc. Rob. on Vol.
Conv. 637.

(*k*) Mo. 618; 3 Rep. 82, b.;
Bridg. 23.

will be void against a subsequent purchaser, although the grantor release or extinguish the power previously to the sale, otherwise the vendor might secretly release or destroy the power, and then show to the purchaser the conveyance containing the power of revocation, and so induce him to buy the land (*l*). In the case, however, in which this was decided, the settlement appears to have been voluntary, and the purchaser had not notice of the power being destroyed. But if a settlement should be made for valuable consideration, with a power of revocation, and the vendor should afterwards release the power for a valuable consideration, it is conceived that a purchaser, subsequently to the destruction of the power, could not prevail over the settlement, more especially if he had notice of the power being released.

The statute, as we have seen, operates conditionally, that is, where the first conveyance is not revoked according to the power. The act has no effect until the donee of the power sell the estate, without revoking the first conveyance by virtue of his power. Suppose then a vendee professes to execute his power, but it is informally exercised, will the defect be cured by the statute? The Legislature intended to protect purchasers against fraudulent settlements, with powers of revocation; for it is essential, to bring a case within the act, that the estate should be sold, and the first conveyance not be revoked according to the power reserved to the grantor by such *secret* conveyance. The non-execution of the power is the fraud which the statute intended to avoid. The conveyances against which

(*l*) *Bullock v. Thorne*, Mo. 615.

which the act was intended to operate were presumed to be *secret*. It was not meant to relieve any man who was aware of the existence of the power, and might have required it to be exercised. The statute was not intended to operate as a mode of conveyance. But, without insisting that where a purchaser is aware of the settlement he must require the power to be executed, it may be urged, that where a purchaser does rest his title on the execution of the power, he rejects the aid of the Legislature, and takes his title under, and not in opposition to, the settlement; and can therefore only stand in the same situation as any other purchaser who has unfortunately taken an estate under a power defectively executed. The purchaser can scarcely be held to have a good legal title, unless the vendor not only attempted to execute the power, but actually conveyed the estate to him.

SECTION II.

OF THE PERSON WHO MAY CLAIM THE RELIEF.

IN Upton and Bassett's case (*a*), it was resolved, that no purchaser should avoid a precedent conveyance made by fraud and covin but he who is a purchaser for money, or other valuable consideration; for although in the preamble it is said (for money, or other good consideration), and likewise in the body of the act, relating to voluntary conveyances (for money, or other good consideration), yet these words (good consideration) are to be intended only of valuable consideration; and that appears by the clause now
under

(*a*) 3 Rep. 83, a.; Cro. Eliz. 444.

under consideration, for there it is said, "for money, or other good consideration paid or given;" and this word "paid" is to be referred to *money*, and "*given*" is to be referred to *good consideration*, so the sense is *for money paid, or other good consideration given*; which words exclude all consideration of nature or blood, or the like, and are to be intended only of valuable considerations which may be given; and therefore he who makes a purchase of land for a valuable consideration is only a purchaser within this statute.

And to take advantage of this statute the purchaser must have purchased *bonâ fide* without deceit or cunning, and for a valuable and not inadequate consideration (*b*).

And a lessee with (*c*) or without a fine (*d*), as well as a mortgagee (*e*), is a purchaser within the statute.

So a settlement made on a wife or children *prior* to marriage is a conveyance for valuable consideration, by reason of the marriage itself (*f*). And the marriage consideration runs through the whole settlement, so far as it relates to the husband and wife, and issue (*g*). And there are cases in which the marriage consideration will extend to remainders to collateral relations (*h*).

(*b*) *Upton v. Bassett*, Cro. Eliz. 444; *Nedham v. Beaumont*, 3 Rep. 83, b.; 2 And. 233; *Doe v. Routledge*, Cowp. 705; see *Bullock v. Sadlier*, Ambl. 764; *Doe v. James*, 16 East, 212.

(*c*) *Cross v. Faustenditch*, Cro. Jac. 180.

(*d*) *Hinde v. Collins*, Cro. Jac. 181, cited.

(*e*) *Goodright v. Moses*, 2 Blac. 1019; *Chapman v. Emery*, Cowp. 279.

(*f*) *Colvile v. Parker*, Cro. Jac. 158; *Douglas v. Waad*, 1 Cha. Ca. 99; *Brown v. Jones*, 1 Atk. 188.

(*g*) *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. jun. 752.

(*h*) See Treat. of Purch. 6th edit, p. 623.

So, if an agreement be entered into before the marriage, for a settlement of the estate (*i*), or the husband receive an additional portion with his wife (*k*), the settlement, although made after marriage, will be deemed valuable. So, even an agreement to pay the husband a sum of money as a portion will support a settlement made after marriage, if the money is paid according to the agreement (*l*).

But it should seem that the agreement before marriage must be in writing, for the Statute of Frauds expressly provides that no action shall be brought on any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, unless there be some memorandum thereof in writing, and signed by the party to be charged (*m*); and it is of course clear that the subsequent marriage does not operate as a part-performance. Fraud is an exception to every rule (*n*). But it was said by Lord Chancellor Parker, according to one report of the case of Montacute and Maxwell (*o*), "that a parol promise on marriage is sufficient consideration to support a settlement made agreeable to it after marriage. This had been frequently determined." It is apprehended, however, that no such determination was ever made. The *dictum* was made upon an agreement for a settlement of *personalty*, to which the statute of 27 Elizabeth does not apply. Lord Thurlow,

(*i*) *Griffin v. Stanhope*, Cro. Jac. 454; Sir Ralph Bovie's case, 1 Ventr. 193.

(*k*) *Colvile v. Parker*, Cro. Jac. 158; *Jones v. Marsh*, For. 64; *Stileman v. Ashdown*, 2 Atk. 477; *Ramsden v. Hylton*, 2 Ves. 304.

(*l*) *Brown v. Jones*, 1 Atk. 188.

(*m*) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4.

(*n*) *Montacute v. Maxwell*, 1 P. Wms. 618; 1 Str. 236; Prec. Cha. 526.

(*o*) 1 Str. 237.

Thurlow, in a case also upon personal estate, where the bill was filed by creditors, although he held that a parol agreement for a settlement before marriage was void, yet asked, whether there was any case, where, in the settlement [after marriage] the parties recited an agreement before marriage, in which it had been considered as within the statute; to which Lord Eldon, then Solicitor-General, answered that he did not think it would be good (*p*). The recital, certainly, unless it could be proved, would not bind third persons. In *Lavender v. Blackstone*, it is stated incidentally, in a case upon a voluntary settlement of real estate after twenty-one, by a man who married under twenty-one, that Hale held, that although it was proved, that upon the marriage he promised to settle his estate, when he should attain twenty-one, upon himself and his issue (which was agreed to be a sufficient consideration to avoid fraud, although infants are not bound in law to perform such promise), yet the settlement not being made until three or four years after he attained twenty-one, and not being directly settled according to his promise, shall not be presumed to be made in performance of his promise, without direct proof of it (*q*). It has escaped observation that this case arose before the Statute of Frauds, and therefore cannot rule the point at this day. The question however did not call for a decision, and the infant received a portion of 2,000 *l.* with his wife. There is a *dictum* to the same effect in Sir

(*p*) *Dundas v. Dutens*, 1 Ves. jun. 199, 200. In *Shaw v. Jake-* decision; see *Randall v. Morgan*, 12 Ves. jun. 74.
man, 4 East, 207, Lord Thurlow's question is represented as a (*q*) *Lavender v. Blackstone*, 2 Lev. 146.

Ralph Bovie's case, upon a promise by an adult, where he received a portion with his wife ; but that case also arose before the statute (*r*). In a naked case of a parol promise before marriage, without a portion with the wife, it should seem that since the statute a settlement after marriage of real estate would be merely voluntary. A settlement after marriage upon a wife or children, without any previous agreement, is upon good, although not valuable, consideration. It is a performance of a moral obligation. The mere agreement by parol before marriage, to make such a settlement, does not place the case higher. The settlement is still only a performance of a moral obligation, for the parol promise is rendered unavailable by the Statute of Frauds. In each case the consideration is a good one, but it is a duty of imperfect obligation on the party to make the settlement. The past consideration of marriage will not support the settlement, and the previous parol promise is not binding ; therefore the settlement is merely voluntary. It may perhaps be binding on creditors, although void against purchasers.

The concurrence of the wife in destroying an existing settlement on her for the benefit of the husband, is a sufficient consideration for a new settlement, although much more valuable than the former (*s*). And the better opinion, as well upon principle as in point of authority, seems to be, that the wife joining in barring her dower, for the benefit of her husband, will be a sufficient consideration

(*r*) 1 Ventr. 194 ; and see Griffin v. Stanhope, Cro. Jac. 454, where the question, it should seem, was raised by creditors.

(*s*) Scott v. Bell, 2 Lev. 70 ; Ball v. Bumford, Prec. Cha. 113 ; 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 354, pl. 5 ; see Clerk v. Nettleship, 2 Lev. 118.

sideration for a settlement on her (*t*). It has been decided, that the wife parting with her jointure is a sufficient consideration. Now, if that which comes in lieu of dower is a valuable consideration, surely the dower itself must be equally valuable. Besides, where a woman is entitled to dower, the estate cannot be sold to advantage without her concurrence : she is a necessary party to any arrangement respecting the estate, and that alone seems a sufficient ground to support a settlement on her (*u*).

But if an unreasonable settlement be made upon a wife in consideration of her releasing her dower, it seems that equity in favour of subsequent purchasers will restrain her to her dower (*x*).

If upon a separation the husband settle an estate upon his wife, and a friend of her's covenant to indemnify the husband against any debts which she may contract, this will be a sufficient consideration to uphold the settlement as valuable (*y*). Indeed, the Courts will anxiously endeavour to support a fair settlement ; and nearly any consideration will be sufficient for that purpose. Therefore if a person, whose concurrence the parties think necessary, join in a settlement, his concurrence will be deemed a valuable consideration, although he do not substantially part with any thing (*z*).

(*t*) *Lavender v. Blackstone*, 2 Lev. 146 ; see and consider *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. C. C. 148.

(*u*) Vide *Roe v. Mitton*, cited *infra*.

(*x*) *Dolin v. Coltman*, 1 Vern. 294.

(*y*) *Stephens v. Olive*, 2 Bro.

C. C. 90 ; *King v. Brewer*, ib. 93, n. ; see, however, Lord Eldon's argument in *Lord St. John v. Lady St. John*, 11 Ves. jun. 526.

(*z*) *Roe v. Mitton*, 2 Wils. 356 ; see *Myddleton v. Lord Kenyon*, 2 Ves. jun. 391.

It follows, therefore, that a conveyance, lease, or mortgage, to a purchaser, lessee, or mortgagee, or to a wife or child, under the circumstances before mentioned, by a person having settled his estate with a power of revocation, is valid, although the power of revocation is not executed, for the settlement is defeated by the force of the statute of Elizabeth. But any conveyance executed by a husband in favour of his wife or children *after* marriage, which rests wholly on the moral duty of a husband and parent to provide for his wife and issue, is voluntary (*a*), and consequently the prior settlement would not be void as against such a conveyance.

And the purchaser must have contracted for the interest, or an estate or right out of the interest (*b*), to which the vendor would be entitled in case the first deed were void. Thus, in a case mentioned by Sir Edward Coke in his Commentary on Littleton (*c*), *A* had a lease of certain lands for 60 years, if he had lived so long, and forged a lease for 90 years absolutely, and he, by indenture reciting the forged lease, for valuable consideration, bargained and sold the forged lease, and all his interest in the land, to *B*. Sir Edward Coke adds, that it seemed to him that *B* was no purchaser within the statute of 27 Elizabeth, for he contracted not for the true and lawful interest, for that was not known to him, for then, perhaps, he would not have dealt for it;

(*a*) Woodie's case, cited in C. C. 148; see Parker v. Serjeant, Finch, 146.
 Colvile v. Parker. Cro. Jac. 158;
 Goodright v. Moses, 2 Blackst. 1019; Chapman v. Emery, Cowp. 278; Evelyn v. Templar, 2 Bro-

(*b*) See Hatton v. Jones, Bul. N. P. 90.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 3 b.

it ; and the visible and known term was forged ; and although by general words the true interest passed, notwithstanding he gave no valuable consideration, nor contracted for it ; and of this opinion were all the Judges in Serjeants'-Inn.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE ESTATES WHICH MAY BE CREATED UNDER POWERS OF APPOINTMENT, AND OF LIMITATIONS IN DEFAULT OF APPOINTMENT.

IN treating of this important branch of our subject, I propose to consider : 1. What estates may be created in point of perpetuity. 2. The construction of powers in general. 3. Where an exclusive appointment is authorized. 4. What is deemed an illusory appointment. 5. The construction of a power to appoint to children. 6. The like inquiry upon a power to appoint to relations. 7. The rules established respecting powers to jointure. 8. The effect of an excess in the execution of a power. And lastly, How estates go in default of appointment, or where there is a bad appointment.

SECTION I.

WHAT ESTATES MAY BE CREATED IN POINT OF PERPETUITY.

1. **BEFORE** we enter into the consideration of the estates which may be created under *powers* in point of perpetuity, it will be necessary to ascertain what estates
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the law will not permit to be created under an original instrument, by reason of their tendency to a perpetuity. Mr. Justice Buller, in delivering judgment in *Robinson v. Hardcastle* (a), stated it as settled, that nothing less than an estate of inheritance could be limited under a power to a person unborn at the time of the execution of the deed creating a power, *because every execution of a power must be coupled with the power itself, and a life-estate to a person not in esse could not have been limited in the deed creating the power.* The learned Judge cited several cases to prove this position, which do not bear him out, and particularly an opinion of Wilmot's (b) on this point, who said that he had known a case where there had been an only child, and that child had, under a power to appoint to children, been made tenant for life, with remainder in tail to its issue ; but he much doubted whether it could be legally done : manifestly, Mr. Justice Buller added, pointing out, that if a child to whom an estate is limited under a power is not born at the time the power is created, he can only take an estate of inheritance.

I cite this passage to rescue my Lord Chief Justice Wilmot from the imputation of having laid down any such doctrine. That very learned Judge's doubt was, not whether a person not *in esse* could be made tenant for life, but whether under a power to appoint to *children*, grand-children were proper objects. His doubt arose on the estate limited to the issue of the children, and not upon the life-estate limited to the child himself. His opinion on this point is contained in a case upon a will which occurred while he was a Judge of B. R. ;
 " I dare

(a) 2 Term Rep. 241.

(b) See 2 Wils. 337.

“ I dare say,” he observed, “ the variation in the wording of the will arose from a notion in the drawer that you cannot make an after-born son tenant for life. I have known such a notion prevail in the country, *though nothing is more untrue (c).*” And it is incontrovertibly settled, that an unborn son may be made tenant for life, and that a vested remainder may be limited thereon to a person *in esse (d)*; but it is equally clear that the estate cannot be limited to the children of the unborn tenant for life as purchasers. Upon this point Mr. Booth and Mr. Yorke were clearly agreed in Mr. Baker’s case. They considered it as a possibility upon a possibility, which the law could not endure (e). Mr. Fearne was of the same opinion (f), and in *Haye v. the Earl of Coventry (g)*, Lord Kenyon said it was clearly settled, that an estate for life may be limited to unborn issue, provided the deviser does not go farther, and give an estate *in succession* to the children of such unborn son, by which expression it is clear that he meant that the children could not take as purchasers. This is proved by an observation which he made in another case; he said, that “an unborn child may be made tenant, in tail, but not tenant for life, *with a limitation to his children as purchasers (h)* ;” and it is distinctly laid down in the reasons for the respondent in the Duke of Marlborough’s case, that if after the first vested estate of freehold you limit a contingent estate, or use for life to a person unborn, and then follow it with

(c) *Evans v. Astley*, 2 Blackst. 529.

(d) *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357.

(e) See 2 vol. Ca. and Opin. 435. 440.

(f) Posth. 215.

(g) 3 Term Rep. 86.

(h) 1 East, 452.

with contingent remainders in tail to the sons or children of such unborn tenant for life, such contingent limitations of the inheritance would be void (*i*); and we learn from Lord Kenyon that this doctrine was afterwards recognized by the learned Chief, who delivered the opinion of the Judges on the case in the House of Lords (*k*). Indeed a limitation like this is clearly void by reason of its tendency to a perpetuity, independently of the technical objection of its being a possibility upon a possibility, which probably means the same thing. For, in the first place, a life not in being at the creation of the limitation, and a few months for gestation are taken, as the unborn tenant for life may be *in ventre matris* at his father's decease. Then twenty-one years and a few months more for gestation may be required, as the tenant for life may in like manner die, leaving a child *in ventre sa mere*, so that a century may easily elapse before the entail can be barred. Now, in the common case of a limitation to one for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, the estate is not, *by force of the limitation*, tied up for more than a life *in being*, and twenty-one years and a few months, allowing for the gestation and infancy of the tenant in tail, although in this as well as in every other limitation, the estate may, by successive deaths and infancies, be tied up for a vast number of years; but that, as Mr. Justice Buller has correctly observed, is by operation of law, and the limitation cannot be affected by legal consequences (*l*). And it may be remarked by the way, that

(*i*) 5 Bro. P. C. 608.

(*k*) See 1 East, 453.

(*l*) See 4 Ves. jun. p. 328; but see 12 Ves. jun. p. 232;

see Lord Southampton v. Lord Hertford, 2 Ves. and Bea. 61;

Marshall v. Holloway, Lord Chan. June 1820, MS.

that it is perhaps not yet clear that the law will, even in the case of an executory devise, permit the twenty-one years and a few months to be taken independently of the birth and infancy of the devisee (*m*).

But as a child in *ventre sa mere* is considered as a life in being, an estate may be settled on him for life, with remainder to his sons as purchasers, in the same way as if he were actually born (*n*).

II. To proceed to the immediate point of inquiry :— An important distinction is established between general and particular powers. By a general power we understand a right to appoint to whomsoever the donee pleases. By a particular power it is meant that the donee is restricted to some objects designated in the deed creating the power, as to his own children (*o*). A general power is, in regard to the estates which may be created by force of it, tantamount to a limitation in fee, not merely because it enables the donee to limit a *fee*, which a particular power may also do, but because it enables him to give the fee to whom he pleases ; he has an absolute disposing power over the estate, and may bring it into the market whenever his necessities or wishes may lead him

(*m*) See Gilb. on Uses, 270, n. —The Judges of the Common Pleas have since certified in favour of the gift. A case has been directed by the Lord Chancellor to the Judges of the King's Bench, who certified against the validity of the gift, 5 Barn. and Ald. ; and the Lord Chancellor has made a decree according to the last certificate. 1 Turner, 25.

(*n*) *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 1 New Rep. 393, where the observation, although addressed to an unborn child generally, is evidently confined by the context to a child in *ventre sa mere*.

(*o*) See Butler's note to Co. Litt. 271, b ; and see Powell's note to *Fearne's Ex. Dev.* p. 327, n. (a) ; *ib.* 371. 377.

him to do so. It has been held that such a power is within the exception in the old annuity act of estates of which the grantor is seised in fee (*p*). Therefore whatever estates may be created by a man seised in fee may equally be created under a general power of appointment; and the period for the commencement of the limitations, in point of perpetuity, is the time of the *execution* of the power, and not of the *creation* of it. Thus we have seen, that if *A* were to convey his estate to his unborn son for life, remainder to the sons of that son as purchasers, the limitations to the children of the son would be void, as tending to a perpetuity; but if *A* were to convey his estate to such uses generally as he should appoint, he might afterwards, upon the birth of a son, limit the estate to that son for life, remainder to his sons as purchasers, in precisely the same terms as if at the birth of the son he had been seised in fee. Mr. Powell, in one of his notes to Fearne's Executory Devises, admits this doctrine to be true, where the general power of appointment, and the fee-simple, in default of appointment, are vested in the *same* person by the deed creating the power. But he contends that, where the *act* is *merely* an *exercise* of the power, *capable* of taking effect by *virtue* of the power *only*, the uses limited by the power must be such as would have been good if limited by the original deed; and he illustrates this position in the following manner (*q*): "If *A*, owner of an estate in fee-simple in lands, were to limit them to the use of such person or persons (generally) for such estate or estates, &c. as he (*A*) should appoint, and in the

(*p*) Halsey v. Halls, 7 Term Rep. 194.

(*q*) Powell's n. to Fearne's Ex. Dev. p. 5.

the mean time, and subject to such power, to the use of *B* in fee, and then *A* exercised his power in favour of *C*, (a person unborn at the time of the creation of the power) for life, remainder to his first and other sons in fee, so as to make the sons of *C* take by purchase, he would thereby be enabled to tie up the property beyond the period of a life in being, and twenty-one years after, computed from the time at which the instrument creating the power bore date (which is the point of time to which our attention must be directed), in the same manner as if such declaration were made in the exercise of a special power; for in such case, if the appointment were valid, no complete alienation could take place until the unborn issue of the son of *C* (if any), (he, *C*, being unborn at the time of the creation of the power) attained twenty-one. Or, taking it in another point of view, the person in whom the fee is vested, subject to the power, could not alien his estate, but subject to be divested by *C*'s issue (if any), and such issue would take the fee-simple under the power, as purchasers, though the unborn issue of a person unborn at the creation of the power."

Now, in opposition to the foregoing remarks, we cannot fail to observe, that neither with regard to the limitations themselves, nor to the estate limited in default of appointment, is there any objection whatever on the ground of perpetuity. In regard to the limitations, they are merely such as a man seised in fee might create; and, as the power is equivalent to the fee, the same estates may be created by force of both. To take a distinction between a general power and a limitation in fee is to grasp at a shadow whilst the

substance escapes. By the creation of the power no perpetuity, not even a tendency to a perpetuity, is effected. The donee may sell the estate the next moment; and when he exercises the power in strict settlement as if he were seised in fee, he creates those estates only which the law permits with reference to the time at which they were raised. If we are to consider the interests of the person who takes until appointment, no perpetuity in regard to him is created beyond the life of the donee of the power. And when the power is executed, it is immaterial to him what estates are created by it, for in whatever mode the fee is disposed of, his estate is defeated. But it certainly is not necessary to advert to his estate, as the grand object of the law's anxiety against perpetuities—the restraint of alienation—is in this case avoided. The donee may, notwithstanding the estate is limited over to a stranger, dispose of the estate in the same manner as if he were seised in fee. There appears, therefore, to be no solid principle upon which the distinction taken by Mr. Powell can be supported.

With respect to particular powers, they have a tendency to a perpetuity, which is not obviated by their enabling the donee to limit the fee. For the question in these cases is, not whether the donee *can* limit *a fee*, but whether he can, through the medium of his power, dispose of the estate *as if he were seised in fee* of it. It is well established, therefore, that under a particular power, as a power to appoint to children, no estate can be created which would not have been valid if limited in the deed creating the power. The test of the validity of the estates raised is to place them in the deed

deed creating the power, in lieu of the power itself. Thus, if by a settlement an estate be limited to *A* for life, remainder to his children as he shall appoint, and he afterwards appoint to a son born subsequently to the settlement for life, remainder to the children of that son as purchasers, read the limitations as if inserted in the settlement in the place of the power, and they will stand thus: to *A* for life, remainder to his unborn son for life, remainder to the sons of that son as purchasers. Now the limitation to the grandchildren would have been void if contained in the settlement; and therefore it cannot be sustained as a due execution of the power.

But it is important in these cases to consider whether the power was *created* by will or deed; this speaks from the execution of it, that from the death of the testator; so that in the case of a power *created* by will, children born in the testator's life-time, though *after his will*, stand in the same situation as children born at the execution of the deed where the power is created by deed (*r*). We must be careful not to destroy this distinction by extending it to an instrument *executing* a power; for whether the power be executed by deed or will, the limitation, in regard to the question of perpetuity, must receive the same construction. The point of inquiry is the instrument *creating*, and not the instrument *executing*, the power.

It remains to observe, that a power may be given to a person *in esse*, to appoint an estate amongst his grand-children, or more remote issue born during his life; and even where the power is given generally,
yet

(*r*) *Duke of Devonshire v. Lord G. Cavendish*, 4 Term Rep. 741.

yet if he only appoint to such as are living at his death it will be good (I) (s). There is no objection to the due execution of such a power on the ground of perpetuity. And a power to appoint to "issue," includes all issue, however remote, born in due time (t).

But although a limitation under a power may be void, as too remote, yet where the power is *executed* by *will*, the courts will construe it as a proper will, and endeavour to put such a construction on the limitation as will bring it within the proper limits. This will be considered hereafter (u).

(s) *Hockley v. Mawbey*, 1 Ves. jun. 150; *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357. (t) *Hockley v. Mawbey*, *ubi sup.* (u) *Vide infra*, sect. 8.

(I) As to the effect of an appointment to those born afterwards, *vide infra*, sect. 8.

SECTION II.

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF POWERS IN GENERAL.

WE may here consider: 1. What estates may be created under powers in general; 2. The construction of limitations in instruments executing powers; and 3. What acts are authorized by different powers, reserving the consideration of such powers as appear to require a separate discussion.

And 1. Where the intention is clear, a power may enable the disposition of a fee, although no words of inheritance are used, as, where a testator gives a power to *sell* lands, the donee may sell the inheritance, because

the testator gives the same power he himself had (*a*). So where by a power in a will the tenants for life were merely authorized to appoint the estate *to trustees* upon trust to raise a jointure for any wife they might marry, during her *life only*, the power was held to authorize a limitation to trustees in fee (*b*), although the power did not include the word heirs, or words tantamount to them, and the trust was expressly restrained to the life of the wife; and notwithstanding that the construction contended for authorized any one tenant for life in possession, to convert the legal remainders over into equitable estates, so that no subsequent tenant for life could raise a legal jointure. Upon the same case, however, the Court of Common Pleas certified that the appointment was void (*c*), and the Lord Chancellor determined the case according to their certificate (*d*). A general power to dispose of an estate in favour of a particular object will authorize the limitation of a fee, although no words of inheritance are contained in the power. This was decided in the 26 Car. 2, in a case which underwent great consideration (*e*). The devise was to the testator's wife for life, "and by her to be disposed of to such of my children as she shall think fit." It was agreed that the wife took for life only, and that the power to dispose did not relate to her life-estate; but the question remained as to what estate the wife was authorized to limit to the children. Upon the

(*a*) *Liefe v. Saltingstone*, *infra*.

(*b*) *Wykham v. Wykham*, 11 East, 458.

(*c*) 3 Taunt. 316.

(*d*) 18 Ves. 395.

(*e*) *Liefe v. Saltingstone*, 1

Mod. 189; 1 Freem. 149. 163, 176; 2 Lev. 104; Cart. 232; and see Anon. 2 Kel. Cha. Ca. 6.

the second argument, Vaughan, Chief Justice, and Atkins, seemed to incline that she should have power to dispose of an estate for life only, because, if the testator had said, *I dispose of it to my son*, it would have been but an estate for life. But Windham and Ellis held otherwise, as there was a difference between a devise of an interest and a power; and they granted, that if the testator had said *I dispose of it to my son*, it would have been but for life; but here the testator gives a power to dispose, which seems to imply such a power as he himself had, which was to dispose of the fee (I) (f). After another argument, Atkins came over to the opinion of Windham and Ellis, and they three pronounced judgment in favour of the power enabling a limitation of the fee. But Vaughan, Chief Justice, dissented from his brothers, on the ground that the wife was merely to nominate what person should take by the will, the plain signification of which was, "I bequeath the estate to such of my children as my wife shall think fit, at her disposal;" and by this way the children would take it expressly by the gift of the testator; and the words (at her disposal) are with relation to the children, and not to the estate: and when she hath disposed of it to any child, that child shall have but an estate for life. But he added (with some want of decorum) *subirascens, sententiæ numerantur non ponderantur*.

(f) See 1 Freem. 164.

(I) Levinz states, from the relation of a friend, that Vaughan and Atkins were in favour of a fee, and Windham and Ellis *contra*; but he was misinformed, 2 Lev. 104, *nom.* Sir Richard Saltonstall's case.

In Leonard Lovie's case (*g*) the uses of a feoffment were declared to be to the use of the settlor for life, with power to make leases, and then to the use of the performance of his will, and to the use of such person and persons to whom he should devise any *estate or estates* in the premises ; and it was holden, that without question he might devise the land to any person in tail or fee.

And in a recent case in the court of King's Bench (*h*), the testator, after an estate for life to his grand-daughter, gave the estate to the lawful *issue of her body, in such parts, shares, and proportions, manner and form*, as she should appoint, and in default of appointment to the children (as the Court determined) in fee. Lord Ellenborough, in delivering the judgment of the Court, said, that this power, in the course of the argument, was said, but not much pressed, to be only a power to appoint to her children in tail ; and if that were so, it would furnish an inference that the limitations which were to take place in default of appointment were intended to be of the same nature. But the Court thought that this devise gave a power to appoint in fee ; for admitting that there might be ground to contend that the power was only to appoint in tail, if the power of appointment had only been "to the use of her lawful issue, in such parts, shares, and proportions as she should direct," (upon which it was not to be understood that they gave any opinion (*i*),) yet when the words "manner and form" were added, there could be no doubt

(*g*) 10 Rep. 78.

(*h*) *Rex v. the Marquis of Stafford*, 7 East, 521.

(*i*) See *Phelp v. Hay*, MS. App. No. 21.

doubt but that in order to give them some effect (and every word, if it could, ought to be made to operate), something more must be understood than merely a power of unequal division of an estate to be limited in a certain course of descent: and if they did mean anything beyond a power of division, they must import a power of determining the nature and quantity of the estate the issue should take: and if so, the mother might appoint estates in fee to all or any of her children.

In a case before the late Master of the Rolls (*k*), the testator, after devising an estate to his wife for life, gave it “unto and amongst all and every our children, in such *manner* and in such proportions as she shall appoint.” He then empowered his wife to sell the estates, and to lay out the money, and receive the interest for life; and after her decease he directed and appointed the same, both principal and interest, to be paid “to and among our children in such proportions as aforesaid.” The widow made no appointment. The Master of the Rolls said, that though in the devise of the lands in the first part of the will there were no words of inheritance, yet in the subsequent part, the testator giving his wife power to sell the estate, and appointing the money, both principal and interest, among the children, as the testator could not be supposed to intend to give them a larger interest in that part than in the former, they took several estates of inheritance.

It should seem, therefore, that the Master of the Rolls thought that the power did not authorize a limitation of the fee; but he was not called upon to deliver an

(*k*) *Casterton v. Sutherland*, 9 Ves. jun. 415.

opinion on the point. Upon the authority of *Liefe v. Saltingstone*, and the opinion of the Court of King's Bench in the Marquis of Stafford's case, he would perhaps have been of opinion that a fee might be limited, had it been necessary to decide the question. For in all these cases it is quite clear that the testator means the fee to pass; and the word *manner*, or any word of the like effect, may well be construed in favour of the intention to mean, in such mode, *as to the quantity of estate to be given*, as the donee shall think fit. The case of *Liefe v. Saltingstone* has been entirely overlooked in the modern cases, although it is a most important authority in favour of that construction which all mankind must wish to prevail—a construction that effectuates the testator's intention.

In equity, a power to appoint an estate, directed to be bought with the money to arise by sale of another estate directed to be sold, may be exercised over the estate directed to be sold in the same manner as it might be over the estate directed to be purchased (*l*).

At law, a particular power of charging lands will not authorize a limitation of the fee as a security for the sum to be raised.

Thus, in *Jenkins v. Keymis* (*m*), a tenant for life under a settlement, having a power to *charge* the land with 2,000*l.* conveyed the inheritance, without referring to the power, by way of mortgage for securing 2,000*l.* and interest,

(*l*) *Bullock v. Fladgate*, 1 Ves. and Bea. 471; see and consider *Pearson v. Lane*, 17 Ves. jun. 101; and observe that the rents and profits until sale were directed to be laid out with the principal. Lord Harkwicke's doctrine, in *Trafford v. Boehm*, 3 Atk. 446, 447, has been questioned.

(*m*) 1 Lev. 150; Hard. 395; 1 Cha. Ca. 103.

interest, and it was determined, both at law and in equity, that the power was not executed. Hale, Chief Baron, said, that the power might have been well executed by a grant of the land until 2,000 *l.* was raised by the profits, or by a declaration of use until 2,000 *l.* was received, or by a deed charging the land with the sum ; but he doubted whether a release of the inheritance was within the power, for by this mode all the subsequent estates would be destroyed, which was not the intent of the parties.

But it should seem, that at this day, if a clear intention appeared to execute the power, equity would consider such an execution as that in *Jenkins v. Keymis* a substantial, although defective, execution, and would relieve against the defect in favour of the mortgagee ; and it has been ruled, that in equity an unlimited power to charge an estate will authorize a disposition of the estate itself, in trust to sell and divide the money amongst the objects. This was decided by Lord Rosslyn in *Long v. Long* (*n*), where the estate was limited to the father for life, remainder to the wife and issue in strict settlement ; and power was given to the father, in case there were any younger children, to charge the estate with the payment “ of such sum or sums of money,” for the benefit of the children, as he should think fit. By his will he directed the estate to be sold, and gave the money amongst his children, giving the eldest son a very small portion. The bill was filed for sale of the estate, and the Chancellor stopped the argument, and treated the

(*n*) 5 Ves. jun. 445 ; Reg. Lib. B. 1799, fo. 1023. The power the whole value of the estate might be appointed so as plaintiffs insisted, that under the totally to exclude the eldest son.

point as clear. This appointment he said was *in substance* exactly what he had a right to do. The late Master of the Rolls, addressing himself to this judgment, said, that it determines this, that to enable a person to sell land it is not necessary to have that authority given to him (o). The terms of the settlement in *Long v. Long* gave room in a peculiar degree for that implication; for it might be contended that was only a power to charge; and the estate was to be in possession of the eldest son. Of necessity it was to be implied that the estate was to be permitted to remain in the eldest son, to bear the charge; and therefore nothing but a charge could be intended. But it was held, that as there was nothing to restrain him in the amount, and he might have charged the utmost value, he had done only what was equivalent to that. It was supposed the eldest son had all he was entitled to, if he had in money all he could have claimed in land.

It is to be regretted that so important a decision as that in the case of *Long v. Long* should have been pronounced without all the arguments which might have been adduced against it having been heard. The case of the *Earl of Tankerville v. Coke* (p), might have been cited. In that case a particular power of jointuring was given to a tenant for life, and a general power to charge the lands with portions for younger children. The tenant for life charged the lands with very heavy sums. It was insisted that the Court would cut down the power as unreasonable, *as it appeared that the testator*

(o) See 6 Ves, jun. 797; 1 Ves. and Bea. 478.

(p) Mose. 146; and see Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour, *sup.* p. 276.

tator designed the estate to remain in the family. Lord Ch. King, assisted by Lord C. J. Raymond, and Mr. Baron Comyns, held that the donee had restrained his power by his marriage articles, so that it became unnecessary to decide the point; but all the three Judges expressed their opinion that the power was under the influence of the Court, and that an unreasonable execution of it would be relieved against. The hasty decision in *Long v. Long*, opposed, as it appears to be, by the well-considered case of *Tankerville v. Coke*, can scarcely be considered such an authority as will control any future decision, should the principle upon which it was made not be approved of.

In a late case in the Common Pleas, upon a devise to a wife for life of the residue of the testator's property, "reserving to her full power to will away any part or proportion of his said residue at her decease," with a gift over of the residue of what should not be disposed of by his wife, it was held that the wife had a power to dispose of the whole property (*q*).

In *Ward v. Hartpole* (*r*), a general power, with consent of trustees, to the tenant for life to raise any sum of money he should think fit, was held to be well exercised by a lease for lives granted *for a fine* at an annual rent, although the settlement also contained a power of leasing for lives at the best rent without fine.

The converse of the decision in *Long v. Long*, viz. that a power to grant the land enables a charge of a sum of money on the land, has also been decided. This
was

(*q*) *Cooke v. Farrand*, 2 Marsh. 421; 7 Taunt. 122. (*r*) 3 Bligh, 470.

was determined by Lord Hardwicke in the case of *Roberts v. Dixall* (s), where a father had a power *to appoint and divide* the estate among his younger children in such proportions as he should think proper. The father intending to exercise his power, gave a gross sum to the only younger child, and charged it on the estate and Lord Hardwicke decreed that the power was *in substance* well executed. It was true, he said, that the direct terms of the power were not pursued, but the intent and design of it were. *It was admitted that the father might have appointed part of the estate to be sold, and the money raised by such sale*; and what was done was exactly the same thing; the Court might order a sale. It was the same to the heir or remainder-man which way the child was to be provided for, only that giving a portion of the estate might be a mean to tear it to pieces, whereas now the estate would be kept entire; and it was better for the daughter, and perhaps thought so by the testator, that she should have a sum of money, than a small estate; *and though the will might not enure as a good execution of the power in strictness*, yet within the meaning and design of it it was a good charge for the young lady's benefit.

The case put by Lord Hardwicke in the preceding decree, as admitted in argument, occurred in specie in the late case of *Kenworthy v. Bate* (t). The parent had an exclusive power of appointing to any of his children. He gave the estate to trustees, to sell, and divide

(s) 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 668, pl. 19; 2 Ball and Beatty, 18; Trollope S. C. Appendix, No. 22. The facts and decree stated from *Lib. Reg.*; *Palmer v. Wheeler*, 2 Ball and Beatty, 18; *Trollope v. Linton*, 1 Sim. and Stu. 477. (t) 6 Ves. jun. 793; see 1 Ves. and Bea. 78.

divide the money amongst his children. The Master of the Rolls treated this case as infinitely less strong than Long and Long, which, as we have seen, was a direct determination that a power to charge includes a power to sell ; and the learned Judge thought it followed that a power to give includes a power to sell, for the purpose of giving the money instead of the land.

In a case of frequent reference, prior in point of time even to the case of Roberts and Dixall, under a power to appoint to children *for such estate and estates*, and in such *shares and proportions*, as the parent should think fit, he limited a rent-charge to his youngest son and the heirs of his body, and in default of such issue he charged the estate, which would then go to his eldest son under the settlement, with portions for his daughters (*u*). The execution of the power was resisted by the eldest son. The testator might, it was said, have distributed the land amongst his younger children in what proportions he thought fit, but had not power to devise a rent-charge, or sums of money ; but the Court over-ruled this plea to the daughters' bill for their portions, and the decree was affirmed in the House of Lords.

But it has been determined at law, by three Judges against one, that a limitation to the use of such persons as *A* should appoint, *for such interests, or otherwise*, as he should specify, did not authorize a limitation of a rent-charge, but a disposition of the estate of the land only (*x*).

In the Earl of Bath's case, Mr. Baron Powell, addressing

(*u*) Thwaytes v. Dye, 2 Vern. 80 ; Raith. ed. 3 Cha. Ca. 69.

(*x*) Browne v. Taylor, Cro. Car. 38 ; and see Lord Arundel v. Earl of Pembroke, Dy. 263.

dressing himself to the case of *Thwaytes and Dye*, said that one great question was, whether, the power being to limit estate or estates, he might limit a rent out of those lands : It was held, in equity, he might, and truly he thought that he might at law. There was, he confessed, an opinion against it in the case of *Browne v. Taylor*, where there were three Judges against one; but really he thought it was good in law (*y*).

From the present temper of the courts, there is great reason to suppose, that in a case like *Thwaytes v. Dye* it would, agreeably to the opinion of Mr. Baron Powell, be determined that a rent-charge might be limited even at law. There is no magic in words. "Estate or estates" mean quantity of interest, and a rent-charge is clearly a portion of the entire interest in the land. Such a determination, therefore, would be authorized, as well by the spirit as the words of the power. In *Browne v. Taylor* the words were strongly in favour of the power to limit a rent, and Croke, Justice, was of that opinion. It scarcely admits of doubt, but that in a similar case the courts would, at this day, decide that a legal rent might be limited under the power.

In a recent case, a power to a tenant for life "to raise or borrow any sum or sums of money not exceeding 1,500 *l.* and that without the consent of the trustees," was held to authorize the grant of a rent-charge until a principal sum of money and interest should be thereby fully paid (*z*); but the House of Lords in affirming the decree particularly stated that this was not to be considered as a general rule.

The

(*y*) And see *Middleton v. Pryor*, *Ambl.* 393.

(*z*) *Blake v. Marnell*, 2 Ball and Beatty, 35; 4 Dow, 248, S.C.

The principle of the late decisions, it must be observed, has been extended in practice ; and some gentlemen treat the case of Kenworthy and Bate as a decision that the power was *legally* executed. It cannot be discovered from the decree what the meaning of the Court on this head really was. The decree merely declares the power to be well executed, and orders a sale, in which all proper parties were to join (*a*). We have seen, however, that the case of Thwaytes and Dye was deemed an equitable execution only ; and Lord Hardwicke admitted, that in *Roberts v. Dixall*, the power was not legally executed. Of course in *Long v. Long*, the execution was deemed valid in equity only (*b*). In most of these cases it may well be held that the power is *substantially* executed ; but consistently with the established rules on the construction of powers at law, it could not be determined that a power to *charge* includes a power to *give the estate itself*, or that a power to give the *estate to one* enables a gift of it to *another* to sell for his benefit. The trustee in that case is not an object of the power, and the courts of law would not advert to the trust. The party not being an object of the power is of itself a sufficient objection to the execution at law ; for in *Hervey and Hervey*, under a power of jointuring, Lord Hardwicke considered it clear that no conveyance could be pursuant to the power but what was *to the wife* herself only (*c*). Nor is the case of *Peters v. Masham*, which will be hereafter

(*a*) Reg. Lib. A. 1801, fol. 1000.

ance when of age ; and see *Jenkins v. Keymis*, *supra*.

(*b*) See Reg. Lib. B. 1799, fol. 1023. The eldest son was directed to join in the convey-

(*c*) 1 Atk. 563, 564 ; and see *Ambl.* 341.

after stated, an authority against this rule ; for there it was considered that the donee had only to select the land, and not to limit the estate (*d*). These, therefore, cannot be considered as cases of *legal* executions. To make them so, a power to give the estate to *A* must be read as if it authorized a gift to any other person for his benefit. Even in cases like *Thwaytes v. Dye*, and *Browne v. Taylor*, a court of equity could scarcely hold the power *legally* executed without the last case having been first over-ruled in a court of law.

A power to grant a rent-charge on any part of the estate of a particular value will not, even in equity, authorize a charge of the rent on the entire estate, because in such cases the intent is that the whole estate shall not be encumbered (*e*) ; so a power to settle part of the land of a given value, will not authorize a grant of a rent-charge of the same value on the whole estate (*f*), but equity, where there is a proper consideration, will of course relieve against the defective execution.

In *Whitlock's case* (*g*) it was laid down and agreed to by the whole Court, that under a power to make an estate for three lives, the donee cannot make a lease for ninety-nine years determinable upon three lives.

But in that case a distinction was taken between such a particular power affirmative, and a general power restrained with a negative, as a power generally to make leases, with a proviso that they should not exceed three
lives

(*d*) *Fitz.* 156 ; *Fortes.* 339,
infra, sect. 8. 11.

(*e*) *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 *Atk.*
561.

(*f*) *Earl of Tyrconnel v. Duke*
of *Ancaster*, 2 *Ves.* 500.

(*g*) 8 *Rep.* 69, b. S. C.
1 *Brownl.* 169, nom. *Chappel*
v. Whitlock;

lives or twenty-one years; under which it was determined that he might make a lease for ninety-nine years determinable on three lives, because the power was absolute and indefinite; and the proviso of correction is added, that the lease shall not exceed three lives or twenty-one years, which clause is negative, and qualifies the generality of the first proviso; and a lease for ninety-nine years, determinable on three lives, *does not exceed* three lives, although in truth it is not a lease for lives.

The first resolution in Whitlock's case appears to have been much debated in a case called *Rattle v. Popham* (*h*), where, under a power to a tenant for life in a marriage settlement, to limit the estate to any woman he should marry, for her life, by way of jointure, and in bar of dower, he made a lease for ninety-nine years, determinable on the death of his wife; and it was determined in the Court of King's Bench, whilst Lord Hardwicke was Chief, that however she might be entitled to relief in a court of equity, it could never be said to be an execution of the power; for the estates are very different, one being a freehold, and the other a chattel, and the freehold in her being a qualification to any future husband to be a member of parliament, kill game, &c. But if the power had been general to provide for a wife *so as that he did not make a greater estate than for life*, because an estate for years determinable on a life is a less estate, such an estate might have been raised by virtue of the latter power, which
authorizes

(*h*) Str. 992; Cunn. 102; and Amb. 335; the same point decided. see 2 Ves. 644; and see accordingly *Churchman v. Harvey*,

authorizes the creation of any estate that is not greater than an estate for life (i). And the Court founded their decision on Whitlock's case, and treated it as a very plain case.

In a case before Lord Mansfield, he said, that in the case of *Rattle v. Popham* the Court thought themselves bound by Whitlock's case, and held the lease not to be warranted by the power. The widow brought her bill in the Court of Chancery; and Lord Talbot, arguing from the same premises, the power and the lease, without any other circumstance, held the lease to be warranted by the power. He said it was *not a defective*, but a blundering execution; and he decreed the defendant to pay all the costs, both at law and in equity (k).

Lord Mansfield adduced this decision of Lord Talbot's in support of his favourite doctrine, that whatever was an equitable, ought to be deemed a legal, execution of a power. In a late case before Lord Redesdale, in which he combated this doctrine, he said, that if Lord Mansfield found fault with the decision in the case of *Rattle v. Popham*, as he was represented to have done, he (Lord Redesdale) thought, with deference, that there was no ground for the remark (l); and indeed, notwithstanding Lord Mansfield's assertion, it appears, from a manuscript note of the case, which will be found in the Appendix to this volume, that Lord Talbot admitted clearly that the power was *not* well executed *at law*, but he relieved the wife against the defective execution,

(i) See 10 East, 181.

(l) 1 Scho. and Lef. 71.

(k) 2 Burr. 1147.

execution, on the general rule of equity (*m*); and on the same principle, viz. relief of equity against the defect, Lord Nottingham, when Lord Keeper, is reported to have said that the resolution in Whitlock's case might be laughed at (*n*).

In a late case (*o*), where a power authorized a lease "for any number of years not exceeding twenty-one years, or for the life or lives of any one, two or three person or persons, so as no greater estate than for three lives be at any one time in being in any part of the premises," the Court held, that the power authorized a lease for years, or a lease for lives, but not a lease for years determinable on lives. They relied upon the distinction in Whitlock's case, where the power, as in this case, particularized the species of lease, and they treated the case of *Rattle v. Popham* as well decided at law.

The result of the authorities appears to be, that, subject to the distinction taken in Whitlock's case, where a freehold interest is authorized to be appointed under a power, a different species of estate, although less valuable, as a term of ninety-nine years determinable with the life, cannot at law be granted. But that in equity such an execution will be supported, because less than the power is effected, and it clearly appears how much less: If the appointee should outlive the ninety-nine years, the estate, as to the residue of his life, will be undisposed of, and will go over to the remainder-man, or other person entitled (*p*).

(*m*) S. C. nom. *Newport v. Savage*, MS. App. No. 23.

(*n*) 1 Freem. 308.

(*o*) *Roe v. Prideaux*, 10 East, 158.

(*p*) See 2 Ves. 645; *Churchman v. Harvey*, Ambl. 335.

But although a different interest cannot be given from that designated in the power, for example, a chattel interest instead of a freehold, yet it seems, that where the nature of the interest is the same, the appointment will be good at law as well as in equity, although the power is not executed to its fullest extent.

Of course, if a power expressly required that an estate in fee, and *no other*, shall be appointed, a less estate than a fee cannot be limited; and even where a power authorizes the appointment of a fee, and there are not any express words of restriction, it has been considered in practice that a less estate cannot be given (*q*). But in the case of *Bovey v. Smith*, it was said by the Court that such a power may be executed at several times; an estate for life may be appointed at one time, and the fee at another time (*r*). And the case of *Phelp v. Hay* (*s*) appears to be a direct authority, that under a power to appoint to one or more of several objects, *their, his, or her heirs and assigns*, in such manner, form, &c. as the donee may choose, an estate-tail may be given. The words there were peculiarly strong. The limitation, which was in a deed, was to the use of three children, or to any or either of them, *their, his, or her heirs and assigns*, in such manner and form, and by and after such rates, shares, and proportions, and charged and chargeable with such sum and sums of money unto and amongst any or either of them, and at such time or times, as the mother should appoint; in default of appointment, to the children as tenants in common *in fee*. The donee appointed a sum to one child, and the estate, subject

(*q*) See *Snape v. Turton*, Cro. Car. 472.

(*r*) 1 Vern. 84.

(*s*) MS. Appendix, No. 21.

subject to that, to another (as the Court determined) in tail, with remainder to the first in tail. And Sir Thomas Sewell, Master of the Rolls, decreed in favour of the appointment.

In ill-penned powers of sale it sometimes happens that the party is authorized to appoint the estate to the purchaser, his heirs and assigns, which should never be done (*t*); for it has in this case also been contended in practice, that the estate can only be appointed to the purchaser in fee, and not to uses to bar dower, or to any other uses which the case may require. To obviate this difficulty, where it was intended to bar the purchaser's wife of dower, it has been recited (contrary to the fact) that the contract was entered into by *A*, as agent for *B*, the real purchaser, and the estate has been conveyed to *A* in fee, in trust for the purchaser. But upon the authority of *Phelp and Hay* it may be thought that the doubt in this case is not well founded. If it be well founded, there is great reason to contend that the estate *must* be conveyed to the purchaser himself in fee, and that a conveyance to a fictitious purchaser as a trustee would be absolutely void, he not being an object of the power. But really, when it is once admitted that the intention of the power is to be regarded, and not the precise terms of it (*u*), there seems to be no ground for this practice. The *intention* expressly is, that the inheritance of the estate shall be sold, but the mode of the conveyance rests in the breast of the purchaser. The direction simply amounts to a declaration that the fee shall belong to the purchaser. It merely expresses what would be implied in the power, in the absence of an ex-

(*t*) *Vide supra*, p. 204.

(*u*) See *Morris v. Preston*, *infra*.

press provision, it being clear that a power to trustees to sell an estate will authorize them to appoint the estate to the purchaser in fee, although the power be silent on that head. Now, if the direction were wholly omitted it would scarcely be doubted that the estate might be conveyed to any uses the purchasers should desire. Therefore, according to the rule of law, that *expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur*, it may be contended, independently of decision, that although the trustees of the power are only authorized by the words of it to appoint the estate to the purchaser in fee, yet they may appoint it to uses to bar dower, or in any other manner that the purchaser may direct; and so the point has lately been decided by the Lord Chancellor. He held that an appointment to a trustee for the real purchaser was a valid execution of the power (*x*).

The case of *Phelp and Hay* only shows that a less interest may be appointed than that authorized where the interest is a freehold. But the same principle applies to chattel interests; nor are cases wanting on this head. In the case of *Briers (or Breers) and Boulton* (*y*) (which, like most of the cases in the same reporter, it is scarcely possible to comprehend), it seems to have been holden at law, that under a power to grant an annuity till 200 *l.* was received, an annuity might be granted till a less sum was raised; and *Jones and Twisden* said, that on the statute for leases otherwise than for three lives or twenty-one years, a lease for less is good, which is a clear point. And in the case of *Harris v. Bessie* (*z*), a power was given to devise 300*l.*; and the donee disposed of

(*x*) *Howard v. Ducane*, 1
Turn. 81.

(*y*) 3 Keb. 692, 745.
(*z*) 1 Keb. 347.

of 200 *l.* by fifties, and it was held good by the Court, and they took a distinction between a power of attorney to make a lease, and a power reserved for that purpose. In the first case a lease cannot be made for less, in the last it may.

Where a power is to lease for any term or number of years *not exceeding* a given number, a lease may of course be made for any term within the limit.

In *Winter v. Loveday*, a question arose upon a complicated power, whether it authorized a lease for a term absolute, or dependant upon lives (*a*). The power was to lease, “if in possession for one, two, or three lives, *or for* the term of thirty years, *or for* any other number or term of years, determinable upon one, two or three lives, or in reversion *for* one or two lives, or *for* the term of thirty years, or *for* any other number or term of years, determinable on one or two lives.” Mr. Justice Rokeby held, that a term could only be granted determinable upon lives; but Lord Chief Justice Holt, and Turton and Eyre, Justices, held, that a lease for thirty years absolutely was good within the proviso, for the words of the proviso were for one or two lives, or for the term of thirty years, or for any other number or term of years, determinable on one or two lives, &c. where the repetition of the particle (*for*) disjoins and separates the sentence, and makes so many distinct clauses, so that the donee had power to make leases either for one or two lives, or for thirty years, or for any number of years, determinable on one or two lives; he had his election to make the one lease or the other;

(*a*) 1 Com. 37, and other books; and see *Roe v. Prideaux*, 10 East, 158.

if he could not lease but for thirty years determinable on two lives, the preposition (for) in the clause (for the term of thirty years) would govern the whole sentence, which would have been penned in this manner, viz. for the term of thirty years determinable, &c. or rather, for any term or number of years determinable on one or two lives; for if such a construction were to be made, what occasion would there be for these words, (for the term of thirty years)? They might be entirely omitted; but as the sentence runs, for the term of thirty years, or for any other number or term of years, such repetition or reiteration makes them distinct clauses; and as the first (for) governs the first clause (for the term of thirty years), so the last preposition (for) governs the latter clause (for any term or number of years determinable, &c.) and explains the intent of the parties to be, that leases might be made for any number of years determinable on lives, so in like manner for thirty years absolutely.

In the case of *Lutwich and Piggot* (b), the power was to demise for three lives or *twenty-one years*, or under, or *for any term of years*, upon one, two, or three lives, or as tenant in tail in possession might do. It was insisted that a lease for twenty-one years only could be granted determinable upon lives; but the Court, with great reason, supported a lease granted under the power for ninety-nine years, determinable upon three lives.

A general power to a tenant for life to grant a term or estate, without specifying the duration of it, will enable him to grant a term beyond his own life, although

(b) 3 Mod. 268.

although it defeat the remainders over, for otherwise the power would be merely idle and void, as every tenant for life may alien the estate during his own life (c).

A power to grant an interest in possession will not of course authorize a grant in reversion. What amounts to a reversion is a question which generally occurs only on leases, and shall therefore be reserved for the next chapter. In the same place we shall have occasion to consider in what cases concurrent interests can be granted (d). But we may here notice, that although a reversionary interest be granted where the power authorizes a grant in possession only, yet equity will in some cases supply the defective execution of the power where there is a meritorious consideration in the appointee (e).

In considering the extent of a power, the intention of the parties must be the guide. Thus, on the one hand, a power limited in terms has, in favour of the intention, been deemed a general power, whilst on the other hand a general power in terms has been cut down to a particular purpose.

The case of *Talbot v. Tipper* (f) is an instance of the first construction. In a settlement by Sir John Fortescue he reserved a power to make leases with fine or without fine, *and rendering such rents and services as he should think fit*. He made a lease without reserving *any* rent; and it was objected, that some rent ought to be reserved, and there not being any,

(c) *Hele v. Green*, 2 Ro. Abr. 261, pl. 10.

(d) Chap. 10, sect. 3.

(e) *Anon.* 2 Freem. 224.

(f) *Skin.* 427.

his power was not well executed; but the objection was overruled, because it being to reserve such rent as he should think fit, and he having thought fit to reserve no rent, this should not avoid the execution of the power, and especially he not having said such *yearly* rent; so that a pepper-corn reserved, payable forty years after, would have been sufficient, and therefore such matter should not be regarded as a cause sufficient to avoid the lease, where he had made it subject to a trust to pay the rents, issues and profits, to such persons as he should direct.

In the late case of *Morris v. Preston* (g), it appeared that in a settlement powers of sale and exchange were given to the trustees to preserve contingent remainders. And there was a power, in case of the death of any or either of the trustees, for the husband or wife, or the survivor, *with the consent of the surviving co-trustee or co-trustees*, to appoint any new trustee or trustees, and upon such appointment the *surviving co-trustee* should convey the estate, so that the *surviving trustee and trustees*, and the new trustee or trustees, might be jointly concerned in the trusts, in the same manner as such *surviving trustee* and the person so dying would have been in case he were living. The purchaser objected to the title of the trustees under the power of sale, because they were not appointed until the death of *both* the trustees under the original settlement, which was not authorized by the power, but the objection was waved without argument. Now the power in terms clearly did not extend to the event which happened: it contemplated only an appointment on the death of one trustee, and not an appoint-
ment

(g) 7 Ves. jun. 547.

ment after the death of both ; but the ground on which the plaintiff's counsel waved the objection must be, that the *intention* of the power was, that new trustees should be appointed whenever circumstances might require it. Clear as this point appears to be, it is to be regretted that the opinion of the Court was not taken upon it. It has more than once happened, that what counsel have given up in argument the Court have enforced.

An example of the second kind is exhibited in the case of *Bristow v. Warde* (*h*). There, by marriage articles, funds of each party were agreed to be settled on the husband and wife, and then as the husband should appoint *generally*, and in default of appointment to the children of the marriage as usual. It was insisted that his power was indefinite, and not confined to children. But Lord Rosslyn, after observing that the articles were made in order to secure a provision for the intended wife and the issue of the marriage, said that it would be a forced construction of articles to hold that a provision to be made for children, in default of appointment, to be equally distributable in the case of an appointment, should be subject to his debts, which would be the necessary consequence of holding that he had an indefinite power of appointing, for if he had that indefinite power it would be assets ; he might appoint to any one ; his creditors could affect it ; and if he executed his power for the children, the children must take it subject to the debts of their father. It was not, he added, the natural frame of such a settlement, nor was it the construction of the words of this. It was clear the power of appoint

. (*h*) 2 Ves. jun. 336. This case, however, must not be considered as establishing a general rule.

pointment was not indefinite, but was confined to the issue.

The cases of *Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour* (i), and the *Earl of Tankerville v. Coke* (k), which have been already noticed, are also strong authorities that a general power may be restrained to a particular purpose, where the intention of the parties demand such a construction. And in *Mildmay's case*, in my Lord Chief Justice Coke's first report (l), the estate was settled, in default of issue male, on the settler's three daughters in tail, with cross remainders. And it was provided that Sir Henry, the settler, might "limit any part of the lands to any person or persons for any life, lives, or years, for the payment of his debts, performing of his legacies, preferment of his servants, or any other reasonable considerations as to him should be thought good." One of the daughters died, whereby the two others became seised of the entirety, and Sir Henry limited a great part of the land to one of the surviving daughters and her husband for a thousand years, without reserving any rent. And upon these words in the proviso (other considerations), it was held that this word (other) could not comprehend any consideration expressed in the indentures before the proviso : for (other) ought to be other in nature, quality, and person, and the advancement of his daughters is the consideration mentioned before. And it was resolved, that the limitation of a thousand years was as well against the intent of the parties, as against the words of the proviso, for the intent was to make distribution of his lands amongst his three daughters, and the heirs of their bodies ; but if this limitation should be good it would

(i) *Supra*, p. 276.

(k) *Supra*, p. 456.

(l) P. 175, a.

would frustrate the estate of the other sister; and defraud the intent of the parties grounded upon a consideration of marriage. And this limitation for a thousand years, without any rent reserved, seemed also to be against the words of the proviso, for that cannot be called a reasonable consideration which tends to the subversion of the estates settled by the indenture upon good consideration against the meaning of the parties.

Where a power is given to appoint a fund (whether real or personal, and of whatever tenure) amongst several objects either *in esse*, or to be born, and the fund is, in default of appointment, given amongst the objects of the power, if there should ultimately be but *one* object of the power, an interest cannot be limited to him under the power, determinable on the happening of a particular event, for example, his death under twenty-one without issue.

This was decided in the case of *Doe v. Denny* (*m*). There, under a marriage settlement, the estate was limited to the use of such child or children of the marriage, and for such estate and estates, and subject to such powers, conditions, provisos, and limitations, as the wife should appoint; and in default of appointment, to the use of the children in fee; and in default of issue, then as the wife should appoint generally. There was only one child of the marriage, and the wife, by virtue of her powers, devised the estate to her son in fee; and in case he should die under twenty-one, *and without issue* (I), then over. The Court said, that it was clearly the

(*m*) Say. 295, reported; 2 Wils. 337, cited.

(I) These words, which are very important, are not noticed in Sayer's report.

the intention of the parties to the settlement that the issue should take an estate in fee ; and after showing that the *general* power given to the wife never arose (*n*), they held that the son took an estate in fee under the devise to him, or an estate in fee under the marriage settlement ; and in one report it is said that the wife could not alter the estate of the son.

In the later case of *Roe v. Dunt* (*o*), a copyhold estate was surrendered to the child or children of the marriage, in such proportion and proportions, and for such estate and estates, as the husband and wife, or the survivor, should appoint ; and in default of appointment, then to all the children in fee as tenants in common, and for want of such issue to the husband in fee. The husband, who survived his wife, appointed to the only child of the marriage in fee, when she attained twenty-one, but if she died under twenty-one, then he gave the estate over ; and the whole Court of C. B. were clearly of opinion that the husband had no power to make such appointment ; but there being only one child of the marriage, *that* child was entitled to the whole estate in fee. But Lord Chief Justice Wilmot said, that he thought *a single child in such a case as this might be made tenant in tail*. This case was decided on the authority of the preceding case of *Roe and Dunt*, but the Court thought the case at bar was a stronger case ; for if this power could have taken place, and the child had died under twenty-one, *and left issue*, that issue would have been disinherited.

It is observable that neither of the foregoing cases is an authority, that where the power authorizes not
merely

(*n*) *Vide supra*, p. 280.

(*o*) 2 Wils. 336.

merely a distribution as to shares, but also an appointment of the quantity of estate or interest in the land to be acquired by the objects of the power, the donee cannot limit a less estate than a fee to the sole object of the power, *so as that an absolute and not a defeasible estate be limited.* On the contrary, Lord Chief Justice Wilmot expressed his opinion, that a single child might in such case be made tenant in tail, and by a parity of reason the child might be made tenant for life, although a limitation for life would be nugatory where the object takes an estate of inheritance in default of appointment, because the estate for life limited to him under the power would merge in the estate of inheritance. But Mr. Serjeant Wilson, the reporter, adds a quære to the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice in *Roe and Dunt*, on the question under consideration. He does not, however, advance any argument against the opinion, nor, perhaps, would it be easy to frame one. Where the power, as in that case, authorizes an appointment to the *child* or children of the marriage, for such *estate and estates* as the donee shall limit, the words of the instrument cannot be satisfied without giving the donee a power to limit the *quantity of estate* to be taken by a single *child*, the only object of the power. A contrary construction would lead to endless difficulties. Suppose there to be two objects of the power, it will be admitted that an appointment of the estate to them in tail, with cross-remainders between them in tail, would be good ; then take it that one dies in the life-time of the donee of the power without issue, so that the survivor becomes the only object of the power, can it be seriously argued that the appointment would in that event become void, and

and that he would take the fee under the limitation in default of appointment; and if this appointment be good, does it not follow, on the same principle, that an appointment to a single and the only object of such a power in tail is equally valid? In truth, in both the above cases, the appointment appears to have been made with a view to defeat the limitation in the deed to the object of the power in default of appointment, and to increase the interest of the person executing the power at the expense of the object of the power.

But where the power simply authorizes an appointment of the *shares* to be taken by the objects, the power necessarily ceases when there is only one object, for he of course must take the whole.

Thus where by marriage articles leaseholds for lives were agreed to be conveyed to trustees to the use of the issue of *A* and *B*, in such shares and proportions as *A* should appoint, and for want of appointment to go to the children equally: There was only one child; and Lord Redesdale held that this power was only to limit proportions, and that only in the event of the existence of more children than one; consequently the power never arose at all, there having been only one child capable of taking under the settlement, and the instrument, he added, was to be considered as if the power had not been inserted (*p*).

In the cases hitherto discussed, it is of course assumed that the object of the power takes the estate under the settlement *in default of appointment*; for it is clear, that
if

(*p*) *Campbell v. Sandys*, 1 456, where the power only extended to the case of several objects.
Scho. & Lef. 281; and see
Folkes v. Western, 9 Ves. jun.

if the object can only take the estate by an execution of the power, it may be appointed to him. And even if he take a share of the estate in default of appointment, yet the entirety may be appointed to him. This was decided by Lord Thurlow, in a case where a power was given to appoint personalty amongst children, and in default of appointment, the fund was given to the children equally to be vested at twenty-one, although they died in the life-time of the donee of the power. There were two children, one of whom attained twenty-one, and then died, and the donee appointed the entirety to the surviving child. Lord Thurlow said, that where there are only two children, the power, by way of exercise of discretion, is totally gone by the death of one before it is exercised, and it cannot be the same power in point of extent as when meant to be a distribution among several, for which it is necessary there should be several. But this clause made it proper for the donee to express that she did intend the power to be executed. If there was no appointment, the consequence was, each would be entitled to a moiety, because there was no appointment. In respect of that clause, she had a power to appoint to one only; for though that was not a distribution, it was an expression that it should go by appointment, and not transmit for want of it. And he decreed accordingly (*q*).

And here it may be observed, that where a power is given by will to appoint an estate amongst several objects, and the estate in default of appointment is given to

(*q*) Boyle *v.* Bishop of Peterborough, 1 Ves. jun. 299;—see Vane *v.* Lord Dungannon, 2 Scho. and Lef. 118, a case stand-

ing by itself. Butcher *v.* Butcher, 1 Ves. & Bea. 79; M'Ghie *v.* M'Ghie, 2 Madd. 368.

to them as tenants in common, the death of any of the objects in the life of the testator will, *pro tanto*, defeat the power and devise over, so that the power and devise will only remain as to the shares of the survivors (*r*) (I). But as it is clear, that under a devise to several as joint-tenants, the share of any dying in the testator's life-time does not lapse, but goes over to the survivors (*s*), it should seem, that where the estate in default of appointment is given to the objects of the power in joint-tenancy, as the survivors would take the whole in default of appointment, the power itself ought still to ride over the entirety, and not be confined to the shares of the surviving objects.

II. Secondly, *As to the construction of limitations in instruments executing powers.* A power may be executed by any act *inter vivos*, or by will. In the execution of powers by deed or other act *inter vivos*, technical expressions are as necessary in the limitation of the estate as in feoffments or gifts at common law: Therefore, if under a power the estate be appointed to A, and the deed express or limit no estate, the appointee will take an estate for life only (*t*); so if the estate be limited to

(*r*) Reade v. Reade, 5 Ves. jun. 744; Casterton v. Sutherland, 9 Ves. jun. 445. and see 1 Salk. 238; Doe v. Underwood, Willes, 293; Peat v. Chapman, 1 Ves. 542.

(*s*) Davies v. Kempe, Cart. 2; (*t*) See Co. Litt. 42, a.

(I) This is the point which this case appears to have decided, but it is not easy to collect the fact; see 5 Ves. jun. 744; 8 Term Rep. 118. The decree does not advert to the grounds of the decision. The defendant claimed as the survivor of the four children. Reg. Lib. B. 1800, fo. 708, see 1 Ves. and Bea. 92.

to *A* for life, remainder to his issue male, the father would take for life only, and his sons would take as purchasers and joint-tenants for life. Again, a limitation to *A* for ninety-nine years, and a subsequent limitation to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, cannot coalesce; nor can a limitation of a legal estate of inheritance under a power coalesce with a previous equitable estate of freehold to the same person, although vested in him by the instrument creating the power. And so in every other case which may be put, the construction would be the same as upon a feoffment at common law (*u*). But Lord Hardwicke laid it down as his opinion, that words of regulation or modification of the estate, as the words *equally to be divided* are, and not words of limitation, might have greater latitude given to them in deeds under the Statute of Uses than in feoffments; and he accordingly decided, that the words *equally to be divided* in a deed, operating under the statute, would create a tenancy in common (*x*); which point was afterwards determined the same way by the court of King's Bench in the year 1753 (*y*). However, the student should be cautious how he extends this doctrine. It is difficult to put many cases to which it would apply; and it does not seem to be well established even in the principal case (*z*).

But a greater latitude is allowed in *wills* executing powers; for, as we have seen, wills executed under

(*u*) See *Makepeace v. Fletcher*, 2 Com. 457; *Rigden v. Vallier*, 3 Atk. 731; 2 Ves. 252; *Tapner v. Merlott*, Willes, 177; *Stratton v. Best*, 1 Bro. C. C. 333; *Doe v. Morgan*, 3 Term Rep. 765.

(*x*) *Rigden v. Vallier*, *ubi sup.*

(*y*) *Goodtitle v. Stokes*, 1 Wils. 341; Say. 67.

(*z*) See n. (*i*) to *Gilb. on Uses*, p. 143.

powers must receive the same construction as proper wills. It seems indeed once to have been doubted whether a will made in exercise of a power could be considered as a proper will. In an opinion of Mr. Justice Burnet's, on a case referred to him (*a*), he seemed clearly of opinion, that a power executed by will must be construed the same as if executed by deed. He said, addressing himself to the limitations in the will, "For if such a limitation in the deed would be bad, such an appointment by virtue of that deed would be as bad. Nor will it vary the case that such an appointment is expressly allowed to be made by will; for the appointee is not in by the will, but under the deed, and the will is only directory as to the person and estate to be taken under the deed (*b*). Nor is such an appointment a devise within the Statute of Wills."

But in the *Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin* (*c*), Lord Hardwicke expressly said, "So if a power is given by a deed to appoint lands by will, and the person to whom the power is given makes a will, and gives the lands to *A* and his issue, the law says, that though such appointee takes under the power, yet the execution of the power being by will, it shall receive the same construction as if a devise of lands, viz. an estate-tail. So if it had been to *A* for ever, that would have been an estate in fee. It was never doubted but that the construction of the words would be the same exactly as if he took strictly and properly under the words of a will."

And

(*a*) See 1 Vol. Cas. and Opin. case; 1 Bulstr. 200, *Lemaine's* case.
33.

(*b*) 6 Co. 10, Sir Ed. Clere's. (*c*) 2 Ves. 61.

And conformably to this opinion, in a later case of an execution of a power by will, Lord Hardwicke held, that although the will was not a proper will, yet that the words of it were to have the like construction as if it was a proper will; for otherwise there would be a strange confusion in the construction of writings, if they were to have one construction where proper wills, and another where improper: the words, therefore, of such writings are to receive the same liberal and beneficial construction as the words in a proper will. And he determined an informal limitation to be an estate-tail, although clearly it could not have been so construed had it been contained in a deed (*d*).

So in a case in the year 1778, where by a will made in execution of a power, the estate was given to the object of the power and his assigns for his life, with remainder to a trustee and his heirs during the life of the object, in trust to preserve contingent remainders, with remainder after his decease *to his issue in general in tail*, with remainders over, Sir Thomas Sewell decreed that the appointee took an estate-tail (*e*). We shall again have occasion to touch upon this doctrine in considering the cases upon excessive executions (*f*).

And here we may notice a point in the case of *Clinton v. Seymour* (*g*), which arose upon a deed. The Duke of Newcastle, and his son, the Earl of Lincoln, having a joint power of charging a sum on an estate, directed 16,000 *l.* part of it, to be raised and paid to them, their executors, administrators, or assigns; and by a

(*d*) *Southby v. Stonehouse*, 2 pendix, No. 21; see *Coulson v. Ves.* 610; and see *Robinson v. Coulson*, 2 Str. 1125.

Hardcastle, 2 Bro. C. C. 30.

(*f*) See *post*, sect. 8.

(*e*) *Phelp v. Hay*, MS. Ap-

(*g*) 4 Ves. jun. 440.

deed of even date it was agreed, that if the Earl should survive the Duke, he should apply the money in payment of the Duke's debts, and the residue should go as part of the Duke's personal estate; and if the Duke survived, it was to go in the same way, only of course he himself was to make the application. The Duke did survive; and in consideration of 14,900*l.* and natural love and affection, assigned the 16,000*l.* to one of his younger children. It was insisted that the Earl of Lincoln's object was defeated, as he intended the money to be applied only in payment of the Duke's debts, and that the son purchasing the 16,000*l.* was bound to see to the application of the purchase-money. But as to the 14,900*l.* Lord Alvanley considered the son a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and not bound to see to the application of the money. The question, he said, then remained as to the sum of 1,100*l.* whether that was not appointed in breach of some trust in the Duke. It was a very extraordinary transaction, and all these strange words, he was afraid, were only a circuitous way of saying it was for the Duke himself. However, he thought that the executors of the Duke were the only persons who could call for an application of that sum, on the supposed undertaking of the Duke not to give it gratuitously, but to apply it to the discharge of his debts; he accordingly retained the 1,100*l.*, with liberty for the parties to apply within twelve months. If no application, to be paid to the appointee.

III. Thirdly, We are to consider *what acts powers in general authorize*. It is clear that a power to make partition of an estate will not authorize a sale or exchange of
of

of it; but it has frequently been a question amongst conveyancers, whether the usual power of sale and exchange does not authorize a partition, and several partitions have been made by force of such powers under the direction of gentlemen of eminence. This point underwent considerable discussion on the title, which afterwards led to the case of *Abel v. Heathcote*(a). The late Mr. Fearne thought that the power did authorize a partition, on the ground that the partition was in effect an exchange. The power was *to make sale of, or convey in exchange*, the estate for the best or such other equivalent interest in lands as the trustees should think proper, and for that purpose to revoke and limit new uses. The case was first heard before the Lords Commissioners Eyre, Ashhurst, and Wilson. They all thought that the power was to receive a liberal construction, as its object was to meliorate the estate. Eyre thought, that upon the word *sell*, the trustees should have a power of making partition, because it was in effect to take quite a new estate. And Ashhurst and Wilson thought, that whatever power might be derived from the word *sell*, the other words of the power, *convey for an equivalent*, were sufficient. They, however, ultimately declined to decide the question. Upon the cause coming on before Lord Rosslyn, he determined that the power was well executed, and founded his opinion upon its being in effect an exchange, as the consequences and effects of a partition and exchange, as to the interests of the parties, are precisely the same.

Nearly the same point was again agitated in the late
case

(a) 4 Bro. C. C. 278 ; 2 Ves. jun. 98.

case of M'Queen and Farquhar (*b*). There, however, the power in terms only authorized a *sale*. Upon the first hearing, Lord Eldon expressed his opinion, that even a power to exchange would not authorize a partition : and in delivering judgment he expressed the same opinion more strongly, and said he should rather have been inclined to decide Abel and Heathcote upon the words, " such other equivalent interest in lands," &c. But without infringing upon that case, he determined that a power of sale simply does not authorize a partition, whatever a power of exchange may do.

Until the question shall receive a further decision, it can scarcely be considered clear that a power to exchange will authorize a partition. It is at least very doubtful upon what ground Abel and Heathcote was decided, whether upon the power of sale, or upon the power of exchange, and the principle of Lord Eldon's decision is in complete opposition to that of the Judges in Abel *v.* Heathcote. They contended that the power was for the melioration of the estate, and was therefore to receive a liberal construction. Lord Eldon insists that the terms and limitations of a power must be observed according to the contract, or the new use will not arise. And it may be observed, that if Abel and Heathcote cannot be defended on the broad general ground of a partition being authorized by a power of exchange, it certainly cannot be supported by the words, " such other equivalent interest" in lands, &c. For the power did not authorize an exchange, *or* a disposition for any other equivalent interest in lands, but simply an exchange

(*b*) 11 Ves. jun. 467 ; and see Attorney General *v.* Hamilton, 1 Madd. 214.

exchange of the settled estate for an equivalent interest in other lands. These, or words to the like effect, must of necessity be expressed or implied in every power of exchange, and cannot, by any license, be cut out and read as authorizing a distinct, independent act.

But, as Lord Rosslyn has observed, this objection may be obviated where there is a power of sale. The undivided part of the estate may be sold; the trustees may receive the money, and then lay it out in the purchase of the divided part (c); and although the sale is merely fictitious, in order to effect the partition, yet it should seem that the transaction cannot be impeached. The same observation applies to an exchange under a power of sale. The estate may be sold to the owner of the estate intended to be taken in exchange, and then the money may be laid out in the purchase of this last estate.

It was formerly a very considerable question, whether a tenant for life, with a power of sale and exchange in himself, or to the execution of which his consent was required, could buy the estate himself, or take it in exchange for an estate of his own. As to an exchange, it was insisted that the power meant an act that bore as near a resemblance to a strict legal exchange as possible; and that therefore there must be two different persons to reciprocally exchange, which there could not be where the tenant for life had the power himself. And in regard to the general question, it was doubted whether at least equity would not relieve against the execution of the power. Lord Eldon, although fully aware of the danger attending a purchase of the inheritance by a

(c) See 2 Ves. jun. 101; 4 Bro. C. C. 285.

tenant for life, seems to think that it cannot be impeached on general principles (*d*). A few years ago, however, the doubt was stated as a ground for requiring the aid of Parliament, in a petition for an act to enable an exchange of settled estates with the tenant for life, which it was conceived could not be done under a power of sale and exchange in the settlement. The Chief Baron, and Mr. Baron Hotham, to whom the bill was referred, reported, and submitted it as their opinion, that the doubt which was the cause of petitioning for the bill was not well founded; and therefore that the bill was unnecessary, and that the passing of such a bill might cause a great prejudice to numerous titles under executions of powers of sale and exchange of a similar kind; and the House of Lords accordingly rejected the bill; in consequence of which many estates of great value have since been purchased, and taken in exchange by tenants for life, under the usual powers of sale and exchange. But the point has again been agitated in practice, and a title so circumstanced can scarcely be considered as marketable, although there appears to be no reason to apprehend that a sale or exchange to or with the tenant for life will be deemed not within the power. The point has at last been set at rest by the decision of the Lord Chancellor in favour of the validity of the execution of the power in the late case of *Howard v. Ducane* (*e*).

Where a power of sale is given, the object certainly is not to turn the land into money so as to increase the income of the tenant for life at the expense of the persons entitled

(*d*) See 9 Ves. jun. 52; and 11 Ves. jun. 480; but see *ib.* 476, 477.

(*e*) 1 Turn. 81.

entitled to the inheritance, although every well-drawn settlement contains a clause expressing, that until a convenient purchase can be found, the trustees shall lay out the money in the funds at interest. Lord Eldon, addressing himself to the usual words in powers of sale, that the trustees may sell for such price as shall appear to them to be reasonable, observes, that that expression must be construed, at least in a question between the trustees and the *cestuis que trust*, after they have with due diligence examined. The object of the sale must be to invest the money in the purchase of another estate to be settled to the same uses; *and they are not to be satisfied with probability upon that*; but it ought to be with reference to an object at that time supposed practicable, or at least the Court would expect some strong purpose of family prudence justifying the conversion, if it is likely to continue money (f) (I).

The conclusion of the sentence shows that Lord Eldon is not to be understood to mean that the estate cannot, under any circumstance, be sold, unless the trustees have another estate in direct view. In the case
before

(f) 10 Ves. jun. 309.

(I) In *Lord Mahon v. Earl Stanhope*, 9th March, 1809, MS. Sir Wm. Grant said, that the trustee must have a reasonable prospect of being able to lay out that price in the purchase of an estate, which, from some circumstance or other, is more eligible than the estate proposed to be sold, for else it would be a mere conversion of land into money. This he said was very clearly laid down by the present Lord Chancellor, in the case of *Mortlock v. Buller*, where the power was exactly of the same kind as that contained in the settlement before him; and he then quoted the passage which is inserted in the text..

before him there was not the usual direction, that, until a convenient purchase can be found the money shall be laid out at interest. That direction, where it is inserted, directly negatives such a construction of the power, and many proper reasons frequently occur to induce trustees to sell the estate, although they have not an immediate prospect of purchasing another, as an advantageous offer, &c. And certainly where a sound discretion has been exercised, equity could not affect the trustees as for a breach of trust.

In one case, under a power of sale, the parties sold the estate for a rent-charge out of the same estate, which was to be increased in value by building on it. The Master reported against the title, and the seller acquiesced in the report (*f*).

And where under a power of sale in a will devising the estate in strict settlement, the trustee of the power sold the land, and the tenant for life, whose consent to the exercise of the power was requisite, sold the timber on the estate, and received the price of it on the ground that he was unimpeachable of waste, and therefore might have cut down the timber, it was held that the power was not well executed (*g*). And it now appears that this had been previously decided in the case of *Doran v. Wilshire* (*h*); and it was there said, there was a great difference between a tenant for life cutting down timber, for which he is not impeachable while he actually occupies the land, and his executing
a power

(*f*) *Read v. Shaw*, Ch. 1807, 3 Russ. 565, and 2 Moore & Appendix, No. 24. Payne, 127.

(*g*) *Cholmely v. Paxton*, 3 Bing. 207; and see 5 Bing. 48; (*h*) 3 Swanst. 699.

a power to sell. In the latter case he is not to have the value for himself.

But to return.—A power to sell and raise a sum of money implies, it seems, a power to mortgage, which is a conditional sale (*i*); and a power generally “to raise a sum” out of an estate, enables a sale of it (*k*). But where a power is given to raise money by sale or mortgage, if the parties intend that a sale may be made after a mortgage in order to pay it off, the intention should be clearly expressed, as it is doubtful whether, if a mortgage be first made, the power is not wholly exhausted, so that a sale cannot afterwards be made to exonerate the estate; and it is clear, that in a case of this kind the *mortgagee* cannot require a sale, even if the power authorizes a sale, for he is no object of the power, further than as that power enabled the donee to make him a good mortgage. When he has that, he is in the ordinary situation of a mortgagee. He has all the remedies, but only the remedies, of a mortgagee (*l*).

Where a power of charging is given by an instrument in which different funds are comprised, and the power is not expressly confined to one fund in particular, the question, whether the power embraces both funds, or only one of them, must of course depend upon the construction of the whole instrument, and it is obviously impossible to lay down any general rule on the subject (*m*).

If

(*i*) *Mills v. Banks*, 3 P. Wms. 9.

(*k*) *Wareham v. Brown*, 2 Vern. 153.

(*l*) *Palk v. Clinton*, 12 Ves. jun. 48; but as to the principal

question, see *Omerod v. Hardman*, 5 Ves. jun. 722.

(*m*) See *Doe v. Milborne*, 2 Term Rep. 721.

If a fund, consisting partly of real estate and partly of personal estate, be authorized to be appointed amongst several objects, so that each must have a share, yet it is not necessary to give a part of each fund to each object ; but if there are two, for instance, all the realty may be given to one, and all the personality to the other (*n*).

A power to charge land with a particular sum enables a charge of that sum, and the interest besides, for the intention is to charge the estate with the money, and that of course carries interest ; and no one would lend such sum on such security if the law were otherwise (*o*).

But where a man, having a power to charge an estate with 2,000*l.* *after the death of his wife*, gave 1,000*l.* to his wife, payable with interest *from three months after his death*, Lord Hardwicke held, that the gift of this 1,000*l.* was an execution of the power, although there was a mistake as to the time it would be raised. Then it was insisted, that as the widow had 1,000*l.* left her, *with interest* [and the principal could not be paid at the time intended], the interest should be made good till it amounted to 2,000*l.* which he had power to raise. But Lord Hardwicke determined that the interest should not be made good out of the power, for that was to charge the estate with a principal sum of 2,000*l.* (*p*). In

(*n*) *Morgan v. Surman*, 1 Freke, 2 Ves. jun. 507 ; *Sitwell Taunt.* 289. *v. Barnard*, 6 Ves. jun. 520 ;

(*o*) *Lord Kilmurry v. Geery*, Roe *v. Pogson*, 2 Madd. 457.

2 Salk. 538 ; *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, (*p*) *Probert v. Clifford*, 1 Atk. 440 ; and see *Marnell v. Blake*, 2 P. Wms. 591 ; *Boycot v. Cotton*, 1 Atk. 552 ; *Hall v. Carter*, 4 Dow, 248.

2 Atk. 358 ; and see *Lewis v.*

In the case of *Westby v. Kiernan* (*q*), a man having a power to charge estates with a sum of 10,000 *l.* executed his power by deed, and directed the trustees, to whom he appointed the money, to lay it out at interest, and pay "the interest, dividends, and proceeds," to such persons as he had or should appoint by will, and for want of appointment, to pay the same interest, &c. to his sister for life, and after her death, to pay the 10,000 *l.* and the interest thereof, to her children. By his will, made after the deed, he disposed of the principal, and took notice that such was his intention at the time of executing the deed. Lord Bathurst held clearly that the power over the principal was reserved.

A power to trustees of a public turnpike-act, which authorized them to mortgage the tolls, but declared that there should be no priority amongst the creditors, does not authorize a mortgage of the toll-houses or the turnpike gates, because if any creditor had a power to enter and take possession of the toll-gates, he would gain a priority which the act has denied (*r*).

(*q*) Ambl. 697.

(*r*) *Fairtitle v. Gilbert*, 2 Term Rep. 169.

SECTION III.

WHERE AN EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT IS
AUTHORIZED.

WHERE it is intended to give a power of appointing a fund to several objects, or to any of them exclusively, the power should run thus : “ To all and every, or such one or more exclusively of the other or others” of the objects, as the donee shall appoint ; and in the common case of a power to appoint to children of the marriage, or their issue, it may run thus, (providing for every event,) “ to all and every, or such one or more exclusively of the other or others of the children, *or* to all and every, or such one or more exclusively of the other or others of the issue of the children, *or both* to all and every, or such one or more exclusively of the other or others of the children ; *and* to all and every, or such one or more exclusively of the other or others of the issue,” as the donee shall appoint.

But we are now to inquire in what cases an exclusive appointment is authorized, although these precise technical words are not used ; and first, as to the cases where an exclusive appointment is *not* authorized.

I. Under a power to appoint “ to all and every the child and children” (*a*), or “ unto and among several
objects,”

(*a*) *Pocklington v. Bayne*, 1 Bro. C. C. 450.

objects," every one must have a share (*b*). So even a power of disposal, "unto and amongst *such* children begotten between us, and in such proportion," as the wife shall appoint, compels a distribution amongst all the children; no child can be excluded (*c*). And in a late case (*d*), Lord Alvanley held, that a power to appoint "amongst the children as the donee shall think proper," did not authorize an exclusive appointment. He treated the word "amongst," as equivalent to "all and every," which words are mandatory, that each shall have a share (*e*). And in an early case (*f*), upon a gift to the wife "upon trust and confidence that she would not dispose thereof but for the benefit of her children," it was determined that no child could be excluded. But,

II. On the other hand, powers to appoint "to such of my children as my wife shall think fit (*g*)," "to one or more of my children as my wife shall think fit (*h*)," "to be at my wife's disposal, provided it be to any of my children (*i*)," "amongst all or such of my children (*k*)" "to and amongst such of my relations, in such

(*b*) *Malim v. Keighley*, 2 Ves. jun. 533; and see *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57; *Baker v. Barrett*, 2 Freem. 199, cited. See *Garthwaite v. Robinson*, 2 Sim. 43.

(*c*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640.

(*d*) *Kemp v. Kemp*, 5 Ves. jun. 349.

(*e*) *Menzey v. Walker*, For. 72.

(*f*) *Gibson v. Kinven*, 1 Vern. 66.

(*g*) *Liefe v. Saltingstone*, 1 Mod. 189; and see 5 Ves. jun. 857; *Austin v. Austin*, For. 74, cited.

(*h*) *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Vern. 513.

(*i*) *Thomlinson v. Dighton*, 1 P. Wms. 149.

(*k*) *Macey v. Shurmer*, 1 Atk. 389.

such parts, shares and proportions (l),” (I) have been held to enable the donees to appoint exclusively to any of the objects. So where the power was to appoint unto and amongst *all* such child or children of *A*, in such parts, shares, and proportions, &c. as *B* should choose, it was holden to authorize an exclusive appointment, although it was insisted that upon the word *all* none could be excluded ; but the Chancellor said, that the fault of the plaintiff’s argument was, that they stopped at the word “ *all*.” They must, he added, go on and finish the sentence, and then it was, “ all such child or children as he shall appoint” (m). And this construction had previously been established by a case more difficult to manage : Under a marriage settlement, a real estate was settled to the use of such child *and* children, and for such estate and estates, and purposes, as the husband should appoint, and in default of appointment the estate was limited to the use of *all and every the child and children* of the marriage in fee : The father made an exclusive appointment. Against the power it was forcibly argued, by Lord Ellenborough, then at the bar, that the grammatical sense and construction of the words plainly imported, that the appointment

(l) *Spring v. Biles*, 1 Term Rep. 435, n.

(m) *Wollen v. Tanner*, 5 Ves. jun. 218.

(I) In determining this case, the Court appears to have placed some stress on the power being for the benefit of *relations*. It seems, however, that the case must have received the same construction had the power been to appoint to *children*. This has been since decided, *Doe v. Alchin*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 122.

ment must be *among* the children, to *such child*, if only one, and to *such children*, if more than one, that “*and*” could not be satisfied without giving a share to each; that the words *such child*, and *such estate*, were only added to show, that even if there were only one child, the father had a discretion as to the estate to be given to him; and that the words “in default of appointment, to all and every the child and children,” must mean the same as “child and children” in the former part, and they showed that the power must be executed in favour of *every one* of the children. But the Court construed the power to be exclusive, and read “or” for “and.” Ashhurst, J. considered the case stronger, as the subject was realty and not personalty; and that, if it had been intended that *all* should have derived some benefit, they would have said, “among them,” and they would not have used the word “child” in the singular number, which could only have been added for the purpose of giving a power to appoint to *one only*; and Buller, J. thought the case of *Spring v. Biles* stronger than the present. There the power was “to and among such of my relations, &c. in such parts, shares, and *proportions*,” &c. which imported that a division was intended. But in the present case, the words “parts, shares, and proportions,” were not used (I) (*n*).

(*n*) *Swift v. Gregson*, 1 Term Rep. 432; and see *Kenworthy v. Bate*, 6 Ves. jun. 793.

(I) These words, however, can scarcely be considered as important in any case, with reference to the question under discussion. They are inserted to meet the case of an appointment to two or more.

In many cases an exclusive appointment may be authorized by the apparent intention of the donor, although no words of exclusion are expressly used.

Thus in the case of *Bevil v. Rich* (o), the testator gave all the rest of his estate to *A B*, “on trust, to give my children and grandchildren *according to their demerits*.” *A B* gave the estate to one, omitting the rest. Lord Nottingham refused to set aside the appointment, as the children were to come in by the act of the devisee, and he was to give or distribute according to their demerits; therefore he was judge.

So in the case of *Burrell and Burrell* (p), where the property was given by will to the testator’s wife, “to the end she might give his children such fortunes as she should think proper, or they best deserve, to whom he charged his sons and daughters to be dutiful and obedient, and loving and affectionate to each other.” Lord Camden appears to have determined that the wife had a power to appoint to any of the children exclusively of the others. Lord Alvanley has observed, that he would not say what his own opinion would have been on that case. He was willing to submit to that of Lord Camden upon such a doubtful question, being perfectly satisfied, that in criticising on the words “to and amongst,” &c. the Court goes against the intention (q).

Again, in a case where a testator bequeathed a sum to his executor, “to be distributed *amongst his poor relations, or such other objects of charity*” as the testator should mention in private instructions: no instructions were

(o) 1 Cha. Ca. 309.

(p) Ambl. 660.

(q) See 5 Ves. jun. 860; and see *ib.* 363.

were left, and it was not necessary to decide the point ; but Lord Redesdale said, that the testator's design was to give to them as objects of charity, and not merely as relations ; and he expressed his opinion that the executors had a discretionary power of distribution, and need not include all the testator's poor relations (*r*).

The word "such" standing unexplained, authorizes, as we have seen, an exclusive appointment ; but that word is not unfrequently governed by a preceding clause, so as to mean a particular class or description of issue, all of whom must be provided for. And as a power to appoint exclusively may be collected by implication, where an authority in express words is wanting, according to the cases just dismissed, so an express power in terms to appoint exclusively may be construed to be merely a power of distribution, in order to effectuate the clear intention of the parties. Both these points were determined by Lord Hardwicke in the case of *Burleigh v. Pearson* (*s*).

Burleigh, previous to his marriage, by a deed of trust declared the uses of a copyhold estate belonging to his wife ; reciting, that to make a provision for the maintenance and preferment of *such younger children which they should leave unmarried*, and unadvanced, or otherwise provided for at their deaths ; and for raising such sum as they should think requisite for the fortunes and preferments of *such younger children*, the trustees should raise 1,000 *l.* to pay the same to *such younger children*, in such manner and proportion as they should appoint by writing ; and in default of appointment by

(*r*) *Mahon v. Savage*, 1 Sch. and Lef. 111.

(*s*) 1 Ves. 281 ; and see *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640.

both, then to the said younger children, *or some of them*, as the survivor should appoint by writing or will; in default of appointment, equally to be divided among them. The question was, whether an exclusive appointment was authorized. Lord Hardwicke said, that the deed by which this trust was created was certainly very inaccurately penned, but a reasonable construction must be made, and that from the intent of the parties, fully declared in the beginning of the deed, which was the leading clause; and therefore other doubtful words, if any, ought to be controlled and construed by that plain declaration of the intent, which was to make a provision for those younger children who should be left unmarried, &c. to which description the word *such* was plainly relative. “*And*,” after unmarried, must be construed “*or* ;” and the negative must run through the whole, otherwise it was absurd; for they certainly meant *unprovided for*; and then a child, though married, if not advanced or otherwise provided for, would be the object of the power: and in this sense it was used in the will. Then, *such*, he added, referred to the description before the governing clause through the whole, and did not mean a general power to appoint to one or two, for all must have some. The contrary construction would overturn the intent, empowering to give the whole to a child even provided for, and to leave the rest unprovided. But the most doubtful part was from the words *or some*: but it would be strange to construe this deed so as to leave greater power to disinherit in the survivor than was given jointly, especially if the husband survived, as happened when it was the wife’s estate. The addition of *some*, must mean some of those under the qualifications
before

before described, in the same manner as *such*. Another inaccuracy occurred afterwards in case of no appointment; for it must not be construed to be divided among all, as well provided for as not, but meant the said younger children, viz. unprovided. And he accordingly set aside the execution of the power because some of the objects were excluded.

In the cases hitherto considered, it is clear that the party may appoint to all the objects of the power; and the doubt is, whether he can exclude any, but a power may authorize an appointment to one of many objects, and not an appointment to all: thus in a case where the estate was given by will, "to one of the sons of *A*, as *B*. shall direct," Lord Alvanley said, that if he had made a disposition to all, it would have been void. He was obliged to select one. He had power, if he thought fit, to give it to any one son, and if he had gone beyond that, it would not have been well executed (*t*).

(*t*) *Brown v. Higgs*, 4 Ves. jun. 708, see page 717.

SECTION IV.

WHAT IS DEEMED AN ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT.

HAVING once ascertained that none of the objects of any given power can be excluded from participating in the fund, the question at once arises, What share must each have? At law, it is clear that any share, however nominal or illusory, will satisfy the terms of the power.

The gift of a ring (*a*), or a shilling (*b*), will be a good legal execution of the power, although the fund be 100,000*l.* (*c*); whereas, in equity, five shillings (*d*), ten guineas (*e*), or any other sum, merely illusory, with reference to the amount of the fund, and the number of the objects amongst whom it is to be distributed, will be void. But all the interests given to the child, contingent as well as vested, must be taken into consideration (*f*). We have already had occasion to consider how far this distinction between the legal and equitable execution of such a power can be defended upon principle (*g*).

This equity was enforced at a very early period, and was frequently administered (*h*); nor has it been less the subject of discussion in modern times (*i*). It extends as well to real as to personal estate (*k*); and the only difficulty is to ascertain what proportion shall in every particular case be deemed illusory. In *Wilson and Piggot*, the proportion given to one of four children

(*a*) See 1 Vern. 67.

(*b*) 1 Term Rep. 438, n. and see 4 Ves. jun. 785; 16 Ves. jun. 26.

(*c*) *Morgan v. Surman*, 1 Taunt. 289.

(*d*) *Gibson v. Kinven*, 1 Vern. 66.

(*e*) *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, 4 Ves. jun. 771.

(*f*) *Bax v. Whitbread*, 16 Ves. jun. 15.

(*g*) *Vide supra*, ch. 7, sect. 2.

(*h*) See *Wall v. Thurborne*, 1 Vern. 335, 414; *Cragrave v. Perrost*, cited, *ibid.* 355; see

2 Cha. Ca. 228; and see 9 Ves. jun. 395. In *Civil v. Rich*, 1 Cha. Ca. 310; Lord Nottingham referred to this case, as expressly confined to the widowhood of the wife; *Astry v. Astry*, Prec. Cha. 256. As to *Sweetnam v. Woolaston*, cited 1 Vern. 356, see 5 Ves. jun. 858.

(*i*) See *Menzey v. Walker*, For. 72; but note, there one child was totally excluded; *Madison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57; *Coleman v. Seymour*, *ib.* 211.

(*k*) *Pocklington v. Bayne*, 1 Bro. C. C. 450.

dren amounted only to one sixteenth of the whole fund, and Lord Alvanley held it to be good (*l*), although it was one fourth less than an equal proportion. In *Alexander v. Alexander* (*m*), the proportion given was only a sixtieth part of the fund to one of five children, and the point was not raised. In *Kemp v. Kemp* (*n*), Lord Alvanley repeated the desire, which he had often expressed, to get out of the rule altogether, and lamented that equity had not followed the rule of law; but he was compelled, against his inclination, to hold the appointment in that case illusory. The fund amounted to nearly 1,900*l*. There were three objects: to one 50*l*. was given; to another 10*l*. and the residue to the other. The first, therefore, had only a thirty-eighth share, and the second only a one hundred and ninetieth share, of the entire fund, when, upon an equal division, each would have been entitled to a third. Lord Alvanley, in delivering judgment, said, that he should hardly have conceived that 50*l*. could be considered a substantial part; but that the sum of 10*l*. was evidently meant to be no gift, the party merely supposing himself to be under the necessity of giving something to each.

Thus the doctrine stood till the late case of *Butcher v. Butcher* (*o*), in which the Master of the Rolls, after delivering a luminous and argumentative judgment, held, that as no case had been found in which a sum

(*l*) 2 Ves. jun. 351. In *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, 4 Ves. jun. 771, the amount of the fund is not stated; and see *Spencer v. Spencer*, 5 Ves. jun. 362. (*m*) 2 Ves. 640; but see 9 Ves. jun. 392, where it is stated from the Register's book that the child did not claim more. (*n*) 5 Ves. jun. 849. (*o*) 9 Ves. jun. 382. See 1 Bligh, 479.

of the amount in the case before him had been declared illusory, there was no ground upon which he thought himself justified in determining that this was an invalid appointment. He summed up the difficulties attending this branch of equitable jurisdiction in a few words: "To say, under such a power, an illusory share must not be given, or that a substantial share must be given, is rather to raise a question than establish a rule. What is an illusory share, and what is a substantial share? Is it to be judged of upon a mere statement of the sum given, without reference to the amount of the fortune, which is the subject of the power? If so, what is the sum that must be given to exclude the interference of the court? What is the limit of amount at which it ceases to be illusory, and begins to be substantial? If it is to be considered with reference to the amount of the fortune, what is the proportion, either of the whole, or of the share, that would belong to each upon an equal division?"

In the case of *Butcher and Butcher* there were nine persons, and the fund amounted to about 17,000*l.* To some of the children, 200*l.* 3 per-cents only was given; so that reckoning the stock at even 70 per cent. the share did not exceed a hundred and twenty-second part of the fund. In the next case which came before the Master of the Rolls, the fund was 2,500*l.* South Sea annuities, and there were only two objects of the power; to one 100*l.* stock was given, and the residue to the other. The first therefore had only a twenty-fifth share; and the Master of the Rolls, referring to his former decision, held the appointment not illusory (*p*). Another case

(*p*) *Bax v. Whitbread*, 10 Ves. jun. 31.

case arose shortly afterwards, in which the fund was 2,500*l.* There were five (I) objects of the power. To some, the donee of the power gave only a share, which amounted to 33*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* each, when, upon an equal division, they would have been entitled to 500*l.* each. The Master of the Rolls said, that he adhered to the rule he laid down in *Butcher v. Butcher*, that he would go as far as he was bound by authority, and no farther. Show me, he added, a case in which a specific sum, or an equal proportion of what would be the share of each object of the appointment upon an equal division, has been held to be illusory, and I will in the same case make the same decision. And after showing that *Kemp v. Kemp* was an authority only as to the 10*l.* and did not turn upon the 50*l.* he determined that the appointment was good, as the sum of 33*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* was not the same specific sum, or the same proportion of the share of each child, upon an equal division, that had been in any former case held to be illusory (*q*).

In the foregoing case, with reference to the whole fund, the share given was only equal to about a seventy-fifth of it; and in another case, which occurred a month afterwards, the disproportion was still greater. The fund amounted about to 7,100*l.* and there were nine objects of the power, seven of whom had only about 71*l.* a-piece given to them. The point was given up in argument;

(*q*) *Mocatta v. Lousada*, 12 Ves. jun. 123.

(I) Although the power extended to the issue of the children, yet it also seems that they, the issue, were considered as standing in the place of their parent, and there were only five children; *sed qu.*

argument; and the Master of the Rolls thought that there was nothing in an objection taken that there might be more children; there was so little probability, under the circumstances, that the shares would ever be reduced below the standard under which he had said he should consider himself bound by the authorities (*r*).

The result of the authorities, then, was rather a negative than an affirmative rule. Lord Alvanley determined, that where a party is, in default of appointment, to take a third share, a gift of a hundred and ninetieth share to him is illusory; and here the Master of the Rolls drew the line; so that any share which, squared by this rule, would exceed that in amount, was not deemed illusory. But upon an appeal to the Lord Chancellor, in *Bax v. Whitbread*, for the express purpose of restoring the old rule, his Lordship thought that the principle stated in the late cases in effect destroyed all the authorities. The sum of 50 *l.* being given, he said, in one family, and by one will, it is difficult to conceive that the identity of the sum, or the proportion, can afford the ground of determination in another family and upon another will. The motives also must be furnished by the same circumstances, whether good conduct or misconduct: a provision by a parent or a third person: circumstances, if the Court is at liberty to regard them, of utility. The result of the authorities, he added, was, that from the time of Lord Nottingham, the Court has taken upon itself the duty of exercising a discretion in these cases; and his Lordship seems to have considered himself still bound by

(*r*) *Dyke v. Sylvester*, 12 Ves. jun. 126.

by those decisions. Upon a later appeal to Lord Eldon, in *Butcher v. Butcher*, he expressed the same opinion (s). The law, therefore, on this head, appears to stand as it did before the case of *Butcher and Butcher* was decided by the Master of the Rolls; and yet, although Lord Eldon has decided, that the Court is bound to inquire whether the share is substantial or not, his Lordship has shown a strong disposition to narrow the doctrine. In both the appeals, the decrees of the Master of the Rolls were confirmed, on the ground that the shares were not illusory. In *Butcher and Butcher*, Elizabeth Butcher had a power to appoint the fund amongst her children by her present or any future husband, by deed or will, from time to time. The power was quite in the common form; and therefore, perhaps, much weight could not be given to the circumstance, that at the time of making any particular appointments he could not know what the number of objects would ultimately be; and, indeed, as appointments are not often made till the children require their portions, when the probability of many other children must have ceased, this is a difficulty which is not likely to arise. In default of appointment the fund was given in the usual way to sons at twenty-one, and to daughters at twenty-one or marriage; but it was provided, that if any son of her present marriage should attain twenty-one, or any daughter twenty-one, or marry, no child by any future husband should, by marriage or otherwise, be entitled to more than a moiety of the property, which provision, it might be contended, could not affect the right of each class of

(s) 1 Ves. and Bea. 79.

of children, as between themselves, to a substantial share. She made the unequal appointment which has been mentioned; and Lord Eldon held, that attending to all the circumstances, and the nature of the trust collected from the deed, he was not authorized to say that the share was not substantial. His Lordship relied upon the circumstances, that the power was from time to time, and the number of objects was incapable of being ascertained until she reached an age at which she could not have more; and if there had been one child by a subsequent marriage, after all her particular appointments, that child might have taken a moiety of what constituted the whole fund before any appointment, though that should leave to perhaps twenty children of the former marriage only their respective shares of what remained unappointed. It is evident, his Lordship observed, how immensely large a discretion was given, and to what the fund might, by repeated executions of the power, be reduced, and this went far to show that her discretion must, as far as it can in any case, be unfettered.

Where it is intended that a party shall have a power to divide the fund amongst several objects, in substantial proportions, according to his discretion, but shall not be at liberty to give merely a nominal share to any, the smallest sum which the person creating the power would wish each of the objects, in any event, to have, should be named; and it should be expressly declared, that the donee of the power shall not appoint a less sum to any one of the objects.

As we shall hereafter see what is not appointed, or is ill appointed, goes as in default of appointment, and

where the fund is given by the instrument creating the power to the objects in default of appointment, the dying without any appointment as to a part is considered equal to an actual appointment; and therefore a sufficient share being permitted to descend will be deemed tantamount to an appointment, so as to prevent any question of illusion (*t*).

And if an appointment be made of part of the fund, excluding some of the objects, but leaving a share not illusory to descend, and afterwards an appointment be made of the residue, wholly excluding or giving an illusory share to some, the last appointment only shall be void, so that the residue may descend and uphold the former appointment. If a contrary rule were established, an appointment, leaving a share not illusory to descend, would be good at first, but become bad afterwards (*u*).

And although an appointment, abstractedly taken, be illusory, yet it may be justified by circumstances, and equity will not relieve against it. Formerly it was considered, that where but a trifle was given, yet if the child by misbehaviour deserved it, the Court would not vary the appointment (*x*); but at the present day the conduct of the objects of the power cannot be taken into consideration (*y*).

In *Boyle v. the Bishop of Peterborough*, Lord Thurlow laid it down, that where gross inequality is accounted for, and, by the situation of the children, is rendered humane, and wise and discreet, the Court will not call it

(*t*) *Wilson v. Piggott*, 2 Ves. un. 351.

(*u*) *Ibid.* See 1 Ves. and Bea. 101.

(*x*) *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57.

(*y*) *Kemp v. Kemp*, 5 Ves. jun. 855; see 1 Ves. and Bea. 97.

it illusory (z). Therefore, if a child become a bankrupt, and has not obtained his certificate, that may be a sufficient reason to give him a small share (a). And where a father, having advanced a child upon marriage, recited that as a reason for giving her a small share, it was held not to be illusory (b). For the ground of interference in these cases is fraud, and in such case the *child* would be guilty of a fraud in attempting to set aside the appointment, the parent, perhaps, having advanced more on that account; the answer would be, he had given that child a substantive share, who therefore could not complain of the difference (c). Lord Alvanley expressed his opinion, that, perhaps, if a sufficient reason *could be proved* between parent and child the Court would apply the rule; but it must be proof, he said, that leaves no doubt whatsoever. And in speaking thus, he adverted to extrinsic proof, where no statement appears upon the face of the appointment (d). But it seems that in these cases the provision must move from the person intrusted with the power of appointment (e), although in one case Lord Alvanley expressed an opinion, that a small share might be given where there is an actual provision made for some, *even where it does not move from the person executing the power*. The power of

(z) 1 Ves. jun. 299; 3 Bro. C. C. 243.

(a) Bax v. Whitbread, 16 Ves. jun. 15.

(b) Bristow v. Warde, 2 Ves. jun. 366; and see Smith v. Lord Camelford, ib. 698; Vanderzee v. Adom, 4 Ves. jun. 771; Long v. Long, 5 Ves. jun. 445; Spen-

cer v. Spencer, 5 Ves. jun. 362; Bax v. Whitbread, 16 Ves. jun.

15.

(c) See 5 Ves. jun. 368.

(d) Spencer v. Spencer, *ubi sup.*; see 1 Ves. and Bea. 97.

(e) Mocatta v. Lousada, 12 Ves. jun. 123.

of distribution, he said, was given in order that there might be an inequality, if necessary. It was therefore, he added, nothing but a trust in the party to discriminate how much each ought to have, under every circumstance that ought fairly to enter into his consideration, and with a view of the object of the power, that each of them should receive a provision. If that was satisfied *aliunde*, it had its object (*f*). It is however clear that the provision must not move from the person *creating* the power (*g*). And in a case, where, under a power to appoint to younger children, the parent, in effect, excluded the second son, because the eldest was an idiot, and he considered that the second child would obtain a grant of the surplus rents, which he actually did, yet Lord Redesdale held that the appointment was illusory (*h*). His Lordship said, "if a younger son is provided for amply by a fortune *aliunde*, by obtaining a lucrative situation, or the like, it may be a ground for an appointment so unequal that it might be otherwise deemed illusory; but that cannot be considered as a provision which is a mere expectancy, depending on the will and pleasure of another; and an appointment cannot be deemed good or bad according to the manner in which that pleasure may be afterwards exercised. If a father supposed that provision would be made for one of his sons by his brother, which expectation might be finally disappointed, a very unequal appointment made

(*f*) *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, 4 Ves. jun. 785, *sed qu.*; see 16 Ves. jun. 25; *Lysaght v. Royse*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 151; and 1 Ves. and Bea. 97.

(*g*) *Kemp v. Kemp*, 5 Ves. jun. 861; *Lysaght v. Royse*, *ubi sup.*

(*h*) *Lysaght v. Royse*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 151.

made under that expectation, however founded, and however reasonable at the time, could not be supported. In the present case, if the appointment had been made in such form as would have given the son a fair share in case he had not derived benefit from the peculiar circumstances of his elder brother, it might perhaps have been sustained ; but this is an absolute appointment in all events, and the question is, whether such an absolute appointment, not subject to any contingency, can be made good by subsequent events, if it would not be good in all events. He thought the appointment must have been good on the day it was made, or not good at all. In cases of this kind, where the appointment is grossly unequal, and there is no just foundation for the inequality, but it is the result of mere caprice or mistake, the appointment cannot stand ; it is not a just exercise of the power given. Here there was no caprice, no intentional injustice, but there was mistake, and the gross inequality was made under the influence of that mistake."

It may here again be observed, that if the fund consist partly of real and partly of personal estate, it is not necessary to give a part of each to every object ; but if there are two, for instance, all the realty may be given to one, and all the personalty to the other (*i*).

If the objects have agreed to abide by the intention and will of the donee of the power, they cannot set aside even an illusory appointment (*k*) (I).

Where

(*i*) *Morgan v. Surman*, 1 Taunt. 289.

(*k*) *Pawlet v. Pawlet*, 1 Wils. 224.

(I) This case, which is very long, did not decide any thing. The Earl made provisions by his will for all his children, and the decree is

Where the donee of the power is a mere stranger, and a trustee of it, upon a bill being filed before an appointment, the Court always decrees an equal distribution of the fund amongst the objects ; and although the trustee of the power might have excluded some, the Court cannot (*l*). And the same rule prevails where the appointment is set aside as illusory, and there is no gift in default of appointment (*m*). In some early cases, the Court exercised a dangerous discretion, as by giving the whole (*n*), or a double share, of the estate to the heir-at-law (*o*); but this power the Court has of late very properly disclaimed (*p*), and a discretionary power in a parent is never executed by the Court (*q*); nor is it controlled, except on the ground of fraud, as in the case of an illusory appointment.

(*l*) *Kemp, v. Kemp* 5 Ves. jun. 849; *Longmore v. Broom*, 7 Ves. jun. 124.

(*m*) *Gibson v. Kinven*, 1 Vern. 66.

(*n*) *Clarke v. Turner*, 2 Freem. 198; and *Mosely v. Mosely*, cited *ib.*; see *Finch*, 53.

(*o*) *Warburton v. Warburton*, 2 Vern. 420; 1 Bro. P. C. 34; and see *Carr v. Bedford*, 2 Cha. Rep. 77.

(*p*) See 5 Ves. jun. 859; and see *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640.

(*q*) *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57.

is prefaced by this declaration; that the plaintiff having by his bill, and now in court, expressly submitted to be bound by the intention of his father, the late Earl, in his deed of appointment and will, according to the true construction thereof, and all the defendants, the other children of the late Earl, having, by their answers, or now by their counsel at the bar, submitted to take, according to the true intention of the said Earl, and all the said parties disclaiming to take advantage of any defect in point of law or equity in the execution of the said Earl's power by the deed of appointment, his Lordship declared, &c. *Poulett v. Earl Poulett*, Reg. Lib. B. fol. 582.

L. L.

Thus

Thus the law stood in regard to illusory appointments previously to the 1st W. 4, c. 46; and it is still necessary to retain the old law in this work, as the act does not operate retrospectively. The attempt of equity to restrain the legal right of a donee of a power to fix the shares so as to make all substantial ones, had entirely failed. No certain rule was established, and every attempt to make a considerable difference between the shares led inevitably to litigation. All agreed that the law required alteration. Some, to whose opinions great respect was due, thought that *every* power ought to be declared an exclusive one; but this would have trenched unnecessarily upon the right of parties to prevent their donees of powers from altogether excluding any object. If a father delegate to me a power to appoint amongst all his children, I may not consider a child's conduct to be such as to justify me in *giving* him a nominal share; whereas if I had an exclusive power, I might, upon slight grounds, give all to one without noticing any of the others. A father, besides, may not choose to have a child altogether excluded without the donee of the power distinctly declaring that to be his intention. It was thought that the safest plan was to take away the equitable rule and leave the legal one in operation, by which litigation would be avoided, without breaking in upon the present power of disposition; for wherever a donor of a power is desirous that no object of the power should be excluded from taking, in all events, a given sum or a given share of the whole fund, he is at full liberty to declare his intention, to which the law will give full effect.

The

The act is called "An Act to alter and amend the Law relating to Illusory Appointments." It recites that by deeds, wills and other instruments, powers are frequently given to appoint real and personal property amongst several objects, in such manner that none of the objects can be excluded by the donee of the power from a share of such property : and that appointments in exercise of such powers, whereby an unsubstantial, illusory or nominal share of the property affected thereby is appointed to or left unappointed to devolve upon any one or more of the objects thereof, are invalid in equity, although the like appointments are good and binding at law ; and it recites that considerable inconvenience had arisen from the rule of equity relative to such appointments, and that it was expedient that such appointments should be as valid in equity as at law ; it therefore enacts, that no appointment which from and after the passing of the act should be made in exercise of any power or authority to appoint any property, real or personal, amongst several objects should be invalid or impeached in equity on the ground that an unsubstantial, illusory or nominal share only should be thereby appointed to or left unappointed to devolve upon any one or more of the objects of such power ; but that every such appointment should be valid and effectual in equity as well as at law, notwithstanding that any one or more of the objects should not thereunder or in default of such appointment take more than an unsubstantial, illusory or nominal share of the property subjected to such power : provided that nothing in the act contained should prejudice or affect any provision in any deed, will, or other instrument creat-

ing any such power as aforesaid, which should declare the amount of the share or shares from which no object of the power should be excluded: And provided also, that nothing in the act contained should be construed, deemed or taken at law or in equity to give any other validity, force or effect to any appointment than such appointment would have had if a substantial share of the property affected by the power had been thereby appointed to or left unappointed to devolve upon any object of such power.

SECTION V.

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POWER TO APPOINT TO CHILDREN.

IT is upon the power of which I am now to treat that by far the greater proportion of cases arise. As we have already discussed, perhaps sufficiently, the general doctrine in regard to the estates which may be created under powers, I shall here only consider, 1st, To whom an appointment may be made under a power to appoint to children. And, 2ndly, In what manner the fund may be settled upon them, merely premising that an indefinite power in words may, upon the whole instrument taken together, be confined to children (*a*). And,

I. First

(*a*) *Bristow v. Warde, vide supra, p. 473.*

I. First then, It is now perfectly established that a power to appoint to children will not authorize an appointment to grandchildren (*b*).

In the case of *Doe on the demise of the Duke of Devonshire v. Lord George Cavendish*, a contrary opinion was in effect delivered, although it was pronounced on the particular circumstances of the case. The case was shortly this: Lady Burlington devised freehold estates to the use of the Duke of Devonshire for life, remainder to trustees, to preserve remainder "to the use of such of his child or children by his late wife, for such estate and estates, and in such shares and proportions, and under and subject to such powers, provisos, conditions, restrictions or limitations as he should appoint;" and in default of appointment, to all the child or children of the Duke by his wife, as tenants in common in tail, with cross-remainders between them in tail, with remainder to the Duke in fee. He exercised the power by limiting the estate to his two younger sons for life, with remainder to their issue in strict settlement, with a power to make jointures, &c. In the view that was taken of the case it was not necessary to decide the point, but the Court gave an extra-judicial opinion upon it (*c*). They said there were three grounds from which they were of opinion that this was a good execution: 1st, From the subject matter of the power; 2ndly, From the limitations over for want of appointment; 3rdly,

(*b*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640; *Bristow v. Warde*, 2 Ves. jun. 336; *Whistler v. Webster*, *ib.* 367; *Smith v. Lord Camelford*, *ib.* 698; *Crompe v. Barrow*, 4 Ves. jun. 681; *Adams v. Adams*, Cowp. 651; *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 1 East, 442; 7 Ves. jun. 382; *Butcher v. Butcher*, 9 Ves. jun. 382.

(*c*) 4 Term Rep. 744, n.

From the words in which the power was created. 1st, This was not money, nor to be turned into money, nor portions. It was a limitation of a family estate, how it should go after her death. She considered how it should go, being determined that it should go amongst grandchildren. Suppose she had only said, at the time of making her will, that she meant it to go to the grandchildren, it must have been inquired, whether absolutely, or in strict settlement: if so, her answer must have been, "in strict settlement." There are two kinds of settlement, one by which the issue of the person to whom the first limitation is made shall certainly take, by giving the first taker only an estate for life, the other by creating an estate-tail in the first instance. But then there is a trick in law, by which, when the issue arrive at twenty-one the entail may be barred. If this had been represented to Lady Burlington, her answer would have been, that she was sorry for it, as it might be a mean of defeating her purpose: but then it would be answered to that again, that there was a trick against that, to make a strict settlement. That was meant; but to guard against all events, she said, "I will put the father in my place, and give him authority, if he choose to execute it." If the words "in strict settlement" had been used, nobody could have doubted her meaning. Now all the words in the language, except those, are used to carry this power as far as possible, and to show that she meant an appointment in strict settlement. Whatever he might do with his own estate he might do with this; that was her intention, only that the children were the objects. What is the use of powers? It implies a strict settlement, with power to make jointures, leases, and raise portions.

Upon

Upon the foregoing decision it need only be remarked, that, as to the first ground, it can at most only go in aid of the construction upon the words of the power itself; that the second ground bears against the construction of the Court, as the estate was, in default of appointment, given amongst the children in tail, so that they might acquire the fee, and their issue could only take through them, and not as purchasers; and that in regard to the third ground, the objects were the child or children, and the general words are merely those which are usually inserted by conveyancers, with a view to the interests to be given to the objects designated, and not with an intent to extend the power by implication to objects not named in it, nor will the words bear a contrary construction, consistently with the decided cases (*d*).

The same point arose in *Griffith v. Harrison* (*e*). By one codicil an estate, part freehold and part copyhold, was given to his wife for life, and after her decease, "to such *child or children* of him, the deviser, as she should judge most proper to bequeath the same to." By a later codicil he gave the estate to his wife for life, and empowered her to devise the same to any one or more of his *child or children*, in such manner, share, and proportion as she should appoint, but *so as the said estate should not be divided, but transmitted whole and entire to his heirs*. And he gave the reversion of an estate adjoining to the other in like manner, and declared that the two estates should be considered *as one estate, and be transmitted entire to his family*. In default of

(*d*) See this case more fully observed upon in Powell's note to *Fearne's Ex. Dev.* p. 349.

(*e*) 3 Bro. C. C. 310.

appointment he gave the estate to his own right heirs. The widow appointed the estate to her eldest son for life, remainder to trustees, to preserve remainder to his children in strict settlement, in the usual way, with like limitations to her other children and their issue. The Court of King's Bench were equally divided in opinion (*f*): Lord Kenyon and Mr. Justice Grose were of opinion that the children were the only objects, and that the whole execution of the power must be exhausted upon them. The execution which the wife had attempted took in persons who were not children of the testator, and affected to make them purchasers, and was not only not warranted by the power, but might give a descendable quality to the estate to persons out of the testator's views, viz. to the heirs *ex parte materna* of the children of the sons, and *ex parte paterna* of the children of the daughters. But they thought, that in favour of the general intention, the children might be held to take estates-tail.

On the other hand, Ashhurst and Buller (who were Judges of B. R. when the Duke of Devon's case was decided) certified that the first son took for life only. They prefaced their opinion with a declaration that the intention of the person creating the power is to be the guide in the construction of it, and that a settlement upon a child for life, with remainder to his children in strict settlement is, in common parlance, a settlement on the child. They then criticised on the words of the power, which they thought tantamount to a power to limit the estate "in strict settlement;" and they relied on the Duke of Devonshire's case, as in point. But if
a strict

a strict settlement was not authorized then, as the estate was to be transmitted entire, they thought that the only way of making the different parts of the power consistent was to consider the word "heirs" as applicable only to more remote descendants than the children, and to confine the wife's power of appointment to the children during their lives only, in which case, after their deaths, the estate would go entire to the right heir of the testator.

If the rule attempted to be established in the Duke of Devonshire's case, and by Ashhurst and Buller in the last case, were to prevail, it would certainly amount to this, that every power of appointment to *children*, in which the general words *manner, share, proportion, &c.* are thrown in, extends to grandchildren. Now it is incontrovertibly settled that grandchildren are not objects within a bare power to appoint to children, and it would be highly mischievous if this broad rule were to be cut down by a minute inquiry in every case, whether there are not words in the power tantamount to "strict settlement," so as to embrace grandchildren according to the supposed *intention*.

But we may fairly consider the principles upon which the extra-judicial opinion delivered in the Duke of Devonshire's case was founded as completely overruled. They received a severe shock from the certificate of Lord Kenyon and Mr. Justice Grose in Griffith and Harrison. And in a subsequent case, which it is quite impossible to distinguish from the Duke of Devonshire's case, the Court of King's Bench, and afterwards Lord Eldon, held that the power did not authorize a limitation to grandchildren, notwithstanding

ing

ing that the usual words "in such parts or proportions, and for such estate and estates, and with and under such charges, provisions, conditions, and limitations," were inserted in the power (*g*). In a case which arose since Lord Kenyon's death, Mr. Justice Lawrence observed, that the Duke of Devonshire's case was one that would not rule any other, at least not exactly similar. That he had heard Lord Kenyon express that opinion of it (*h*); and neither Lord Thurlow (*i*) nor Lord Alvanley appear to have considered the case as of much authority (*k*).

If the case of *Brudenell v. Elwes* is to be treated as a binding authority, a power, in the precise words of that in the Duke of Devonshire's case, must now be held to extend to children only. It would be idle to attempt to distinguish the cases: the powers are nearly word for word the same:

Duke of Devonshire's case.

"To the use of such his child or children by Charlotte Lady Cavendish, his late wife, for such estate and estates, and in such shares and proportions, and under and subject to such powers, provisoes, conditions, restrictions, or limitations as he shall, by deed, &c. nominate, direct, limit, or appoint."

Brudenell v. Elwes.

"To the use of all or any the child or children of the body of J. C. on the body of Louisa his wife, lawfully begotten and to be begotten, in such parts or proportions, and for such estate and estates, and with and under such charges, provisions, conditions, and limitations, as they should, by any deed, &c. direct, limit, or appoint."

In the case of *Mallison v. Andrews* a power was given to a woman to dispose by deed or will of 1,300*l.* to

(*g*) *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 1 East, 442; 7 Ves. jun. 382.

(*h*) See 2 East, 381, n.

(*i*) *Lowson v. Lowson*, 2 Bro. C. C. 26, cited; and see *ibid.* 29.

(*k*) See 4 Ves. jun. 684.

to such of her children, in such manner and form, *and to such uses and purposes*, as she should appoint. She gave a part to one child for life, and after her decease the principal to be divided among her children. And under the very full words of this power the appointment was held to be well made (l) (I).

But, even full as these words were, yet, unless the words "and to such uses and purposes," were considered as an independent clause, authorizing an appointment even to strangers, which perhaps can hardly be contended, the case, it should seem, cannot stand consistently with the later determinations.

In *Alexander v. Alexander*, after giving a power of appointment in favour of his children to his wife, the testator directed that if she should think fit to apply in her lifetime any part of the fund for their better advancement in marriage, or otherwise, in the world, then the trustees should pay such part of it, *for the benefit of such children*, as his wife should appoint. Sir Thomas Clarke

(l) 2 Bro. C. C. 26, n ; Chan. Hil. 1782.

(I) Most of the cases in the notes to Brown are inaccurately reported. This case is introduced as a note of a case cited in the argument of *Robinson v. Hardcastle*; but it is evident that the case intended to be cited was *Maddison v. Andrew*, in 1 Ves. 57; and there appears to be reason to suspect, from the striking similarity of the names, that the case of *Mallison v. Andrews* is merely an inaccurate statement of the former, or that that case has been confounded with some other. I could not discover the case referred to by Brown in the Register's book. There is a case in 1782, *Mallison v. Nesbitt*, but that turned upon a very different question, Reg. Lib. B. 1781, fol. 388. There is also a case of *Mallison v. Robinson*, *Archdale*, and others, which was a petition by a tenant for life under a will, and the question could not arise in that case, Reg. Lib. B. 1782, fol. 66.

Clarke thought that this power would have enabled the mother, for better advancement in marriage, to make *a strict settlement* (*m*).

Where a child dies without any appointment having been made to him, no part can be appointed to his executor or administrator (*n*); and indeed, as we have seen, an appointment may be made to the surviving children or child, so as to exclude the representatives of the deceased child from taking any share under a gift in default of appointment (*o*).

But it is settled, that in equity a valid appointment may be made to persons not objects of the power, with the approbation of the real object of the power. Therefore, if upon the marriage of a child, the parent, by the marriage settlement, under a power to appoint to children, appoint to the issue of the marriage, the appointment would be supported in equity, not as a good appointment to the issue of the marriage, but as an appointment to the child *itself*, and a settlement of it by *him* (*p*); nor is it essential that such a settlement should be made upon marriage. The principle is, that the act operates first as an appointment; and secondly, as a settlement by the appointee. Therefore an appointment of personalty to the children of a married daughter, who is herself the object of the power, is valid if made with the concurrence of the husband (*q*),
for

(*m*) 2 Ves. 640. In citing this case, Mr. Justice Buller appears to have overlooked this power; see 2 Term Rep. 253.

(*n*) *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57.

(*o*) *Boyle v. the Bishop of*

Peterborough, 1 Ves. jun. 299; see 1 Ves. and Bea. 91.

(*p*) *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357; *Langstone v. Blackmore*, Ambl. 289.

(*q*) *White v. St. Barbe*, 1 Ves. and Bea. 399.

for a husband can dispose of such property of his wife in expectancy against every one but the wife surviving. But the mere circumstance of the child being made a party to the deed, and not executing or assenting to it, will not be sufficient (*r*). An appointment first to the child, and then a settlement by the child, in consequence of a previous agreement with the father, upon himself (the child) and his children (not objects of the power), with provisions for other objects of the power, have been held valid (*s*).

Hitherto we have seen that children only are objects of the power; but it still remains to inquire *what* children come within the scope of the power.

A power to appoint to children *living* at the parent's decease includes a child in *ventre sa mere* at that time (*t*). This point has been otherwise decided (*u*); but the law is now perfectly settled (*x*).

In *Coleman v. Seymour* (*y*), a man gave 3,000 *l.* to a married daughter for the use of her younger children, to be distributed amongst them as she should appoint; and Lord Hardwicke determined, that the gift did not extend to her children by a second marriage; and he was of opinion, that it extended only to children living at the making of the will, or at the farthest at the death of

(*r*) *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 7 Ves. jun. 382.

(*s*) *Tucker v. Tucker*, 13 Price, 607.

(*t*) *Beale v. Beale*, 1 P. Wms. 244.

(*u*) *Pierson v. Garnet*; *Cooper v. Forbes*, 2 Bro. C. C. 38. 63.

(*x*) *Clarke v. Blake*, 2 Bro. C. C. 320; S. C. nom. *Doe v. Clarke*, 2 H. Blackst. 399; and see *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 4 Ves. jun. 226; see also *Hale v. Hale*, Prec. Cha. 50.

(*y*) 1 Ves. 209; see *Crowe v. Odell*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 449.

of the testator. This question, however, seldom arises upon powers, because generally an interest for life in the fund is given to the parent, with remainder to his unborn children, as he shall appoint, in which case it is clear that the power embraces all the children. This is the case of every common marriage settlement (z).

In a late case (a), where a fund was given to *A* for life, and at her decease to divide it in portions as she shall choose to her children, it was held that the children of *A* living at her death were the only objects of the power and of the gift by implication in default of the execution of the power. But this decision, it is apprehended, cannot be supported.

Where the estate is settled on the eldest son, and subject to that, a power is given of appointing portions to the younger children, a younger child who becomes the eldest before receiving his portion is not within the power (b). So where a power was given to appoint a sum amongst younger children, provided that the eldest son, or the *son* possessing the estate should have no share of it, and an appointment was made, *nominatim*, to Anthony, the second son, and the other *younger* children, and after the appointment Anthony became the eldest son by the death of his elder brother, and the estate descended upon him, Lord Thurlow held that

(z) See *Baldwin v. Carver*, ch. 7, sect. 2; and see *Lady Cowp.* 309; *Hughes v. Hughes*, 3 Bro. C. C. 355. *Lincoln v. Pelham*, *Bowles v. Bowles*, *Leake v. Leake*, 11 Ves.

(a) *Kennedy v. Kingston*, 2 jun. 166. 177. 477, *Savage v. Carroll*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 265, and *Jac. & Walk. qu.* 431.

(b) *Chadwick v. Doleman*, 2 *Matthews v. Paul*, 3 *Swanst. Vern.* 528; *Lord Teynham v. Webb*, 2 Ves. 198; *vide supra*, 328.

that Anthony could not take any part of the fund, although the appointment was not revoked (c).

But in a case where provision was made by a private act of Parliament for an eldest son, and a power was given to the father to appoint a sum amongst his younger children, "Stephen, Martha, and Catherine," and Stephen, by the death of his elder brother, became entitled to the provision made for the eldest son, and then the father appointed a considerable sum to Stephen under his power, Lord Talbot said this case arose upon an act of Parliament, in which the intent shall prevail against the very words, but then the intent must be plain and clear. Now Stephen was indeed called a younger child in the preamble, but when the power was given, it was not to appoint amongst the younger children generally, but to *Stephen, Martha and Catherine*; and he held the appointment to Stephen to be a valid exercise of the power (d). Upon this statement of the case, then, it seems to establish this principle, that where a younger child is included by his *name* in a power, he will continue an object of the power, although he lose his character of younger son. But Lord Talbot principally distinguished this case from that of Chadwick and Doleman, on the ground that there the question was between the eldest son, become so by his brother's death, and the other younger children : whereas in the case before him, Stephen was the only child left, and the dispute was between him and the administrator of a deceased child, so that this case cannot perhaps be relied on as an authority for the
general

(c) *Broadmead v. Wood*, 1 Bro. C. C. 77.

(d) *Jermyn v. Fellows*, For.

general principle, which at first sight it seems to establish ; and certainly if the rule in *Chadwick v. Doleman* is the law of the Court, the question in these cases ought to be, not whether the younger children are in the instrument creating the power called “younger children,” or by their proper names, but whether, upon the whole instrument taken together, they are treated as younger children ; and whether, judging from the evidence to be collected from the instrument itself, a portion would have been provided for them if they had stood in the place of their eldest brother.

These cases profess to go merely upon the intention that the child is not a younger child within the power, and by parity of reason where an eldest child is in effect a younger child, *with reference to the estate*, he may be an object of a power to appoint to younger children ; as, where an estate is settled on the son, and there is an eldest daughter, there, although in point of age the daughter is eldest, yet it is well settled that the son, as he takes the estate, though not so by primogeniture, shall be considered an eldest child, and the daughter, though eldest, shall be taken as a younger child (*e*) ; so an elder son unprovided for may take under a provision for younger children, for it is to the intention, and not to the words *elder* or *younger*, that the Court adverts (*f*).

But of course the change of character must take place
before

(*e*) *Pierson v. Garnet*, 2 Bro. C. C. 38, and see *Beale v. Beale*, 1 P. Wms. 244 ; *Lord Teynham v. Webb*, 2 Ves. 210 ; *Heneage v. Hemlocke*, 2 Atk. 456 ; *Billingsley v. Wells*, 3 Atk. 221.

(*f*) *Duke v. Doidge*, 2 Ves. 203, cited from Mr. Noel's note ; and see *Emery v. England*, 3 Ves. jun. 232.

before the receipt of the money ; clearly a younger son becoming eldest, and taking the estate itself, cannot be called upon to refund a portion received out of the estate whilst he was a younger child, and in that character (*g*).

It remains to observe, that in the case of *Hall v. Hewer* (*h*), Lord Hardwicke laid it down, that there was no case where the Court had considered a youngest child as an eldest, but between parent and children, or those who stand in *loco parentis* (*i*), but this distinction does not appear to be attended to at the present day.

II. We are now to consider in what manner the fund may be settled on the children.

A power to appoint a fund, in such *proportion* as a party shall think fit, implies that he may apportion it out in such manner as he pleases, consequently he may give an interest for life in a particular share to one child, or limit the capital of the same share to another, or even go so far as to limit to a third child upon a contingency, provided he doles out the whole in this various way among all the children only. The power does not require that he should distribute it in *gross* sums, and give each child an absolute interest in that gross sum, for such a power enables the gift of particular interests, and the appointment of such interests (*k*) ; and a general power to apportion lands receives the same con-

(*g*) See *Graham v. Lord Londonderry*, 2 Ves. 199, 531, cited ; but see *ibid.* 212 ; and see *Loder v. Loder*, *ibid.* 530 ; *Coleman v. Seymour*, 1 Ves. 209 ; *Lady Lincoln v. Pelham*, 10 Ves. jun. 166 ; *Leake v. Leake*, *ib.* 477.

(*h*) *Ambl.* 203.

(*i*) And see *Lord Tenyham v. Webb*, 2 Ves. 198, 10 Ves. jun. 174.

(*k*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640 ; *Bristow v. Warde*, 2 Ves. jun. 336.

struction, therefore life-estates or rent-charges may in like manner be given to any of the children (*l*). Where under such a power it is wished to settle the estate on the eldest son, subject to portions for the younger children, it is usual to limit different parts of the estate to each of the younger children during a term, with remainder as to all to the eldest son in fee, and to give him a power of redeeming the estate by paying the portions intended to be provided for the younger children, nearly in the same way as in a common mortgage for a term of years.

But under such a power, a merely reversionary interest cannot be given to any one child, as it is intended for a provision (*m*).

An appointment under the power to a daughter for her separate use, independently of her husband, is so far from being an objection, that it is more strictly carrying into execution the will of the donor (*n*); and this is still more clearly authorized where the power is to appoint *in such manner* as the donee pleases (*o*).

In one case (*p*), a father having a power to appoint to his children, gave the interest of a portion to the husband of one of his daughters for life, and after his decease, the capital to the daughter herself. Lord

Rosslyn

(*l*) *Thwaites v. Dye*, 2 Vern. 80. *Vide supra*, p. 459.

(*m*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, *ubi sup.*; see *Duke of Devonshire v. Lord G. Cavendish*, 4 Term Rep. 744, n.

(*n*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640.

(*o*) *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1

Ves. 59; and see *Pitt v. Jackson*, 2 Bro. C. C. 51; *Smith v. Lord Camelford*, 2 Ves. jun. 698. *Crompe v. Barrow*, 4 Ves. jun. 681; *Wilson v. Grace*, Rolls, MS. *vide supra*, p. 221.

(*p*) *Bristow v. Warde*, 2 Ves. jun. 336.

Rosslyn said, that if he had given to the wife for life, and in case the husband should survive, to the husband, that would have been a substantial gift; for it was admitted, a gift for life was sufficient. He had done the same thing; for the husband would in that case, in point of law, have taken during the life of the wife. The insertion of the name of the husband prior to that of the wife, was doing no more than if he had given to the wife first. The intention, therefore, not being to illude, but to give in effect such estate as a married woman could take, viz. for the benefit of the husband, as long as the coverture should continue, was not illusory. But the Chancellor principally relied upon the circumstance of the daughter having been provided for by her father in his lifetime.

Now it must be observed, that in the preceding case Lord Rosslyn did not mean to say that the excess beyond the wife's life would not be considered void in case her husband survived her (*q*). And we should be cautious how we admit the doctrine that the fund may be appointed to the husband even during the joint lives of him and his wife, for *he* is no object of the power; and although, as it was observed by the Court, the husband will take during the life of the wife, where it is given to her, yet he will take in a different right, and subject to equities, to which he would not otherwise be liable. If he take under a direct appointment to himself, he may be considered as the absolute owner of it; whereas, if he merely take in his marital right, his wife would have her equity for a settlement out of it, which would bind his assignees, if he should become bankrupt,

(*q*) See *Burleigh v. Pearson*, 1 Ves. 281.

his creditors claiming under an assignment from him, persons claiming under him without any valuable consideration ; and perhaps even purchasers for a valuable consideration ; and where the power rides over real estate, and operates under the Statute of Uses, it seems clear that an appointment to the husband would not invest him with the legal estate, he not being an object designated in the power. But it is probable, that under such an appointment, where the husband can take, he would be held to take in exactly the same manner as he would have done had the fund been appointed to his wife.

Thus far as to the quantity of interest which may be given to each child ; and we may now consider what conditions may be imposed by the person executing the power.

In *Pawlet v. Pawlet* (r), Lord Hardwicke took this distinction, that where a father has only a power of appointment, or distributing portions which are to be raised at all events, he cannot annex any condition to the payment of any share which he appoints, otherwise it is where the portions are not to be raised at all without the father's appointment, for there the father may annex a condition. This, however, was a *gratis dictum*, and I have not met with any case in which the distinction has been acted upon. It would be difficult to establish it upon principle, as in each case the words of the *power* must be the guide of the father's appointment.

A parent having a power to appoint a fund amongst his children, cannot, unless he has a power to annex a condition, restrain a child's share to the payment of a particular

(r) 1 Wils. 224. *Vide supra*, p. 512.

particular debt, for there may be a defence to that debt. Therefore, where a father appointed a share to his daughter, to pay a debt of her husband, for which the testator's son was surety, Lord Hardwicke set it aside. He considered it bad, because not given for her benefit, although by possibility the discharging her husband's debts might tend thereto. It might be otherwise (*s*). And of course he cannot annex any condition for his own benefit (*t*); nor can the property appointed be exempted by the donee of the power from the debts of the appointee, but it must be left to take the fate of being his property, and subject to be come at as his creditors shall think fit (*u*).

This section may be closed with the observation, that powers to appoint to nephews, or any other class of persons, will be construed by the same rules as are applied to a power to appoint to children. Thus, as under such a power, grandchildren are not the objects, so a power to appoint to nephews cannot be extended to great nephews (*x*); yet as a settlement made in favour of the grandchildren, with the assent of the child, is valid, so a like provision may be made in the like case for great nephews.

(*s*) *Burleigh v. Pearson*, 1 Ves. 281; and see *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640. (*u*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640.

(*t*) *Roberts v. Dixall*, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 668, pl. 19; App. No. 22. (*x*) *Falkner v. Butler*, Ambl. 514.

SECTION VI.

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POWER TO APPOINT
TO RELATIONS.

THE observations already made on appointments in general, apply as strongly to a power of appointment in favour of relations as to any other power, only, that it seems to have been thought that a power of appointment to relations may receive a more liberal construction in favour of an exclusive appointment than a power to appoint to children (*a*). We need therefore only inquire, first, what sense is attached to the word relations, kindred, &c. which will show to whom the fund will go under such a bequest, in default of appointment; and 2dly, To whom an appointment may be made under such a power.

I. Nothing is better established than that under a bequest to “relations,” without saying *what* relations, the fund shall go amongst all such relations as are capable of taking within the Statute of Distributions; and this has been adopted as the best measure for setting bounds to such general words, for the relation may be infinite (*b*), although, in two early cases, the Court extended

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| <p>(<i>a</i>) Spring v. Biles, 1 Term Rep. 435, note; and see Mahon v. Savage, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 111; and <i>supra</i>, sect. 3, div. II.</p> | <p>1 Atk. 469; Green v. Howard, 1 Bro. C. C. 31; Hands v. Hands, 1 Term Rep. 437, n.; 3 Bro. C. C. 69, cited; Rayner v. Mowbray, 3 Bro. C. C. 234; Mahon v. Savage, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 111; and see Rob. on Stat. of Frauds, 64, n.</p> |
| <p>(<i>b</i>) Anon. 1 P. Wms. 327; Roach v. Hammond, Prec. Cha. 401; Crossly v. Clare, Ambl. 397; Harding v. Glyn,</p> | <p>3 Bro. C. C. 234; Mahon v. Savage, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 111; and see Rob. on Stat. of Frauds, 64, n.</p> |

tended it farther (c); but these cases are clearly overruled by the current of authorities, and were expressly treated as of no authority by Lord Chancellor Camden in the case of *Widmore v. Woodroffe* (d). The same rule has even been extended to a devise of real estate, and the relations on the maternal side are equally entitled with those on the paternal side, of equal degree (e).

The construction is the same upon the words “*near relations* (f).” And so upon a trust for “*friends and relations*,” Lord Hardwicke said, that *friends* was synonymous to *relations*, otherwise it was absurd (g). And Lord Rosslyn has decided that a bequest to relations by *blood or marriage* was confined to relations entitled under the Statute of Distributions, and those who had married with them, although he said he was not sure that he hit the intention by it (h). But upon a gift to “*my nearest relations*” there is no uncertainty, and consequently no necessity for resorting to construction either to confine or extend a description in itself sufficiently certain. A brother, therefore, would take in exclusion of a nephew (i).

In a case in *Peere Williams* (k), the bequest was to *poor* relations, and a countess, as a relation within the limits, claimed a share, and it was decreed to her, in

(c) *Jones v. Beale*, 2 Vern. 381; and *Arnold v. Bedford*, cited ib.

(d) *Ambl.* 640.

(e) *Doe v. Over*, 1 Taunt. 263.

(f) *Whithorne v. Harris*, 2 Ves. 527.

(g) *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. 87.

(h) *Devisme v. Mellish*, 5 Ves. jun. 529.

(i) *Smith v. Campbell*, 19 Ves. jun. 400; *Brandon v. Brandon*,

3 Swanst. 312.

(k) *Anon.* 1 P. Wms. 327.

regard that the word *poor* was frequently used as a term of endearment and compassion, rather than to signify an indigent person ; as, speaking of one's father, one often says, my *poor* father, or of one's child, my *poor* child. But the reporter treats this as a case of compassion, the countess not having a sufficient estate to support her dignity. In a case before Lord Hardwicke, he appears to have determined, that where the bequest was to *poor* relations, it should not be confined to the rule of the Statute of Distributions, but should be extended to those that were of kin, *and objects of charity* (*l*) ; although he held that this construction could not prevail where the bequest was to the *nearest* poor relations (*m*). Sir Thomas Sewell, also, thought that the epithet *poor* was to be attended to, but he would not extend the bequest to relations beyond the limits (*n*) ; and Lord Redesdale seems to have made a similar decision in the case of *Mahon v. Savage* (*o*), where he determined, that under a bequest to *poor* relations, a person becoming rich before the distribution was not entitled. However, it was expressly decided by Lord Camden, that the addition of the epithet *poor* or *necessitous*, or the like, does not vary the case, but the will must be read as if the word denoting poverty was not in it, *as there is no distinguishing between degrees*

(*l*) *Attorney-General v. Buckland*, 1 Ves. 231 ; *Ambl.* 7, cited.

(*m*) *Goodinge v. Goodinge*, 1 Ves. 231 ; and *Edge v. Salisbury*, *Ambl.* 70.

(*n*) *Brunsdon v. Woolridge*, *Ambl.* 507 ; see *Isaac v. Defriez*, *ibid.* 595. 508 ; and see *Carr v.*

Bedford, 2 Cha. Rep. 77 ; and 1 Bro. C. C. 38 ; and *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. 87. 110.

(*o*) 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 1. 11 ; but read the case ; and see *White v. White*, 7 Ves. jun. 423 ; but note, there the bequest was otherwise too remote, and void.

grees of poverty (*p*), which we may observe is a much better reason than that given for a similar determination in the case in *Peere Williams*. So where the bequest was to the testator's relations "fearing God and walking humbly before him," these words were rejected by Lord Cowper. And in a later case (*q*), where it was to the relations, "who were most deserving," the Master of the Rolls said, that he had no rule of judging of the testator's relations, and could not enter into spirits, and therefore could not prefer one to another. Upon the whole, then, there appears to be great reason to contend that the true rule is, that the epithet poor, necessitous, or the like, is merely nugatory, although certainly there is a considerable weight of authority in favour of the contrary doctrine.

The words "most necessitous of my relations," or similar words, must receive the same construction as *poor* relations (*r*).

The signification imposed on the word *relations* is for the same reason extended to a bequest to "kindred (*s*); and "next of kin" has likewise received the same interpretation (*t*); but the better opinion is, that if there is nothing to show that the testator had reference to the Statute of Distributions, or to a division, as in the case of intestacy, the nearest in kindred only would be entitled; and that brothers and sisters would exclude nephews and nieces from participating in such a bequest.

(*p*) *Widmore v. Woodroffe*,
Ambl. 686; 1 Bro. C. C. 33, n.

(*q*) *Doyley v. Attorney-General*, 4 Vin. Abr. 485, pl. 16; see
Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. jun. 27.

(*r*) *Widmore v. Woodroffe*,
ubi sup.

(*s*) *Carr v. Bedford*, 2 Cha.
Rep. 77; and see 9 Ves. jun. 323.

(*t*) *Phillips v. Garth*, 3 Bro.
C. C. 64.

quest (*u*). A similar construction has been put upon the word "family (*x*)," although certainly that word may, according to the context, have different significations in different wills. It may be restrained to mean only the children (*y*). In one case Lord Alvanley, at the Rolls, construed it to embrace a husband of the party, although he cautiously referred his decision to the particular case before the Court (*z*); and in a devise of real estate it means, it is said, the heir-at-law (*a*).

Lord Thurlow has justly observed, that a bequest to relations is not, under the foregoing construction, rendered totally inofficious, for the *wife* cannot claim, the statute providing for her by the name of wife (*b*). And as this construction is only made in the absence of evidence of the testator's intention, any express direction by him will be imperative. Therefore, where the bequest was to the relations, *equally* to be divided between them, Lord Talbot determined that an unequal distribution could not be directed (*c*); and he accordingly decreed them to take *per capita*, although under the statute they would have taken *per stirpes*; and "share and share alike" have the same meaning as "equally to be divided (*d*)."
So where a testator explains the
meaning

(*x*) *Garrick v. Lord Camden*, 14 Ves. jun. 372; *Smith v. Campbell*, 19 Ves. jun. 400.

(*x*) *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. jun. 319; and see *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. 110; see *Doe v. Joinville*, 3 East, 172.

(*y*) See 9 Ves. jun. 324.

(*z*) *Mac Leroth v. Bacon*, 5 Ves. jun. 156.

(*a*) *Wright v. Atkyns*, 17 Ves. jun. 255; *Doe v. Smith*, 5 Mau. & Sel. 126.

(*b*) See 1 Bro. C. C. 33.

(*c*) *Thomas v. Hole*, For. 251; *Butler v. Stratton*, 3 Bro. C. C. 367; *Wimbles v. Pitcher*, 12 Ves. jun. 433.

(*d*) *Phillips v. Garth*, 3 Bro. C. C. 64.

meaning which he attaches to the word, his will must be attended to; as, where a testatrix gave a residue to be divided between her *relations*, that is, the Greenwoods, the Everits, and the Dows. The Everits were not within the degree of relationship limited by the statute, but were decreed to take jointly with the Greenwoods and Dows, who were (e).

It remains to observe, that parol evidence is inadmissible of the testator's intention not to confine the word *relations*, kindred, &c. It is immaterial that he knew *relations* to mean more than *next of kin*. It may, however, be shown, that the testator had relations in a particular place, and that he knew them; but the evidence cannot be acted upon in opposition to the words of the will (f).

II. But although the Court of necessity thus restrains the import of the word *relations*, yet, where a party has a power of selecting or distributing amongst *relations*, he may go beyond the rule which the Court itself adopts, when the distribution is made under its authority (g). And the Court will not deprive the donee of the discretion reposed in him, but will, although a bill is filed for an account and distribution, still permit him to exercise his power under the eye of the Court (h); but
unless

(e) *Greenwood v. Greenwood*, 1 Bro. C. C. 32, note.

(f) *Goodinge v. Goodinge*, 1 Ves. 231; see *Green v. Howard*, 1 Bro. C. C. 31; *Edge v. Salisbury*, Ambl. 70.

(g) *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; 5 Ves. jun. 501, stated from Reg. Lib.; *Supple v. Lawson*,

Ambl. 729; *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. jun. 319; *Mahon v. Savage*, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 111; *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Mer. 437; *Grant v. Lynam*, 4 Russ. 292.

(h) *Carr v. Bedford*, 2 Cha. Rep. 77; *Brunsdon v. Woolridge*, Ambl. 507; *Bennett v. Honeywood*, ib. 708; *Supple v. Low-*

unless the donee has a power of selection he can only appoint to the next of kin (*i*).

In this kind of bequests, *in default of appointment*, the fund vests in the persons who are next of kin at the death of the donee of the power, and not in the persons who were next of kin at the death of the testator (*k*).

son, *ib.* 729 ; Mahon *v.* Savage, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 111 ; and see Gower *v.* Mainwaring, 2 Ves. 87. 110 ; Cole *v.* Wade, 16 Ves. jun. 27 ; *sed vide supra*, p. 513, and *qu.* the distinction.

(*i*) Pope *v.* Whitcombe, 3 Mer. 689.

(*k*) Harding *v.* Glyn, Cruwys

v. Colman, *ubi sup.* ; see Cole *v.* Wade, 16 Ves. jun. 21 ; Pope *v.* Whitcombe, 3 Mer. 689. In common cases it is otherwise, Doe *v.* Lawson, 3 East, 278. As to the claim of representatives of relations, see Bennett *v.* Honynwood, Ambl. 708 ; Mahon *v.* Savage, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 111.

SECTION VII.

OF POWERS TO JOINTURE.

IT has been already shown in what instances equity will aid the defective execution of a power to jointure (*a*), and the estates which may be created under the power have also been pointed out (*b*). It remains only to state such questions as may be said peculiarly to relate to this power, although certainly the decisions upon them would equally govern any other power of a similar nature.

As the object of a power to jointure is to enable the party to whom it is given to make a provision for the wife

(*a*) *Vide supra*, p. 373.

(*b*) *Vide supra*, ch. 9, sect. 2, div. 1.

wife who shall survive him, and as the power, however frequently exercised, can only operate as a charge in one instance, the most liberal construction should be put upon the power in favour of a repeated execution of it. And it has been decided, that under a power, if a man's present wife die, and he marry any other wife, *then and so often* to settle a jointure for *such* wife during *her* life will enable him to settle a jointure upon any wife that he may afterwards marry, and so *toties quoties* (c).

But in a case where the testator directed, that if his son married a gentlewoman with a good fortune, the trustees should settle a rent-charge on her for her life, subject thereto on the issue of that marriage in strict settlement; but if the son died without issue, then over, and the question was, how the estate was to be settled; Lord Hardwicke determined, that an estate-tail should be given to the son after the strict settlement, as otherwise the issue of any future marriage could not take, which would defeat the testator's intention. He said it was objected that this inconvenience would not happen there; for that the trustees might execute this power *toties quoties*, and that *gentlewoman* was *nomen collectivum*. But that, he said, would not be according to the construction of powers, which can be executed but once, unless the words import otherwise, as it evidently was not there, although it might be executed upon a second wife, if not done before. And this decree, he added, answers all the words in the will (d). This case, it will be observed, can scarcely be ranked with those upon the common power of jointuring, for the object

(c) *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 Atk. 561; Barn. Cha. Rep. 103.

(d) *Allanson v. Clitherow*, 1 Ves. 24.

object of the power was to make a strict settlement of the estate, and not merely to authorize the limitation of a jointure.

A general power to jointure to a particular amount, without expressing that it shall be clear of taxes, will only enable an appointment of the jointure, subject to natural outgoings, as parochial payments and repairs, &c. (e).

Where the jointure is to be of the *clear* yearly value, it means clear of incumbrances and all other charges, which by the course and usage of the country in which the lands lie, ought to be borne by the tenant, but subject to the land-tax and all other outgoings, which, according to such course of the country, ought to be borne by the landlord. In the case in which this was decided, Lord Hardwicke said, that the word "clear" should be construed in the power as it would in an agreement between buyer and seller, that is, clear of all outgoings, incumbrances, and extraordinary charges, not according to the custom of the country, as tithes, poor-rates, church-rates, &c. which are natural charges on the tenant. If, he added, in the country where these estates lie, it had been the custom for the landlord to pay those rates, he should have thought this jointure ought to have been subject to them, for they would in such case be only ordinary charges. But the contrary was proved, that it was not the custom of the country (f). And where the *custom* is for the tenant to

(e) *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1 Atk. 561; Barnard. Cha. Rep. 103; *Lady Londonderry v. Wayne*, Amb. 424.
 (f) *Earl of Tyrconnel v. Duke of Ancaster*, Amb. 237; 2 Ves. 500.

to pay, it is not material that in respect of the particular estate the landlord has agreed to pay them, so as to increase the nominal value of the lands by increasing the rent (*g*).

So under the words clear of *charge* or *reprise* the jointure could not be limited clear of land-tax (*h*).

But where the power was to jointure to a stated amount, without any deduction or abatement, *for any taxes, charges, or impositions, imposed, or to be imposed, parliamentary or otherwise*, but subject to leases in being at the time of such execution made, Lord Harwicke decreed that the power authorized a jointure to be appointed, "free from all incumbrances, rent-charges, rents-seck, fee-farms, quit-rents, annuities, stipends to ministers, pensions and procurations payable thereout, and also free from all parliamentary taxes or impositions of such nature and kind as were in being at the time of executing the power, and particularly from the land-tax then in being (*i*);" and the words *free from taxes*, particularly embrace the land-tax, as being the only tax to which land is absolutely liable (*k*).

And where a man having power to jointure clear of all *taxes*, by articles referring to his power, agrees to grant a jointure free from *reprises*, or the like, although the words may not be co-extensive with those in the power,

(*g*) S. C.

(*h*) Ambl. 240; 2 Ves. 504; as to the extent of the word *reprise*, see Hall v. Hall, 2 Dick. 710; and see 2 Atk. 545.

(*i*) Marchioness of Blandford v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 Atk. 542.

(*k*) Champernon v. Champer-

non, Dougl. 626, cited; and see on the general question, Brewster v. Kitchen, 1 Lord Raym. 317; Bradbury v. Wright, Dougl. 624; and see Da Costa v. Villareal, 1 Bro. C. C. 4, n.

power, yet as the intention is evident, it shall be considered an agreement to grant such a jointure as is authorized by the power (*l*).

But Lord Hardwicke very properly determined, that where *land of a given value* is to be settled, the taxes, from which the jointure is to be free, are such only as were in being *at the time of executing the power*, and the same as to the *quantum* of any existing tax, so that the land would not be free in the hands of the jointress from any future increase of the tax (*m*), for otherwise this mischief would follow, that whenever any tax varied, that would be a defect in the value of the jointure, and the jointress would come into a court of equity to make the defect good against the remainder-man.

And where lands of a given value are to be settled, the value is in other respects to be taken as it stood *at the time of the execution of the power*. This Lord Hardwicke repeatedly determined (*n*). If by any accident after the execution of the power there should be an excess, it will be for the benefit of the jointress. By parity of reason, if there should be any deficiency by inundation, or casualties, the jointress must acquiesce under it; to construe it otherwise would make these powers desultory (*o*). But in a subsequent case before Lord Northington, where the point was not much debated,

(*l*) Marchioness of Blandford v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 Atk. 542; Lady Londonderry v. Wayne, Ambl. 424, *et infra*.

(*m*) Marchioness of Blandford v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 Atk. 542; and see Ambl. 239, 2 Ves. 502.

(*n*) Marchioness of Blandford v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 Atk. 542; Earl of Tyrconnel v. Duke of Ancaster, 2 Ves. 500, Ambl. 237.

(*o*) See 2 Atk. 544; and see Speake v. Speake, 1 Vern. 217; Pinnell v. Hallett, Ambl. 106.

bated, he held that the value cannot be fixed with justice *but at the time of the husband's death*. The wife cannot know the value but by inspection of leases, or by information, if the estates are in hand. The rent taken at a particular time, and under a particular letting, ought not to bind the wife. The rent of an estate is very uncertain; it often varies; the landlord is often obliged to give boons. Where he has been at an expense of improving, it is common for the tenant, instead of paying a sum of money for the improvements, to pay an increase of rent; and he accordingly decreed the value of the lands to be taken as at the time of the husband's death (*p*).

The case before Lord Northington is, in some respects, distinguishable from those before Lord Hardwicke, but their opinions are at variance. The value must be taken as it stood at some given time, and Lord Hardwicke's is decidedly the better rule. For by that rule, if the power be duly executed, with reference to the time of its execution, no question can arise upon any subsequent rise or fall in the value of the lands: whereas, if Lord Northington's opinion were to be followed, nearly every case of this nature would occasion a suit in equity; because in most cases the lands would fall or rise in value between the time of the execution of the power and the husband's death.

Where a man covenants that a jointure is of a given value, the wife has of course a remedy to have the defect supplied out of her husband's assets (*q*); but where it

(*p*) *Lady Londonderry v. Wayne*, *Ambl.* 424; see and consider the case. (*q*) *Probert v. Morgan*, 1 *Atk.* 440.

is clear that the parties merely intended that he should execute his power, although he agrees to do something beyond it, the Court will consider the excess as a mistake, and will not give the wife a compensation in respect of it out of her husband's assets. This was settled in the case of *Londonderry v. Wayne* (r), where a man having a power to jointure to the extent of 400*l.* generally, agreed to convey part of the estates comprised in the power, of the yearly value of 400*l.*, *clear of taxes and reprises*, to his wife, and afterwards executed his power *without* making the jointure clear of taxes. And Lord Northington decreed, that the insertion of the words "clear of taxes and reprises," was a mistake. The persons concerned imagined that the words of the power were to be so understood; and he was of opinion that it was not the husband's intention to covenant beyond his power of jointuring. Another ground relied upon was, that the settlement rectified the mistake: and that the wife, who had reserved a great part of her own fortune to her separate use, and was assisted by her own solicitor, a man of eminence, was to be considered a feme sole, and capable of contracting, although she was under coverture.

But of course this rule can only prevail where it is evident that a *mistake* was made *by all parties*, therefore if the power was not known to the wife, and not referred to in the articles, it is clear that the wife might come against her husband's assets for any deficiency, although he should execute his power to the fullest extent; and it would be no plea that he himself mistook the construction or extent of his power.

It

(r) Ambl. 424; and see the converse of the case, *supra*, p. 542.

It is very customary to give a man a power to jointure his wife in proportion to the fortune she brings; for example, 100 *l.* per annum for every 1,000 *l.*; and as the object of such a power is that the estate may not be incumbered in favour of a woman who brings no fortune into the family, any underhand execution of it will be set aside; a nominal portion is not sufficient; as, if the husband or his friends advance money to make up the sum, and it is afterwards repaid (*s*), so although she has a portion, yet if it is settled to her separate use, it will not enable the husband to exercise his power (*t*), so perhaps if it were settled on the husband for life only, remainder to the wife absolutely.

But it is not necessary that the portion should be paid, and absolutely expended by the husband, because that would put it out of his power to make a reasonable settlement of it on his family, and yet enable him to waste and squander it away; therefore, where the portion is settled in a proper and reasonable manner for the benefit of the family, in the fair way of contracting, that is not within the reason of the cases on fraud and collusion. Upon these principles Lord Hardwicke determined, that a settlement of part of the wife's portion on the husband for life, remainder on the younger children of the marriage, and in case there should be no such child, on the survivor of the husband and wife, was not a fraud on the power, although the wife survived him, and there was no younger child, so that she herself eventually

(*s*) *Vide supra*, ch. 7, sect. 2. of Ancaster, Ambl. 237, 2 Ves.

(*t*) Lord Tyrconnel *v.* Duke 500.

eventually became entitled to her portion as well as her jointure (*u*).

In a late case, where an estate was devised to several persons and their issue male, in strict settlement, with a power to the tenants for life to jointure according to the amount of the wife's portion, upon condition that not less than two thirds of the portion should be settled, "one third upon the eldest son of the marriage, and one other third upon the younger children," Lord Eldon determined that a life-interest in the two thirds might be reserved to the husband; and that the interest of an eldest son might be divested in case of his death without issue male under twenty-one (*x*).

Under a power of this nature, the tenant for life cannot bind the estate in the hands of the remainder-man in respect of any part of his wife's fortune, not received or ascertained till *after his death*, for the estate might otherwise be burthened with jointures, to take effect upon remote contingencies, or possibilities of further portions coming in. But if it be agreed, that in consideration of such future jointures the wife's future property shall belong to the husband, as she cannot have the recompense in consideration whereof it was agreed she should part with it, she will be entitled to retain such property herself (*z*).

(*u*) Lord Tyrconnel v. Duke Ancaster, *ubi sup.*

(*x*) Burrell v. Crutchley, 15 Ves. jun. 544.

(*z*) Holt v. Holt, 2 P. Wms. 648; *Vide supra*, p. 374.

SECTION VIII.

OF THE EFFECT OF AN EXCESSIVE EXECUTION.

THERE are three modes in which a power may be exceeded : First, in the objects, as where a power to appoint to children or nephews is exercised in favour of grandchildren or great nephews. 2dly, In the interests given, as, where under a power of leasing for twenty-one years, a lease is granted for twenty-two years. 3dly, In conditions annexed to the gift, as where the fund is given on condition that the appointee pay a particular debt.

We have in this chapter already had occasion to treat of what amounts to an excessive execution of a power, and we have now only to consider the *effect* of the excess.

I. And first, *Where the power is exercised in favour of persons not objects of the power.* It hath before been observed, that a will made in execution of a power must receive exactly the same construction as a proper will. Now it is a rule of law, that where a testator has two objects, one particular, and the other general, and the particular intent cannot be effected unless at the expense of the general one, the latter shall be carried into effect at the expense of the former. This is the case where a man gives an estate to one for life, with remainder to his issue, but the estate is so given that all the issue cannot take unless through their parent. The particular intent is, that the parent shall only take for life ; the general

550 OF THE EFFECT OF EXCESSIVE EXECUTIONS.

intent is that all the issue take, and in these cases the Court will effectuate the general, at the expense of the particular intent, by giving the parent an estate-tail (I).

This doctrine applies with equal force to similar limitations in wills executed under powers. An important question has arisen in relation to it, upon which the Judges have been much divided in opinion. The question is, whether, under a power to appoint to children, an appointment to a child for life, remainder to his children, who are incapable of taking, shall give the child himself an estate-tail in order to effect the general intent.

This point first arose in a case, where money was directed to be laid out in land, to be settled, after the death of the husband and wife, to the children of the marriage, as the father by deed or will should appoint. The father, by his will, directed part of the fund to be laid out in real estate, to be conveyed to the use of his daughter, *during her life*, for her separate use, remainder

(I) This doctrine appears to have been carried too far. And it is established, that where there is only a *single* intent to create a perpetuity, and not a *particular and a general* intent, the Court cannot enlarge the limitation: Thus, where there was a devise to *A* for life, and *after him* to his eldest or any other son, during his life, and after them to as many of his descendants, issue male, as should be heirs of his or their bodies down to the tenth generation, during their lives, it was determined that *A* took for life only. *Seward v. Willock*, 5 East, 198; *Somerville v. Lethbridge*, 6 Term Rep. 213; and see *White v. Collins*, Com. 298; *Doe and Goff*, 11 East, 668; but where the devise amounts simply to an executory trust, a court of equity may effectuate the intention; see *Humberston v. Humberston*, Prec. Cha. 454; 1 P. Wms. 333; 2 vol. Ca. and Opin. 417; but *Doe and Goff* was denied to be law in the late case of *Doe v. Jesson*, in Dom. Proc.

remainder to all and every the child and children of his daughter, as tenants in common. Lord Kenyon, then Master of the Rolls, determined, that in order to effectuate the testator's general intention, the daughter must be considered as taking an estate-tail (*a*).

In the case of *Griffith v. Harrison* (*b*), where the devise was to the wife for life, with an exclusive power of appointing by will to the children, but so as the estate should not be divided, but transmitted entire to his heirs, the wife by will, gave the estate to one of her sons for life, remainder over to his children in strict settlement, and so to her other children and their children successively in like manner, the Judges of the Court of King's Bench were divided in opinion upon the operation of the will creating the power. Lord Kenyon, and Grose, J. agreed that there was an excess in the execution of the power; but they certified, that although the appointment could not, as they conceived, take effect in the particular manner the widow intended, yet her *general* intention being that the children of her several children should take estates of inheritance in tail general, on the death of their respective parents, they thought that that general intention should be carried into execution as far as the power given by the husband would allow; and, consequently, that the *children* respectively took estates in tail general. This construction they thought fairly warranted by great authorities. This opinion, we must perceive, accords precisely with Lord Kenyon's decision

(*a*) *Pitt v. Jackson*, 2 Bro. C. C. 51; see *Phelp v. Hay*, App. No. 21; but note, there the devise was to *issue*, which may be considered a word of limitation.
(*b*) 4 Term Rep. 737.

decision in *Pitt v. Jackson*. The other two Judges, Ashhurst and Buller, did not deliver any opinion on this point, for they thought, on the authority of the Duke of Devonshire *v. Cavendish* (c), that the power authorized a limitation in strict settlement; but, if it did not, then they thought that it authorized a limitation to the *children during their lives* only. In a prior case, however, Mr. Justice Buller appears to have entirely agreed with Lord Kenyon's opinion in *Pitt and Jackson* (d).

The case of *Griffith v. Harrison* arose upon a case sent out of the Court of Chancery; and upon the first hearing the Lord Chancellor seemed to think that it was not an estate-tail (e). It does not appear what ultimately became of the case; but, as it was a bill filed against the purchaser for a specific performance, the bill was no doubt dismissed in consequence of the different opinions of the Judges, a purchaser not being compellable to accept a doubtful title.

In *Routledge v. Dorril* (f), Lord Alvanley said that he subscribed to the case of *Pitt v. Jackson*, *as far as it was decided, with regard to real estate settled to a person who was an object of the power for life, with limitations in strict settlement to persons not objects of the power*, for that was decided in *Humberston v. Humberston* (g), and *Spencer v. Duke of Marlborough* (h). *Pitt v. Jackson* was, he said, a case of real estate. The first and other sons were incapable of taking as purchasers. Lord Kenyon thought, that as it was perfectly clear

(c) *Vide supra*, p. 517.

(d) See *Robinson v. Hardcastle*, 2 Term Rep. 254.

(e) 3 Bro. C. C. 410.

(f) 2 Ves. jun. 364.

(g) 1 P. Wms. 332.

(h) 5 Bro. P. C. 592.

clear it was intended to go to the daughter and her issue, and they could not take as purchasers to effectuate the general intention of the testator, it should be so moulded, and he relied upon Chapman v. Brown (i). There, according to the report, Lord Mansfield laid down that doctrine, and he (Lord Alvanley) did not find much objection to it, viz. *that where there is a limitation for life, to a person unborn, with remainder in tail to the first and other sons, as they cannot take as purchasers, but may as heirs of the body, and as the estate is clearly intended to go in a course of descent, it shall be construed an estate-tail in the person to whom it is given for life.*

In a case which occurred nearly sixteen years after Pitt v. Jackson, Lord Kenyon said, that perhaps no case had carried the doctrine farther than he did in Pitt v. Jackson, and he knew that great Judges entertained considerable scruples at the time concerning that decision. It went indeed to the outside of the rules of construction, yet still he did not think it was wrong (k). In Routledge v. Dorril, Lord Alvanley said that he knew the doctrine in Pitt v. Jackson had by very great authorities been questioned. Indeed, although, apparently, the fact is not generally known, the case of Pitt v. Jackson ultimately met with no decision. The case afterwards came on to be heard before Lord Rosslyn, and it then appeared, that the children, in default of appointment, were to take estates-tail *under the settlement*. And the Chancellor said, that under the circumstances, and if the necessity of the case obliged the Court to consider how to dispose of this strange execution of the power, he should be very much inclined to
adopt

(i) 3 Burr. 1626.

(k) Brudenell v. Elwes, 1 East, 451.

adopt the idea Lord Kenyon pursued ; but, as the child took an estate-tail under the settlement, he determined that the appointment was void beyond the life-estate ; therefore there was only this difference, that under the original settlement she would have an estate-tail at once, and in this way, an estate for life, remainder to herself in tail, which was the same, for her life-estate was moulded in it (*l*).

But although this doctrine has never been decided, it rests on high authority. Had Lord Kenyon been Chancellor, instead of Master of the Rolls, the point evidently would have been decided ; and, paradoxical as it may appear, his decision at the Rolls, although reversed, was not over-ruled. The opinions, too, of Mr. Justice Buller, Mr. Justice Grose, Lord Alvanley, and even Lord Rosslyn, all stand in favour of Lord Kenyon's doctrine. In *Adams v. Adams* (*m*), however, where, under a power to appoint to children, the parent appointed to the children for life, remainder to their sons in tail, remainder to their daughters in tail, the doctrine of *cy pres* was not discussed ; and Lord Mansfield, and the other Judges of B. R. certified to the Lord Chancellor, by whom the case was sent, that the power was exceeded by limiting estates to the grandchildren, but that the limitations to the children for life were good, and the disposition of the inheritance to their children void. Therefore, as there was no appointment of the inheritance of the premises, the estate went to the uses declared by the deed creating the power,

(*l*) *Smith v. Lord Camelford*,
2 Ves. jun. 698 ; and see *Bristow*
v. Warde, 2 Ves. jun. 336.

(*m*) Cowp. 651 ; the certificate
was confirmed 27 November
1777.

power, in default of appointment, subject to the estates for life to the children.

This certainly is a considerable authority against the doctrine, although it was not necessary to decide the point. At all events the doctrine must not be carried too far. It has never, for instance, been ruled, that a limitation by will of a legal estate to an *unborn* child, for life, remainder to his children, will be construed to give the intended tenant for life an estate-tail (*n*).

Nor will this construction prevail unless it will clearly effectuate the testator's general intention. Therefore, in a case (*o*) where the estate was given by a settlement to the children, as the father should appoint, and in default of appointment, to them as tenants in common, in tail, with cross-remainders in tail, and the father by his will appointed part of the estate to one of his sons, Henry, for life, remainder to the children of Henry, as he should appoint, it was insisted that Henry should take an estate-tail; and Lord Rosslyn in the course of the argument asked why he could not put that construction on the devise; to which he was answered, that it was intended that the children (of Henry) should take absolutely, not that it should go as an estate-tail would carry it. It was said, that the principle of all the cases for an implied estate-tail is, that there was a clear *indicium* of an intention that all the issue should take in the course in which an estate-tail would go, but that no inference could be drawn from those cases to this, where there was no such indication. Lord Rosslyn, in delivering judgment, adopted these arguments.

(*n*) See 2 Ves. jun. 365; *Seaward v. Willock*, 5 East, 198.

(*o*) *Bristow v. Warde*, 2 Ves. jun. 336.

ments. He said that the case of *Pitt v. Jackson* would not enable him to do the same thing here, for here it was a power to Henry to appoint to children in such shares as he thought fit. No estate-tail was given, nor was any intention of that sort expressed; but the children would take either by appointment, or for want of it, distributively *per capita*. Therefore that did not apply; and he was under the necessity of saying the interests to the children of Henry could not in any respect take effect.

The doctrine of *cy pres* does not apply to personalty. It was originally introduced in favour of the testator's intention. If it were extended to personal estate, it would defeat the intent, for it would vest the personalty in the executor, and not in the children on the death of the parent (*p*).

And the rule is expressly confined to wills. It does but extend to limitations by *deed* of either real or personal estate. In *Brudenell v. Elwes* (*q*) Lord Kenyon himself expressly laid it down, that this doctrine of *cy pres* went to the utmost verge of the law, even in the construction of wills, but that it had never been applied to the construction of *deeds*; and he accordingly refused to extend it to a limitation in a *deed* executing a power. In the same case, Lord Eldon observed, that the case did not come near *Pitt v. Jackson*, and the other cases upon wills; first, as they were cases upon wills, not deeds, to which this doctrine had not been applied; secondly, those cases had at least gone, as Lord Kenyon observed,

(*p*) *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 364; and see *Knight v. Ellis*, 2 Bro. C. C. 570; *Keily v. Fowler*, Wilm. 298.

(*q*) 1 East, 451.

observed, to the utmost verge of the law, and he should find it very difficult to alter an opinion he had taken up, that it was not proper to go one step farther; for in those cases, in order to serve the general intent, and the particular intent, they destroy both (*r*).

Where a partial interest is given to an object of the power with *remainders* to persons not objects of it, and the doctrine of *cy pres* cannot be applied, yet the whole appointment will not be void, but merely that part which is not authorized by the power. This rule is observed as well at law as in equity. The point was expressly decided at law in *Adams v. Adams* (*s*), which was a case sent out of the Court of Chancery, where, under a power to appoint to children, the estate was given to the two daughters for life, in moities, remainder to their children in strict settlement. The Court of B. R. certified, that though they were of opinion that the donee had exceeded her power, which was confined to child or children, by limiting estates to her grandchildren, yet they thought that the same ought to prevail so far as her power extended, and that the limitation to her daughters for life was good; but that the disposition of the inheritance to their child or children was void (*t*). By a decree made in the cause on the 27 November, 1777, the Lord Chancellor, agreeing with the certificate, dismissed the plaintiff's bill. The same decision was made in Equity by Lord Rosslyn, in the case of
Bristow

(*r*) 7 Ves. jun. 390; and see
Adams v. Adams, Cowp. 651.

(*s*) Cowp. 651.

(*t*) And see accordingly *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 1 East, 442;
7 Ves. jun. 382; *Phelp v. Hay*,
App. No. 21.

Bristow v. Ward (*u*), although it was contended, that if the appointment could not take effect in the manner the distribution was made by the parent, the question would be, What he would have done if he had been apprised that, part failing, there would arise an inequality unforeseen by him as to his children? But Lord Rosslyn said, that the answer was, nobody could tell what he would have done; but that was not a ground for setting aside the whole; for each child to whom he had well appointed had a right to claim that (*x*).

But there is infinitely more difficulty where the fund is given generally amongst persons, some of whom are objects of the power, and some not. This was one of the many points in *Alexander v. Alexander* (*y*), where under a power of appointing a personal fund amongst *children*, the wife gave a portion of it to trustees, "upon trust to pay the interest thereof weekly, or otherwise, in such manner as the trustees should think most beneficial for the personal support and maintenance of her son Francis, *and his wife and children*." Sir Thomas Clarke, Master of the Rolls, first held that the discretionary power to the trustees was void. He then treated the case as if the mother had given it herself indefinitely for the benefit of Francis, his wife and children, laying the discretionary power out of the case as if never inserted in the will, and then he said, certainly, so far as the

(*u*) 2 Ves. 336; and see *Roberts v. Barrow*, 4 Ves. jun. 681; *v. Dixwell*, App. No. 22, the appointment over of the 2,000 *l.* *Smith v. Lord Camelford*, 2 Ves. jun. 698.

(*x*) And see *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357; *Crompe*

(*y*) 2 Ves. 640.

the wife and children were to have the benefit of it, that would not be good. And he thought that this appointment would not be considered a complete execution as to Francis, for the wife and children were to have something, and there was no possibility of distinguishing how much she exceeded her power. He then proceeded to consider whether there was any other way to make this good ; and, by a very artificial train of reasoning, he came to the conclusion, that Francis might take the whole fund, and decreed accordingly. His argument was this : “ I own (z) I incline to think there is a method : Suppose the mother, instead of using the words she has, had given this one-fourth to be applied in such way as was most beneficial for her son, and his wife and children, *if they shall by law be capable* ; I should not have doubted but that as the wife and children are not by law capable, it would be absolute to Francis ; and the question is, whether there is any difference ? This bears an analogy to what the dispositions by the mother would be, if she had given it to a son by name who never appeared to have existence, or was never capable of taking ; if given to these four indefinitely, and three were incapable of taking, the fourth would have the whole ; he must take such as the others were incapable of taking. It falls within the reason of the late case of *Humphrey v. Taylour* (a), where a personal estate was given to two in joint-tenancy ; one was outlawed ; and therefore the testatrix made a codicil, whereby she adeemed what was given to one of the two ; the question was, whether the other joint-tenant should take only a moiety ? But the

(z) 2 Ves. 645.

(a) Ambl. 136.

the Court held he was to take what the other did not, they were to take the whole between them. The mother never designed this fourth part should fall into the residue, and it would be extremely hard that it should. Then he will be entitled to the whole of that."

The foregoing reasoning is not satisfactory ; and it cannot be considered clear that a similar case would now receive a similar decision. At least, it is well settled by later determinations that a gift under a power, embracing objects not within the line of perpetuity, is wholly void, and the fund cannot be given to those to whom it might have been legally appointed.

Thus in *Gee v. Audley* (*b*), there was an appointment by will of 1,000 *l.* in default of issue of Mary Hall, equally to be divided between the daughters then living of John Gee and Elizabeth his wife ; and if that had been restrained to the death of the person executing the power, it would have been good. The bill was brought by the four daughters of John and Elizabeth Gee to have the fund secured for their benefit upon the death of Mary Hall without issue. Lord Kenyon held, that as the execution would take in children born after the death of the appointor, it was too remote, and he would not wait to see what contingency would happen.

The same point arose in the case of *Routledge v. Dorril* (*c*) ; and Lord Alvanley, then Master of the Rolls, started the question, whether those children who might have been the proper objects should take. At first he said he was of opinion, that as she might have appointed to the three children born before her death,

when

(*b*) 2 Ves. jun. 365, cited ; (*c*) 2 Ves. jun. 357.
reported in Cox.

when she appointed to all, these three might be considered as the sole objects; but upon considering it further, and particularly upon Gee and Audley, he was of opinion that would be a forced construction; and that the donee, in affecting to give this to all the issue her daughter might have at any time, had transgressed the power; and so far being ill executed, it was to be considered as not executed, and was totally void. The donee, he observed, in another place, did not mean those only to whom she *might* have appointed, but *all*; and upon failure of all, then, and then only, she gave it over.

In the case of *Alexander v. Alexander*, Sir Thomas Clarke, addressing himself to the impossibility of discovering the excess in the case before him, because it was given indefinitely, said, that had it been free from that circumstance of uncertainty, how much each was to take, *it would be void as to the wife and children*. Suppose, he added, she had given it to the husband, his wife and children, in gross sums absolutely, *equally to be divided*, that would have been bad, and an excess of her power, and if it had been such a partial appointment, *so far as void*, it would have fallen into the residue.

Now in the cases of Gee and Audley, and Routledge and Dorril, the fund *was* given equally amongst the children, but yet the Court would not consider the appointment good *pro tanto*. However, those cases turned on the remoteness of the limitation; and it should still seem that where the fund is given amongst several objects, some of whom cannot take, and the excess can be ascertained, the objects who are capable may in most cases take their shares:— If a fund should be given be-

tween the parent capable, and his children incapable, in equal moieties, it seems clear that the parent would be entitled to his moiety ; so if the fund were given equally amongst the objects of the power, and strangers living and ascertained, there appears to be no solid principle upon which the real objects could be refused the shares to which they would have been entitled upon a division if the whole appointment had been valid (*d*).

Although a limitation be void, as not authorized by the power, yet it is not considered absolutely void, so as to accelerate the remainders dependent on it, which, if given immediately, would have been good ; but notwithstanding that it be void itself, yet it prevents the limitations over from taking effect (*e*), for, as Lord Alvanley observed, it would be monstrous to contend that though it was appointed to the remainder-man in failure of the existence of persons incapable of taking, yet notwithstanding they exist, he should take it as if it was well appointed to them, and they had failed. It is given upon a contingency, upon which there is no right to give it (*f*). And where the first limitation is too remote, and therefore void, a subsequent limitation to an object of the power shall not take effect, although the persons intended to take under the void limitation have actually failed.

But in a case where the fund was given to a son, who was an object of the power, for life, and after his decease
to

(*d*) See 2 Ves. 644.

(*e*) *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 640 ; *Robinson v. Hardcastle*, 2 T. Rep. 241 ; but see *Doe v. Lord George Cavendish*,

4 Term Rep. 744, n. which in this respect is not law.

(*f*) *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357 ; *Beard v. Westcott*, *Gilbert on Uses*, 270, n. 1 *Turner*, 25.

to his wife and children, who were not ; *but in case he should die without leaving a wife or child him surviving*, then to his sister who was an object of the power, the trusts for the wife and children were determined by Lord Alvanley to be bad, but he at the same time held, that if the son should die without leaving a wife or child surviving, the gift over to the daughter would be good. And he distinguished this case from the others, on the ground that this limitation over to the daughter was if the son should die without leaving a wife or child surviving. It fails as far as it affects to give interests to the children ; but was there, he asked, any occasion to make it fail upon the other point, the gift over to a person who is an object of the power. Why was he to exclude the person taking over who had a right to take ? There were two alternatives. If the son should leave no wife or children at his death, then the limitation over being to a good object would take effect ; if he should leave a wife or children, then it could not take effect (*g*). As Lord Kenyon observed in a subsequent case (*h*), the case went upon the ground of its being an appointment with a double aspect, and therefore that if the contingency which went beyond the power should not happen, it would not stand in the way of those who might take under the appointment in the event which happened, and who were within the power.

So a gift to an object, with a gift over in a particular event to a person not an object, is void only as to the gift over (*i*).

(*g*) *Crompe v. Barrow*, 4 Ves. jun. 681 ; and see 3 Bro. C. C. 415.

(*h*) *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 1 East, 450.

(*i*) *Brown v. Nisbet*, 1 Cox 43.

So where actual estates are not attempted to be given, but a mere power is limited to a stranger to appoint the fund, and in default of appointment the fund is given amongst proper objects, the power being merely void on the ground that *delegatus non potest delegare* (k), the ultimate limitation will take effect in possession. This was decided by Lord Hardwicke in *Ingram v. Ingram* (l), where, however, the delegated power was to appoint the fund amongst the objects of the original power, and in default of appointment, the fund was given to the same objects. It should seem that the rule would not prevail where a power is affected to be given to appoint the fund amongst *strangers*, because in that case it would be the intention of the donee of the original power, that the object should not take unless in default of execution of the delegated power in favour of the strangers. The intention of the donee of the power is the express ground upon which limitations over to good objects, after limitations to strangers, are held to be void ; and the principle applies as forcibly to a direct *power* to appoint to strangers as to a direct gift to them. Nor would the rule, for the same reason, apply to a case where the delegated power is to appoint to some of the objects, and the fund in default of appointment is given to *others*, although objects of the original power. But in this last case it might be otherwise if in default of appointment under the delegated power, the fund was given amongst *all* the objects.

Secondly, *As to excess in the quantity of interest*—the same principle prevails. Where there is a complete execution,

(k) *Vide supra*, ch. 4, sect. 1.

(l) 2 Atk. 88.

execution, and something *ex abundanti* added, which is improper, there the execution shall be good, and only the excess void, but where there is not a complete execution of a power, and the boundaries between the excess and execution are not distinguishable, it will be bad (*m*).

If a man having a power to lease for twenty-one years, lease for forty, that will be good in equity *pro tanto*, because it is a complete execution of the power, and it appears how much he has exceeded it (*n*). This point has often been decided, and was determined in the great case of Campbell and Leach (*o*), where, under a power of leasing for twenty-one years, a lease for twenty-six years was granted, and it was holden to be void only for the excess. But it was admitted at the bar in that case, and appears to have been considered by the Court, that the excess rendered the lease void at *law*; and Hale, when Chief Baron, expressed his opinion clearly, that if a man has power to make leases for twenty-one years, and he make a lease for twenty-two years, it is not good for twenty-one years (*p*). And in a recent case the Court of King's Bench actually decided that the excess was fatal at law (*q*). We cannot fail to distinguish this case from cases like that of Adams and Adams (*r*), where a *distinct and independent* limitation is introduced, not
authorized

(*m*) Per Sir Thomas Clarke, 2 Ves. 644; and see 13 Ves. jun. 576.

(*n*) Ibid.; and see Parry v. Brown, 2 Freem. 171; 3 Cha. Rep. 610; Nels. Ch. Rep. 87;

and see Anon. 2 Freem. 224; Barnard, Cha. Rep. 116.

(*o*) Ambl. 740.

(*p*) Hard. 398.

(*q*) Roe v. Prideaux, 10 East, 158.

(*r*) *Vide supra*, p. 554.

authorized by the power; whereas, in cases like Campbell and Leach the excess is interwoven with the limitation authorized by the power. The same rule must apply more forcibly where the lease is made, contrary to the power, to commence *in futuro*, for no limitation of the term will make a lease in reversion a lease in possession (s).

Where a *distinct* limitation is superadded, it will be merely void, and will not affect a prior valid appointment, even at law, as, if under a power to lease for twenty-one years a lease be accordingly made for twenty-one years, and by the same deed the donee limit a further term in this manner, viz. *and from and after the term aforesaid for one year more*, the power will be well executed by the first limitation, and the excess will be surplusage not to be regarded (t). The leading case of *Common v. Marshall* (u) appears to have been decided on this ground. There, Lord Netterville had a power of leasing for any term, not exceeding thirty-one years, *or* three lives, to commence in possession, and he granted a lease for three lives, *or* for thirty-one years, *which should last longest*. The Court of Exchequer in Ireland construed the word *or* into *and*, and so made it a lease certain for lives, with a *remainder* of thirty-one years; and, considering the excess only as void, gave judgment in favour of the lessee. Upon appeal to the Exchequer Chamber in Ireland, Lord Chief Justice Annaly delivered his opinion for reversing the judgment, but the Lord Chancellor being of a different opinion, affirmed it. Upon this

(s) Doe v. Calvert, 2 East, 376.

(t) Fitz. 157; and see 2 Scho. and Lef. 332.

(u) 7 Bro. P. C. 111.

this a writ of error was brought in parliament; and it was insisted, for the plaintiff in error, that the words *which shall last longest* showed that *both* the term for lives and years were not intended to pass, but one only, and which it should be was to depend upon the event mentioned, and could not therefore *commence in possession* at the making of the lease, as expressly required by the power. On the other hand, it was insisted that the lease, so far as it was a lease for three lives, was clearly warranted by the power, and this was apparently the primary object of the parties. Besides this they had a second in view, which was, to secure the estate to the lessee for thirty-one years in case the lives should determine sooner. But this was not warranted by the power, and was therefore void; but the excess only was to be corrected. The Judges here gave an unanimous opinion in favour of the lease, and the House of Lords decreed accordingly.

But where the limitations, although several and distinct, make but one estate in law, the appointment is wholly void at law by reason of the excess; as, if under a power to appoint for life, the donee appoint to the object of the power for life, and after his death to the use of his (the appointee's) heirs, or the heirs of his body, the two limitations coalesce, and the appointment is, in effect, of an estate in fee, or an estate in tail, and therefore is at law void *in toto* (x), although the excess would be corrected in equity.

In equity also, a power to charge a particular sum, as 7,000*l.*, will be duly executed by a charge of a larger

(x) Fitzg. 157; *sed qu.*

larger sum, as 8,000*l.*, and the excess only will be void (*y*).

So equity will correct a mistake in the execution of a power, with respect to the time at which the interest should commence (*z*).

In some cases a power at first sight appears to be exceeded, when in fact it is not. Thus in the case of *Thomlinson v. Dighton* (*a*), where a tenant for life, with a power to appoint the inheritance to her child, limited the estate to herself for life, *without impeachment of waste*, with remainder to her child in fee, it was objected, that the conveyance left in her an estate for life, *without impeachment of waste*, which was not in her power to do. Lord Chief Justice Parker, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said, that the child would be in, not by virtue of her conveyance, but by the will creating the power, and so would over-reach her estate without impeachment of waste; and consequently, that clause in the conveyance “without impeachment of waste,” would have no operation, for the child might, notwithstanding, bring an action of waste against her.

So where the quantity of interest to be taken by the appointee is expressly limited by the instrument creating the power, and the donee is only authorized to appoint the *lands* over which the estate is to ride, an appointment by him of an interest exceeding that intended to be given to the appointee, is tantamount, even at law, to a regular appointment. This is the case of *Peters v. Morehead*,

(*y*) *Parker v. Parker*, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 168.

(*z*) *Probert v. Morgan*, 1 Atk. 410.

(*a*) 10 Mod. 31. 71.

v. Morehead (b), where an estate was given by will to the son for life, and then the testator devised *such part of the said lands as his son should appoint* to such wife as the son should marry, for her life, with remainder to the sons of the son. The son exercised his power by granting the estate by deed, merely sealed and delivered, to trustees, in trust for himself for life, and after his death to the use of his intended wife for life, and after her death to the use of the heirs male of her body. The Court thought, that as the two limitations made but one estate in the wife, it would, in a common case, have been a void execution; but they held that the son had power, not to limit the estate, but to appoint the land, so that the question simply was, whether he had sufficiently specified the land; and they decided in favour of the validity of the appointment. Eyre, Chief Justice, even thought that, though the son had limited an inferior interest, yet the wife should have an estate for her life; but Fortescue is reported to have doubted if the son had barely appointed the land without limiting any estate, whether it would be good. It is observable, however, that the learned Judge does not notice this doubt in his own report of the case, and it certainly is directly overruled by the decision itself, which was, that the son had no power to limit the estate in the land, but only the land itself; and it is in express opposition to the opinion of the Chief Justice, that the wife would have taken for life, though a less estate had been limited to her.

Thirdly. *As to conditions annexed to the gift not authorized by the power.* In these cases the gift is good, and the condition only is void, so that the appointee takes

takes the fund absolutely. As, if an appointment should be made, and a condition annexed to it, that the appointee shall release a debt owing to him, or pay money over, the appointment would be absolute, and the condition only would be void, because the boundaries between the excess and proper execution are precise and apparent (*c*). So if the power be only to give the property unconditionally, and it be exceeded by directing the portions to be paid at the age of twenty-one or day of marriage, the appointment will be reformed so as to make the portions vest at once (*d*). So it should seem that if, under a power to appoint an estate to an object in tail, or in fee, the donee appoint to him in tail or fee, with a proviso, that if he die under twenty-one without issue, or the like, the estate shall go over, the first appointment will be good, and the qualification annexed to it will be void.

In the case of Roberts and Dixall (*e*) the father's estate was charged with 1,000 *l.* for younger children, and he had a power over his wife's estate, in favour of the younger children. He gave the only child 3,000 *l.* which he declared should be in satisfaction of the 1,000 *l.* charged on his own estate, and in pursuance of this power he charged the 3,000 *l.* on his wife's estate. Lord Hardwicke said, that where a gift was to discharge a former debt, something should move from the giver, but here the whole was to arise out of his wife's estate, and therefore to satisfy the father's covenant as to the charge on his own estate, this declaration was entirely void ;

(*c*) See 2 Ves. 644, and see *Burleigh v. Pearson*, 1 Ves. 281.

(*d*) *Dillon v. Dillon*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 77.

(*e*) 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 668, pl. 19, S. C. App. No. 22.

void ; however, as his intention was only to give his daughter 3,000 *l.* Lord Hardwicke decreed that 2,000 *l.* ought to be raised upon the wife's estate, and the other 1,000 *l.* out of the father's estate.

Perhaps we should in this place notice a point which arose in *Robinson v. Hardcastle* (*f*), but was not decided. The donee of the power appointed the estate by his will, *charged with the payment of his debts*, which he had no authority to do, and Mr. Justice Buller said, that this, *perhaps*, might render the *whole* execution of the power void. There is, however, no authority for this. If the estate had been given to the object of the power, upon condition that he paid the donee's debts, the appointment would have been good even at law, and the condition void. This case is in effect the same, and would, it should seem, receive a similar decision. At any rate, in equity, the excess only in the appointment would be void.

We have already had occasion to consider the converse of the cases just discussed, viz. where an interest can be granted short of that authorized by the power (*g*).

This subject must not be dismissed without observing that a valid appointment will be sustained, although confounded in the same deed with other subjects not relating to it. In Lord Conway's case, it appeared that he, having power to grant leases of his estate, by one instrument granted several, some of which were not within the power ; and though all were by the same instrument, they were considered as several leases, and it was sent to the Master to separate them (*h*).

(*f*) 2 T. Rep. 241.

(*g*) Vide *supra*, sect. 2.

(*h*) 2 Ves. 645, cited.

SECTION IX.

HOW ESTATES GO IN DEFAULT OF OR WHERE
THERE IS A BAD APPOINTMENT.

WE have already had occasion to consider the effect of the creation of a power on the estates limited in default of appointment (*a*), and also in what cases the objects take in default of appointment, although there is no express substantive gift to them in that event (*b*). It will here, therefore, only be necessary to state, 1. A few cases which have arisen on particular limitations in default of appointment, and, 2. To show how estates go where there is a bad appointment. And,

1. A general power of appointment may be cut down to particular objects by reason of a gift over to them in default of appointment (*c*); and by parity of reason, a general gift over in default of appointment may, in favour of the intention, be restrained to the objects to whom an appointment might have been made (*d*).

Where a power is given to a tenant for life to appoint to his children, and in default of appointment the fund is given to the children at a particular age, as at twenty-one, although it is expressly declared that if any child shall attain twenty-one in the life of its parent, his share shall be considered as a vested interest, subject to the life-estate, yet that provision will only relate to *unappointed*

(*a*) Vide *supra*, ch. 2, sect. 4.

(*c*) Vide *supra*, p. 472.

(*b*) Vide *supra*, ch. 6, sect. 3.

(*d*) Vide *supra*, p. 499, 500.

pointed shares, and the power will not be defeated by the children attaining twenty-one before it is exercised ; nor will it give them vested interests at that age in what may have been actually appointed to them (*e*). This was decided by Lord Thurlow, and the point has always been considered as well decided. In a late case before Lord Eldon the point was again agitated, and his Lordship said that he would not disturb the case before Lord Thurlow : Lord Eldon said, that the question was, what is the law at this day, as to the due mode of executing a power of appointment by a parent among all the children, to be executed at any time up to the death of the parent, even by deed or will, where some of the children are dead before any appointment. After adverting to the doctrine, that an appointment cannot be made to a deceased child, or the representatives of a deceased child, he observed, that the mode of executing the *power* in the case of a deceased child, according to the old practice of conveyancers, that prevailed before the case of *Boyle v. the Bishop of Peterborough*, was by giving part to the surviving children, making no appointment of the residue, which therefore was permitted to go as in default of appointment. That, certainly, was very ill-conceived, and incorrect ; the consequence was, that as in most cases the share unappointed would go among all who attained twenty-one, living and dead, as property vested in them at that age, or on marriage of daughters, it would be divisible among a child surviving, and all those who were dead ; but it is very difficult, almost impossible,

(*e*) *Boyle v. Bishop of Peterborough*, 1 Ves. jun. 299 ; and see particularly p. 309, *Butcher v. Butcher*, 1 Ves. and Bea. 79. *Supra* 470.

possible, to speak of that sort of device as an appointment. Lord Thurlow dissented from that which he (Lord Eldon) understood to have been the previous notion of conveyancers, and established the rule in that case of *Boyle v. the Bishop of Peterborough*.

The mode above alluded to was a mode of executing the *intention* through the medium of the power. It is, as we shall see, firmly settled, that unless there is a provision to the contrary, the unappointed part goes to all the objects under a gift in default of appointment, including those to whom part has been appointed. It is settled, that the donee may defeat the gift in default of appointment by appointing to a surviving child; but he may not wish to wholly defeat the gift over, and yet be desirous to make an inequality. Thus, under a common power to appoint to children, with a gift to them in default of appointment at twenty-one; suppose there to be three children, and two attain twenty-one, and then die, here, subject to the execution of the power, the personal representative of each of the deceased children is entitled to a third. The donee cannot increase the share by an appointment, because the representatives are not objects of the power, but he may increase the share of the surviving child by appointing a portion to him, and of course leaving him to participate in the residue equally with the representatives of the deceased children. Where there is the usual provision that appointed shares shall be brought into hotch-pot, the donee may appoint to the surviving child more than his share upon an equal division; in which case, of course he will not claim any portion of the residue, but will suffer it to go to the representatives of the deceased children.

We

We have seen that a mere power in words may imply an absolute gift to the objects in default of appointment. Where this is the case, and no appointment is made, it frequently becomes a question whether the objects take as tenants in common, or as joint tenants. In *Maddison v. Andrew* (*f*) the fund was to be disposed of *to and amongst* the testator's daughters as his wife should appoint. It was not necessary to decide the point; but Lord Hardwicke expressed his opinion that the bequest was joint. But in a case before Lord Rosslyn, where the devise was to *A* in trust, to give, &c. the estate *unto and amongst* his children as he should appoint, he held it to be a tenancy in common (*g*); and, in a similar case, the late Master of the Rolls followed that case as an authority (*h*), and decided accordingly.

In the case of *Routledge v. Dorril* there was a gift in default of appointment, to the children, grandchildren, or issue generally of the marriage, living at the decease of the survivor of the husband and wife, with a proviso, that in case of no appointment the issue of any child dead should not have a greater share than his parent, if living, would have been entitled to; and Lord Alvanley determined, that although the children of a living parent might have had shares appointed to them under the power, and not being made objects of it, if their parent had been dead they would have taken his share; yet as he was alive, it was impossible to hold that a child of a living parent could take any share, though it was clear they might have been made substantive objects of the appointment;

(*f*) 1 Ves. 57.

(*h*) *Casterton v. Sutherland*,

(*g*) *Reade v. Reade*, 5 Ves. 9 Ves. jun. 445.

jun. 744. /

appointment (*i*) ; and this case was followed in a subsequent case before Lord Kenyon, sent out of the Court of Chancery (*k*), the certificate of the Judges in which case was confirmed by the Lord Chancellor on the 18th December, 1802.

And here it may be remarked, that a gift to children in default of appointment is not confined to those only who are alive at the death of their parent, to whom the power is given, but all the children take vested interests upon their birth, subject to be divested by the execution of the power ; and therefore the share of a child dying in the life-time of his parent shall, in default of appointment, go to its representative. And the same rule would prevail as to other objects (*l*).

It seems doubtful whether, if one object be removed by the effect of advancement, the share shall go over under the provision in default of appointment, or whether it shall be considered as a purchase by the father at the sum advanced. This question arose in the recent case of *Folkes and Western* (*m*). Under the trusts of a term, trustees were to raise 4,000 *l.* for younger children's portions, to be paid, if more than one, as the father and mother, or survivor, should appoint ; in default of appointment, as usual. Another 4,000 *l.* was settled in the same way. There were two younger children, both daughters ; upon the marriage of one, the father gave her a portion, which, it was declared, should be a satisfaction

(*i*) *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357.

(*k*) *Legard v. Haworth*, 1 East, 120 ; see *Longmore v. Broom*, 7 Ves. jun. 124 ; *Fox v. Gregg*, App. No. 12.

(*l*) *Vanderzee v. Aclom*, 4 Ves. jun. 771.

(*m*) 9 Ves. jun. 456 ; see *Noel v. Lord Walsingham*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 99.

faction of her claims under the settlement. . The Master of the Rolls held, that as the daughter had no definite interest, except in default of appointment, she had nothing that she could make the subject of a bargain with her father; he could not say that any definite proportion had sunk. If she had had a definite interest, it would, he admitted, have sunk, and therefore have been no charge on the estate. He thought, then, that the case could only be compared to the cases upon the custom of London, where the effect of advancement was merely to remove that child out of the way, and to increase the shares of the others, and not to increase the disposable part of the father's estate. This provision, he added, must have the same effect; removing the daughter, putting her out of the question altogether, as if there never had been such a child. Therefore, before the power ever arose, there ceased to be objects, for it was impossible the mother, who had survived her husband, could give any thing to the daughter advanced. That was expressly stipulated, and she was incapable of receiving any more than if she was dead. The consequence was, that one of two objects being removed, the other must of necessity take the whole.

This decision appears to be in direct opposition to a case not adverted to. . I allude to Pitt and Jackson, or Smith and Lord Camelford (*n*), where money was directed to be laid out in land, to the use, after the deaths of the husband and wife, of the children of the marriage, as the father should appoint, and in default of appointment, as the mother should appoint, with remainder,

(*n*) 2 Bro. C. C. 51 ; 2 Ves. jun. 698.

mainder, in default of appointment, to the children in tail. There were two children. The father, considering the money as not laid out in land, by his will gave rather more than a moiety of it to Ann, one child, and the remainder to Mary, the other child. After the will, and upon the marriage of Ann, he advanced her a large portion, and soon afterwards by a codicil revoked the legacy to her. And it was conceded by the counsel for Ann and her husband, and accordingly decreed by Lord Kenyon at the Rolls, that the legacy was well revoked, as the father was a purchaser of that moiety by the fortune given to Ann upon her marriage. Upon a bill of review being filed to this decree, which involved other points, Lord Rosslyn held that the fund had been invested in the purchase of an estate; and that the appointment in the will of the fund could not be supported as an appointment of the estate. He considered, therefore, that the estate must go as in default of appointment: but as to Ann, he thought her father had satisfied all the interest that she could, as a creditor, set up in opposition to any act in his will, in regard to her provision under the marriage settlement. She was totally in his power by the portion given to her upon her marriage, *when her interest under the appointment was contingent and uncertain, in respect of the possibility of the existence of other children*. But he thought that even a well-executed appointment could not take from Mary, the other daughter, one moiety; for though the father could entitle himself to all Ann could claim, it could be only to *that* she could claim *absolutely* against the other daughter. He could not make an appointment in truth beneficial to himself.

It

It is to be lamented that this case, which carries with it the joint authority of Lord Kenyon and Lord Rosslyn, was not adverted to in the case of Folkes and Western, more especially as the latter case was decided by analogy to cases which do not necessarily bear upon it, and which are themselves not founded in reason ; for it was admitted that in those cases one should think, *primâ facie*, the effect of advancement by the father would be to increase that part of the estate of which he had power to dispose. Lord Rosslyn avoided the objection upon which the opinion of the Court was grounded in Folkes and Western, viz. that the interests being contingent and uncertain, there was nothing that could be made the subject of the bargain, by holding the advancement to be a purchase of the child's share in default of appointment, or of what she should become entitled to under an appointment. The only objection to this construction appears to be, that where the power is given to the wife if she survive, the advancement circumscribes her power ; for as the husband himself cannot appoint a greater portion to the child he has advanced than the child would take in default of appointment, because it would in effect be an appointment to himself, it seems equally to follow that the wife could not appoint a larger share, lest such a power should open a door to fraud on the other child. But still the wife's power might well be held to remain, so as to enable her to give the same share to the daughter *unadvanced*, as she might have given to her if the other daughter had not been advanced, and the father's representatives must be content with the share which may be appointed by the wife to the advanced

daughter, or may be permitted to descend to her. The only infringement then on the mother's power would be this, that in case of disobedience, she could not deprive the unadvanced child of the share provided for it in default of appointment, but she would have the best possible hold on the obedience of the child, in the power which would still remain of increasing the portion given in default of appointment. Besides, if the curtailment of the power be an objection, it bears with the greatest possible force on the rule as established by Folkes and Western, for there, by the effect of the advancement, it was holden, that the entire fund was at once given to the unadvanced child, and consequently the mother was deprived of all power over the fund. It would seem, therefore, that till the cases come again under the review of the Court, it would not be safe in practice to consider the case of Pitt and Jackson as over-ruled.

II. It remains only to observe, that where the whole or even part, of the fund is ill appointed, it goes according to its original destination in the event of there being no appointment. And therefore a person to whom a specific share is well appointed, shall not be excluded from taking any of the unappointed shares (o). To guard against these decisions where *part only* of the fund is well appointed, in which case the intention of the

(o) *Menzey v. Walker*, For. 72; *Routledge v. Dorril*, 2 Ves. jun. 357; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 357; *Smith v. Lord Camelford*, 640; *Pocklington v. Bayne*, 1 2 Ves. jun. 698; *Attorney-Bro. C. C.* 450; *Bristow v. General v. Ward*, 3 Ves. jun. 327; see 1 Ves. and Bea. 92, *Warde*, 2 Ves. jun. 336; *Wilson v. Piggott*, 2 Ves. jun. 351; 93.

the person executing the power is generally defeated, it is usual to insert an express clause in instruments creating powers of appointment amongst several objects, as children, that no child to whom a share is appointed shall take any share of the unappointed part until each of the other children shall have received a share equal to that appointed to him.

CHAPTER X.

OF POWERS TO LEASE.

WE are now come to the last branch of our subject, of which much has been necessarily anticipated. It remains only to consider : 1. The general rules of construction applicable to this power ; 2. What may be demised under different powers ; 3. For what term ; 4. At what rent ; and, 5. Subject to what covenants and conditions.

SECTION I.

OF THE GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE TO THIS POWER.

LORD Mansfield has truly observed (*a*), that of all kinds of powers, the most frequent is that “to make leases.” For the encouragement of farmers to occupy stock and improve the land, it is necessary they should have some permanent interest. Unless the owner of the estate for life was enabled to make a permanent lease, he could not enjoy, to the best advantage, during his own time ; and they who come after must suffer, by the land being untenanted, out of repair, and in a bad condition. The plan of this power is for the mutual advantage of

(*a*) 1 Burr. 120, 121.

of possessor and successor. The execution thereof is checked with many conditions, to guard the successor, that the annual revenue shall not be diminished, nor those in succession or remainder at all prejudiced in point of remedy, or other circumstances of full and ample enjoyment.

Formerly a distinction used to be taken between a power to a stranger having a particular estate, and a power reserved by the owner of the fee, which latter, it has been said, is to receive a more liberal construction than the other. But this doctrine, which has so direct a tendency to introduce different decisions on the same words, appears to be completely exploded at the present day, although an opinion has prevailed that a power of leasing is to receive a more strict construction than any other power (*b*), and that equity cannot relieve against a defect in the execution of it. However, we have already seen that this relief is administered in proper cases (*c*), and the books abound with authorities in favour of the liberal construction of this power. Lord Mansfield, whose authority is generally quoted in favour of the rigid construction (*d*), seems merely to have meant that the power must not be abused (*e*). Lord Chancellor Cowper thought the power was to be taken strictly (*f*); but Lord Chief Justice Holt, in the same case, was of a contrary opinion (*g*). Lord Kenyon has decided that the *intention of the parties* must govern in the construction of this power,

(*b*) See Fitz. 219; 3 Vin. Abr. 431.

(*c*) *Vide supra*, p 382.

(*d*) See 1 Burr. 121.

(*e*) Dougl. 573; 1 Blackst. 449

(*f*) See 3 Cha. Rep. 73.

(*g*) *Ibid.* 69, 70.

power (*h*), and Lord Redesdale has shown, upon very solid grounds, that the power must receive as liberal an interpretation as a power of jointuring or any other power (*i*). In the construction, therefore, of powers of leasing we may call in aid the rules established in regard to other powers.

The decisions upon leases by tenants in tail and ecclesiastical persons, under the statutes, have been said to apply with equal force to leases under powers in settlements ; but this position is certainly not well founded : in several instances those decisions even differ from each other, according to the words of the statutes upon which they severally arose. In the course of the ensuing inquiry it will appear generally how far those determinations apply to the subject before us.

Where a lease is granted which is void under the power, no acceptance of rent by the remainder-man can set it up ; for, though an acceptance of rent may make a *voidable* lease good, it cannot make good a lease which was actually *void* at first (*k*). The acceptance of rent, however, *as rent*, may operate as an admission by the remainder-man that the lessee is his tenant, and in that case he is entitled to notice to quit. And, under some circumstances, equity would compel the remainder-man to grant a new lease (*l*). But where a lease not warranted by the power contains a covenant for perpetual renewal, the reversioner, by accepting for many years the

(*h*) 3 Term Rep. 675.

82 ; and see *Doe v. Butcher*,

(*i*) 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 61 ;

Dougl. 50.

vide supra, p. 387.

(*l*) See *Roe v. Prideaux*, 10

(*k*) *Jones v. Verney, Willes*, East, 158.

169 ; *Doe v. Watts*, 7 Term Rep.

the rent reserved by the lease, does not bind himself to perform the covenant (*m*).

Where the terms of the power are complied with, it is no objection that the lease is granted in trust for the lessor himself, for that is a question merely between the parties. It is just the same thing as between the lessor and the successor, where *the legal tenant* is bound during the term in all requisite covenants and conditions (*n*).

Whether a power of leasing extends to all the persons entitled under the instrument creating it, or only to some in particular, depends not upon the place where the power is inserted, but upon the fair construction of the whole instrument taken together (*o*).

Where trustees are invested with a power of leasing they must act in the exercise of it precisely as if the estate was given to them in trust to let (*p*).

(*m*) *Higgins v. Lord Rosse*, 3 Bligh, 112.

(*n*) *Wilson v. Sewell*, 1 Blackst. 617; *Earl of Cardigan v. Montague*, App. No. 13; *Taylor v. Horde*, 1 Burr. 60.

(*o*) See *Forster v. Graham*, 2 Str. 961; 2 Barn. B. R. 341. 428; *Right v. Smith*, 12 East, 455; see *Collett v. Hooper*, 13 Ves. jun. 255.

(*p*) See *Sutton v. Jones*, 15 Ves. jun. 588.

SECTION II.

WHAT MAY BE DEMISED UNDER DIFFERENT
POWERS.

IT is seldom that any question on this head arises at the present day, except upon wills unskilfully penned; for the power usually introduced in modern settlements is to lease all the hereditaments comprised in the deed at the best rent, and if the mansion-house, park, or any other part, is not intended to be leased, it is expressly excepted in the power. However, the cases must be stated which have arisen in regard to the subject over which the power rides.

Where a power extends to lands *usually* letten, lands which have been twice or thrice letten are within the power (*a*), but land which has only been once letten is not, we are told, within the proviso, for *usus fit ex iteratis actibus* (*b*). And it is said, that if land has been let by a contract from year to year, for three years, it is not within the power, for it is but one lease (*c*). But Lord Chief Justice Vaughan, upon citing this case of a single demise (*d*), said that he did not much insist upon it, for the words “*usually* demised” may be taken in two senses; the one, for the often farming,
or

(*a*) 2 Ro. Abr. 261, pl. 11, 12;
Vaugh. 33.

(*b*) 2 Ro. Abr. 262, pl. 13.

(*c*) 2 Ro. Abr. 262, pl. 14;
contra P. 2 Ja. B.

(*d*) See Vaugh. 28.

or repeated acts of leasing lands, the other, for the common continuance of land in lease, for that is usually demised, and so land leased for five hundred years long since, is land usually demised, that is in lease, though it have not been more than once demised, which, he justly added, is the more received sense of the words land *usually demised*. Indeed, the common sense of mankind must revolt at a distinction which considers lands leased for one hundred years as not usually demised because the term was granted by one deed, but allows land to come within that description which has been let for two years only, on two distinct lettings.

In the case of Tristram and Lady Baltinglass, the power was “to demise all or any of the premises which at any time heretofore have been *usually letten*, for the term of twenty-one years, reserving the rent thereupon now yielded and paid.” The settlement was made in the twelfth of Jac. and the jury found the lands in question to have been demised in the twelfth of Eliz. for twenty-one years, and that term was expired, *and they had not been demised for the space of twenty years before the settlement*; and the Court held that they were not within the power. The word *usually*, excluded demises at a great distance of time, and the words “any time” in this case, meant “at *all* times.” And what was not farmed twenty years before could not be said to be at any time before commonly farmed; for those twenty years was a time before in which it was not farmed. And the power requiring the rents *then* reserved to be made payable, necessarily implied that the land demisable under the power was land which was then under rent.

rent (*e*). The case of *Foot v. Marriot* (*f*), which was a case to the like effect, was decided the same way by Lord Chancellor King, assisted by Lord Chief Justice Raymond, Mr. Justice Denton, and Mr. Baron Comyns, simply upon the authority of *Tristram and Baltinglass*.

This last case, we must observe, did not decide *affirmatively*, that land demised within twenty years was subject to the power, but merely that land not demised within that period was not subject to the power. It remains to be decided within what period the land must have been demised. The Courts might probably incline to fix twenty years as the limit, by analogy to the enabling statute of 32 H. 8, c. 28, which in a similar case considered that as a reasonable period.

Upon this statute it has been very properly determined, that the lettings to which it refers are by some person seised of an estate of inheritance, and not by tenant by the courtesy, dower, &c. (*g*). But the same doctrine cannot be applied to powers in private settlements, although a contrary opinion has been entertained. The act of Henry was intended to have a general and perpetual operation, it was therefore absolutely necessary to establish by whom the lettings must have been made, so as to authorize subsequent demises, and it would have ill accorded with the true spirit of the act to have holden that demises by persons having partial interests only constituted the standard to which the statute refers. But in the case of a power raised by a private settlement,

(*e*) 2 Jo. 27; Vaugh. 28; 1 Freem. 23. As to the last ground, *vide infra*.

(*f*) 3 Vin. Abr. 429, pl. 9.
(*g*) Co. Litt. 44, b. Dy. 271, b. pl. 28.

ment, the party creating it must be considered to know that the lands have been in lease, and by whom the leases were granted, and therefore, when he authorizes the lands *usually demised* to be leased, to what can he refer unless to the leases which have been theretofore actually granted. If he disapprove of any lands being let, which usually have been leased, it behoves him to expressly declare his intention by excepting them out of the power.

Upon the construction of the words *usually demised*, it has been determined that they embrace every species of demise—at will, from year to year, or for years, or lives, and whether granted by parol or by deed, by copy of court-roll, covenant to stand seised, or any other instrument (*h*).

We have before seen that one point relied on in Lady Baltinglass's case was, that the *rent then reserved* was to be made payable, which the Court thought necessarily implied that the land demisable under the power was land which was *then* under rent (*i*). And in Lord Mountjoy's case, where it was declared by a private act of parliament that no alienation should be made but only leases, &c. "yielding the true and ancient rent," it was determined that land could not be leased which had never been demised before. For how, it was asked, could a rent be called *the true and ancient rent* when it issued out of a thing which was never charged with any rent by any reservation before (*k*)?

So

(<i>h</i>) Co. Litt. 44, b. Baugh v. Haynes, Cro. Jac. 76 ; S. C. 6 Rep. 37, nom. Dean and Chapter of Worcester's case ; S. C. Mo. 759, nom. Banks v. Brown ;	Right v. Thomas, 3 Burr. 1441. 1 Blackst. 446.
	(<i>i</i>) <i>Supra</i> , p. 587.
	(<i>k</i>) 5 Rep. 3, b. Mo. 197.

So in the case of Bagot and Oughton, which underwent great consideration, the power was to lease "*all* or any of the premises, *at such yearly rents, or more, as the same are now let at ;*" and a lease was made of the capital mansion-house, which was the family seat, and the demesne lands, which were never leased before. And it was determined, principally on the authority of Lady Baltinglass's case, that the lease was void, although it was forcibly argued that *all* the lands were authorized to be leased ; and the subsequent words were only explanatory of the first part of the sentence, " that the lands usually let may be let at the usual rent " (*l*) (*I*).

Lord Mansfield, addressing himself to this case, observed, that (*m*) the nature of the thing showed that the power could not be meant to extend to letting the ancient manor-house at all, much less to letting it without reserving any rent. In a family settlement of an estate, consisting of some ground always occupied, together with the seat, and of lands let to tenants upon rents reserved, the qualification annexed to the power of leasing, that the ancient rent must be reserved, manifestly excludes the mansion-house, and lands about it, never let. No man could intend to authorize a tenant for life to deprive the representative of the family of the use of the mansion-house. The words, in such a case, show that the power is meant to extend only to what
has

(*l*) 8 Mod. 249 ; Fort. 332. (*m*) Dougl. 573, 574.

(*I*) This decision is said to have been affirmed in the House of Lords ; but the case is not in Brown ; and, after a diligent search, I have not been able to meet with it amongst the printed cases of that period.

has been usually let. By that means the heir enjoys all the premises in the settlement just as they were held and enjoyed by his ancestor, the tenant for life : He has the occupation of what was always occupied, and the rent of what was always let. The Court, Lord Mansfield added, all therefore agreed as to the rectitude of the decision in *Bagot v. Oughton*. The nature of the thing spoke the intent as forcibly as the most direct words could have done. It was demonstration.

In the last case on this subject a similar decision was made. A man by his will devised his estate in strict settlement, and gave a power to lease *all* or any of the said manors, messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, for lives or years, *so as the usual rents* were reserved. There were some tithes which were never leased before the making of the will, but some parts of the estate had been usually demised at rents ; and the Court considered Lord Mansfield's observations on *Bagot* and *Oughton* to apply most pointedly to the case before them, as the tithes never had been let, but had always been occupied by the possessor of the estate ; and they accordingly determined that the power did not embrace the tithes (*n*).

But in all these cases the intention of the parties is to govern ; and there are several instances in which parts of the estate never leased have, in favour of the supposed intention, been considered to be within powers requiring the ancient or usual, or present rents, to be reserved.

The

(*n*) *Pomery v. Partington*, 3 Term Rep. 665 ; and see accordingly *Foot v. Marriot*, 3 Vin. Abr. 429, pl. 9 ; which case, although a very considerable au-

thority on this head, has hitherto unaccountably escaped notice ; see also *Doe v. Rendle*, 3 Mau. & Selw. 99.

The first of these is Cumberford's case (*o*), where, under a power to make leases of the premises, or any part thereof, "*so that* as much rent, or more, was reserved upon each lease as was reserved in respect of it within the two years immediately preceding," it was resolved, that lands which had not been leased within the two years at any rent, might be leased by the donee at any rent he pleased, because it appeared by the generality of the words that it was intended he should have power to lease all the land. The Court, therefore, considered the restrictive clause as applicable only to such lands as had been demised two years before.

Upon the authority of this case, as it should seem, the case of Waker, or Walker and Wakeman, was decided (*p*). A power was given in a settlement of an estate to demise the premises, (which consisted of land, a rectory, &c.) so as 5*s.* *an acre* were reserved for *every acre* of the land demised. The rectory consisted of tithes only, and no glebe; and it was adjudged, that the power authorized a demise of the land at 5*s.* per acre, and of what did not consist of acres, as the rectory, without rent. And, upon the same principle, Lord C. J. Holt delivered an extra-judicial opinion, that under a power to lease an estate comprising a manor, so as the leases were not made of the demesne lands, and so as the ancient rent were reserved, the rents and services might be demised *without rent*, because it appeared to be the intent of the settlement that part of the manor might be demised; and, as the demesne lands were not comprised in the power, then the rents and services must be; for the

(*o*) 2 Ro. Abr. 262, pl. 15. 1 Ventr. 294; 3 Keb. 544. 547.

(*p*) 1 Freem. 413; 2 Lev. 150; 586. 589. 619.

the whole of the manor consists in demesnes, rents, and services; and he said, *if a man hath a power reserved to him of making leases of two things, and a qualification is annexed to the power, which cannot extend to one of these things, he may make a lease of that thing without any regard to the qualification* (I). And he relied upon Cumberford's and Waker's cases as authorities for these positions; but Turton and Eyre, J. thought, that as there were other lands mentioned in the power, they satisfied the words of it (q).

In the case of *Goodtitle v. Funucan* (r) the power in a settlement of manors, fishery, &c. was to demise all or any of the manors, fisheries (s), messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments therein before mentioned, *so as there were reserved so much rent, or more, than was then paid for the same*. The manors, or manorial rights, had not been let before. The fishery had been let before, but was not at the time of the settlement; since that time it had been again let at 15s. a year. A lease was made under the power of the manors and *fishery*, and some lands, reserving the right of shooting and fishing, at a rent exceeding what they had ever produced before,

(q) *Winter v. Loveday*, Com. Clayt. 99; *Campbell v. Leach*, 37; 1 Freem. 507; 1 Lord Raym. Ambl. 740.
267; 2 Salk. 537; Carth. 427; (r) Dougl. 565; see 1 Bur. 124.
and see *Campion v. Thorpe*, (s) See 3 Term Rep. 671, n.

(I) Lord C. J. De Grey quoted this rule in *Campbell v. Leach*. The passage in Ambler, p. 748, should be read thus: Where there is a power of leasing (with a description) applicable to some parts of the estates, and not to all of them, those to which it is (not) applicable, may be leased without such description. Vide *supra*, page 376, n.

before, about 30*l.*; and the Court held the lease to be valid. Lord Mansfield, in delivering the judgment of the Court, said "that the power was express to demise the manors and fisheries. They were particularly mentioned in the settlement, and the power went to the whole. They paid under this lease as great a yearly rent as at the time of the settlement, for they paid nothing then. The *words*, therefore, were complied with, and the objection could only stand upon the intent. But the Court thought no such intent appeared. The manors were nominal; of no value; no object of yearly income. The fishery only worth 15*s.* a year. They were convenient to the lessee living on the land, and of no use to the remainder-man. The right of shooting and fishing was reserved to him. For his own part, he thought the intent was to give leave to demise all, reserving as much rent *in the whole* as had been paid before, and in fact, 30*l.* more had been reserved." (*t*)

These cases must not be dismissed without observation. The decision in Cumberford's case has been deferred to the *ita quod*, or *so that*, in the power (*u*), and Waker's case was distinguished by the Court from Mountjoy's, on the ground that there the proviso was *disabling*; that no lease should be made but with ancient rent, whereas in the case before them the power was general and *enabling*, and the latter clause restrictive (*x*). But these subtleties (I) are now happily got rid

(*t*) And see 3 Term Rep. 677.

(*x*) See 3 Keb. 597.

(*u*) See Fort. 332.

(I) In treating a distinction between a *disabling* and an *enabling* power as a subtlety, I allude only to those cases where it turns merely

rid of (*y*). The intention of the parties, to be fairly collected from the whole instrument, is the only guide to the true construction of the power. Upon this broad ground it was that the case of Goodtitle and Funucan was decided. If, then, in these cases we are to advert to intention, the value of the property must have considerable weight: for it is decided, that if the lands, tithes, &c. to which the restriction does not apply, *are* within the power, they may be leased for the term prescribed without rent. The mischievous consequences of this construction are evident. The intention of a settlement may be entirely defeated by it. The donee may lease lands, not letten before, without rent, taking a large fine at the expense of the remainder-man, whereas, in regard to those before letten, he is compellable to reserve the ancient rent. How incongruous and absurd is this rule, and how little calculated to effectuate the intention of the parties! Waker's case appears to have been decided solely on the authority of Cumberford's case, and Lord Chief Justice Hale said that *if* it had been *res integra*, perhaps, he should have been of another opinion (*z*), and Mr. Justice Barclay seems to have entertained the same sentiments (*a*); and in the great case of Foot *v.* Marriot, Lord Chancellor King adopted Hale's opinion of Cumberford's case, and

(*y*) See 3 Term Rep. 677.

(*a*) 3 Keb. 596.

(*z*) See 2 Lev. 151.

merely on the form of the words creating the power, for certainly there is a wide difference between a power *disabling* a tenant in fee from making any lease but for a certain time, and a power *enabling* a tenant for life to lease for the same period; vide *infra*.

and added, that *if* the case were law it should not be carried one step farther (*b*). In all the modern cases, the Judges, without expressly over-ruling Cumberland's case, have clearly evaded the *spirit* of the decision. If the cases of Bagot and Oughton, Foot and Marriot, and Pomery and Partington, are well decided, it is still open to contend that the property to which the restrictive clause cannot apply, shall, if valuable, be rather held not to be within the power, than that the first tenant for life shall be authorized, contrary to the intention of the donor, to decrease the rental of the estate for his own particular emolument. The rule laid down by Holt, that "where a man hath power reserved to him of making leases of two things, and a qualification is annexed to the power, which cannot extend to one of these, he may make a lease of that thing without any regard to the qualification," may be a sound rule; but the question in these cases is, whether the qualification does not form a part of the sentence, and virtually exclude that subject to which, it is admitted, it cannot extend. There are, however, cases to which the rule ought to be applied; as, if in a power to lease estates, including mines opened and unopened, a clear intention appears to embrace all the mines, but a clause is added, that no lessee shall be made punishable of waste, there, to effectuate the general intention of the power, the latter clause should not be deemed applicable to the unopened mines (*c*): So if a similar clause should be inserted in a power to grant leases

(*b*) 3 Vin. Abr. 429, pl. 9.

in remembrance that it is not

(*c*) See and consider Campbell
v. Leach, Ambl. 740; and keep

waste to work open mines. Co.
Litt. 54, b.

leases at rack-rent, and building-leases, it should be construed to extend to the leases at rack-rent only, because no improvements by building could be made, unless old buildings could be pulled down, trees felled, &c. Indeed, it even seems that such a clause in a power to grant building-leases only would not restrain the liberty of pulling down the old buildings in order to erect new ones (*d*).

Where leases are granted under powers to lease lands usually demised, it must be shown, by old leases or other satisfactory evidence, that the lands have usually been demised, or they cannot be supported (*e*).

In the case of *Campbell v. Leach* (*f*) it was determined that under a power to lease, the "messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments," in the deed, (except the capital messuage and warren) at the best rent, opened mines might be leased as they were in lease at the time of the settlement, and twelve years then to come of the term, and must be understood to have been settled for the benefit of all claiming under it, and the words were sufficient to carry the mines.

The usual power of leasing for lives authorizes a lease during co-existing lives only (*g*). And where a power is limited to lease for any given number of lives such parts of the estates as are demised for *any such time*, it does not include lands which were then demised for lives, not concurrently, but successively, and by way of settlement (*h*).

In

(*d*) *Vide infra*.

(*g*) *Vide infra*, sect. 3, div. 4.

(*e*) See *Earl of Cardigan v. Montague*, App. No. 13 (6).

(*h*) *Doe v. Halcombe*, 7 Term Rep. 713.

(*f*) *Ambl.* 740.

In the case of *Winter v. Loveday*, it was determined by Holt, Chief Justice, Turton and Eyre, against Rokeby, that an exception in a power of leasing of the demesnes of a manor included the copyholds of the manor. Rokeby thought that the exception extended only to lands in the occupation of the donor. He, however, held, that if the demesne lands had *not* been excepted by express words, yet the power of leasing would not have extended to them, for if it did, it would destroy the tenure, because copyhold lands once leased are for ever enfranchised, and therefore, it shall never be presumed that the tenure was intended to be destroyed, without express words of the parties for that purpose (*i*). This is an important general rule of construction applicable to every power.

(*i*) Carth. 428, *et sup.*

SECTION III.

OF THE TERM WHICH MAY BE GRANTED.

SOME of the cases on this head have been unavoidably treated of in a former part of the work (*a*). We may here inquire, 1. In what cases leases in possession only can be granted; 2. In what instances leases in reversion may be granted; 3. Whether concurrent interests can be granted under the usual power of leasing; and, 4. For what lives the estate may be granted under powers to lease for lives.

I. And

(*a*) Vide chap. 9, sect. 2.

I. And first, in all well-drawn powers of leasing, where it is intended that a lease in reversion may be granted, it is expressly declared so ; and if a reversionary lease is not to be granted, it is expressly declared that the lease shall be made to take effect in possession, and not in reversion, or by way of future interest. But it has been determined, that even a general power to lease for a certain number of years, without expressing that the leases shall be in possession, and not in reversion, authorizes leases in possession only, and not in reversion or *in futuro*, for if by the power a reversionary lease might be made, then a lease for the years authorized might be made in possession, and afterwards infinite leases for the same term in reversion, which would be contrary to the meaning of the power, and would render idle and vain the express limitation in the power of the number of years for which the lease might be granted (*b*).

And it seems to have been settled, after considerable doubt, that where the power is expressly to lease *in possession*, a lease in reversion cannot be granted, although the estate is in lease *at the time of the creation of*

(*b*) Countess of Sussex v. Cro. Jac. 318 ; 1 Brownl. 1481 ; Wroth, Cro. Eliz. 5 ; S. C. cited Yelv. 222, nom. Slocomb v. 6 Rep. 33 a. nom. Leaper v. Hawkins (I).
Wroth ; Shecomb v. Hawkins,

(I) As this case is reported in Cro. Jac. the first lease was granted *before the power was created*, and Brownlow's report seems the same way : but if so, the decision was perhaps doubtful, *vide infra*. Yelverton states it otherwise. At any rate, the principle in the text was clearly admitted. In Raym. 133, it is said *arguendo* that the record of the case does not warrant Croke's report.

of the power, so that unless a present lease can be granted of the reversion, the power is in suspense till the determination of the first lease (c).

II. But in the foregoing case it was laid down by Windham and Twisden, that if the power had been to lease generally, without saying *in possession*, a lease might have been made to commence at the end of the lease then *in esse*. And the same point was expressly decided in the Marquis of Northampton's case by Manwoode and Dyer against Mounson, but by the marginal note in Dyer, Lord Chief Justice Treby (I) appears to have agreed with Mounson (d); and in the case of *Baynes v. Belson* (e), the Court delivered an extra-judicial opinion that such a lease was void, although certainly they appear to have relied on the cases where the land was in possession as authorities in point.

(c) *Opy v. Thomasius*, 1 Lev. 267; Raym. 132; 1 Keb. 778. 910; and 1 Sid. 260, where it was admitted that the lease was void; but see 4 Mod. 6, and *Marquis of Antrim v. Duke of Buckingham*, 1 Cha. Ca. 17; 1 Sid. 101; S. P. acc. and see and con-

sider *Sands v. Ledger*, 2 Ld. Raym. 792.

(d) Dy. 357, a.; 2 Ro. Abr. 261, pl. 8; 1 Leo. 36, cited; loosely reported in 3 Leo. 7 (II).

(e) Raym. 247; and see *Berry v. Riche*, *infra*.

(I) The marginal notes in Dyer are understood to have been his production.

(II) It is far from clear upon the face of the report that any lease was in existence at the time of the settlement; and from the cases relied on it should seem that the fact was not so.

point (I). But in the modern case of *Coventry and Coventry* (*f*), leases in reversion, under a general power to demise an estate in lease at the time of the settlement, were sustained after many arguments. The ground of the decision, is not, however, stated, and the case, perhaps, turned on the particular penning of the power, which was with a "so as there be not in any part of the premises so leased at any one time, any more or greater estate or estates than for twenty-one years, or three lives, or for any number of years determinable on three lives;" and upon the old leases and the reversionary lease there were not at any one time upon any of the lands demised, more or greater estates than estates for years determinable upon three lives: the Court therefore might well have relied on this clause as evidence of the intention that leases in reversion might be granted, so as with the leases in possession they did not exceed the limits pointed out. It seems far from clear that at the present day a lease in reversion would be supported under a general power, although the estate was in lease at the time of the settlement, unless there were some direct evidence, as in *Coventry v. Coventry*, of the intention of the parties. Such a construction, it must be admitted, would, in most cases,

(*f*) 1 Com. 312.

(I) Note—The report in *Leonard* does not state both the leases to have been granted under the power; and *Dyer*, before whom the cause was tried, and whose accuracy may be relied on, states *expressly*, that the first lease was granted before the creation of the power. Indeed the point cannot be doubted, for *Dyer* gives the date of the first lease, which was three years previously to the creation of the power.

cases, ill accord with the intention of the parties (I). It might upon the same principle, perhaps, be contended that a remainder-man may, under a general power, grant a reversionary lease of an estate, leased by a prior tenant for life under the same settlement.

Since the publication of the above observations I have met with the observations of the Chief Justice on the hearing of the case of Coventry and Coventry (g). He said there was no doubt but by a general power it must be restrained to leases in possession, yet if there was any thing to explain the intention of the parties to extend to make leases in reversion, it may be extended thereto. Therefore, if there appear lands in lease already, and only
a reversion

(g) 27 Apl. 1719, MS. Rep. in Linc. Inn Library.

(I) I should do wrong to pass over the principle which Mr. Powell has extracted from the case of Fox v. Prickwood, 2 Bulstr. 216; 1 Ro. 12; Cro. Jac. 349; 2 Ro. Abr. 260, pl. 5, as it would, if established, be a very important one. It is this: "If," says Mr. P., "there be a power to make leases *in possession* expressly, which attaches upon an estate, part of which is in possession, and other part thereof in reversion at the creation of the power, the donee of the power may *immediately* make leases *in possession* of the estate in reversion, as well as of that in possession." Pow. Powers, 425, 426. No such principle, however, was established by that case. The estate was limited to a stranger for a valuable consideration for fifteen years, remainder to the owner for life, with a power to make leases *in possession*. And the only question was, whether he could make leases till *his own estate for life* came into possession by the expiration of the fifteen years, and it was holden that he might; which, we must admit, was rather a strong decision. The other question could not arise, for although the estate demised was in lease at the time of the settlement, yet it is expressly stated that that lease had expired before the new one was granted, and the Court considered it clear that a lease in reversion could not be granted.

a reversion in the person who created the power, any person thereto enabled, who is tenant for life, may make leases of those lands in reversion. But it is a question if the power ought not to be uniform to extend to leases either wholly of lands in possession, or wholly in reversion, where there are lands part in possession and part in reversion. The proviso is, *so as, &c.* It is a question if it will not extend to lands in reversion, for though it is a restrictive clause, yet that is as to the number of years or lives. A lease to commence after the death of tenant for life [created under a power] cannot be warranted by the power, for the lease may determine by effluxion of time, surrender, or forfeiture, before the life-estate; so here would be a chasm in this case, and too great difficulty to get over. The Chief Justice said that he had mentioned these matters only as proper to be considered on the next argument.

A power to grant a lease may, by the particular wording of it, authorize a lease in reversion, although not so expressly stated, and the estate is not in lease at the time of the creation of the power: Thus, where the power was to lease for any number of years, not exceeding ninety-nine years *from the time of making the demise*, it was adjudged that the latter words did not refer to the commencement of the lease, but only restrained the making of the lease for more than ninety-nine years from the making; and that a lease might be made for sixty years, to commence twenty years afterwards; for it would not exceed ninety-nine years from the time of making the demise; the true construction of the power was, that he might lease for ninety-nine years
from

from the time of making the lease, or for any other term not exceeding ninety-nine years (*h*).

In the case of *Doe v. Harvey* (*i*), the power was to demise for any term of years, so as such term did not exceed ninety-nine years from the date of executing such lease; and so as every such lease be made to take effect either in possession or immediately after the determination of the lease then subsisting thereof respectively, and so that the best rent were reserved. In May 1787, there were leases subsisting which would expire on 10th October 1791. On the 29th May 1787 a lease was granted under the power for thirty years from the 10th October 1791, and *at the same time*, under the same contract, another lease was granted to the same person for sixty-three years from the day when the lease for thirty years would expire, at a less rent than was reserved by the first lease. The object was to obtain a larger rent for the tenant for life than for the reversioner. The two leases were held to be in substance but one. It was held that the second lease was not a lease to take effect in possession or immediately after the determination of the lease then subsisting, for the only subsisting lease at that time was that which expired on 10th October 1791. It was said by the Court, that if "the tenant for life might make two successive leases, he might make any other number; he might even make successive leases for every year of the term which the power enabled him to grant. Now that might be very prejudicial to the reversioner;

(*h*) *Harcourt v. Pole*, 1 And. 273; see 2 Lord Raym. 1000. (*i*) 1 Barn. & Cress. 426; and 2 Dow. & Ry. 589.

reversioner; it might even make the clause of re-entry wholly inoperative; for by non-payment of rent, or breach of any of the covenants in the several leases, the lessee would only forfeit the subsisting term granted by the lease then running; and if he was turned out of possession, he might enter again under the next lease; whereas, if there were but one lease, the entire term would be forfeited by any breach of the covenants. Suppose in this case the tenant for life had lived twenty-seven years after the first lease took effect, and then died, and that the tenant of the estate then refused to pay the high rent reserved by the first lease, the landlord might re-enter, but at the expiration of three years the tenant would be entitled to have the estate again at the lower rent reserved by the second lease; but if the clause of re-entry was in one undivided lease, by entering, the owner of the estate would become possessed of it for the entire term. It was not necessary to intimate an opinion whether, if the tenant for life had honestly made a lease for one term, he might subsequently, and in consequence of a different bargain, have made another lease for a further term. Here both the leases were made in consequence of one bargain."

In the later case of *Shaw v. Summers* (*j*), there was a subsisting valid lease for 99 years, determinable with three lives. This lease was transferred to a trustee upon trust to sell and pay off some mortgage-money; and upon trust, until such sale, to let the premises for such time and term, not exceeding twenty-one years, and determinable as the said term of twenty-one years was

was determinable, as the trustee should think proper. In pursuance of the trust or power, the property was let from a day to come for ten years, if the lives should so long continue; and it was held that the lease was not a valid one under the power.

Although a power enable a man to make leases in reversion, as well as in possession, yet he cannot make a lease in possession, and another lease in reversion, of the same land, but his power to make leases in reversion shall be confined to such land as was not then in possession (*k*).

And the very same expression, *lease in reversion*, may have a different signification in the same conveyance; being applied to a lease for life, it shall be intended of a concurrent lease, or a lease of the reversion, viz. a lease of that land which is at the same time under a demise, and then it is not to commence after the end of the demise, but hath a present commencement, and is concurrent with the prior demise, and this construction is imperiously called for, as a lease for life cannot be made to commence at a future day (*l*), but being applied to a lease for years, it shall be intended of a lease which shall take its effect after the expiration or determination of a lease in being (*m*).

Thus we have seen in what cases leases in possession and leases in reversion may be granted. It is still necessary to ascertain what the law understands by leases in possession, and what by a lease in reversion.

Lord C. J. Holt has thus explained the nature of a lease in reversion: "In the most ample sense, that is said to

(*k*) *Winter v. Loveday*, 1 Com. 36, per Holt.

(*l*) *Whitlock's case*, 8 Rep. 69, b.

(*m*) 1 Com. 39, b. per Holt.

to be a lease in reversion which hath its commencement at a future day, and then it is opposed to a lease in possession ; for every lease that is not a lease in possession in this sense, is said to be a lease in reversion (*n*) ; but the usual construction of the term *lease in reversion*, in powers, is a lease to commence after the end of a present interest in being (*o*), and not a lease to commence at a future day."

In common parlance, a lease is said to be *in futuro* when it is granted at a day to come, and is not dependent on a subsisting prior lease ; and it is termed a lease *in reversion* when it is to take effect after a prior subsisting interest.

Where a lease ought to be granted in possession, a lease made to commence only a day after the date of the deed creating it, is as fatal a variance from the power as if made to take effect at the expiration of 100 years from the time.

It has long been settled, that a lease to hold "from henceforth," "from the making," "from the time of the delivery of the indentures," or "from the sealing and delivery of the deed," is a lease in possession, and not *in futuro* (*p*), and it shall begin from the delivery, where no time is mentioned (*q*) ; and "from the date," has in these cases the same meaning (*r*), although, certainly, this opinion has not always prevailed (*s*).

And

(*n*) 1 Com. 38 ; and see Cart. 14, 15 ; 2 East, 383.

(*o*) 1 Com. 38.

(*p*) Clayton's case, 5 Rep. 1 ; Higham v. Cole, 2 Ro. Abr. 520, pl. 1.

(*q*) Co. Litt. 46, b.

(*r*) Osborn v. Rider, Cro. Jac. 135 ; Hatter v. Ashe, 3 Lev. 438 ; 1 Lord Raym. 84.

(*s*) See Clayton's case, 5 Rep. 1 ; Bacon v. Waller, 1 Ro. 337 ; 2 Ro. Abr. 520, p. 4 ; and see Co. Litt. 46, b.

And nice as the distinction may seem, the words "from the day of the date," were, by a series of decisions prior to the famous case of Pugh and the Duke of Leeds, holden to be exclusive, and to render the demise a lease *in futuro*, and consequently void. Amongst these decisions several modern ones may be ranked, which underwent great consideration (*t*); and even two cases before the very same Judges who decided Pugh and the Duke of Leeds (*u*).

In that case, however, after a full review of all the authorities, which Lord Mansfield, in delivering the judgment of the Court, declared to be so many contradictions backwards and forwards, it was decided, that "from the *day* of the date" was the *same* thing as "from the date," and consequently that a lease to hold "from the day of the date," was a valid lease under a power to lease in *possession* only. The principal ground of the decision was, that "from" might mean either *inclusive* or *exclusive*: that the parties necessarily understood and used it in that sense, which made their deed effectual: that courts of justice are to construe the words of parties so as to effectuate their deeds, and not to destroy them, more especially where the words themselves abstractedly may admit of either meaning (*x*). In a subsequent case before Lord Kenyon, upon the word "from" in an *indictment*, in which the case of Pugh *v.* Duke of Leeds was cited, he said that it was not applicable to the case before him; and that it must be remembered,

(*t*) *Denn v. Fearnside*, 1 Wils. 176; *Attorney General v. Countess of Portland*, Cowp. 723, cited; and see *Freeman v. West*, 2 Wils. 165.

(*u*) *Hotley v. Scot*, Lofft, 316; *Doe v. Watson*, Cowp. 189.

(*x*) *Pugh v. Duke of Leeds*, Cowp. 714.

remembered, that though he believed that case was rightly decided, the contrary determination had before been made by all the Judges. Mr. Justice Ashhurst observed, that the case of *Pugh v. Duke of Leeds* was properly decided, but that it turned on the construction of a contract between two persons, where their intention was to be considered (*y*).

Mr. Powell, in an elaborate argument, which occupies upwards of 100 pages, has shown very successfully that this decision was in direct opposition to the decided cases (*z*); but however we may dread the precedent which this case sets for similar innovations, yet, as the mischief to be apprehended from the removal of landmarks must in this instance have already been sustained, it cannot be expected, nor is it to be hoped, that a decision which has so much good sense for its basis will ever be over-ruled. No one, however, would be so rash as to grant a lease to hold “from the day of the date,” under a power to grant leases in possession; on the contrary, conveyancers, *ex abundanti cautela*, always make the *habendum* “from the day next before the day of the date of the deed.”

It has sometimes happened that a lease, though dated back, and on the face of it appearing to commence *in futuro*, was not in truth executed till at or after the time when it was expressed to commence, and in such case the lease is a valid execution of the power, and
may

(*y*) *Rex v. Inhabitants of Gamlingay*, 3 Term Rep. 513; see *Ex parte Fallon*, 5 Term Rep. 283; *Dowling v. Foxall*, 1 Ball and Beatty, 193; *Welch v. Fisher*, 8 Taunt. 338.
(*z*) *Pow. Pow.* 433—540.

may be supported as a lease in possession : for a deed takes effect from its execution, and not from the date of it; and therefore if the time of the execution can be proved, the lease cannot be defeated (*a*); and extrinsic evidence is admissible to show when the lease was actually executed (*b*).

Under a power of leasing a binding *contract* for a lease may be entered into (*c*); and if a *bond fide* contract be entered into to grant a lease at a future day, it will not be deemed a lease *in futuro* against the remainder-man if the person agreeing to grant it live beyond the time limited for its commencement, although he die before it is actually granted, for every contract must necessarily precede the execution of it (*d*).

The foregoing cases arose upon leases *in futuro*. In regard to leases *in reversion*, it has been decided, that where the lease is to take effect in possession it will be good, although the estate is in the possession of tenants from year to year, or at will, provided they at the time the lease is granted receive directions to pay their rent to the lessee. This was decided in the case of *Goodtitle v. Funucan* (*e*). The lessees at will, and from year to year, in that case, had attorned to the lessee under the power; and, at the trial before Eyre, Baron, at *Nisi Prius*, he left it to the jury, whether the attornment of the occupiers to the defendant, in consequence of the direction given them at the time of making

(*a*) *Campbell v. Leach*, Ambl. 740; *Doe v. Day*, 10 East, 427; see *Hall v. Cazenove*, 4 East, 477.

(*b*) *Doe v. Robson*, 15 East, 32.

(*c*) Vide *supra*, ch. 6. sect. 1, div. 11.

(*d*) *Shannon v. Bradstreet*, Rep. T. Redesdale, 52.

(*e*) Dougl. 565.

making the indenture, did not amount to a surrender by them ; and whether they were not to be considered as having become thereby parties to the lease, and as having put the defendant in possession ; and the Jury were of that opinion, and found a general verdict accordingly. A rule for a new trial having been granted, it was insisted against the lease, that the lessor could not have brought an ejectment against the lessees in possession at the time of the demise, and therefore had no immediate possessory right. But to this three answers were given : The first, that the tenants agreed to this lease, and surrendered their possession before the execution of it, in order to make it valid : The second, that if the Jury had *not* found the defendant to have been in possession, this would have been good as a concurrent lease (*f*) : The third, that in respect of the power all the subsisting leases were leases at will. There was no outstanding lease as against the remainder-man ; he would not have been bound to give the tenants notice to quit, but might have entered upon them immediately. And upon these grounds the Court were all of opinion against the objection.

In deciding the foregoing case, the Court did not state upon which of the three grounds their judgment was founded ; but the first appears to be the true principle to which it must be referred. And it even seems that an actual lease under the power, if in fact given up at the time of the execution of the new lease, might be presumed to be surrendered in support of the new lease, and at least in a *bond fide* case, where the lessee is
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(*f*) As to this point, vide *infra*, S. 3.

in the nature of a purchaser, equity would relieve against the want of a surrender (*g*).

And of course, if the new lease be made to the person in possession under the old lease, it will, without any actual surrender, operate as a surrender in law of the old lease, and so no objection on this head will lie to the new lease. But where the second lease does not pass all the interest which it purports to grant, as if it be void because the best rent was not reserved, there it will not operate as a surrender of the prior term; nor in these cases is it material that the first lease is cancelled; for cancellation at this day will not amount to a surrender in law of a lease (*h*).

Where a tenancy from year to year has expired, a lease in possession may be duly granted (*i*), although the old tenant has a right to depasture the meadow, &c. till a future day (*k*).

In the case of *Doe v. Lady Cavan* (*l*) a lease was in existence under a power of leasing, and a further term was granted under the same power to the person in whom the first lease was vested, and the terms did not exceed together the number of years for which leases were authorized to be granted. It was confidently hoped that the second lease would be considered merely
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(*g*) *Campbell v. Leach*, Ambl. 740.

(*h*) *Roe v. Archbishop of York*, 6 East, 86, and the cases there cited; to which add *Lowther v. Troy*, Irish T. Rep. 198.

(*i*) See *Doe v. Calvert*, 2 East, 376.

(*k*) See *Doe v. Snowden*, 2 Blackst. 1224.

(*l*) 5 Term Rep. 567, affirmed in Dom. Proc. 1795; see printed case, and 6 Bro. P. C. by Toml. 175; see *Doe v. Harvey*, 1 Barn. and Cress. 426; *Shaw v. Summers*, 3 Moore, 196.

as a continuation of the first. The case, however, was disposed of without argument, as it appeared that the rent reserved was not the rent required by the power ; but the Judges appear to have considered the first objection also as fatal.

It is no argument in favour of a lease *in futuro*, or in reversion, under a power to lease only in possession, that the donor of the power himself leased the estate in that way ; or that lands are always so leased according to the custom of the country (*m*). And although part of the lands are leased in possession, yet if the lease is entire it is wholly void (*n*).

Before closing this head, it may be observed, that where a power authorizes leases for any given term, as for any term of years not exceeding 21 years, a lease may be made for the term, with a proviso, that upon the tender by the donee of the power of one shilling, or the like, the lease shall become void (*o*) ; or in other words, a lease may be made for a term certain, with a proviso determining it on a given event, at the option of the lessor, but it would be otherwise if the power, as is sometimes the case, requires the lease to be for a term *absolute*.

So if the power be to lease for any given term, as for 21 years, without saying *for any term not exceeding the number of years*, a lease may be made for a less term (*p*).

III. Thirdly,

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| <p>(<i>m</i>) Doe v. Calvert, 2 East, 376.</p> <p>(<i>n</i>) Ibid.</p> <p>(<i>o</i>) Earl of Cardigan v. Montague, App. No. 13, 1 ; as to such</p> | <p>a power to the lessee, see Lowe v. Swift, 2 Ball & Beat. 536.</p> <p>(<i>p</i>) Isherwood v. Oldknow, 3 Mau. & Selw. 382 ; S. C. MS.</p> |
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III. Thirdly, *As to concurrent leases*. Upon the statute 1 Eliz. c. 19, which restrained bishops from making leases for more than twenty-one years, it has been solemnly decided, that a concurrent lease made to take effect in possession is good (*q*). And in the case of *Read v. Nashe*, in the 31st of Eliz. (*r*), under a power in a will to lease for twenty-one years, the donee leased for that term, and then a year before the expiration of the lease he made a new lease for twenty-one years to another person, to begin *in presenti*. And it was argued that although he could not make leases in reversion, yet such a lease as this he might make well enough, for this lease was to begin presently, and so no charge to him in reversion, and the inheritance was not charged in the whole with more than twenty-one years. And Serjeant Newdigate, in arguing the case of *Edwards v. Slater*, in the 17th of Charles the 2d, vouched a case of *Berry and Riche* in the Common Pleas, where it was adjudged, that if a man has a power to make a lease for years, where there is another lease in being, there, if he make a lease to commence *in presenti* the power is well executed, and the second lease shall continue so long as it may, taking effect in possession after the determination of the first lease (*s*).

One of the arguments we have seen in favour of the lease in *Goodtitle v. Funucan* was, that it was good as a concurrent lease, and for this the case of *Read and Nashe* was cited. Lord Mansfield in giving judgment said that the reason given was a strong one, viz. that the inheritance was not charged in the whole with more
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(*q*) *Fox v. Collyer*, And. 65.
pl. 140; *Mo.* 107, pl. 251.

(*r*) 1 *Leo.* 147.
(*s*) *Hard.* 412.

than twenty-one years. No authority, he said, was cited against this case, nor any answer given to the reasoning in it. The words of the 13th Eliz. c. 10 (I), he added, as strongly require leases to be in possession, and not in reversion, as those in this or any of the common powers to tenants for life; yet in the case of *Fox v. Collyer* all the Judges held that an immediate lease for twenty-one years of premises on which there was a subsisting lease for four years was good. The 18th of Eliz. c. 11, restrained the right to make such concurrent leases to cases where the old lease had not more than three years to run (II). In a very recent case, decided by Grose, Lawrence, and Le Blanc, J. an *obiter* opinion was delivered, that according to the case of *Goodtitle and Funucan*, a concurrent lease might be granted under a power to lease in possession. This opinion was not pronounced on two leases *under the power*, but in a case where the first tenancy was not created by force of the power, and consequently was not binding on the remainder-man.

Thus stand the authorities in favour of concurrent leases. As the doctrine owes its foundation to the case of *Fox and Collyer*, it may be proper to open the other side of the question, with some observations on that case. At the common law the bishop could not make any lease without the confirmation of his dean and chapter; the stat. of 32 H. 8, c. 28, *enabled* bishops, of their own authority, to make leases for twenty-one years,

(I) Note, the question in *Fox and Collyer* arose on the 1st Eliz. c. 19, and not on the 13 Eliz. c. 10.

(II) Note, this act did not affect the 1st Eliz. c. 19.

years, under certain restrictions ; but this did not prevent them from granting the possessions of their Sees for any term, with proper confirmation. Elizabeth, upon her accession to the throne, after the sanguinary reign of Mary, found the principalities of the church filled by Roman Catholics. These she resolved to remove, and justly apprehending that they would charge the bishoprics in their own favour, caused the stat. of 1 Eliz. c. 19, to be passed ; whereby it was enacted, that any estate made by bishops of hereditaments, parcel of their bishoprics, “ other than for the term of twenty-one years, or three lives, from such time as it should begin, and whereupon the old rent should be reserved, &c.” should be void. In *Fox and Collyer*, the second lease was duly confirmed by the dean and chapter, for it was not authorized by the 32 H. 8. And the only question was, whether it was rendered void by the statute of Eliz. and it was determined that it was not, because it was not either within the letter or the intent of the statute ; not within the letter, as was clear by the words ; nor the intent, because it was not prejudicial to the successor, inasmuch as he would have two rents ; that is, one by estoppel, and the other in interest, where he had but one before, and the intent of the statute is satisfied if there is no longer estate against the successor than twenty-one years or three lives.

This case, however, was decided against the opinion of Lord C. J. Dyer, and Mead, J. and also of Plowden, and has never been received as a satisfactory decision, although under the authority of it bishops at this day constantly grant concurrent leases, with the proper confirmation. Mr. Justice Hutton, in the 1st of Cha. I, treated

treated the case as ill decided ; he said it was a resolution according to the very words, but without question, against the very intent of the makers (*t*). And Holborn, in his argument in *Evans and Ascough* in the 22d of Jac. I. (*u*), well observed, that the 18th Eliz. c. 11, was a parliamentary judgment against the decision. And in the same case, Mr. Justice Doddridge observed, that a concurrent lease was very mischievous, and that the case of *Fox and Collyer* was only carried by one or two voices of the Judges (I). But Whitlock, J. thought that not a reason to dispute it ; and Jones, J. agreed with him ; and Whitlock seemed to think that the same decision ought to be made if the point were *res nova* ; and in the case of *Threadneedle and Lineham* (*x*), Ellis, Justice, thought the opinion of Mr. Justice Hutton was not to be put in balance with the resolution of the Judges in *Fox and Collyer*. Wyndham, J., however, seemed to think that the statute intended leases in interest only ; and Lord C. J. Vaughan said that the Judges had made a great strain upon the statute in *Fox and Collyer*, and he treated a concurrent lease as not within the letter or the intent of the statute, because the statute intended, when a lease was once made, that on the expiration of it the advantage should be to that bishop in whose time it expired, and by this mean there will, he added, be always a concurrent lease in being, and the successor can never make an entire lease ; and though in pleading men be estopped to say the

(*t*) *Bishop of Chester v. Freeman, Ley*, 78.

(*u*) *Latch*. 233 ; *Palm*. 457.

(*x*) 3 *Keb*. 372.

(I) This seems to have been admitted by all the Judges ; but see the report in *Moore*.

the party that made the latter lease had no power, yet this being found by verdict, the Judges might judge according to truth; also the executors of the lessee are not bound by this estoppel, while the other lease, first made, lasts, and if so, this lease is not for the successor's advantage, and so only good to some purposes, viz. pleading; and in Sheppard's Touchstone it is said, but no case is referred to, that in the case of a power to make leases for twenty-one years, if the party make more leases for twenty-one years, at more times than one, they are all void but the first; because it is against the intention of the parties, though it be not against the words (*y*).

By this time it will be admitted that Fox and Collyer is not a case to rule others by analogy merely; and if any doubt arises on the doctrine in that case, as applied to the statute of Elizabeth, how much more forcibly must it arise when applied to leases under private powers? In that case, until the statute, the bishop *pro tempore* might have aliened the land absolutely, with the proper confirmation, and still the concurrent lease is not valid without such confirmation. This, therefore, is a case in which the Judges may have been tempted to restrain a severe *disabling* statute; and they may have considered that the successor was only bound by a term of twenty-one years at most, upon which he was entitled to the old rent, whereas before the statute he might have succeeded to the land encumbered with a lease for two thousand years at a pepper-

(*y*) Shep. Touch. 269. If this book was, as it is generally supposed, written by Doddridge, the above passage shows that he

continued of the opinion he expressed in Evans v. Ascough, *vide supra*.

pepper-corn rent. But how widely different is the usual power of leasing: It is an *enabling* power to a man who could not, of his own authority, make a lease binding on the estate for a single month; and it requires that the lease should take effect in possession, which clearly means not merely a term to commence *in presenti*, but also a term to commence in interest; the object of such a power is rather the benefit of the *estate* than of the particular tenant for life in possession; whereas in cases not expressly prohibited, the Legislature intended to leave bishops in possession of their former rights. In the statute of Elizabeth the lease is not required to take effect in possession; and Whitlock, who we have seen thought Fox and Collyer well decided, expressly distinguished it from a particular power of leasing. The argument of Mr. Justice Yates, in *Wilson v. Sewell* (z), is still more to our purpose; he said that a lease *in being* is only that *in possession*; *a concurrent lease is not a lease in esse*. It operates only by estoppel. It passes no interest during the former lease. The 18th Eliz. meant to restrain leases in reversion, therefore by lease “in being” the Legislature meant a lease in *possession*.

The advantage to be derived from the two rents, which was relied on in Fox and Collyer’s case, is no other than a fruitful field of litigation. If the second lessee should enter and be ousted, as of course he would be, the rent on the second lease would, it should seem, be suspended. Or it may be thought that, as at this day leases are made by deed, the second lease would take effect by estoppel as a lease in possession, and
attornment

(z) Blackst. 126.

attornment being now unnecessary, would carry with it the right to the rent reserved by the first lease, and then the remainder-man's remedy for his rent would be more complicated and less effectual than it would have been under a single lease. And if it should be established that a concurrent lease may be granted, it will of necessity follow, that any indefinite number of concurrent leases may be granted of the same land, a doctrine fraught with too much inconvenience to be established on light grounds. It should seem, then, 1st, That whatever may be the authority of the case of Fox and Collyer, it cannot be considered as ruling private powers; and 2ndly, That a concurrent lease cannot be granted within the true spirit and meaning of such powers. As to the authorities in favour of the contrary doctrine, we may first ease the point of Berry and Riche, cited by Serjeant Newdigate (*a*); for it is far from clear that that was not the case of a lease granted of an estate which was in lease at the time of the settlement; and the Serjeant refers to Moore's Rep. p. 618, which turns upon a very different question. The case of Read and Nashe, which Lord Mansfield relied upon as an authority, was never decided. It was merely the argument of Coke at the bar, who produced no other authority than Fox and Collyer; and in Read and Nashe also the power was so particularly penned, that Coke occupied a considerable time to show that a power was actually given. Lord Mansfield's observations in *Goodtitle v. Funucan* appear to have been made without much previous attention to this point, probably from the circumstance that this was not the true ground of the decision,

(*a*) *Vide supra*.

decision (*b*), but was merely thrown in as an additional argument. The observation in *Doe v. Calvert* was a mere *dictum*, and rests solely for its authority on Lord Mansfield. Besides, both these opinions may perhaps be supported on the third ground of *Goodtitle v. Funucan*, viz. that the first lease was not binding on the remainderman, a case very distinguishable from one where both the leases are granted under the power. The point then is not surrounded by much authority; and there seems reason to suppose, that if it should ever be argued on its true principles, the decision will be that a concurrent lease cannot be granted. To guard against a contrary determination, it might be advisable in powers of leasing to expressly declare that a concurrent lease shall not be granted.

Since the above observations were published a case arose in which the Court were desirous to distinguish between the effect of a power to lease for life, and a power to lease for years determinable on a life. Lord Ellenborough stated the distinction to be, that a chattel lease may be granted pending a prior subsisting one, provided it be within the limits of the power, and provided it give no beneficial interest during the continuance of the subsisting lease; but so long as there is a freehold lease *in esse*, a second freehold lease cannot be granted. The right of granting a second chattel lease was, his Lordship said, settled in *Read v. Nashe*, and is recognized as law in *Goodtitle v. Funucan*. It was not, however, necessary to decide this point. The case was determined on the authority of Whitlock's case (*c*).

But

(*b*) *Vide supra*, p. 614, 615,
and the notes.

(*c*) *Roe v. Prideaux*, 10 East,
184.

But although a concurrent lease cannot be made, yet a surrender may be taken of the old lease, and a new one granted. If the new lease be made to the old tenant, an express surrender is of course unnecessary. It has indeed been doubted in practice, whether a new lease, granted upon the surrender of the old one at an increased rent, is valid. The increased rent, it has been argued, is equivalent to taking a fine at the expense of the remainder-man; for if the old lease had been permitted to run out, a larger rent might have been obtained. There is not, however, any weight in this argument (*d*).

IV. Fourthly, *As to leases for lives*. A power to grant leases for two or more lives, implies an authority to grant them during the life of the survivor, although the power is silent in that respect (*e*). And it has been decided upon the 13 Eliz. c. 10, that a lease to one for three lives, and to three for their three lives, is the same thing within the intent of the statute which restrains leases *other than for three lives* (*f*). The same construction would extend to a private power of leasing, but the lease must be made for lives *in esse* (*g*), and the lives must be concurrent; the candles, as the phrase is, must all be burning at the same time, although the power is to demise “for one, two, or three lives,” which seems to import succession (*h*).

Where a power was to lease for ninety-nine years, to be

(*d*) See *Wilson v. Sewell*, 1 Blackst. 617, *post*. p. 619.

(*e*) *Alsop v. Pine*, 3 Keb. 44, pl. 16; see *Doe v. Hardwicke*, 10 East, 549.

(*f*) *Baugh v. Haynes*, Cro. Jac. 76.

(*g*) Raym. 263.

(*h*) *Doe v. Halcombe*, 7 Term Rep. 13.

be determined on the death of one, two, or three lives, a lease for ninety-nine years, if *A* should so long live, to commence from the deaths of *B* and *C*, was held void. Although there was a subsisting lease for years, if *B* and *C* should so long live (*i*), Lord Ellenborough, C.J., said that what induced the testator to create a power to lease for ninety-nine years, determinable on three lives, in preference to a power to lease for three lives, we do not know; it might have been equally beneficial to the tenant for life to have empowered him to lease for three lives, but the testator has not so willed, and his will must be conformed to the power, which says, to demise and let for ninety-nine years, determinable on one, two, or three lives. The term “demise and let” imports a present possession; if the lease cannot be executed *in presenti*, it is hardly capable of the sense belonging to the expression “to demise and let.” It does not appear that the lease in question was any thing more than a grant of an interest to be postponed to a future time. The lessor died before the prior lives dropped, the lease therefore must take effect, if at all, after the donee’s death. The prior term might also, by possibility, be expended before the lives, and it certainly was not the intention of the deviser that the tenant for life should have power to postpone the grant of an interest to so distant a period, but only that he should encumber the estate to the extent of a term for ninety-nine years, determinable on three lives.

We have in a former place seen in what instances the lease must be for the lives directly, and where it may be for a term of years, determinable on the lives (*k*).

(*i*) *Doe v. Hiern*, 5 Mau. & Selw. 40. (*k*) *Supra*, ch. 9, s. 2.

SECTION IV.

OF THE RENT TO BE RESERVED.

THE questions in regard to the *rent* arise either upon the *quantum*, or the mode of reservation. Where a settled estate has been usually let on lives, the common power of leasing is upon fines, which, as the lives or leases drop, are considered among the annual profits (*a*). This is generally the case in Ireland, but it prevails only in a few counties in England. The power of leasing commonly introduced into settlements of estates in England requires the best rent to be reserved, and expressly prohibits the taking of a fine. Whether the best rent *is* reserved, is a point to be decided by a Jury. It is clear, that under a power to lease at rack-rent, improvements by the tenant, however valuable, will not authorize a lease at an undervalue (*b*); and if a fine be taken, the lease cannot be supported, not only because it is against the intent of the power, express or implied, but because it is evident, that *however considerable the rent*, it might have been increased if the fine had not been taken. In a case before Lord Redesdale, the tenant covenanted to lay out 200*l.* in *improvements*; and it was argued that this was equivalent to a fine, but his Lordship said, that he thought this would not avoid the contract if the rent were, notwithstanding, the best that could be got. Such a covenant,

(*a*) See 1 Burr. 121.

6 East, 86; and see Doe v.

(*b*) Roe v. Archbp. of York, Lloyd, 3 Esp. Rep. 78.

a covenant, he added, is not necessarily a fraud. It may be made with a fraudulent intent, and when it is so made it will avoid the lease; if it were colourable, and merely for the purpose of putting money into the pocket of the tenant for life, it would avoid the lease; or if it were not originally intended as a fraud, but were afterwards used fraudulently (as for example, a covenant to repair, and a sum of money under colour of damages for breach of that covenant recovered by the tenant for life), a court of equity would at least take care that the damages should be laid out on the lands (c).

We should, however, be cautious in the application of the principle of this decision to cases in practice. It should seem, that although the rent reserved be the full value of the land, yet if satisfactory evidence could be produced to a Jury that a tenant was willing to give an additional rent in lieu of the money agreed to be laid out in improvements, the lease could not be supported. It would not be the *best rent* that could have been obtained. In these cases it is not essential that there should be fraud and collusion between the lessee and tenant for life. The simple question is—Is the rent the best rent? If it be not, the lease must fall to the ground, however fair the transaction (d).

But it is not sufficient to impeach a *bond fide* lease without a fine, at a rent which the Jury find a fair rent; that the tenant for life had offers of higher rents from other persons, against whose responsibility nothing appears.

(c) Shannon v. Bradstreet, 1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 52; and see Campbell v. Leach, Ambl. 740; Doe v. Bettison, 12 East, 305; O'Brien v. Grierson, 2 Ball & Beat. 323. (d) See Wright v. Smith, 5 Esp. Rep. 203; see 5 Dow, 344.

appears. And where the transaction is fair, and no fine or other collateral consideration was taken by the tenant for life leasing under the power, or injurious partiality manifestly shown by him in favour of the particular lessee, there ought to be something extravagantly wrong in the bargain to set it aside on this ground ; for in the choice of a tenant there are many things to be regarded besides the mere amount of the rent offered (*e*).

In the *Queensberry* case, in the House of Lords, Lord Eldon, in speaking of powers to lease at the best rent, observed, "There is but one criterion which our Courts always attend to as a leading criterion in discussing the question, whether the best rent has been got or not ; that is, whether the man who makes the lease has got as much for others as he has for himself ; for if he has got more for himself than for others, that is a decisive evidence against him. The Court must see that there is reasonable care and diligence exerted to get such rent as, care and diligence being exerted, circumstances mark out as the rent likely to be obtained (*f*)."

Under a power to lease for any term not exceeding ninety-nine years from the date of executing the lease, so that there should be reserved to be payable during the continuance of the term the best rent that could be obtained without taking any fine, a lease was granted for thirty years at a rent of 270 *l.*, and at the same time another lease in reversion for sixty-three years at a rent of 120 *l.*, and the last lease contained a covenant to rebuild, it was held that the leases were void, although the Jury had found that, taking into consideration the covenants

(*e*) *Doe v. Radcliffe*, 10 East, 278. (*f*) MS. see 1 Bligh, 427.

covenants to rebuild, the rents were the best that could be obtained. For the question was, whether they were the most beneficial to the *reversioner*? and it was clear that whatever rent was reserved should be reserved during the continuance of the term (*g*).

Where, from the quantity and nature of the property demised, it is impossible to ascertain whether the rent reserved is the best rent, the execution of the power cannot be sustained, as where a donee of a power to lease at rack-rent leased an honour and sixteen manors, and other estates, with a park and deer therein, by one lease at 600 £ a year, the lease was deemed invalid, by reason of the general, extensive, casual, and uncertain natures and values of the greater part at least of the premises, and the great difficulty, if not utter impossibility, arising from thence of forming any judgment whether the rent thereby reserved was the best rent that could have been obtained (*h*).

Of course, in a power to grant building-leases, the term *best rent* must, although not expressed, be understood to be the best rent which can be obtained with reference to the gross sum to be laid out by the tenant in building or improvements.

We have already seen, that the surrender of an existing lease, and the grant of a new one at an increased rent is not equivalent to taking a fine (*i*).

In a late case (*k*), where, in a lease under a power
by

(*g*) Doe v. Harvey, 1 Barn. & Cress. 426.

(*h*) See Earl of Cardigan v. Montagu, App. No. 13 (2) Note; there was another objection to

the lease. The one in the text was a question for a jury.

(*i*) *Vide supra*, p. 621.

(*k*) Doe v. Bettison, 12 East, 305.

by a tenant for life, he covenanted in every year *during his life*, upon the request of the lessee, to grant a new lease upon the same rents, &c. as in the first lease, it was argued that the covenant for renewal avoided the lease: it operated indirectly upon the interest of the remainder-man, though it only bound the tenant for life directly. The lessee would not of course apply for a renewal unless it was for his benefit, and the remainder-man loses one of the checks which in general operate in his favour on the tenant for life, to reserve the best rent; for the tenant for life may, for fear of an action on the covenant, be induced to renew at less than the best rent, at the time when such renewal is applied for; and the difficulty upon the remainder-man of proving that a better might then have been had is enhanced in a greater degree, when other uncertain computations are to be taken into the account, than if the question were confined to the mere amount of the gross rent reserved. Lord Ellenborough, in delivering judgment, said, that as to the covenant for renewal, it is said that it has a tendency to induce the lessor to run the question on the *quantum* of rent reserved very closely; for if he renewed at the end of twenty years from the first granting of the lease, the remainder-man might have a lease fixed on him for twenty-one years from that time, reserving less than the best rent which could then have been reserved; but the answer is, that if the fact were so, the lease would be void, and the remainder-man might bring his ejectment and recover the premises.

The *bonâ fide* reservation of rent for the enjoyment of the estate prior to the lease, as where the lessee is
in

in possession, and the lease is granted in a broken half year, does not vitiate the lease (*i*) ; but a rent must be reserved for the whole of the term.

Therefore where the power required the best and most approved yearly rent to be reserved, and the lease was dated 14th September 1809, and was for twenty-one years from the day of the date of the lease, payable by two even half-yearly payments on the 29th of September and 25th of March, the first payment to be made on the 25th day of March then next, the lease was held void ; because, as the rent was made payable on the 25th of March and the 29th of September, and the term of the lease would expire on the 14th of September, there would be no rent payable under it from the 25th of March preceding the expiration of the term (*k*). But where (*l*) the power was to lease for twenty-one years, or any term of years determinable upon three lives, “ so as upon all and every such lease and leases there be reserved and made payable yearly during the continuance thereof the usual and accustomed yearly rents, boons and services for the same,” and the lease was dated from the 6th of January 1785, for ninety-nine years, at a rent payable at Lady-day and Michaelmas in every year, and a similar lease had been granted before the creation of the power, it was held that the lease was valid. The Court said that the objection was, that the rent being reserved half-yearly, the first payment was to take place at a period less than half a year

(*i*) *Isherwood v. Oldknow*, B. R. 22 Feb. 1810, MS. 53 Mau. & Selw. 382. S. C. Barn. & Ald. 371.

MS.

(*l*) *Doe v. Wilson*, 5 Barn. &

(*k*) *Doe d. Wilmot v. Giffard*, Ald. 363.

year distant from the day of the demise, and in support of that objection the case of *Doe v. Giffard* was cited ; that case, however, is very distinguishable from the present. In that case the power was to lease at the best and most improved yearly rent that could be obtained. The power under which this lease was granted requires that there be reserved the usual and accustomed yearly rent. Now as far as the Court had any evidence what the usual and accustomed yearly rent was, it appears to have been a yearly rent payable at Lady-day and Michaelmas. The Court therefore was of opinion that a rent payable at those days, although the right to demand it arose in less than half a year, was a usual and accustomed rent within the meaning of those words in the condition contained in the leasing power. Indeed, when they considered that this was a lease for lives granted upon the surrender of another lease, they could not help seeing that it was in effect an extension of time upon fresh terms ; and where the time only is extended, it is most reasonable that the day of the payment of the rent should continue to be the same, and should not vary according to the day on which the new lease may happen to be granted.

Formerly these powers required the ancient or usual rent to be reserved, but at the present day this practice is very properly exploded (I). Where such a term is introduced, the better opinion is, that as a general rule, the rent reserved at the time of the creation of the power, where a lease was then in being, or last before it,

(I) As to the kind of evidence of the ancient rent admitted in these cases, see *Roe v. Rawlins*, 7 East, 279.

it, where no lease was then in being, is the rent to which the power must be taken to refer (*l*). But it is no objection that *more* than the ancient rent is reserved (*m*), nor that heriots, or other *casual* and *accidental* services, which have been usually rendered, are *not* reserved by the lease under the power (*n*).

It should seem that where the usual rents are required to be reserved, and a certain sum was formerly paid, with a covenant by the lessee to pay all the taxes, a reservation of the like rent, without a similar covenant, would be a fraud on the power, for the new rent would only be nominally the ancient rent, as it would be subject to a deduction for the land-tax and other taxes, which would in effect reduce the rent below the sum anciently rendered (*o*).

Where a power was given by a will to a tenant for life, to lease landed estates for twenty-one years, at the *most rent* that could be got, and houses and ground in Middlesex and London, for any term of years not exceeding sixty-one, at the *usual* or other the *most rent* that could be got for the same, and at the date of the will the London houses were in lease for forty-one years, at a rent of 6*l.*, for which a fine had been paid, the Court of King's Bench held that the Middlesex and London

(*l*) See *Morrice v. Antrobus*, Hard. 325 ; 3 Cha. Rep. 66—68, accordingly per Holt, C. J. ; but see *ib.* 73, *contra per* Lord Ch. Cowper ; and see *Right v. Thomas*, 3 Burr. 1441, 1 Blackst. 446 ; *Doe v. Creed*, 4 Mau. & Selw. 371.

(*m*) See 3 Cha. Rep. 78.

(*n*) *Baugh v. Haynes*, Cro. Jac. 76, Mo. 759 ; Co. Litt. 44, b ; *Coventry v. Coventry*, 1 Com. 312.

(*o*) See *Earl of Cardigan v. Montagu*, App. No. 13.(8) ; *Goodtitle v. Funucan*, Dougl. 565.

London property might be demised at the old rents, taking a fine; *usual* was considered as contrasted to *most*. If the property in London had been situate in a ruinous part of the town, in such a case, the tenant for life might not have been able to get the usual rent, and then he was to get the most (*p*).

But where a power requiring the best rent also required that no power should be *given* to any lessee to commit waste, and that the lease should contain usual covenants, and a lease was granted by which the lessor covenanted to do part of the repairs, and in case of neglect the tenant was authorized to do them, and deduct the expense out of the rent, the Jury found that the rent was the best rent, and that the covenants were usual ones:—It was contended—first, that the lease amounted to an exemption from punishment for *permissive* waste, which, it was said, was within the power—secondly, that the covenant enabling the lessee to deduct the expenses of repairs was unusual and contrary to the power. Mr. Justice Bayley observed, in answer to the first objection, that the restriction on the power of leasing was only that the lease should not contain any clause whereby any power should be *given* to the lessee to commit waste. Does not, he asked, the argument come at last to the *quantum* or sufficiency of the rent reserved? If the tenant be to keep the premises in repair, the rent is so much less; if the landlord be to repair, the rent is the greater. It was a question for the Jury at the trial, whether, taking into consideration the repairs to be made by the landlord, the rent reserved was the fair rent. In delivering judgment, Lord Ellenborough

(*p*) Doe v. Creed, 4 Mau. & Selw. 371. *Sed qu.*

borough observed, that as to the first objection, the power stipulates against any clause in the lease whereby any authority shall be *given* to the lessee to commit waste, &c. and the answer to that objection is, that no such power or authority is given to the lessee, nor is he thereby exempted from the punishment for committing waste; for the burthen of repair in the mansion-house is thrown by the lease on the landlord, and it was incumbent on the plaintiff's counsel to have shown, that according to the terms of the power no such burthen could be thrown on the landlord; but that is not prohibited, and therefore the argument falls to the ground. Next, the covenant provides, that if repair should be wanted on the roof of the mansion, which the landlord took upon himself, and he did not repair it, the tenant might make the repair and deduct the charge out of the rent reserved to the lessor. What objection can there be to provide for setting off the one demand against the other (*q*).

The word *rent*, in powers of leasing, is with great propriety construed to mean not money merely, but any return or equivalent adapted to the nature of the subject demised; therefore upon a lease of mines, a due proportion of the produce may be reserved as a render in lieu of money, although the power requires a "rent" generally to be reserved (*r*).

II. When it is ascertained that the proper *quantum* of rent is payable, the next question is, whether the form of the reservation be proper.

Where

(*q*) Doe v. Bettison, 12 East, 305.

(*r*) Campbell v. Leach, Ambl. 740; Bassett's case cited, ib. 748.

Where the usual or ancient rent is required, it must be reserved in the way it has commonly been ; if gold has been usually reserved, silver cannot be made payable in lieu of it ; if it were commonly paid at four days, a reservation at one, two, or three days, would be void, unless the power require the *yearly* accustomed rent to be reserved, in which case the whole rent may be made payable at one time, or at several periods(*r*) ; but a difference of words is not material ; therefore a reservation of eight bushels of grain in lieu of a quarter, is good, because it is all one in quality, value and nature (*s*) ; and a reservation of the rent *before* the usual day of payment is said to be valid, because payment before the day is payment at the day (*t*).

The strictness on this head has been carried so far, that it has been considered that two several farms not usually let together could not be joined in one demise with a reservation of one and the same rent ; nor a *parcel* of a farm rendering rent *pro rata* (*u*). But it has never been necessary to decide these points upon powers in private settlements, and it probably never may. The questions have generally arisen upon leases under the statutes by ecclesiastical persons, tenants in tail, and husbands seised *jure uxoris* ; and notwithstanding the cases in the books, a lease of part at a rent *pro rata* was considered as valid by very able lawyers. And the doubt to the contrary has, so far as it relates to ecclesiastical

(*r*) 6 Rep. 38, a ; Campbell v. Leach, Ambl. 740 ; see Earl of Cardigan v. Montagu, App. No. 13.

(*s*) Mountjoy's case, 5 Rep. 3 b. ; see 3 Cha. Rep. 75, 1 Burr.

121.

(*t*) See 2 Lord Raym. 1198 ; *sed qu. et vid. infra.*

(*u*) 5 Rep. 5 b ; 3 Cha. Rep. 75 ; Smith v. Trinder, Cro. Car. 22.

siastical leases, been removed by a late act of parliament (*x*), which act, very unaccountably, does not remove the doubt as to leases by tenants in tail, or husbands seised *jure uxoris*, nor does it validate leases by ecclesiastical persons of two or more farms together, which have been usually let separately.

The point upon a private power arose in the late case of *Doe v. Wilson* (*y*), and the Court held the apportionment valid. The Court said, the question was whether or not it is competent to the owner of a considerable estate to make any improvement or alteration in the mode of disposing of that estate? If he cannot divide a farm, but is bound to let it altogether as it formerly was, improvement must in many cases be utterly prevented, and the remainder-man be deprived of the benefit. Independently of authority, they should have thought that that which was for the benefit of the estate might lawfully be done, and that an apportionment of rent might be made; and that the land might be subdivided, provided care was taken to apportion for the parts of the farm so divided as much rent as had been reserved in respect of them in the lease comprising the whole. Lord Mountjoy's case had been cited upon this point. The doctrine there laid down upon this subject, however, was not the point which the Court there decided; and the very learned person in whose report that doctrine is found, had, in his commentary on Littleton, expressly laid it down as law that there may be a leasing of part, reserving a rent bearing the same proportion to the former rent as the part leased bore to the whole land. He says, "If tenant
in

(*x*) 39 and 40 Geo. 3, c. 41. (*y*) 5 Barn. & Ald. 363.

in tail let part of the land accustomably letten, and reserve a rent *pro rata* or more, this is good, for that is in substance the accustomable rent;"—Co. Litt. 44 b.; and Lord Mountjoy's case is referred to in the sentence immediately preceding. The Court was of opinion, that the law so laid down by Lord Coke was consonant to reason, and that it was competent to lease a part, reserving a true and fit proportion of that rent which had formerly been reserved. The case of *Smith v. Trinder* was an authority upon that point. It was true that the 39 and 40 Geo. 3, c. 41, after reciting that doubts had arisen whether ecclesiastical persons could lawfully grant separate leases of parts of lands usually demised by one lease and under one rent, enabled them so to do, but they were not necessarily to infer from thence that those doubts were well founded. Acts of parliament for the purpose of removing doubts are very beneficial, because they prevent that expense of litigation which otherwise must take place in order to have such doubts resolved. For these reasons this was held to be a good and valid lease.

It is clear, that the mere circumstance of the rent being reserved out of the land, *and* recent improvements on it by building, will not vitiate the lease, although, as it has been argued, part of the rent issues out of the new buildings (*y*). To prevent any doubt on these points, where powers are given to lease at the ancient rent, it should expressly be declared that leases may be made of part, at rents *pro rata*, and that lands usually demised by several leases at several rents may be demised by one lease at the aggregate of the old rents.

The

(*y*) *Read v. Nashe*, 1 Leo. 147.

The rent to be paid should, in strictness, be specified in the lease ; but although the reservation be made in the very words of the power, without stating the sum in particular, the lease will be supported if the reservation have reference to some standard by which the rent can be ascertained with certainty and ease, for *id certum est quod certum reddi potest* ; but if the reservation be vague and indefinite, and not easily reducible to a certainty, the lease will be void. As an instance of the first rule may be quoted the case of *Lewson v. Pigot* (2) ; where, under a power to make leases of certain lands, reserving 12 *d.* for every Cheshire acre, a lease was made of all the lands, “reserving all the rent intended to be reserved,” and the lease was determined to be valid : because, Lord Chancellor Cowper observed, there was an absolute mathematical certainty, than which nothing can be more certain : the very power provided it should be so ; at least 12 *d.* for every Cheshire acre (*a*). It was only necessary therefore to compute the number of acres in order to fix the rent (*b*) ; and in a recent case, where a tenant for life, with a power of leasing, contracted to grant a lease at the yearly rent of seven pounds for every acre the lands, upon a proper survey to be had, should appear to contain, and so in proportion for every lesser quantity than an acre ; the uncertainty of the rent was objected against the performance of the agreement, but Lord Redesdale said that he did not think it uncertain, for it was capable of being reduced to a certainty ;
and

(2) 3 Cha. Rep. 61, cited.

(a) See 2 Cha. Rep. 76.

(b) And see *Audley v. Audley*,
2 Cha. Rep. 82 ; but note, there

the power does not appear to
have required the reservation of
any rent.

and it was a common form of reserving the rent in the country where the land was situated. Every executory contract must contain this species of uncertainty ; but if it contains all that leads to future certainty, he took it to be sufficient ; and he accordingly decreed a specific performance of the contract (c).

The second rule is exemplified in the great case of *Orby v. Mohun* (d), where the power was to grant leases of all lands anciently demised at the ancient rents, and of the other lands at the best rents that could be gotten. The power was exercised by two leases, by one of which all the lands not anciently let were demised, reserving thereon "*the best improved rents*," and by the other, *all* the lands within the power were let, reserving the "*ancient and accustomable rents* ;" so that instead of specifying the sums to be paid as rent, the words of the power were repeated. The cause was heard before Lord Keeper Cowper, assisted by the two Chiefs, Holt and Trevor.

They unanimously agreed that the lease was void as to the demesnes, because the remainder-man could not possibly tell what to demand under the reservation of the *best improved rents*.

But as to the lands anciently demised, Lord Chief J. Holt held that the rent was certain enough, and the lease good. It must be admitted, he said, that a power to lease, reserving the *ancient rent*, is a certain power, and well enough to be understood what it is, and what it means ; and why, he asked, shall the same words
that

(c) *Shannon v. Bradstreet*,
1 Rep. T. Redesdale, 52.

(d) 2 Vern. 531. 542 ; Prec.
Cha. 257 ; 2 Freem. 291 ; best
reported in 3 Cha. Rep. 56.

that create and reduce the power to a sufficient certainty when turned into a lease, render it uncertain? The same certainty that is in the power is carried over into the lease, which is the execution of it; but neither in the one or the other is it mentioned what the old rent is, but that may be averred, and that is certain which may be made certain. But the Lord Keeper and Lord C. J. Trevor were of opinion that the rent, even as to the lands anciently demised, was not certain, and that therefore the lease was void. They argued, that as the intent of the settlement was (e) that the tenant for life in possession might lease, so it was on the other hand that the revenue should not be diminished, but the ancient rent at least reserved, and in such beneficial manner as might with certainty, and without any difficulty, be recovered; and for that reason it was provided that there should be a counterpart of the lease, that it might be better known what the rent was, and how to recover it. If the rent had been mentioned in the lease, there, if the tenant had refused to pay it, the proof would have been turned upon the tenant to show the rent in his lease was not the ancient rent; and if he should do so, it would make his lease void. But as the lease was contrived, the remainder-man might be baffled and nonsuited twenty times before he could declare or avow in certain for the rent payable in the lease; and yet the tenant still holds the land, and doth not prove his own lease void, as must have been done in the other case. Where there is a power of leasing in general words, as reserving the ancient rent, in the execution of the power which is to be explained and made certain, the rule,

(e) 2 Vern. 543, 544.

rule, *certum est quod certum reddi potest* is to be understood of a reference to that which is absolutely certain, to former letters patent or the like: but this is rather a delegating the power of leasing to the plaintiff, than an execution of the power, and is the first attempt of the kind; and it is a good rule, that what never has been ought never to be; and therefore they adjudged the lease to be void, and this decree was confirmed in the House of Lords (*f*).

Where the rent is required to be reserved at particular days, it must of course be reserved accordingly, but where merely the best *yearly* rent is required to be reserved, it may be made payable quarterly, or half yearly (*g*). Even where the power requires these to be reserved and *made payable yearly*, the usual and accustomed yearly rents, it authorizes the reservation in portions at the days on which the rents have been usually reserved. Independently of that circumstance, the rent may it seems be reserved half yearly or quarterly: for in the case (*h*) in which the point arose, the Court observed, that it was admitted, that if the words of the power had been "so that there be reserved and made payable during the continuance thereof, the usual and accustomed yearly rent," without the word "yearly" immediately following the word "payable," a rent reserved half-yearly would have been sufficient, that is, that a payment by portions at
the

(*f*) 3 Bro. P. C. 248, nom. Duchess of Hamilton v. Mor-daunt, and see Owen v. Thomas, reported Cro. Car. 94; 3 Keb. 380, cited.

(*g*) Campbell v. Leach, Amb. 740; 6 Rep. 38, a. See Earl of Cardigan v. Montagu, App. No. 13.

(*h*) Doe v. Wilson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 363.

the end of each half-year, or at the end of each quarter of the year, does not prevent the rent from being, in the common understanding of mankind, and in common parlance a yearly rent. 'The Court could not see any reason why the words "payable during the continuance thereof" should make any difference; it could not suppose the parties to have intended in this case to make the rent payable only once a year, which certainly is unusual, and not beneficial to the landlord. To adopt the construction contended for would be to suppose that the parties intended that the leases to be granted under the Act of Parliament should be different in their form and effect from ordinary leases of lands and tenements granted at beneficial rents; the ordinary reservation of rent in leases is "yielding and paying yearly, and every year." In this case the words are yearly, during the continuance thereof, the usual and accustomed yearly rent, which means the yearly rent of so many pounds by so many half-yearly or quarterly payments in the year, and they construed these words "payable yearly" with reference to the common language of leases, which was the subject respecting which the parties were speaking in the clause before them.

It seems clear that the rent cannot be reserved *after* the day appointed (*h*); nor, as it should seem, *before* the day, as that would have a tendency to benefit the tenant for life at the expense of the remainder-man (*i*).

It is perfectly clear that several demises may be comprised in one deed, although very subtle distinctions
are

(*h*) See *Ludlow v. Beckwith*, Al. 90. (*i*) *Vide supra*, p. 628. 634.

are taken between what are and what are not distinct reservations, so as to constitute several leases. It frequently happens that lands comprised in a power are demised in the same lease with lands not comprised in the power; or lands are demised, as to some of which the power is duly complied with, and as to others, it is not; and in these cases the validity of the lease depends upon the *quantum* of the rent reserved, and the mode of the reservation.

The first question arose in *How and Whitfield* (*k*); the ancient rent was required to be reserved, which amounted to six shillings per annum, and by the pleadings it appeared that the lands within the power *inter alia*, were demised, reserving *proinde* six shillings per annum; and the Court thought it might be intended that the *inter alia* might comprehend nothing but such things out of which a rent could not be reserved, and then the six shillings were reserved only for the five acres (the land comprised in the power). However, the *proinde* might reasonably be referred only to the five acres, and not to the *inter alia*; and that a distinct reservation of six shillings might be for five acres; and judgment was given accordingly. Thus the case is reported in *Ventris*; but even on that statement the Court does not appear to have decided, what it would have been difficult to do, that a lease of lands comprised in the power, with other lands, yielding *therefore* a single rent, sufficient only for the lands in the power, should be held to issue out of them

(*k*) 1 Ventr. 339; 2 Jo. 110: *Cardigan v. Montague*, App. 2 Show. 67; and see *Earl of No. 13*.

them only. The Court appears merely to have taken advantage of the pleading, and to have *intended* that there was a *distinct* reservation of the six shillings for the lands comprised in the power, which certainly would have been valid; and moreover it appears from Jones's report of the case, and he was one of the Judges before whom the cause was heard, that the Court thought the objection good, but the defendant perceiving that the opinion of the Court was against him on another, which was the grand point in the cause, consented, upon payment of costs, that judgment should be given for the plaintiff. With this Shower's report agrees; and Jones is there made to say, that "*proinde*" was the most common and general word used in leases for *all* the things demised.

In a case like that of How and Whitfield, it would not be possible, under any construction, to support the lease. If, for instance, the reversions of the several estates were afterwards to descend to different persons, there must be an apportionment of the rent, and then sufficient would not be left to satisfy the terms of the power. There is no sound principle upon which it can be contended that the whole rent is reserved in respect only of the land within the power.

The great case of the Earl of Cardigan *v.* Montagu (*l*), went a step farther. It appeared that lands comprised in the power, and lands excepted out of the power were demised by one lease at an *entire rent*, and the lease was deemed invalid, and not warranted by the power: and it does not appear to have been thought necessary to

(*l*) App. No. 13 (3) (5) and see (2).

to inquire whether upon an apportionment the rent payable in respect of the lands comprised in the power would be sufficient. It seems to have been thought that the difficulty under which the remainder-man would labour in this respect was of itself a fatal objection to the lease.

In a recent case, a lease by tenant in tail of the entailed lands, with leaseholds intermixed at an entire rent, was held void for the whole (*m*). But this certainly could not be supported ; and the point has been otherwise decided in a later case, where lands, of which a person was seised in fee, and also lands over which he had a power of leasing, were comprised in one lease at an entire rent. The lease, as to the lands subject to the power, was void ; but it was determined that the lease remained good as to the fee-simple lands, and that the rent should be apportioned (*n*).

The other point arose in the case of *Orby v. Mohun*(*o*), but it was unnecessary to decide it. Lands anciently and lands not anciently demised, were all demised by one lease, reserving therefore “*the ancient rents ;*” and supposing the reservation good, considered abstractedly, the question was, whether the lease was not bad, on the ground that it comprised the lands not anciently demised. In support of the lease, it was argued that the rent issuing out of all must be apportioned, and so it would be in nature of several leases in construction of law, because *redendo singula singulis*, the ancient rents shall be

(*m*) *Rees v. Philip*, 1 Wight. Selw. 276 ; see *Coxe v. Day*, 13 East, 115, 3d point.

(*n*) *Doe v. Meyler*, 2 Mau. and (*o*) 3 Ch. Rep. 56, *supra*, p. 638.

be construed to be reserved for the lands anciently let ; and no rent being reserved for the lands not anciently demised, it is void as to them. But Lord C. J. Trevor expressed a contrary opinion, and placed much weight on the word “therefore” in the reservation. He, however, declined delivering an absolute opinion on the point, as he went upon another reason (*p*). Lord Keeper Cowper also thought the lease bad on the ground of the reservation (*q*). But Lord Chief Justice Holt maintained strongly the contrary opinion ; he insisted that the reservation was several ; for that which was *not* anciently demised will not hurt the other, but must fall to the ground ; and the contrary opinion, he said, was contrary to all the rules of law : and as to the word *therefore*, he clearly proved that however joint words are, yet they shall be taken severally where they have a distinct subject matter to work upon (*r*).

Lord Chief Justice Holt’s opinion appears to be supported by the case of *Campbell v. Leach* (*s*) ; there opened and unopened mines were demised by one deed, reserving generally a certain proportion of the produce. The Master of the Rolls held that the power did not authorize a demise of the unopened mines, and the lease being of opened and unopened mines, the whole was void. Upon the appeal, it was argued not to be like the case where two things are granted which are inseparable, and the one is out of the power, and the other within it, in such case the lease might be void as to both. But here the opened and unopened mines

were

(*p*) 3 Cha. Rep. 58, 59.

(*q*) Ibid. 78, 79.

(*r*) 3 Cha. Rep. 68, 69.

(*s*) Anbl. 740, *vide supra*.

were separate, and the rent reserved was not a gross sum for the whole, but a proportion of the profits of each mine; and the Court accordingly over-ruled the objection.

In a recent case, where lands not within a power to lease, reserving the ancient rents, were demised, with lands subject to the power, at the ancient rent for the latter, the lease was held void for the whole (*t*).

The cases seem to establish this principle; where, as in *How v. Whitfield*, and the *Earl of Cardigan v. Montague*, an entire gross sum is reserved generally, and part of the lands is not comprised in the power, or being comprised in the power is not duly demised, the power is badly executed, although the rent upon an apportionment would be sufficient for both estates. But where, as in *Campbell v. Leach*, a rent is reserved according to the quantity or produce, as the tenth of the produce of every mine, or 40s. an acre, or the like, there, although the demise is joint in terms, and part is not well demised, or not comprised in the power, yet it shall hold good as to the lands comprised in the power, and duly demised. It might, perhaps, have originally been contended, that if a gross rent were reserved for both estates, and upon an apportionment, the proper rent would still be payable for the lands within the power, and duly demised in other respects, the lease would be good. But according to the authorities it seems to be sufficient to impeach the lease, that it contains lands not comprised in the power, and that an entire rent is reserved in respect of both the estates, although,

(*t*) *Doe v. Rendle*, 3 Mau. & Selw. 99.

although, perhaps, this cannot be treated as a general rule admitting of no exceptions. Suppose an estate to be held in undivided moieties, and the same person to be seised in fee of one moiety, and tenant for life, with a power of leasing, of the other; and suppose him to make a lease of the entirety at an entire gross rent, it seems that upon his death the rent would go according to his several interests in the land; that is, one moiety with the settled portion of the estate, and the other moiety with the unsettled; and that if the rent were sufficient in amount, the power would be well executed.

In none of the cases hitherto considered was there a distinct reservation of a particular sum in respect of the lands comprised in the power; where there is such a reservation, that constitutes a several demise, and no objection can be raised to the execution of the power (*u*).

In powers of leasing it is usual to express that the rent reserved shall be incident to and go along with the reversion and inheritance of the estate demised; and in well-drawn leases under powers the rent is accordingly reserved to the tenant for life, and after his decease to the person or persons who shall for the time being be entitled to the reversion and inheritance of the premises under the instrument creating the power. But it is well established, that a reservation to the tenant for life, exercising the power, "his heirs and assigns," is a good reservation; for those words mean of necessity the person

(*u*) For what amounts to a several reservation, see Knight's case, 5 Rep. 54, b.; and see Doe v. Rendle, 3 Mau. & Selw. 99.

person to whom the inheritance shall go ; the words can have no other meaning (*x*). It is not unusual to reserve rent generally during the term without saying to whom ; and in Whitlock's case it was agreed that this was the most clear and sure way, and the law will make the distribution. However, all the three several ways, viz. to the tenant for life and persons in remainder ; to the tenant for life, his heirs and assigns, and generally during the term, are good enough and effectual in law.

Before closing this section, we may recal to our remembrance the case of *Talbot v. Tipper*, where, as we have seen, under a power "to lease with or without fine, and rendering such rents and services as the donee should think fit," it was determined that no rent whatever need be reserved (*y*).

(*x*) Whitlock's case, 8 Rep. 572 ; *Campbell v. Leach*, Ambl. 69 b. ; *Hotley v. Scot*, Loft, 316, 740.
3 Bligh, 331 n. ; and see Dougl. (*y*) Vide *supra*, p. 471.

SECTION V.

OF THE COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS TO BE OBSERVED.

IN the usual power of leasing, besides the reservation of the best rent, it is generally required that the lessee covenant for payment of the rent ; that a clause be inserted for re-entry in default of payment ; that the lessee be not made dispunishable of waste ; and that he execute

cut a counterpart of the lease, and if any of these conditions be not complied with, the lease will be void.

It should never be stated *generally* that a clause of re-entry shall be contained in the lease, but it should be expressly stated how many days the rent must be in arrear : the usual period is twenty-one days. It seems, however, that a reasonable time may be inserted, although the power is general on this head. In the case of *Jones v. Verney* (a) this was done, and no objection appears to have been made on that ground, although the case was much considered. Indeed, if such an objection were to prevail, it would invalidate nine-tenths of all the leases in the kingdom granted under powers.

In the case of *Hotley v. Scot* (b), the power required the insertion in the leases of a clause of re-entry on non-payment of the rent for twenty-one days. A lease was made with a power of re-entry in case the rent should be behind for twenty-one days, *having been lawfully demanded* (c), or *no sufficient distress*. In support of the lease, it was argued that nothing was added but what came in by force of law, or followed upon a deficiency of the vague and not sufficiently explicit words of the power. Is not rent, it was asked, always to be demanded before a distress becomes liable, or a forfeiture incurred? And as to the other, if there be a sufficient distress, what then? The rent will be recovered without re-entry; and, neither in reason, equity,

(a) Willes, 169; see Higgins Bing. 498; S. C. 7 Price, 343, 3 v. Lord Rosse, 3 Bligh, 112. Bligh, 331 n., and 5 Moore,

(b) Lofft, 316; Lord Tanker- 346 n.

ville v. Wingfield, 2 Brod. & (c) Qu. see the reports.

equity, or conscience, could there be any other intent of the original power. And Lord Mansfield said, that as to demand, a clause of re-entry was required as a security for the rent: demand is requisite both by common law and statute: a clause of re-entry will never be allowed to operate further than as a security for rent. A re-entry is to enforce the payment of rent; it is an immediate forfeiture of the estate by common law: by statute it cannot be without a want of distress.

The condition as to the want of a sufficient distress, was perhaps the most difficult part of the case: if the remainder-man should re-enter for non-payment of rent, he might be turned round, unless he had searched every corner for a sufficient distress (*d*). Such a condition, therefore, is a serious restraint on him, not authorized by the power; and it may be thought to be still doubtful whether such a lease could be supported.

Since these observations were written the point has been decided against the validity of the lease; but the case before Lord Mansfield was not referred to (*e*).

In the later case of *Doe v. Smith* (*f*), in a strict settlement, there was the following power of leasing: "Provided always, and it is hereby further declared and agreed by both the said parties to these presents, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said George Venables Vernon the younger, and Louisa Barbara

(*d*) See *Rees v. King*, For. Excheq. Rep. 19.

(*e*) *Coxe v. Day*, 13 East, 118; see *Doe v. Meyler*, 2 Mau. & Selw. 276.

(*f*) 1 Brod. & Bing. 97, 2d vol. 473; 7 Price, 281; 5 Mau. & Selw. 467; 3 Moore, 339; 5 Moore, 332; 3 Bligh, 290.

Barbara Mansel, his intended wife, from time to time during their respective lives, when and as they shall respectively be in possession of or entitled to the perception of the rents and profits of the manor, messuages, &c. &c., so limited to them for their respective lives as aforesaid, by indenture or indentures under their respective hands and seals, attested by two or more credible witnesses, to demise, lease or grant such part or parts of the said manor, messuages, &c. &c., or parts or shares thereof, whereof they shall be in possession or entitled to the perception of the rents and profits as aforesaid, as now are leased for life or lives, or for years determinable on the dropping of a life or lives, to any person or persons in possession or reversion for one, two, or three lives, or for any number of years determinable on the dropping of one two, or three lives." Then follow the restrictive clauses, amongst which are the following, "So as in every such lease for a life or lives, &c. there be reserved and made payable, during the continuance of the estates and interests thereby to be demised, the ancient and accustomed yearly rents, duties, &c., or more, or as great, or beneficial rents, duties, &c. as now are, or at the time of demising were, reserved;" and then follows the clause on which the question in the cause mainly depends, "And so as there be contained in every such lease a power of re-entry for non-payment of the rent thereby to be reserved." Then follow other restrictions which need not be noticed. Immediately following this power is another power, which it is necessary to advert to particularly, the former power relates only to lands then let for lives, or for years determinable on lives. The
second

second power runs thus, " And also by indenture, &c. to demise all or any of the said manor, messuages, &c. for any term or number of years absolute, not exceeding twenty-one years, in possession, &c., so as upon every such lease there be reserved as much or as great and beneficial yearly and other rents as now are paid, or the best and most improved yearly rent, &c., without taking any fine, &c." This power concludes with this further restriction, " And so as in every such lease for any term of years absolute respectively, there be contained a clause of re-entry, in case the rent or rents thereupon to be reserved, be behind or unpaid by the space of twenty-eight days after the time thereby respectively appointed for payment thereof." Mr. Vernon was tenant for life, and the premises in question had been let for years determinable on lives; and he, on the 5th of September 1803, made the lease in question, which is stated, and appears to contain a proviso or *power of re-entry*, " if it shall happen that the rent of 2 l., and every or any of the duties, services, &c. shall be behind or unpaid in part or in all, by the space of fifteen days next over or after the times whereat or wherein the same ought to be paid, &c., and no sufficient distress or distresses can or may be had and taken upon the said premises, whereby the same, and all arrearages thereof (if any be) may be fully raised, levied, and paid." This lease closes with a general clause, that if any default shall be made in the payment or performance of all or any of the reservations, covenants, or agreements before contained, it shall be lawful for the lessors, their heirs or assigns, to re-enter. The rent, duties, reservations and payments, were the ancient and accustomed, and the usual

usual and accustomed form of leases of the estate contained in the said marriage settlement for lives or years determinable on lives, as well prior as subsequent to that settlement, was, with a conditional proviso of re-entry, similar to that in the said indenture of lease.

It was held by the Court of King's Bench that the power was duly executed (*g*). In the Court of Exchequer Chamber, Garrow, B., Wood, B., and Graham, B., were of opinion with the decision in the King's Bench; but Burrough, J., Park, J., Richards, C. B., and Dallas, C. J., were of a contrary opinion. Each side relied on the lease for twenty-one years being required to be made with a clause of re-entry in case the rent should be behind twenty-eight days. On the one hand it was used as evidence that the term in the first power was left to the discretion of the donee: on the other, that the power of re-entry under the first clause was to be immediate. The judgment in the Exchequer Chamber was reversed upon appeal to the House of Lords; Richardson, J., Burrough, J., Holroyd, J., Park, J., Dallas, C. J., were against the validity of the lease; and Best, J., Garrow, B., Bayley, J., Wood, B., Graham, B., Richards, C. B., Abbott, C. J., the Lord Chancellor, and Lord Redesdale, were in favour of its validity (*h*).

In a later case (*i*), where the power required the usual rents, &c. and that in every lease there should be

(*g*) Doe v. Smith, 5 Mau. & Selw. 467. see Doe v. Wilson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 363.

(*h*) 7 Price 281, 2 Brod. & Bing. 473; 3 Bligh, 290; and (i) Doe v. Wilson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 363.

be contained a condition of re-entry for non-payment of the rent, the lease granted under the power contained the following power of distress and proviso for re-entry : And if it shall happen the said yearly rent shall not be paid at the days and times aforesaid, or if the said amerciaments, pains, fines, and penalties, *nomine pœnæ* after reasonable demand in that respect made, be not paid and satisfied according to the true intent and meaning of this indenture, then from time to time it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Earl, his heirs and assigns, into the said demised premises to re-enter and distrain, and the distress and distresses to take, lead, drive and carry away, detain and keep, until they or some of them be fully satisfied, contented, and paid : provided always then, that in case it shall happen the said yearly rent, or any part thereof, shall be behind or unpaid by the space of 28 days next after any or either of the respective feast-days and times whereon the same ought to be paid as aforesaid, *being lawfully demanded*, that it shall be lawful to and for the said Earl, his heirs and assigns, into all and singular the said demised premises, or into any part thereof, in the name of the whole, wholly to re-enter, and the same to have again, re-possess, and re-enjoy as in his and their former estate, any thing herein contained to the contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding. The Court in giving judgment said that two objections were made to this lease. The 1st objection was, that the clause enabling the landlord to distrain was a restriction upon him, and injurious to the remainder-man ; for it is said that under this power he cannot distrain without making a demand, and when he has made the distress, that he cannot sell.

*

Now,

Now, if this objection avoid the lease, it must do so, not by reason of its contravening any particular condition contained in the leasing power, but by reason of its being contrary to its general nature and object, which is, that there should be a lease at a yearly rent, with the usual and beneficial modes of enforcing payment. It is to be observed, that the clause itself refers, not merely to the payment of the rent of 50 *l.*, but to payments in *nomine pænæ*; the words are, "If it shall happen the said yearly rent or sum of 50 *l.*, shall not be paid at the days and times aforesaid, or if the said amerciaments, pains, fines, and penalties, in *nomine pænæ*, after reasonable demand, be not paid, then the lessor may distrain." It appears, however, that this clause was copied from the lease of 1708, and we ought to pause before we hold that such a clause, copied from the former lease (and which the party who prepared the instrument after the act of parliament probably had before him), vitiates this lease. The Court could not think, however, that the landlord was abridged by this clause of any remedy for the recovery of his rent which he otherwise would have had. Independently of this clause, the landlord has a power to distrain and a power to sell under the distress. And they could not give such an effect to the language of this clause as to say that it was intended to deprive the landlord of any power which he had by the common and statute law. The true construction of it appeared to be to consider it as introduced in furtherance of the power under the common law; and they thought that they could not give it the construction contended for, unless they saw clearly that the landlord

lord at the time of granting it intended to take away the power under the common law.

The 2d objection was as to the right of re-entry. It was said this was to be only at the end of 28 days after the rent was in arrear, and the same "being lawfully demanded." Now as to the right of re-entry not accruing till the expiration of a given number of days, the case of Doe dem. the Earl of Jersey v. Smith is directly in point. It was there decided that the words contained in this power, "so that there be conditions of re-entry for non-payment of rent," are to be interpreted to mean a usual or reasonable condition of re-entry; and if that be so, it appears from the lease of 1708 that 28 days are there given for the payment of the rent before the landlord can re-enter; with this additional clause in favour of the tenant, that if there be no sufficient distress upon the premises the landlord may then re-enter.

Another objection was, that by the terms of this lease the landlord was "to re-enter on the rents being lawfully demanded;" and it was said that this puts the landlord to the necessity of making the demand, notwithstanding the statute 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, which was made generally for the purpose of relieving the landlord from the necessity of making that demand. In Doe dem. Schofield v. Alexander three of the Judges of this Court, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., rather doubting than dissenting, decided, that notwithstanding the words "lawfully demanded" in a lease, the landlord has a right to the benefit of the statute of 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, and may re-enter. The Court were of that opinion. By the
common

common law the landlord never could re-enter without making a demand. Every clause of re-entry, therefore, contained the words "lawfully demanded" in effect though not in terms, and therefore in the lease of 1708 those words were quite nugatory; they were probably copied inadvertently into the subsequent leases without considering their effect. They were of opinion that such a proviso for re-entry, which was originally introduced for the benefit of the landlord, ought not to be construed in consequence of the introduction of those words (which were nugatory in the former leases) to deprive the landlord of the benefit intended to be conferred upon him by the statute 4 Geo. 2, c. 28. The case might have been otherwise if the lease had contained an express covenant that he would not re-enter without demand, or that having entered, he would not sell.

In *Doe v. Colman* (k) a power of leasing was given by will to demise the estates devised in manner following; viz. such parts of the said premises as had been usually granted or demised, and were then in lease for any term of years determinable upon lives, to any persons for the like terms, and in like manner, and under the like rents, services and conditions as the same had been usually granted; and the residue of the same premises unto any persons for any term of years, not exceeding twenty-one years, in possession, at the best and most improved rent that could be reasonably gotten for the same, so as that no such demise or lease should be made dispunishable of waste, nor without
a condition

(k) 1 Bing. 28, and 7 Moore, 271.

a condition of re-entry on non-payment of the rent or services thereby reserved, and so as each lessee should execute a counterpart of his or her lease; and it was held that the word *such* in the will was confined to the latter class of leases, and could not be thrown back to the class first described.

If, contrary to the clause, that the lessee be not made dispunishable of waste, he be empowered to work unopened mines (*l*), fell trees, or do any other act which amounts to waste, the lease will be void, unless indeed in the case of a building-lease, where it should seem the clause would be deemed repugnant to the power itself, and the lessee might pull down old buildings, &c. in order to erect new ones (*m*).

Where a counterpart is required to be executed, the lessee should obtain a memorandum of its execution and delivery to the lessor, to be endorsed on the *lease*, and signed by the lessor, for the counterpart itself is of course delivered to the lessor, and if it should be lost or suppressed, the lessee would be in danger of losing the estate unless he could prove the execution of it. Besides, without this precaution, a purchaser from the lessee cannot be satisfied that the power was duly executed, for the lessor may refuse to discover whether a counterpart was executed.

In the case of *Taylor v. Horde* (*n*), where the power required the best rent to be reserved, payable during the term, *but was silent* as to any covenant for payment of rent, clause of re-entry, or counterpart, and a lease was
executed

(*l*) *Campbell v. Leach*, Ambler, 740.

(*m*) See *Jones v. Verney*, Willes, 169.

(*n*) 1 Burr. 60.

executed in which none of these things were observed, Lord Mansfield considered the lease void, because it was merely nominal, and not executed by the lessees ; but he proceeded to consider the effect of the omission. He said, that (o) as to the rent reserved, the power requires “ the best rent that can be reasonably got, to be reserved payable during the term.” There is no covenant for payment. Under a mere reservation it could not be payable till entry ; and therefore in fact might never be payable during the term. As to the remedy, there being no covenant to pay the rent, the lease might be assigned to a succession of beggars. There being no clause of re-entry, the ground might lie unoccupied without any or not sufficient distress upon it, so that the remainder-man could neither have his rent nor his land. There is no counterpart ; an unusual omission, and very prejudicial. *Therefore the lease could not have been supported if it had been executed by the lessees*, which is not the case. Every fraudulent unfair execution of such a power, in respect of those in remainder, is void at law.

It should seem, therefore, that the circumstances usually made requisite in powers of leasing must be considered as implied, although not expressly required.

Where the power does not require any particular covenants to be contained in the lease, it is no objection to a lease under the power, that it does not contain the same covenants as were inserted in the former leases, if they are upon the whole equally beneficial as the former. To impeach the lease, the ground must be,

(o) Burr. 125.

be, that the new covenants are *a fraud on the power*, by lessening the value of the reservation (*p*).

Sometimes a power expressly requires the leases to contain usual, or usual and reasonable covenants, or the like; and in these cases, unless the covenants contained in the former leases are inserted in the new leases, they cannot be sustained; as, where covenants to repair; to grind corn at the lessor's mill; not to cut or fell coppices, and underwoods; not to put any cattle into the coppices, and the like, were contained in the old leases, but not in the new ones granted under a power requiring (as it was held) the accustomed covenants to be entered into, the new leases were deemed invalid, on the ground that these covenants did, in their nature, tend to the preservation, management, and improvement of the premises demised, and were, for that reason, for the benefit, advantage, and security, not only of the immediate lessor, but likewise of all persons claiming after him (*q*).

In *Jones v. Verney* (*r*), a power to grant building-leases required the leases to contain "the usual and reasonable covenants." A lease was made, and the lessee covenanted to keep the old messuage and buildings on the land in repair, and to *repair such other messuages or buildings as should, during the term, be built on the premises*. The Court, upon the whole, thought that this was not a *building* lease under the power; and Lord Chief Justice Willes said that "*a reasonable*

(*p*) *Goodtitle v. Funucan*,
Doug. 565; see *Earl of Car-*
digan v. Montagu, App. No. 13.

(*q*) *Earl of Cardigan v. Mon-*
tagu, App. 13, (4) (7) (8).
(*r*) Willes, 169.

reasonable covenant in a building-lease must certainly be meant of a covenant to build ; but there was none such in this lease."

In the case of *Doe v. Sandham* (*s*), usual and reasonable covenants were also required, and in the lease the lessor covenanted that in case of fire, &c. he, or the person for the time being entitled to the freehold, should rebuild, or in default thereof, the tenant might quit the premises, and be discharged from payment of the rent. The jury found the covenant to be *an unusual and unheard-of covenant* on the part of the lessor, and the lease was accordingly determined to be void both at law and in equity.

But if the best rent is reserved, and the covenants are the usual ones, a covenant by the lessor to do part of the repairs, and in case of neglect, a power to the lessee to do them, and deduct the expense out of the rent, is valid ; and does not affect the validity of the lease (*t*).

The construction is the same upon any word tantamount to the word "covenants," as "boons," or the like. This was decided in the case of the Earl of Cardigan *v.* Montagu (*u*). The words in the power were "reserving ancient, usual and accustomed rents, *boons*, heriots and services." And it was determined that the covenants formerly entered into were boons, and that therefore leases granted under the power, in which the usual covenants were omitted, could not be supported. The principle, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
rested

(*s*) 1 Term Rep. 705, *supra*, (*t*) *Doe v. Bettison*, 12 East, 305. p. 382, and see 12 East, 309. (*u*) App. No. 13.

rested upon, was, that the estate must come to the remainder-man in as beneficial a manner as ancient owners held it.

The *omission* of a proper covenant avoids, we have seen, the whole lease. In *Doe and Sandham*(*x*), it was argued that the *introduction* of an improper covenant, although it imported to bind the freehold, was merely void, and ought not to affect the validity of the lease; but Mr. Justice Buller observed, that this argument, if it proved any thing, proved this, that no lease executed under a power could be bad except from the *omission* of some covenant required; because each covenant which is contrary to that power might be rejected, but that would be contrary to all the adjudged cases on the subject. The lease must be taken, good or bad, on the face of it. Now where the lease on the face of it imports to bind the reversion as well as the tenant for life, inasmuch as the tenant for life has exceeded his power, the lease cannot bind the reversion, and is therefore void.

If a proper covenant be omitted, the lease cannot be supported, because the lessee has, of his own accord, done that which he ought to have covenanted to do: *quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non convalescet*; therefore, if a covenant to build be wrongfully omitted, it is no argument in favour of the lease, that the lessee has actually covered the estate with buildings (*y*).

Where usual covenants are required, they must be expressly inserted: a lease, with a clause in the very words

(*x*) *Vide supra*.

169; and see *Cooper v. Denne*,

(*y*) *Jones v. Verney*, Willes, 4 Bro. C. C. 80.

words of the deed, would not be good, nor could it be aided by any special verdict, finding what the usual covenants are (*z*).

It remains only to observe, that the covenants entered into by the lessee with the donee of the power, his heirs and assigns, will, under the statute of Henry the 8th, enure to the remainder-man, who may maintain an action on them (*a*).

(*z*) See 3 Cha. Rep. 76.

(*a*) *Isherwood v. Oldknow*, 3 Mau. & Selw. 382, S. C. MS.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

Observations on Uses.

SIMPLICITY was the striking feature of the common law, in regard as well to the estates which might be created, as to the modes by which they might be raised. Estates could only be limited in possession, or by way of remainder, that is, on the natural expiration of the preceding estate. Therefore a proviso in a feoffment to *A* for life, that if *C* should return from Rome in *A*'s life time, the estate should go to *B*, was void ; because this gift was to take effect in derogation of the estate of *A*, instead of waiting for its natural expiration. Qualified or conditional limitations were no exception to this rule, because the estate limited over took effect strictly as a remainder. Under a gift to *A* until *B* should return from Rome, *A* took only a life estate, determinable by its original creation on *B*'s return from Rome, and upon the happening of that event his estate naturally expired, and the subsequent estate took effect regularly as a remainder, without displacing the previous estate. A *condition* might, however, have been annexed, as it still may, to an estate on its original creation. but this did not answer the purposes of a settlement, because for a breach of the condition, only the grantor or his heir could enter, and his entry would defeat *all* the remainders dependent on the estate to which the condition was annexed. The freehold in possession could not be limited on a contingency, because of the necessity of a continual tenant to
the

the precipe. Therefore a feoffment to *A* for life, the day after the feoffment, was void, but estates in remainder might be limited on a contingency, although even in regard to them, it was essential that there should be a preceding freehold created to support them, and that they should vest *eo instanti* that the preceding estate determined. By these and many other rules, contingent remainders were put very much in the power of the freeholder in possession. Remainders at that time might have been limited to take effect at any period however remote. Questions of perpetuity did not arise till the simplicity of the common law gave way to the complication of modern conveyancing. But yet with a view to prevent inconvenient dispositions of property, it was held that a possibility could not be limited on a possibility; therefore, an estate could not have been limited even by way of remainder, to an unborn son of an unborn son as a purchaser. It was doubtful whether there would be a son born, but it was doubly so whether there would be a further male succession. It followed from these rules, that a fee could not be made to shift from one to another by any circumstance, subsequent to its creation, nor could an estate spring up at a future period, independently of any other, neither could a power or authority be reserved to the grantor, or given to any other person to limit the estate, or create any charge on it in derogation of the estates created by the original feoffment. As a feoffment was a gift from one to another, it followed also that a man could not convey an estate to himself, or to his heirs, unless he departed with the whole fee simple out of himself, or, to speak more intelligibly, it was necessary to every gift that there should be a feoffor and feoffee, and therefore if a man seised in fee was desirous to make himself tenant in tail, he could only effect his object by conveying the whole fee to a stranger, and accepting a feoffment from him in tail. Besides all these restrictions, with a few exceptions of socage lands, a testamentary disposition did not exist.

The increasing commerce of the country, and consequent
necessity

necessity of frequent and secret transfers of property; the desire of evading forfeitures for treason, formerly but too frequent; the frauds of the clergy to increase their possessions; the desire so natural to all men of disposing of their property by will—all these circumstances concurred in sharpening men's wits to discover a mode of evading the strictness of the common law, and render estates transferable by the secret delivery of a deed, and subject to all the capricious dispositions of the owner, as well by act *inter vivos* as by will. *Uses* were well adapted to answer all these various purposes. They evaded without overturning the common law. The estate was regularly transferred by a common-law conveyance to some person as a trustee, and he was at law the absolute owner of the property, so much so that the real owner would have been deemed a trespasser had he entered without the authority express or implied of the legal tenant. But in equity the legal tenant and his heirs were by degrees considered the mere nominees of the person by whom the estate was conveyed, and were deemed bound to execute all his directions in regard to the estate.

After the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust*, or *cestui que use*, as he was then called, was thus established, all the refinements which we now meet with in settlements of real property soon became established *in equity*. Shifting or secondary and springing uses arose. Thus if a feoffment was made to *A* in fee, to the use of *B* till *C* paid 50 *l.* and then to *C* in fee, or to the use of *B* at the end of ten years, the legal fee remained in *A*, and consequently no rule of law was violated; but in equity, *B* in the first case took the profits till the 50 *l.* was paid, and then his equity ceased and *C*'s arose; in the other case the use to *B* arose at the day fixed, and in the meantime *A*, the feoffee, was by the construction of equity a trustee for the feoffor; for the beneficial interest, not being disposed of during ten years, resulted to the equitable owner. So a man might take a particular estate as for life, or in tail in the equitable fee. Sometimes, instead of declaring the trusts at the time of the feoffment, the estate was

conveyed to the feoffee upon such trusts as the feoffor, or even a stranger, should subsequently appoint; or if the uses were designated, yet a power was reserved to the feoffor or a stranger to revoke them either wholly or partially. These powers, it will be observed, were mere future uses, or, as we should now term them, trusts; and here as in the former cases the common law was evaded by the legal estate continuing in the feoffee. The legal estate and use were considered so distinct, that it was usual for a man to take a conveyance to himself and others to the use of himself, and the legal estate was considered to remain in him wholly distinct from the use or equitable right to the profits.

Another consequence of the introduction of uses was, that in effect a testamentary power prevailed over lands, for the will only affected the equitable right to the land, which was not subject to the rule of law; and it was thought reasonable in equity that *cestui que trust* might dispose of the profits by will. The legal estate, however, remained in the feoffee, and he still could not devise the estate.

The modes of conveyance then in use, so far as we need advert to them, were three; first, a feoffment with livery of seisin; secondly, a lease and release; and, thirdly, a grant with attornment. The first was resorted to where an estate in possession was to be conveyed. It was essential to its validity that actual possession of the land should be delivered to the feoffee, in the presence of the neighbours; thus a notoriety was added to the conveyance which effectually precluded fraudulent transfers of estates. The second was invented to avoid the necessity of actual livery. It was observed, that where the estate was in lease, and the lessee had entered, the freeholder had a divided reversion which was not capable of actual delivery, because the possession was already full, and therefore lay in grant. This reversion the freeholder was capable of granting or releasing, by way of enlargement of estate, to the lessee, by a simple deed, without any further ceremony. A lease therefore was first granted for a short period, and the lessee actually entered on the land under the lease;

lease; then the fee was released to the tenant and his heirs; for as the release operated by way of enlargement, it required words of inheritance to be added to the gift. A reversion, it may be observed, was as capable of being granted by lease and release, as an estate in possession. The third mode of conveyance was adapted to those cases, where the estate was in lease, and the reversion was to be conveyed to a stranger. Livery of seisin could not be made, because the tenancy was already full, but the estate passed by a mere deed of grant, to which however the attornment or consent of the tenant was essential, whose concurrence has in later times been rendered unnecessary by an act of the legislature. Where a fine was levied, or a recovery suffered of the estate, the conusee or recoverer became seised of the legal estate, and the parties equitably entitled declared the uses of the fine or recovery, or in other words, the trusts upon which the conusee or recoveror was to stand seised of the estate, by parol, writing, or deed, as fancy dictated: sometimes the uses were declared before, and sometimes after the assurance—both were held binding.

When the estate had been by legal conveyance transferred to a person to uses, equity made no scruple in enforcing the trustee to observe the uses. The estate being actually divested out of the owner, it was not necessary to exercise the power of the court over him, and as the feoffee, &c. was a mere trustee, he was considered bound under all circumstances to observe the will of his donor, although the uses were unsupported by any consideration. Therefore a feoffment to *A* to the use of *B*, a mere friend of the feoffor's, who paid no consideration whatever for the estate, was binding, and *A* was compellable to permit *B* to receive the profits.

It did not, however, always happen that the estate was legally transferred to any person, to the intended uses. Upon a sale, it was usual for the owner, in the first instance, to agree to sell the estate to the purchaser. This, which was a real contract, was termed a *bargain and sale*; and equity, although there was no conveyance, and even no words of inheritance in the contract, converted the seller himself

himself into a trustee, and considered him to stand seised to the use of the purchaser in fee. In some instances it happened, that a man, in consideration of marriage, or of his regard to his near kindred, agreed to settle his estate upon them. This was termed a *covenant to stand seised*, and in this case also equity interposed and considered the covenantor to be a trustee for the persons in whose favour he had agreed to settle the estate. But equity, who followed most of the rules of the civil law, refused to interfere in favour of an imperfect conveyance where the agreement was a mere *nudum pactum*. If therefore a man had agreed without consideration to convey an estate to a stranger, equity would not have supported the bargain and sale; nor did they run wild as to covenants to stand seised, for they would not uphold a covenant to settle an estate on a distant relation. In process of time it became a settled rule, that to support a bargain and sale, money, rent, or services incident to tenure, were essential;—to uphold a covenant to stand seised, the consideration must have been marriage, or natural love and affection to a legitimate child, brother, nephew or cousin.

These equitable notions introduced in later times a division of conveyances into those operating by transmutation of possession, and those not having that operation. The first were feoffments, fines, recoveries, and leases and releases, which actually transferred the estate at law to the nominee, and therefore operated by transmutation of possession. The others were bargains and sales, and covenants to stand seised, which did not divest the party of his estate; but merely, in equity, made him a trustee for the person to whom he had sold the estate, or on whom he had agreed to settle it.

But equity did not hold that the uses should bind the land under all circumstances; on the contrary, it was considered essential to the raising of a use that there should be confidence in the person, and privity in the estate of the feoffee. The first rule excluded the King, who could not by
reason

reason of his dignity be a trustee, or a person who purchased the estate from the feoffee without notice ; for, although in the latter case the privity of estate subsisted, yet there was no confidence in the person : the other rule excluded persons coming to the estate by wrong, as a disseisor, or a feoffee of tenant for life.

As to the quality of uses, the maxims of the common law, in regard to descents, *possessio fratris*, &c. were strictly adhered to ; and even particular customs, for instance, gavelkind and borough-english, were likewise adopted by analogy ; but uses were not deemed subject to either dower or curtesy, neither could they be extended on a judgment, nor escheat for want of heirs of the *cestui que use*. In consequence of uses not being subject to dower, it became usual, on a marriage, for the wife's friends to require the husband to take a conveyance to himself and his wife of some specific lands, as a provision for her after his death ; this was the origin of jointure.

To remedy the inconveniences which arose out of this revolution, in the law of real property, the legislature frequently interposed. The estate was made liable to the judgments of *cestui que use*, and even a legal power of disposition over the estate was given to him. This increased, instead of diminishing, the evils which were intended to have been remedied. Clashing dispositions of property were made by the feoffee and his *cestui que use*, and a ready door was thus opened to fraud.

At length it was thought, that "if the possession might be joined to the use all would go well ;" and more particularly that the testamentary power of disposition which had crept in, and of which Henry the Eighth sorely complained, by reason of his loss of wardships, would be destroyed. Accordingly by the 27 H. 8. c. 10, called the Statute of Uses, it was enacted, that persons having any use in lands should be actually seised of the legal estate of the persons seised to their use. And as it was foreseen that vesting the legal estate in *cestui que use* would let in many women to dower,

dower, for whom another provision was already made, it was provided, that a woman having a jointure of freehold, or a greater estate limited to herself in satisfaction of dower, to take effect in possession on her husband's death, should not have dower also, unless evicted of her jointure; and thus a jointure was made a legal satisfaction of dower. For at the common law a woman could not be barred of dower, although a provision was expressly accepted by her in lieu of it; because, first, she had but a right which, not having accrued, could not be barred; and, secondly, it was a freehold, in satisfaction of which no collateral thing could be received; but the strictness of the common law in this respect was relaxed by the statute; and, on the other hand, in later times the legislature prevented a wife from aliening her jointure, unless with the consent of the husband, by whom it was made, or of the heirs next inheritable to the estate in jointure.

It should seem that the intention of the statute of uses was to crush uses, but not to interfere with the new modes of conveyance which had been introduced; for as the use would the moment after its creation become a possession, there appears to have been no object in destroying conveyances to uses, unless to restore in their full vigour feoffments with livery of seisin. This, however, was not done; but as estates might then pass by parol only, it was thought right, immediately after the statute of uses, to enact, that bargains and sales should be by indenture, to be enrolled within six lunar months after their date. Covenants to stand seised, which were not then much in use, were not included in this provision, principally on the ground that marriage, which was the leading consideration to support them, was an open and solemn act; and, therefore, the same notoriety was not required as in the case of a common contract. So declarations of uses of fines and recoveries were not required to be enrolled; because the estate was vested in the conusee or recoveror, by the solemn transaction of the fine or recovery, which at least was equivalent to livery of seisin, and the anxiety

anxiety of the legislature appears only to have extended to the transfer of the legal estate, and not to the mode by which uses were raised out of the seisin so created. With the assistance of this legislative measure it seems to have been considered that all conveyances would either be by feoffment with livery of seisin—by fine or recovery—by lease and release, with an actual entry by the lessee previous to the release—by grant to a stranger, with the attornment of the tenant—by bargain and sale openly enrolled—or by covenant to stand seised upon the solemnization of a marriage. Chattel interests, which had then become fixed and permanent, were held not to be included in the statute of enrolments; and, consequently, bargains and sales for years did not require to be enrolled. This, as we shall presently see, introduced a secret mode of conveyance contrary to the intention of the legislature. After the statute of the 27 H. 8, the conveyances before in use still remained, and the act had its full operation on them. They were, as before, divided into two sorts; first, those operating by transmutation of possession, which were feoffments, lease and release, fines and recoveries; secondly, those not having that operation, viz. bargains and sales, and covenants to stand seised. Upon the former no difficulty arose, they actually transferred the estate at law to the feoffee, releasee, conusee, or recoveror; and if no use was declared, they had wholly a legal operation, and derived no aid from the statute, unless where the lease for a year was a bargain and sale, and even there the statute only assisted in the transfer of the estate, and the release to the lessee in fee operated at common law. If, however, uses were declared upon any of these conveyances, the statute was then attracted, and the legal estate in the feoffee, &c. was instantaneously vested in the *cestui que use*. Declarations of uses of fines and recoveries became now more frequent; and it was in a subsequent reign enacted by a statute, called the statute of frauds, that they should, in order to prevent perjury, be in writing, and signed by the parties making the declaration. The

same statute required all conveyances to be in writing. The principal rules in regard to declarations of uses were, that they might be made as well before as after the assurance: that if made before the assurance, they could not be varied after it: that as a woman might join with her husband in the principal assurance, viz. the fine or recovery, she might also join in the declaration; and that her assent would be implied in a declaration by her husband alone, unless her dissent appeared, although the rule was otherwise as to a declaration by the wife alone: that persons having different interests might declare the uses accordingly.

The conveyance by lease and release was still used, and became in effect a new mode of conveyance. For as the statute of enrollments did not extend to bargains and sales for years, it was discovered that a secret bargain and sale to one for years, gave him the use under the general rule of equity, and the legal estate by force of the statute of uses; and after some difficulty it was considered that the legal estate so vested in him, rendered him capable of accepting a release without the necessity of a previous actual entry. Thus a conveyance by lease and release which were executed at the same time, and were frequently contained in the same deed (in which case the law presumed priority in the lease for a year) transferred the estate as effectually as a feoffment with livery of seisin, not speaking with reference to disseisin, &c. or a bargain and sale enrolled; and thus a secret mode of conveyance was established which has now become the universal assurance of the realm.

Conveyances not working by transmutation of possession, still operated in the first instance in equity, although immediately after their execution the legal estate was vested in the bargainee or covenantee by force of the statute of uses. To give effect to them, it was essential, as formerly, that the person executing them should be capable of standing seised to a use, and that there should be a sufficient consideration. In regard to the first, the only question in modern times
upon

upon that head is, whether corporations can convey by bargain and sale, and it seems that they may. In regard to the latter, to raise a use under a covenant to stand seised, the consideration must still be blood or marriage. A use to a stranger cannot be raised by such a conveyance, nor a power to a stranger, nor even a power to be executed in favour of a stranger. These restrictions soon put an end to this mode of conveyance, for if contingent remainders were raised by it to the children of the marriage, the common limitation to trustees to support them could not be inserted unless to persons within the consideration of blood, nor could the common power of leasing be reserved. This mode of conveyance, therefore, has long fallen into disuse, although it is still necessary to know the properties of it; because an informal instrument, intended to have a different operation, may at this day in favour of the intention be construed a covenant to stand seised, where there is a sufficient consideration.

The consideration under a bargain and sale too, must, as formerly, be valuable, but it is not necessary that it should be pecuniary; a pepper-corn rent reserved is a sufficient consideration. A bargain and sale, therefore, is at this day only the shadow of what it was. The most trifling consideration is sufficient to support it. Five shillings is the sum generally stated, and although even that is never actually paid, yet proof to the contrary is inadmissible; but bargains and sales were not more adapted to complicated settlements than covenants to stand seised, for as it was necessary that every person taking an estate, should by himself or agent pay a consideration for it, limitations to persons not *in esse* could not be introduced in bargains and sales any more than powers to lease, &c. When the stamp duties were insignificant, it was usual on purchases to have the conveyance by lease and release, accompanied by a bargain and sale enrolled. This practice has now ceased, and a bargain and sale in fee is seldom resorted to. It is sometimes adopted to make a tenant to the precipe, and may always be resorted to

with advantage where the fee is intended to be vested in a purchaser. The effect of the statute of enrolments, it should be observed, was to stop the operation of the bargain and sale until enrolled, although after the ceremony is performed within the time limited, the deed operates by relation from the time of the execution; so much so as to avoid the mesne incumbrances of the bargainor, and to let in those of the bargainee.

Thus these conveyances stand at this day; the operation of the statute of uses on the estates created, introduced questions of greater difficulty.

Springing, shifting, and contingent uses and powers, were admitted with nearly the same latitude as before the statute. Nor is this to be wondered at, for although uses were originally creatures of equity, yet long before the statute of uses, by reason of the previous acts of parliament and other causes, they had been under the conusance of the common law judges; and although the statute of uses executed the possession to the use, yet the property and quality, as abstracted from the possession, was not drowned in the possession, for the statute only imbued the possession with the quality, form, and condition of the use, but did not effect any alteration in the mode of limiting and raising present and future uses, which remained as before. Therefore a limitation to *A*, to take effect at the end of ten years, or a gift to *A* in fee, with a proviso shifting it to *B* on a given event, were held good. So a power to the grantor, or even to a stranger, to defeat the estates in the settlement, was valid, and upon the execution of it, the old uses ceased, and the new ones arose. But as these springing and shifting uses did not, like estates at common law, take effect by way of remainder, and were, speaking generally, not capable of being destroyed, it was thought right that they should rise within a convenient period, not tending to a perpetuity, which at length was fixed at a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years after and a few months, allowing for gestation and the infancy of the person entitled. And any spring-
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ing or shifting use limited beyond that period is void, unless after an estate tail, which is permitted; because the owner of the estate tail may at any time bar the estate tail, and all the remainders and future uses depending on it. Powers, too, which are in effect future uses, were admitted with caution, and although it was considered incident to every power that the donee might exercise it with a power of revocation, and so *toties quoties*, yet if he did exercise it without reserving such a power, he could not revoke it; and the reservation in the deed creating the power of a prospective general power of revocation, so that the last execution only might operate, was considered simply void. A great desire was also shown to assimilate contingent uses to contingent remainders, and render them subject to the same laws, and this so far prevailed that contingent uses, similar to contingent remainders, must like them have a preceding estate of freehold to support them, and take effect, if at all, *eo instanti*, that the preceding estate determines.

As before the statute the grantor can by one conveyance raise a particular estate to himself or his heirs; for as the feoffee, &c. takes the estate in the first instance, and the use is served out of his seisin, the rule of the common law has no operation in this case.

Where vested uses only were created, the operation of the act was simple. If a feoffment was made to *A* in fee to the use of *B*, *B* at once by force of the statute took the legal estate. If the uses were to *B* for life, remainder to *C* in fee, they took the legal estate in like manner, viz. *B* for life, and *C* in fee. A limitation to *A* for life, remainder to his first and other unborn sons successively in tail, remainder to *B* in fee, was more difficult, because the use to *A* and *B* exhausted the entire seisin of the fee, and yet it was impossible to exclude the contingent estates to the sons of *A*. The difficulty was avoided by considering the estate to be vested in *A* and *B* *sub modo*, that is, subject to open and let in the estates to the unborn sons; and as they were within the power of the tenant for life, who might by a tortious act ex-

clude them, limitations to trustees, during the life of the tenant for life, to take effect upon the determination by forfeiture or otherwise of his life estate, were introduced in order to preserve them, and such a limitation, although it appears at first view to be only co-extensive with the life estate, was after great consideration held to be a vested remainder. But great difficulty at first arose in regard to the manner in which contingent uses were to be executed by the statute. In later times it has been thought that the prevailing opinion formerly was, that it was essential that there should be a seisin in some person to serve the future use at the time of its rising, and that therefore a possibility, or a *scintilla juris*, remained in the feoffees to uses, to serve the future uses, which, unless previously disturbed, took effect the moment a future use arose, in order to feed and bring it into *esse*. The true construction, however, appears to be, that no *scintilla* whatever remains in the feoffees, but that contingent uses when they arise take effect, by relation, out of the original seisin.

Another effect of the statute is, that where a use is limited to several unborn persons jointly, they will take the legal estate jointly, although born at different times, whereas to constitute a joint-tenancy at law, it is essential that the unity should be complete in time as well as estate.

Resulting uses, too, were executed by the statute in the same manner as estates expressly declared, and they were excepted out of the statute of frauds, which required declarations of uses to be in writing. Therefore upon a conveyance to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* for life, the reversion in fee results to the grantor as his old estate, and the statute executes the use according to its quality, so that the reversion in fee remains in the grantor in the same manner as it would had he merely made a lease for life to *B*; although, indeed, a conveyance of the whole fee would operate as a revocation of a prior will, notwithstanding that the grantor continued in of his old reversion.

The statute of uses at once put an end to the testamentary
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power of disposition which had prevailed over uses; but so difficult is it to overturn the settled habits of mankind, that although the avowed object of the act was to destroy this privilege, yet it was soon found necessary to grant a limited power of devising by will, which was enlarged in later times to its present extent. The operation of the act was thus, in some measure, restrained by the legislature itself; but the whole effect of it in extirpating equitable estates, was subverted by the courts of law and equity. It was held shortly after the statute, that it only executed the first use, or that a use upon a use was void. Therefore upon a feoffment to *A*, to the use of *B*, to the use to *C*, the statute executed only the use to *B*, and the use to *C* did not take effect. This secondary limitation frequently arose by accident. Thus the execution of a power only confers a use; and, therefore, upon an appointment to *A* to the use of *B*, the use of *A* was served out of the original seisin, and *B* took nothing. So chattel interests *in esse* were held not to be within the statute; and, consequently, an assignment of a lease to *A* to the use of *B* was void as to *B*, and vested the estate wholly in *A*. These rigid rules once more gave a pretext to equity to interfere; and in both cases they held the uses, though void at law, to be good in equity; and thus uses were virtually revived under the name of trusts. Many circumstances concurred to give stability to this new usurpation of power. Copyholds were not within the act, and yet they were frequently surrendered to one to the use of another; and here equity on the same principle interfered. Contracts also for sale of estates came in the place of bargains and sales, and although courts of law would not consider them within the operation of the statute; because not made and enrolled according to the statute of enrolments, or not containing words of inheritance; yet equity considered them to attach so firmly on the conscience of the seller as to convert him into a trustee for the purchaser; and they accordingly compelled him to convey the estate to the purchaser upon payment of the purchase-money. Equity, extending its views, would not even suffer

its own creature, although acted upon by the statute, to be a mean of fraud.—A bargain and sale for even a penny consideration was good at law, and owed its foundation wholly to the rules of equity ; but if it was not made for a substantial consideration, although equity could not after the statute impeach its force as a transfer of the estate, yet they would relieve against it, and compel the bargainee to re-convey the estate to the bargainor. By degrees a regular and enlightened system of trusts was established ;—they were subjected to the common law rules as to descents ; they were deemed capable of precisely the same limitations, which received exactly the same construction as limitations of legal estates, except where the party merely gave a minute of his intention and referred to a future act, in which case the settlement was not made strictly according to the words, but in conformity to the presumed intention. When settled, the entail was barrable by the equitable tenant, in the same manner as if he were legal tenant ; although, from their nature, it was impossible to consider them as subject to tortious acts ; therefore the fine, or feoffment of equitable tenant in tail, would not, like that of a legal tenant on the one hand, be a forfeiture, nor on the other a destruction of contingent remainders. In the few instances in which courts of equity were themselves too strict, the legislature itself rendered the system uniform ; and thus trust estates were made assets in the hands of the heir, and subject to the judgment debts of the *cestui que trust*. Estates, however, were held not to escheat for want of heirs of the *cestui que trust* ; because the lord had still a tenant in the trustee. Curtesy was let in by analogy to legal estates, although dower was by some anomaly excluded. The rule would probably have been the converse of this, had women instead of men presided in the Court of Chancery.

The bar of dower created by the statute, was much extended by equity holding any provision which an adult chose to accept in lieu of dower an equitable bar.

The statute is generally considered as having had only the effect of enabling the conveyancer to shift the legal estate from
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from one to another by mere words, in a way which ill accorded with the common law, but is excellently adapted to the increased opulence of the country. It, however, also gave *legal* effect to modifications of property, which were repugnant to the common law ; but are admirably suited to the varying wants and wishes of mankind. It has, moreover, had the beneficial operation of introducing an unrivalled code of equitable jurisprudence, which every admirer of the law of real property must wish for ever to remain sacred, and unconfounded with the strict rules of law. In comparing what the statute was intended to perform with what it actually has performed, one can hardly doubt that almost any other legislative measure, which opposed the confirmed habits of the people in disposing of their property, would have led to the same results. This should operate as a lesson to the legislature, not vainly to oppose the current of general opinion, for, although diverted for a time, it will ultimately regain its old channel in spite of accumulated acts of parliament, which become a dead letter, and have a strong tendency to bring the most wholesome laws into disrepute.

No. 2.

Springing Uses.

THE operation of the statute in setting aside the rules of law is twofold : First, in the transfer of the *legal* estate by a mere secret deed ; secondly, in the creation of estates not allowed by the common law.

I. As we have seen a feoffment, with livery of seisin, was essential at common law, to transfer an estate in possession from one to another. At this day the mere execution of a covenant to stand seised, bargain and sale, or lease and release, will, by the operation of the statute, at once vest the legal estate in the covenantee, bargainee, or releasee. The consequence of this is, that a man may, by one deed, convey an

an estate through the medium of a feoffee or releasee to the use of himself and another. This is constantly done. In the common case of an appointment of a new trustee, where it is wished that the old and new trustee should be joint-tenants, the old trustee conveys to *A* and his heirs, to the use of himself (the old trustee), and the new trustee and their heirs. The estate passes out of the old trustee to *A* in fee by the common law, and the use vests in the old and new trustee, and is turned into a possession by the statute, without whose operation two distinct conveyances, with livery of seisin on each, would have been essential—one to vest the estate in *A*, and another to convey it from him to the old and new trustee. But this double transfer cannot be effected by a bargain and sale, because that gives only a use, and there cannot be a use upon a use. This will be explained in a subsequent page; nor can leaseholds be thus doubly shifted by the same deed, because they are not within the operation of the statute, so that in a case similar to the above, there must be two deeds: by one the estate must be assigned to *A*, and by the other he must re-assign it to the old and new trustee. This is the only mode by which they can be made *joint-tenants*. Of course the old trustee might assign a *moiety* at once to the new trustee; but in that case, they would be *tenants in common*, and on the death of either, the estate would not survive to the other, but his moiety would vest in his own personal representatives, which would create great inconvenience. Fortunately the common law did not require livery of seisin to a transfer of a leasehold interest, so that the double transfer, in cases like this, only occasions the expense of an additional and very short deed, for the re-transfer is invariably made by indorsement.

Another consequence of the operation of the statute is, that through the medium of a feoffee or releasee, a man may convey to his wife, although at common-law she was incapable of accepting a gift immediately from him; Litt. s. 168; Co. Litt. 112 a; *Moyse v. Gyles*, 2 Vern. 385. In like manner, a married woman having a power (which is only a right to
limit

limit a use) may appoint to her husband, or the husband may appoint to the wife; see *Latch*, 44, and see *Bunting v. Lepingwell*, 4 Rep. 29 a; *Holder v. Preston*, 2 Wills. 400.

But a man cannot covenant with his wife to stand seised to her use, because he cannot covenant with her for the reason that Littleton gives, viz. that his wife and he are but one person in the law; Litt. *ubi sup.*; *Mudge v. Mudge*, Comy. 332.

At common law a man could not limit a *remainder* to himself, nor could he limit it to his heirs, for *filius est pars patris*; see *Champernon's case*, 4 H. 6, 19 b, pl. 6; *Earl of Bedford's case*, Mo. 718. Therefore, if a lease were made to A for life, remainder to the right heirs male of the body of the lessor, remainder to the right heirs of the lessor for ever, the limitations to the heirs would be void, because the donor could not make his right heir a purchaser *without departing with the whole fee-simple out of his person*; *Griswold's case*, Dy. 156 a, pl. 24. So if a man make a lease for life, the remainder to himself in tail or in fee, the remainder is void. But as Lord C. J. Hale observed, in all cases touching uses there is great difference between a feoffment to uses, a covenant to stand seised, and a conveyance at the common law. If a man by feoffment to uses conveys lands to the use of J. S. for life, he may remit the use to himself and the heirs male of his body by the same deed, and so alter that which was before a fee-simple, and turn it into another estate; but if A gives land to B for life, remainder to A and the heirs male of his body, because a man cannot give to himself, the remainder is void, for a man cannot convey to himself by a conveyance at the common law; 1 Ventr. 377, 378. And in *Southcot and Stowel*, 2 Mod. 207, the court held, that though at the common law a man cannot be donor and donee without he part with the whole estate, yet it is otherwise upon a conveyance to uses, and see Co. Litt. 22 b.

The student must cautiously observe, that in these cases the rules of law still remain in full force, as applicable to common-law conveyances, by which the estates are created at once,

once, and not served out of the seisin of the feoffee. The statute has given one conveyance the same operation which two ormerly had, and therefore considering a conveyance to uses as having a double operation, the strict rules of law remain, even in regard to them. This, however, at first sight does not appear to be the case on a covenant to stand seised, for a man may covenant to stand seised to the use of himself in tail, and the use will be served out of his own seisin, and transferred into a possession by the statute. But there is no solid distinction between this case and the others; for immediately after the execution of the covenant, equity supplies a common-law conveyance by holding the covenantor himself to be a trustee, and to stand seised to the use: on this seisin the statute attaches, and thus the use takes effect as a legal estate, although the owner did not actually depart with any portion of the estate, much less the fee out of himself. It should be remembered, that the omission of a few words in a conveyance will call this important distinction into action. If a man make a feoffment at once to *A* for life, remainder to himself in tail, the deed would operate purely at common law, and the remainder would be void; but if the feoffment were made to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *A* for life, remainder to the feoffor in tail, the remainder would be good—at law the entire fee-simple would vest in *A*, in equity *A* would be seised to the uses, and the statute operating on this seisin would clothe the uses with the legal estate.

II. *As to the creation of estates not allowed by the common law.* The leading and marked distinctions under this division are, 1, the capacity of several persons to take as *joint-tenants* by way of use, although their title accrues at different periods. 2. The introduction of shifting secondary and springing uses, all of which were repugnant to the common law, whose simple rules did not admit that a fee should be mounted on a fee; that a freehold should commence *in futuro*, or that an estate should be made to cease by any matter *ex post facto*, so as to let in another limitation before the natural expiration of the former.

Shifting

Shifting secondary and springing uses are frequently confounded with each other, and with future or contingent uses. The editor does not undertake to do more than *attempt* to distinguish them. They may perhaps be thus classed ;

1. *Shifting, or secondary* uses. They take effect in derogation of some other estate, and are either limited expressly by the deed, or are authorized to be created by some person named in the deed. A limitation to *A* and his heirs, with a proviso, that if *B* pay *A* 10 *l.*, the use to *A* and his heirs shall cease, and the estate go to *B* and his heirs, vests the fee in *A*, subject to a shifting, or secondary use in fee to *B*. In this instance, the use is limited by the deed. But if the proviso be that *C* may revoke the use to *A* and his heirs, and limit it to *B* and his heirs, although the effect would be the same when *C* actually revokes and limits, yet the expression here is, that *A* is seised in fee with a *power* of revocation and limitation of a new use to *C*.—2. *Springing* uses, which I would confine to uses limited to arise on a future event where no *preceding* use is limited, and which do not take effect in derogation of any other interest than that which results to the grantor, or remains in him in the mean time. A bargain and sale to the use of another ten years hence, is an instance of a springing use.—3. *Future or contingent* uses are properly uses limited to take effect as remainders ; for instance, a use to the first unborn son of *A*, after a previous limitation to him for life, or for years, determinable on his life, is a future or contingent use ; but yet does not answer the notion of either a shifting or a springing use. They naturally arose after the statute in imitation of contingent remainders.

1. *Then in regard to shifting or secondary* uses, it may be observed, that the common law did not allow the fee to change from one to another, except upon breach of a condition annexed to the estate on its creation, and of which the feoffor or his heir only could take advantage. Before the statute the legal estate remained in the feoffees, and there was no mischief in the use or equitable estate being thus shifted. The
same

same doctrine appears to have been established without a struggle after the statute, principally, it is presumed, on the words of the act that persons having the use shall be seised of the estate in the feoffee, "after such quality, manner, form and condition, as they had before, in, or to, the use that was in them." Very shortly after the statute, it was held that the use might alter from one to another. Brooke, after stating a case of this nature so early as the 6th of Edward 6, adds, "and therefore observe, that a man at this day may make a feoffment to a use, and that the use will change from one to another by act *ex post facto*, by circumstance, as well as it would before the statute of uses;" Bro. Feoff. al Uses, 339 a, pl. 30; and see Harwell v. Lucas, Mo. 99; Spring v. Ceasar, 1 Ro. Abr, 415, pl. 12; Anon. Dy. 314 a, pl. 96.

In Benicombe v. Packer, 1 Leo. 25, a conveyance was made by *A* to *B*, in fee, and *B* covenanted by the deed, that if *A* should pay before such a day to *B* forty shillings, then *B* and his heirs would stand seised to the use of *A* and his heirs; and if *A* did not pay, then if *B* did not pay to *A*, within four days after, ten pounds, then *B* and his heirs from thenceforth should be seised to the use of *A* and his heirs. It was determined, that the covenant to be seised to the new uses upon payment and not payment, being in one and the same deed, should raise the use upon the contingency according to the limitation of it. So in a case of frequent reference, (Woodliff v. Drury, Cro. Eliz. 439, and see Smith v. Warren, ib. 688) where one made a feoffment, and it was declared by the indenture that it should be to the use of himself and *A*, his feme that should be, after their marriage, and of the heirs of their bodies, and he took *A* to feme: whether he should take by the limitation of this use was the question, and Coke moved that he should not; for, presently, by this feoffment the fee is in the Baron by the possession executed to the use which he had before the marriage, which cannot after the marriage be divided and made an estate tail in him, for he had the fee in him until the marriage, for it might have been

been that the marriage had never taken effect, and that would have confounded the other use. And uses *in futuro* shall not rise upon such future acts, for then a use should rise out of a use. But all the justices held, that although he be seised in fee in the mean time, as in truth he is, yet by the marriage the new use shall arise and vest, if there be no act in the mean time to destroy that future use (as it was in Chudleigh's case), according to the limitation of the use. And judgment was given accordingly for the plaintiff.

Again, in *Lloyd v. Carew*, Prec. Cha. 72, Show. Parl. Ca. 137, it was determined, that a proviso in a marriage settlement, defeating in a certain event the remainder in fee limited to the husband and giving it to another in fee, was valid, *vide post*.

So provisos defeating estates actually created are commonly introduced in settlements, where it is wished that on the accession of another estate, the one settled shall go over to another branch of the family, and the validity of such provisos is now well established; *Nicolls v. Sheffield*, 2 Bro. C. C. 215; *Heneage v. Heneage*, 4 Term Rep. 13; *Carr v. Erroll*, 6 East, 58.

These shifting uses are at this day so common that they pass without observation. In every marriage settlement, the first use is to the owner in fee till the marriage, and after the marriage to other uses. Here the owner, in the first instance, takes the fee, which upon the marriage ceases, and the new uses arise.

But a shifting use cannot be on a shifting use; and if the estate, which it is to displace, be vested in the person entitled to it under an entry for a condition broken, the rule of the common law will prevail, and such an entry will not create a seisin, out of which a use to any other person can be served. Thus in a case where lands were bargained and sold to *A* and his heirs for 500*l.* upon condition that if *B*, the bargainer, paid 500*l.* &c. he should re-enter and be seised to the use of himself and his heirs, until he attempted to alien without the assent of the bargainee, and then to the use of the bargainee and

and his heirs. The 500*l.* was paid, and *B* entered and then aliened without the assent of the bargainee; and Lord Chancellor Egerton held, that the use did not rise to the bargainee, because the bargainer entering for a condition broken, ought to be in of the old use and estate, and could not be seised to another use; *Holloway v. Pollard*, Mo. 761; and see *Farrand v. Ramsey*, 1 Leo. 268; *Stoneley v. Bracebridge*, 1 Leo. 5.

And now that shifting uses are allowed they must be confined within proper limits, so as not to tend to a perpetuity. A use therefore limited to *A* in fee could not be made to shift to *B*, on any event beyond the period of a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards, and a few months allowing for gestation and the birth of a child; nor can the twenty-one years, there is great reason to contend, be taken as an absolute term, but only as depending on the infancy of the person intended to be benefited. Thus the editor apprehends that a limitation in a marriage settlement to *A* in fee, with a proviso, giving the fee to *B* at the expiration of twenty-one years after the death of *C*, a person living, would be void as too remote; but that a limitation to *A* in fee, with a proviso, that if *B*, a person living, leaves issue a child living or *in ventre sa mere* at his death, who shall live to attain twenty-one, such child shall have the fee, would be good.

In *Lloyd v. Carew* (Prec. Cha. 72, *vide supra*) the fee was shifted in a marriage settlement from *A* to *B*, "in case there should be no issue of the marriage living at the death of the survivor of husband and wife, and the heirs of the wife should, within twelve months after the death of the husband and wife," pay a sum of money. This shifting or executory fee, therefore, was to take effect at the expiration of twelve months after two lives in being. The rules on this head were then (1697) in their infancy. It was strongly insisted, that this period was too remote, as not being confined to lives in being; and, if the extra term of one year were allowed, one thousand years might as well be given; and the Chancellor,
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assisted by the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Mr. Justice Rooksby, actually decided against the validity of the proviso; but this decree was reversed in the House of Lords; Show. Parl. Ca. 137. And in *Blandford v. Thackerell*, 2 Ves. Jun. 241, Lord Rosslyn expressly said, that there might be any number of springing uses *within twenty-one years* after lives in being. At this day the question is quite clear, and although there are no express decisions on this point in relation to springing uses, yet the rule is well settled in regard to executory devises, and those decisions apply equally to springing uses; see 12 Mod. 39.

But it has long been established that a shifting use may be created after an estate tail, to take effect at any period, however remote, because such a limitation has no tendency to a perpetuity, inasmuch as the tenant in tail for the time being may, by a recovery, defeat the shifting use. The proviso before noticed, shifting one estate upon the accession by the same party of another, is, for this reason, always penned generally, and not confined to an union of the estates within any particular period. In the case of *St. George v. St. George*, in the House of Lords, in the year 1767, it was insisted, that such a general proviso was void in its creation as annexing a contingency to arise upon the distant period of a general failure of issue, which the law does not endure. But the Lords, by confirming the decree in Ireland, which was founded upon the proviso, established the validity of it: Printed Cas. Dom. Proc. 1767, Ca. 20. The same argument was resorted to in *Nicholls v. Sheffield*, 2 Bro. C. C. 218; but Lord Kenyon, in answer to it, said that there was no doubt with respect to the validity of the proviso; several estates were held under similar limitations. No rule of law is contradicted by it; and if no recovery was suffered, it might take place at any distance of time. He might as well be told that an estate tail was an illegal estate, because it may endure for ever, and must, where the remainder is in the crown; and see *Goodiar v. Clerke*, 1 Sid. 102; *Att. Gen. v. Milner*, 3 Atk. 112.

With respect to shifting, or secondary uses, created by powers. In this, as well as in the case of shifting or secondary uses limited by the deed at once, the legal estate before the statute remained in the feoffee; and although it was repugnant to a feoffment at common law, that a power should be reserved to revoke it, yet there was no such repugnancy as to trusts, which were simply declarations or directions to the person seised of the legal estate, in what manner, and to whom he should convey the estate; and for the same reason, the owner might direct the trustee to convey as a stranger should appoint, although a power of entry for a condition broken could not be reserved to a stranger on a common-law conveyance. Powers, before the statute of uses were mere directions to the trustee of the legal estate, how to convey the estate, in truth they were future uses, to be designated by the person to whom the power was given; these, when they arose, equity compelled the trustee to observe; and when conveyances under the statute of uses became established, it was still usual to reserve or limit such powers as the exigencies of the case required: thus powers to lease, to sell or exchange, to jointure, to charge with portions for younger children, or to revoke the settlement itself, soon became usual. In the reign of Elizabeth, however, it was insisted that a man having once limited the fee simple in use, could not reserve a power by a future act to defeat the uses, and so raise new ones by force of the same assurance; for as the statute extinguished the use in the possession, it could no more be determined, and new estates created without a new livery, than an estate in possession. But to this it was answered, that uses were not to be compared to the land itself, being mere accidents inherent to the possession, and built thereon by civil equity; and that the statute only imbued the possession with the quality, form, and condition of the use, but did not effect any alteration in the mode of limiting and raising present and future uses, which remained as before; Anon. Mo. 608; and accordingly Manwood laid it down, in Brent's case, 2 Leo. 16, that although the possession

was executed to the use, yet the property and quality, as abstracted from the possession, should not be drowned in the possession.—Treat. of Powers, p. 17.

Whether a shifting use is limited by the deed creating the primary use, or under a power in the deed, is, when the use comes *in esse*, by the happening of the event or execution of the power, immaterial. If a fee be limited to *A*, with a proviso that if *B* die in his life-time, *C* shall have the fee, *A* takes a qualified fee, and without any power to defeat the shifting use, which, on the happening of the event, will at once arise and take effect by relation, out of the original seisin: if a *power* were given to *C* in the same event to revoke the use to *A*, and limit it to *B*, on the execution of the power the use to *B* would, speaking generally, take effect in the same manner as if it had been inserted in the original deed, in the place of the power.

Where the use created by the execution of a power takes effect in derogation of any other estate limited by the instrument which raised the power, (whether limited in the first instance, subject to a power of revocation, and new appointment, or only in default of execution of the power) such use is a shifting or secondary use. But as the same estates may be created under a power, as might have been created in the original instrument, it is obvious that although the uses *take effect* as shifting uses, yet vested, springing, shifting, or contingent uses may be created by the power. Thus suppose an estate be limited to *A* in fee, with a power to *B* to revoke and limit new uses: if *B* exercise the power, the uses created by him will, *with reference to A's estate*, be shifting or secondary; but in regard to their own independent operation, we must look at the deed, and the uses must receive the same construction as if created by an original instrument.

A shifting use we have seen cannot be so limited as to tend to a perpetuity, nor by a parity of reason can a power be reserved to create such a future use as would have that tendency, if contained in the deed creating the power. This was decided in the great case of *Spencer and the Duke of*

Marlborough, where, in a strict entail under a will, a power was inserted, authorizing trustees, on the birth of each unborn tenant in tail, to revoke the uses limited to them, and to limit the estates to them for their lives, with remainder to their sons in tail. Lord Chancellor Northington held this power to be void, as tending to a perpetuity, and repugnant to the estate limited. And this decree was confirmed in the House of Lords upon the unanimous opinion of the Judges that such a power, whether in a deed or will, was void; 5 Bro. P. C. 592; see *Ware v. Polhill*, 11 Ves. Jun. 257. So a power in a strict settlement by will to trustees during such time as the tenant in tail in possession should be under the age of twenty-six, to enter and receive the profits, and accumulate what should not be required for his maintenance, was held void, because it took away from the tenant in tail his power of alienation five years beyond the period allowed by the law; *Lade v. Holford*, 3 Burr. 1416; 1 Blackst. 428, Ambl. 479; and see Mr. Butler's n. to Fearn, p. 530. Nor can estates be created by the *execution* of a power in point of perpetuity, which would not have been good, if contained in the instrument creating the power; *vide post*.

2. *As to springing uses*: before the statute, there was no mischief in an independent original springing use to commence at a distant period, because the legal estate remained in the trustee. It amounted merely to a direction to the trustee, at the period appointed, to stand seised to the use of the nominee; and in the mean time, the estate of course belonged to the person making the direction. After the statute, they were admitted in like manner, and the use was held to result or remain in the person creating the future use, according to the mode of conveyance adopted, till the springing use arose. This resulting use the statute executed, so that the estate remained in the settlor till the period when the use was to rise.

It is clear as a general principle, that a springing use may be well limited to arise within the period allowed by law in the case of an executory devise. The case of *Parsons v. Mills*, is a perfect instance of a springing use on a bargain and sale.

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There a man in a bargain and sale in fee of part of his estate, covenanted to give the bargainee the first offer of the residue, and that if he should attempt to alien the land to any other, then he would stand seised to the use of the bargainee in fee. He afterwards did attempt to alien to another, and it was held that the use was well raised to the bargainee; 2 Ro. Abr. 786, (K). Upon the same principle a man may covenant to stand seised to the use of another person after the covenantor's death; see 2 Wills. 79. If I bargain and sell to the use of another five years hence, this is a good future use; so a feoffment to the use of the right heirs of *J. S.*, after the death of *J. S.*, if he die without issue within twenty years, is a good future use. This was laid down by Holt, C. J. 2 Salk. 675; Holt, 731; and Lord C. J. Hale had before treated it as clear that the limitation of a use after two years, or after the death of John at Stiles, to the use of *J. N.* was good; and that the feoffor had the fee-simple remaining in him, until the future use come *in esse*; Poll. 65, 66. So Bacon considers it clear, that a bargain and sale to take effect at a future day is good: Uses, p. 63; and he even treats a bargain and sale to *J. S.* to take effect after the bargainor's death without issue, as a valid expectant use; but such a use would at this day be void, on account of its tendency to a perpetuity. For springing uses, like executory devises, must be limited to take effect within the period prescribed by law, to avoid perpetuities. Therefore in *Davis v. Speed*, where the limitations of the wife's estate were to the heirs of the body of the husband on the wife, and for want of such issue to the right heirs of the wife, it *appears* to have been determined (for the reports are at variance and full of errors) that no estate could result, or be implied to the husband, because the estate belonged to the wife, that the *first* use to the heirs of the body was a good springing use; but that the ultimate limitation was void as too remote, being limited to rise after the death of one without issue, which the Court said the law will not expect the vesting of, but will construe the limitation to be void, because the possibility is foreign; 4 Mod. 154; 12 Mod. 39; Skin. 351, and other books,

books. The judgment in this case was affirmed in the House of Lords, where it was strongly argued in favour of the judgment, that the intention was to raise a use immediately to the heirs, and that there was no person capable of taking at the time; and this being designed to raise a use *ex presenti*, and no person being capable of taking at that time, the use must be void; Show. P. C. 104.

Springing uses are either raised by a conveyance operating by transmutation of possession, or by a conveyance not having that operation. If raised by the latter, viz. a covenant to stand seised, or bargain and sale, the estate remains in the covenantor or bargainor, until the springing use arise, and as these conveyances have only an equitable effect until the statute and use meet, a springing use may be limited by them at once. Therefore a bargain and sale to the use of *J. D.*, after the death of *J. S.* without issue, if he die without issue within twenty years, would be good, (although it must be recollected that a springing use cannot be limited on bargain and sale to a person not *in esse*, because no person can take under a bargain and sale who does not by himself, or agent, pay a consideration). But where there is a conveyance which does operate by transmutation of possession, as a feoffment, fine, recovery, or lease and release, two objects must be attended to; viz. first, to convey the estate according to the rules of the common law; secondly, to raise the use out of the seisin created by the conveyance. Now the common law does not admit of a freehold being limited, to commence *in futuro*, therefore a feoffment to *A* and his heirs, to commence six months after, or a release (although founded on a lease for a year) *after the death* of the releasor, would be absolutely void; see *Roe v. Tranmer*, 2 Wils. 75; *Edmunds v. Boothe*, Yelv. 131; *Carter v. Madgwick*, 3 Lev. 339, and note the distinction: but a feoffment to *A* and his heirs *in presenti* is good, and out of the seisin of *A* and his heirs a springing use may be well limited; therefore, a feoffment to *A* and his heirs, to the use of *B* and his heirs, at the death of *J. S.*, would be valid, and the use would result to the feoffor until the spring-
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ing use took effect by the death of *J. S., Doe v. Whittingham*, 4 Taunt. 20. It should be observed, that in some cases (*e. g.* in 1 Ventr. 372) the judges have spoken of conveyances operating by transmutation of possession when they have alluded simply to a gift at common law, and not to a feoffment upon which *uses* were declared.

Springing uses appear to have been freely admitted shortly after the statute. So early as three years after the act, it was held, that if *A* covenanted with *B*, that when *A* shall be enfeoffed by *B* of three acres in *D*, then *A* and his heirs, and all others seised of the land of *A*, in *S*, shall be seised of it to the use of *B* and his heirs; then if *A* make a feoffment of his land in *S*, and afterwards *B* enfeoffs *A* of the three acres in *D*, the feoffee of *A* shall be seised to the use of *B*, although he had no notice of the use; Bro. Feff. al Uses, 340 a, pl. 50. But in later times the repugnance of the common-law to a freehold to commence *in futuro*, and the dread of perpetuities appear to have rendered the judges more adverse to springing than to shifting uses. So late as in the case of *Davies and Speed*, 12 Mod. 39, Sir Edward Northey insisted in argument, that the notion of a springing use had been to set a fee upon a fee; but it was never known that the *first use* was a springing use; but this Holt, C. J. properly denied. I shall here dismiss the *separate* consideration of springing uses; but the next division will necessarily involve the further consideration of them.

3. *As to future, or contingent uses.* The rule of law, in regard to contingent *remainders* of a freehold interest, is, that a vested estate of freehold must precede, in order to support it; see Co. Litt. 143 a, 217 a; and that it must vest *eo instanti*, that such previous estate determines. Before the statute of uses this rule did not apply to uses, because the freehold remained in the feoffees; therefore, if before the statute a man had made a feoffment to the use of one for years, remainder to the right heirs of *J. S.*, this limitation had been good. But in *Chudleigh's case*, 1 Rep. 135, Gaudy, J. said, that such

limitation after the statute, is void, for then the freehold would be in suspense, for nothing can remain in the feoffees; and this observation was cited and approved of by Mr. Justice Hutton, in *Buckley v. Simonds*, Winch, 60; and see 1 Atk. 596. The Earl of Bedford's case, Mo. 718, is often cited as a decision to this effect, where the rule of law, "that every remainder must depend upon a particular estate, and vest during the particular estate," was relied upon against a similar limitation; but there the judges avoided the question, by holding that the use which was to the feoffor's own right heirs was the old use, and reverted to the donor, and consequently did not take effect as a remainder or a springing use: indeed, there the use could not have taken effect as a springing use, because it was limited to take effect after the death of a person without issue, and was therefore too remote.

But it appears to be now well settled, that where an estate is limited previously to a future use, and the future use is limited by way of remainder, it shall be subject to the rules of the common law, and consequently, if the previous estate is not sufficient to support it, shall be void. The question was for a long time evaded by implying an estate for life in the settlor, which coalesced with the limitation to the heirs of his body, and made him tenant in tail in possession.

But the question at last called for a decision in the case of *Adams v. Savage*. There Savage being seised in fee, conveyed the lands by lease and release to trustees and their heirs, to the use of himself for ninety-nine years, if he should so long live, remainder to the trustees for twenty-five years, remainder to the heirs male of his body, remainder to his own right heirs; and the question was, if Savage, during his life, not having heirs male of his body, should have a use result to him for his life, and so become tenant in tail in possession, or if no use could result, and then there being no freehold to support the contingent remainder to the heirs male of the body of Savage, the said remainder would be void, and Savage seised in fee as before. And the Court held that no use could result
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to Savage during his life; and therefore the remainder to the heirs male was void, and Savage seised in fee. And their reasons were, because the limitations to himself for ninety-nine years, and to the trustees for twenty-five years, and the heirs male, were new uses and new estates. As if a man, by lease and release, or by covenant to stand seised, limit the use to himself for life, or in tail, these are new estates, and not parcel of the old estate, according to 7 Co. 13 b, Englefield's case. And where in such case upon a conveyance, such uses are limited, as (supposing the limitations to be good) would pass the whole estate there, no use will result contrary to the express limitation of the party. But if the limitations are void, the conveyance of necessity will fail. If a man seised in fee conveys his estate, by lease and release, to the use of himself for life, remainder to trustees for their lives, remainder to the heirs of his body, he hath an estate tail in him; but he is but tenant for life in possession, otherwise if there had been no intermediate estate in the trustees for their lives. And in the former case, if a man makes a feoffment, it is no discontinuance, but only divests the estate. And for the same reason, in this case, where the first limitation is only for years, the remainder to the heirs of the body of the tenant for years, is a contingent remainder, and void; 2 Lord Raym. 855; 2 Salk. 680.

This case was decided in the King's Bench. A few years afterwards the same point arose, and received the same decision in the Court of Chancery, and upon a case directed to the Common Pleas. *A* seised in fee on his marriage with *M*, a second wife, conveyed to *W. R.* and *W. S.* and their heirs, to the use of *A* for ninety-nine years, if he should so long live, and after, to the trustees and their executors for two hundred years, in trust to raise portions for his children by *M*, remainder to the heirs male of the body of *A*, remainder to his right heirs; the Master of the Rolls was of opinion that the limitation was void; and as to what had been urged that a use arose by operation and construction of law, he said, that to talk of raising a use by implication was a mystery in law which he

he did not understand. But, upon the importunity of the defendant's counsel, a case was stated, and sent to the judges of C. B. who certified, Nov. 26, 1712, that the limitation to the heirs male of the body of *A* was void, no freehold being limited to any person precedent to that estate; and that no estate of freehold could result to *A* for his life, by implication, because another estate, viz. for ninety-nine years, if, &c. was expressly limited to him, which would be inconsistent with a freehold to him by implication, and that a freehold, either express or implied, was necessary to support such limitation; *Rawley v. Holland*, 22 Vin. Abr. 189, pl. 11; and see *Goodtitle v. Burtonshaw*, App. to Mr Butler's edit. of *Fearne*, No. 1; and *Jackson v. Jackson*, Fitzg. 146.

In these cases, then, it was solemnly decided, that a future or contingent use must, like a contingent remainder, have a sufficient preceding estate to support it; and that a use limited by way of remainder shall not be construed a springing use, although actually void in its creation if not so considered. Upon principle certainly it would seem that the limitations to the heirs of the body, in those cases, were good springing uses, unless indeed it be objected to them that they were limited *per verba de presenti*. In *Lamb v. Archer*, 1 Salk. 225, it was said, *arguendo*, that if one make a feoffment to the right heirs of *B*, that this was a good springing use: the book says, "*sed tot. cur. contra eum in hoc*, because it is by way of present limitation; *aliter*, where it is future, as to the right heirs of *B*, *after his death*." This objection, however, was not made in the cases of *Adams v. Savage*, and *Rawley v. Holland*, which appear to have been decided upon a broad principle utterly subversive of contingent uses limited to take effect after the natural expiration of a preceding estate, where that estate would not be sufficient to support them if they were contingent remainders; and see *Penhay v. Hurrell*, *infra*. These cases have denied to springing uses the favour which would have been extended to executory devises; see *Gore v. Gore*, 2 P. Wms. 28; *Harris v. Barnes*, 1 Blackst. 643. They appear also to have overruled some notions which were entertained

entertained shortly after the statute, in regard to the cases in which the fee should remain in the feoffee. Thus, it is said, that Popham and Anderson held, that if one make a feoffment to the use of himself for forty years, and limits no other estate, the fee is in the feoffees, (Dy. 111 b, margin), obviously because the term would be destroyed if the fee resulted to the feoffor; but this notion appears to have been exploded in the cases of Adams and Savage, and Rawley and Holland; for, if the freehold had been held to remain in the feoffees, that might have supported the limitations to the heirs of the body as contingent uses. This construction, however, was not adopted; and it has since been argued, that of necessity the freehold must result in the cases cited to the ancestor, because it cannot be in abeyance, and can only reside in the ancestor, or in the trustees. It must therefore be considered, it is said, to be vested in the ancestor, and it cannot be a legal objection to this conclusion that it destroyed the term. But the cases are not open to this objection, because the whole fee results to the feoffor.

These cases must be distinguished from that of *Penhay v. Hurrell*, 2 Vern. 370, where the first limitation was to the trustees for 70 years, if the settlor should so long live, in trust for him, *and after his death* to trustees for 3,000 years upon trusts, and after the death of the settlor and the determination of the 3,000 years' term, to the use of others for life and in tail. This case underwent considerable discussion. The objection was that an estate of freehold was made to commence *in futuro*, for the first freehold estate limited was not to arise until the expiration of the terms, *and after the death of the settlor*, and no estate for life limited to him unless an estate for life should be supposed to result back to him. The Chancellor at one hearing having consulted the judges, said they were of opinion that the limitation to the son was void, there being no estate for life vested in the settlor; but if it had been in case of a covenant to stand seised, it might have been otherwise; 2 Freem. 231, pl. 302.

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On another day, being assisted by Powell, J., he and the judge were of opinion that the use should result, and the rather because contingent uses are not favoured in law, but where it may be remainders shall vest; but it was said the Earl of Bedford's case seems contrary, and the Chief Justices were of another opinion, and therefore the Chancellor desired the opinion of all the judges; 2 Freem. 235, pl. 307. It appears that ultimately the Lord Keeper, a case being stated, decided that the settlor had an estate for life by implication, and so the remainders were all good; and he went upon the case of Pybus and Mitford, which he considered a decision that as well in a fine or feoffment as in a covenant to stand seised so much of the use as a man did not depart with remained in him.

In this case the student will observe, that the term was limited to trustees and not to the grantor himself, which distinguishes it from Adams and Savage. Penhay and Hurrell is stated in the reports as a limitation to trustees for 70 years, if the settlor should so long live, remainder to trustees for 3,000 years, "and after the death of Roger," to the freehold uses. Mr. Fearne, who wished to establish, that as the term was so long as 70 years, the law would not presume that the settlor would outlive it, and therefore a remainder of the freehold limited upon it to a person *in esse* would not be deemed contingent, although limited generally after the death of the grantor, enters into a long argument to show that this case depended on the estate of freehold being limited to take effect generally on the settlor's death, without any dependence on the term of 3,000 years, which was not determinable on his death, and therefore the limitation could not take effect as a remainder; Fearne, p. 25, last edit. But from the above correct statement of the case, which is warranted by the Register's book (see Mr. Raithby's edit. of Vernon), it appears that the remainder was limited *after the expiration of the 3,000 years' term*, and the death of the settlor, and therefore Mr. Fearne's argument falls to the ground. For if the term of 70 years had been deemed equal in point of duration

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to the settlor's life, no question could have been made as to the remainder being in contingency; but as it was clearly assumed that the remainder was contingent, unless an estate for life could be implied, the contrary doctrine appears to have prevailed where the term is only 70 years. This is deserving of attention. And even in a modern case, where the term was 99 years, if *A* should so long live, with a remainder *after his decease* of the freehold, the Court did not rely on the length of the term, but considered the words "his decease" as repugnant, and held that the words "from and after" should be referred to the term itself; or that the words "the decease" might stand, and the words "or other sooner determination of the term" might be implied; *Goodtitle v. Burtonshaw*, App. to Mr. Butler's edit. of *Fearne*, No. 1. This seems to support Mr. *Fearne's* rule, although on a very different ground, and there are many cases to which evidently the rule could not be applied; see *Beverley v. Beverley*, 2 Vern. 131. Of course where the freehold is limited on a contingency, it is unimportant how long the *term* is, because an estate of freehold is essential to support a contingent remainder. In the cases in which this question arises, the freehold is limited to a person *in esse*; but the doubt is whether the shortness of the term does not of itself render the remainder *contingent*, by reason of its being limited after a period before the expiration of which the preceding estate *may* determine.

I must still observe, that in *Goodtitle v. Burtonshaw*, Lord Mansfield said that the conveyance there, being by way of feoffees to uses, no such thing as a springing use could arise in the trustees to support the subsequent estates analogous to executory devises. I do not exactly understand this observation: probably the learned judge alluded to an estate of freehold vesting in the trustees by implication. It is clear that a springing use may as well arise on a conveyance, operating by transmutation of possession, as on a conveyance not having that operation.

Springing uses have been further restrained, and future
uses

uses established, by what is now a firm rule of law, "that if such a construction can be put upon a limitation in use as it *may* take effect by way of remainder, it shall never take effect as a springing use."

Thus in *Southcot v. Stowel*, 1 Mod. 226, 237, 2 Mod. 207, where a man covenanted to stand seised to the use of one of his sons in tail male, and for default of such issue, to the use of the heirs male of his own body, the remainder to his own right heirs, amongst other arguments foreign to our purpose, it was insisted that the limitation was good by way of future springing use; but North, C. J. said, that it could not take effect as a springing use, because where the limitation is of a remainder, the law will never construe it so as to support it in any other way. And in *Goodtitle v. Billington*, Lord Mansfield said, in delivering judgment, that it was perfectly clear and settled, that where an estate can take effect as a remainder, it shall never be construed to be a springing use. Dougl. 758.

So in *Weale v. Lower*, Lord C. J. Hale took a difference between a contingent remainder by way of use, and a future use, or an estate *in futuro* by way of use: as if a feoffment be made to the use of *A* for life, and after the death of *A* and *B*, to the use of *C* in fee, this is a contingent remainder to *C*; but if a feoffment be made to the use of *C* and his heirs, after the death of *A* and *B*, this is no remainder, but a future use; Poll. 65. In the first case it will be observed that there was a preceding estate of freehold to preserve the contingent use; and although the use might be defeated by the death of *A* in the life of *B*, that is, by the determination of the particular estate before the time appointed for the vesting in possession of the remainder, yet that was not deemed a sufficient ground to support it as a springing use. The latter case was strictly a springing use, being limited to take effect at a future period without any dependence on a previous estate.

This doctrine was fully discussed in an important modern case, to which the student's attention cannot be too strongly directed. There a settlement was made previous to the marriage

riage of *J. C.*, by which the lands in question were limited to trustees and their heirs, to the use of *J. C.* (the settlor) for life; remainder to *M. W.* (his intended wife) for life (except in such cases as should be thereafter excepted), for her jointure, remainder to the heirs of the body of *J. C.* begotten on his said intended wife, remainder to the said *J. C.* and his heirs, followed by a "proviso, and the special trust and confidence in the said trustees and their heirs was thereby declared to be, that if the said *J. C.* should happen to die and leave such issue as aforesaid behind him, he the said *J. C.* not making otherwise a provision for such child or children in his life-time, then and in such case the said trustees shall stand seised of one moiety of the said premises from and immediately after the decease of the said *J. C.*, to the use of such child or children as aforesaid, and be empowered, out of the rents, issues, and profits of the said money, to raise such provision for such child or children as the said trustees and their heirs should think fit." The husband and wife after the marriage levied a fine, and he, by his will, totally disinherited his eldest son.

The principal question in the case was, whether the plaintiff, who was the eldest son of *J. C.*, was entitled to any, and what provision under the proviso in the settlement?

It was argued for the eldest son, that in case of springing uses (as that was contended to be), and of executory devises, the whole fee given before need not be disturbed; but the estates before given might open to receive and let in the use upon the contingency happening; and so there it let in the new estate, but did not operate to take away any of the estates before given.

On the other side it was said, that the first question was, whether under the settlement, which was a conveyance of the legal estate, the provision was in the power of the father, and any thing was left untouched by the fine?—That this point would depend upon the question, whether it was to be considered as a contingent remainder or as a springing use? For if it was the first, it was clearly barred by the fine; for
which

which they referred to Archer's case, 1 Co. 66.—That the maxim of law being that a fee could not be limited upon a fee, springing uses arose in order to give persons a power to provide for all the exigencies of their families, and therefore the Court permitted them to arise within a reasonable compass of time, as in the compass of a life, and during the infancy of the first taker, as in Lloyd and Carew, Prec. Chan. 72; and that a springing use is in a deed what an executory devise is in a will, and the same rules are applicable to both. But that a springing use always displaces the former estates where the whole fee has been departed with; that a feoffment to the use of A and his heirs, to commence four years from thence, was good as a springing use; so after the death without issue, if he died without issue in 20 years, it was good by way of springing use; because what was left undisposed of was in the feoffor in the mean time, and just in the same state as before the conveyance; Davis v. Speed, 12 Mod. 39. And that is a certain rule, that it should never take effect by way of springing use, or executory devise, where it could possibly take effect by way of remainder. That although where the whole fee is disposed of, you may make a new disposition thereof, to arise within a reasonable compass of time; yet there must be always a particular estate to support a remainder. For the law always takes care there should be a tenant to a freehold liable to the actions of all persons who claimed any right; and that whenever there is such a particular estate, any limitation afterwards must be construed a remainder. And in the case in question, it must be considered as if the limitation to such issue had been placed in the parenthesis, where the exception is to the wife's estate. And then, where the limitation was in the middle of the disposition of the fee, as in that case, it must always be construed a remainder. That in a springing use the whole estate (that is to be displaced) vests. But in the case then in argument, the mother took an estate for life, only in one moiety. As to the other moiety it was contingent, whether it could vest or not; and depended on the father's dying in the lifetime

time of the mother, and leaving such issue unprovided for ; and therefore was a contingent remainder.

The Lord Keeper, after observing that the question arose upon a deed very imperfectly and inaccurately penned ; and was a question of law arising upon a legal conveyance, a settlement executed, and not on articles, or by way of trust executory, divided the consideration of it into two points :—1st, The intention of the parties to the deed :—2dly, The legal operation and effect of it. After considering what the intention was, he said, that the second question was, what was the legal operation of the deed ? It was admitted, it must be either a springing use, or a contingent remainder ; whichever it was, the consequence was also admitted, if that was once known. That he did not know by what rule of law he could construe that a springing use. Springing uses were introduced to answer the exigencies of mankind, in providing for all the contingencies in their families, in like manner as executory devises were allowed of, in order that after a departure with the whole fee, a new limitation of the fee might take place, upon a contingency to arise within a reasonable compass of time, and not within the danger of a perpetuity ; not that a fee could be limited upon a fee, but upon the contingency happening, the former uses were to give way. And he did not recollect any case, where a springing use had been created in the middle of other uses, but always determined the first limitation of the fee, and displaced the first gift, and changed the uses in favour of other persons. And that it made no difference whether the whole fee was given away at once, or in particular estates, and by way of remainders. That it was a certain rule of law, that if such a construction could be put upon a limitation, as it might take effect by way of remainder, it should never take place as a springing use, or executory devise. That the best construction he could put upon the limitation was, that of its being a contingent remainder, and that the limitation ought to stand thus, viz. to husband for life, remainder, as to one moiety, to the wife for life, remainder as to the other moiety, to the children during

the wife's life, if they are left unprovided for ; remainder as to this moiety, to the wife for life, remainder of the whole to the heirs of the body of the husband, remainder to the husband and his heirs. Now if this estate was executed, he could give it no other construction, than what a court of law would do : and he was of opinion, it was executed, and not an estate executory remaining in the trustees. That he must determine according to the legal operation of this deed, and he thought it was a contingent remainder; *Carwardine v. Carwardine*, 2 *Fearne*, 4th edit. p. 5; last edit. p. 388; and see *Bostock's case*, *Ley*, 56.

The result of the authorities seems to be, that to create a good springing use it must be limited at once independently of any preceding estate, and not by way of remainder, for if it be, it shall be construed a contingent and not a springing use, and shall be subject to the laws which govern contingent remainders. By a train of decisions springing uses are thus confined within very narrow limits, and future or contingent uses are placed on exactly the same footing with contingent remainders. We shall see indeed in another place, that where a contingent use is divested, an actual entry is said to be requisite to revest it, although a *right* of entry is sufficient to support a contingent remainder. In this respect, therefore, if such be the rule, contingent uses are less favoured than contingent remainders. But this would break through the system which in other respects applies equally to contingent uses and remainders, and the editor hopes to be able to show that the notion is not well founded.

It must be observed that although shifting, or secondary uses cannot be classed with future or contingent uses, because of the different modes in which they take effect, yet a shifting use when created *may*, in point of limitation, be like unto a contingent remainder, and shall, in that case, as well as a strict contingent use, which did not take effect in derogation of any other estate, be subject to the same laws. We shall hereafter see that a shifting or contingent use, to take effect in the place of a previous fee-simple, cannot be barred or
destroyed

destroyed by the person taking the qualified fee; but if under a proviso or power, a use were limited in derogation of other estates to *C*, after the decease of the survivor of *A*, tenant for life of the estate, and *B* a stranger, it would, in point of limitation, be a contingent use, and would be liable to be defeated as such; vide *supra*.

It will be observed, that *conditional limitations* have not yet been mentioned. The distinction is very refined, but it is certainly well established, that if an estate is limited to *A* until *B* return from Rome, and after *B*'s return to *C*, the limitation to *C* is a good contingent remainder; whereas if the estate is limited to *A*, for life, or generally, which amounts to the same thing, with a proviso, that if *B* return from Rome, the estate shall go to *C*; in this case the limitation to *C*, although precisely the same as the former in effect, is not a remainder, but what is generally termed a conditional limitation; see *Fearne*, last edit. sect. 3, p. 9, and *Mr. Butler's n. ibid*; *Cogan v. Cogan*, Cro. Eliz. 360, where the conveyance was not to uses, and therefore the proviso was held void; and see *Bostock's case*, Ley, 56. Now these conditional limitations are in truth shifting, or secondary uses. In the proposed case, *A*'s estate is in its *original* creation, to endure for his life. If *B* return from Rome in *A*'s life-time, the use to *C* arises, and takes effect in derogation of *A*'s estate. It is, therefore, strictly a secondary use, and as such it falls within my first division. It is barrable indeed, like a contingent use, but the reason of this has already been explained. If the term *conditional limitation* is to be retained, it should rather be applied to those cases where the qualification is introduced in the very gift, as in the instance of a gift to *A*, until *C* return from Rome; and indeed it was originally introduced in order to distinguish such limitations from limitations upon condition, of which only the grantor or his heir could take advantage; see *Dougl.* 754, 2d edit. n. (1). *Mr. Fearne* appears to be the first writer who applied the expression to a shifting, or secondary use.

Before this note is closed, it may be observed, that where

in a conveyance operating under the statute, a rent is granted in fee, with powers of distress and entry, the grantee has such an estate that he may make a lease until the rent is paid. And it is *quasi* a conditional inheritance, which shall go to his heirs and assigns, but always determinable upon payment of the rent. And it may well be transferred with the rent because it is a matter of inheritance and waits upon the rent, and not a mere possibility or a contingent estate, not coupled with any other estate, in which case it would not pass by a grant of the rent; *Havergill v. Hare*, Cro. Jac. 510.

We must distinguish this case from the limitation of a shifting use, to one, his heirs and assigns, which will not pass to an assignee. This was decided in the case of the *Earl of Kent v. Steward*, Cro. Car. 358. 2 Ro. Abr. 792, (S) pl. 1, where upon a conveyance to one in fee, a shifting use was created in another estate in favour of the same person, his heirs and assigns, in case he or they should be evicted out of the first estate. The first estate was aliened, and the assignee was evicted; and it was determined that the assignee could not enter on the other estate, but that the shifting use on eviction ought first to vest in the person to whom it was limited; for the words heirs and assigns are to be taken as words of limitation, and it shall not first vest in the assignee as purchaser, and it is not such an interest as is assignable over before eviction.

In exchanges, by a conveyance operating under the statute, it has been sometimes attempted, in case of eviction, to limit the other estate to the uses to which the estate evicted should stand limited at the time of the eviction; but such provisos are clearly void if considered as creating shifting uses, because they are too remote: nor can such a proviso be inserted in a common-law deed of exchange. No power of re-entry used to be inserted in old deeds of exchange, and it may be thought, that the powers now usually inserted are merely void, as expressive of the rule of law which controls them.

No. 3.

Case in the Reign of HENRY VII. (a).

THIS case first came on in the 14th Henry VII. and is the last case reported in that year. In the King's-bench the case was such: A man had certain feoffees in his land to his use, and made his will, and wills that his lands should be sold after the death of one *A*, whom he willed to have the profit during his life; which feoffees have enfeoffed others to the use to perform the will of the testator; and if the second feoffees shall sell the land or not, that was the matter, Kings' *semble*, that the second feoffees may well sell the land.

This case came on again in Trinity term, in the 15th of Henry VII., and is in the year-book, fo. 11 b. A man enfeoffs *A* and *B* upon trust, and afterwards he makes his will, and recites that *A* and *B* were seised to his use, and that his will is, that the said *A* and *B* should make an estate to his wife for the term of her life, and the remainder to his son and heir, and to the heirs of his body begotten. And if the son should die without heirs of his body, then his will was, that the aforesaid feoffees should alien the said land, and that the money arising thereby should be distributed for his soul. Then the feoffor died, and the feoffees make a feoffment over to the same use, and declare their will that the second feoffees shall act according to the first will, &c. And the wife dies, and the son of the first feoffor dies without heir, and the second feoffees alien the land to a stranger in fee, and if this alienation was good or not, that is the matter. Per *Rede*, Justice. It seems to me that the second feoffees cannot make an alienation according to the will of the first feoffor; for the will of the man ought to be taken according to the intent of him who made the will, and according to the law of the land; for if a man makes his will, that the land of which he

(a) *Vide supra*, p. 49. 170. 175.

was seised shall be sold and aliened to *I. S.* after his death, &c. and then dies seised, there his will shall not be performed, because his will is contrary to the law of the land, to make a will of land of which he was seised, and died seised : *quod fuit concessum per Tremaille*. And so if a man has feoffees upon confidence in his land, and makes his will, that one *I. S.* shall alien his land, and there is no such person in *rerum natura*, there his will is void, because no other man can sell that; and, for that reason, the feoffees shall be seised to the use of the heir, &c. because it appears by the will that no other man shall interfere with the alienation. And so also if a man has feoffees in his land, and makes his will that *I. N.* shall alien the land; there, if *I. N.* dies without heir, his executors shall not alien, because that is not warranted by the will; but the feoffees shall remain seised to the use of the heir of the first feoffor. And so it is where he names the feoffees from the first in the will, and then he says, the aforesaid, &c. feoffees shall alien the land for his soul: the authority is solely given to them, and their executors cannot alien this. But if these feoffees make a feoffment over to the same use, yet the first feoffees may alien the land according to the will of the first feoffor : *quod fuit concessum per Fineux et Tremaille*. And also the second feoffees may alien the land by the commandment of the first feoffees, and that is good, for it is the sale, and the alienation of the first feoffees in law. And no one will deny that the second feoffees cannot alien the land during the life of the first feoffees, if it be not by their commandment; so that it be, in fact, their alienation; and by consequence no more can they sell after the decease of the first feoffees. *Tremaille* to the same purpose. And there is a diversity where the will is that the alienation shall be made to a person certain; and where it is that the alienation shall be made generally; for if the will was, that the aforesaid feoffees alien to one *I. S.*, there, if they make a feoffment over to the same use, yet the second feoffees shall make this alienation, for there is in a manner an use to *I. S.* *quod fuit concessum, per Rede et Fineux*.

Fineux. But when the will is, that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien, there the authority is solely given to them : for if his will was that his executors shall alien his lands, although they refuse to alien, yet the feoffees cannot alien. So if his will was that the feoffees shall alien, and they will not, but die, yet the executors cannot alien. And so it is here. *Fineux*, chief Justice, to the same purpose. And so if a man makes not a will, the common law makes a will for every man, as to his lands and his goods, and that is, so that the heir shall have the land, and the ordinary the goods. But if a man is desirous that his land should be aliened in another manner to that which the common law ordains, then the common law suffers him to make his will of them. And every will which a man makes ought to be construed and taken according to the purport of the words ; or as it may be implied and understood by the words what his intent was. Therefore here, when he recites the names of the feoffees, and then says that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien, &c., there it is as much as to say in effect that no other shall alien except them. And if the will was, that the aforesaid feoffees should alien within the two years next ensuing, if they do not do so they cannot do it afterwards, but the heir of the feoffor shall have the land for ever. And if a man makes his will that *I. S.* shall have his land *in perpetuum* for his life, there by that he shall only have it during his life ; for these words “during his life,” abridge the interest given before. And so here, when he says the aforesaid feoffees shall alien, there no other can have that power but only them. And there is a diversity where the power given to the feoffees is annexed to the land, and where not ; for if the will be, that the aforesaid feoffees shall make an estate over to a certain person for certain years, there, if they make feoffment over to the same use, the first feoffors cannot do that, for that power is a thing annexed to the land, which no one can do but he who has the land. But here the will was, that the aforesaid feoffees shall alien the land, &c. and that may well be done after the feoffment made by themselves to the use ;

and therefore their power is not determined by their feoffment. And if a man has feoffees upon confidence in his land, and makes his will that his feoffees shall alien his land, to pay his debts, there the creditors shall compel the feoffees to alien, &c. *quod fuit concessum per Rede et Tremaile*. And so if the will was, that a stranger shall alien this land to one *I. S.*, there *I. S.* shall compel this stranger by *subpoena* to alien this land to him; and the feoffees cannot alien. But if the will was, that the feoffees shall alien his lands for money to distribute, &c. (*in pios usus*), there no man can compel them to make an alienation, &c.; for no one is damaged, although the land be not aliened, &c. and so there is a diversity, *quod fuit concessum*. And if a man has feoffees upon confidence, and makes a will that his executors shall alien his lands, there if the executors renounce administration of the goods, yet they may alien the land, for the will of land is not a testamentary matter, nor have the executors to interfere in this will, except so far as a special power is given to them. And if a man has feoffees in his land, and makes his will that his executors shall sell his land, and then he does not make executors, there the ordinary shall not meddle with the land nor the administrator neither, for the ordinary has only to meddle with testamentary matters, as of goods; and consequently no more can the administrator, who is but his deputy. And, therefore, it was lately adjudged in the Exchequer chamber by all the Judges of England, that if a man makes a will of his lands, that his executors shall sell the land, and alien, &c. if the executors renounce administration and to be executors, there neither the administrators nor the ordinary can sell or alien, &c.; *quod nota*. *Quod fuit concessum per Rede et Tremaile*, for good law. And if a man makes his will that his executors shall alien his land, without naming their proper names, if they refuse the administration, and to be executors, yet they may alien the land: *quod fuit concessum per Fineux et Tremaile* for clear law; *Rede non dedit*. And if a man makes his will, that his land which his feoffees have, shall be sold and aliened, and does not say by whom, there
his

his executors shall alien that, and not the feoffees, *per Rede, Tremaille, et Frowik*. *Fineux* said nothing to this this day; but the day before, he in a manner affirmed this. *Conisby* said that the feoffees shall alien this, for they have the confidence placed in them, &c. But this was denied, for executors have much greater confidence placed in them than the feoffees have, for the money to arise by the sale of the executors shall be assets in their hands, and therefore they shall sell. *Fineux, Rede, et Tremaille* said, that if a man makes his will that his feoffees shall alien his land, before the alienation the heir may take the profits, and they are seised to his use; and if an alienation be not made by them, the heir shall have the land for ever.

No. 4.

Roper v. Halifax (b).

THIS was an action of *assumpsit*, brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, for not performing the contract for the purchase of an estate in the county of Suffolk. The cause was tried at the Westminster sittings, in Easter term 1816, before the Honourable Mr. Justice Dallas, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas on the following case:

7th and 8th March 1788.—BY INDENTURES of Lease and Release, bearing date respectively the 7th and 8th March 1788, being articles executed previously to the marriage of Miss Katherine Castle with Edward Bouverie, Esq. then a minor. It was, (amongst other things,) agreed, that certain manors and freehold estates at Rougham and Wickenhall, and elsewhere, in the county of Suffolk, of which Miss Castle was seised in fee-simple, should be conveyed by her to John Thomas Batt and Everard Fawkener, Esqrs. their heirs and assigns, to the uses following: To the intent that Miss

(b) Vide *supra*, p. 55. 273.

Castle,

Castle, during the joint lives of herself and Mrs. Bouverie, might receive an annuity of 300*l.* by way of pin-money; remainder to the use of Frederick Robinson and John Crewe, for ninety-nine years, for securing it; remainder to the use of Edward Bouverie, for life; remainder to the use of John Thomas Batt and Everard Fawkener, and their heirs, during his life, in trust to preserve contingent remainders; remainder to the use of the said Katherine Castle, for life; remainder to the use of the same trustees, their heirs and assigns, during the life of Miss Castle, in trust to preserve, &c.; remainder to the use of Edward Vincent and John Blake, for 500 years, for securing portions for the younger children of the marriage; remainder to the use of the first and other sons of the intended marriage severally, according to seniority, in tail-male; remainder to the use of Edward Vincent and John Blake, their executors, &c. for 600 years, for raising additional portions for daughters, in case of failure of issue male; remainder to such uses as Katherine Castle should appoint; remainder to the use of Katherine Castle, in fee. “AND it was and is further agreed, that in the said intended settlement there shall be contained a power for the said John Thomas Batt and Everard Fawkener, or the survivor of them, or the heirs or assigns of such survivor, with the consent and approbation of the said Edward Bouverie the son, and Katherine Castle his intended wife, or of the survivor of them, to be testified in manner last hereinbefore directed;” [viz. by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, under their hands and seals, or his or her hand and seal, to be executed in the presence of, and to be attested in the presence of, two or more credible witnesses] “from time to time to sell or exchange all or any part of the manors, hereditaments, and premises, in the said county of Suffolk, so agreed to be settled and limited as afoesaid, and all or any part of the hereditaments and premises so to be purchased by and with the capital of the said trust funds and securities, so as that the money to arise from the sale thereof be laid out and
invested

invested in the purchase of, and that the exchange be made for, manors, freehold messuages, lands, and hereditaments, and copyhold or leasehold messuages, lands, or hereditaments, which may lie near to or be intermixed with, or be proper and convenient to be held and enjoyed with the freehold hereditaments and premises so to be purchased or taken in exchange, but so as that the copyhold and leasehold hereditaments and premises, to be so purchased or taken in exchange as aforesaid do not exceed one fifth part of the value of the entire hereditaments or premises to be so purchased or taken in exchange, and so as all the hereditaments and premises so to be purchased and taken in exchange be immediately thereupon conveyed, settled, limited, and assured to the same uses, upon the same trusts, and for the same intents and purposes, as the hereditaments and premises which shall be so respectively sold or exchanged as aforesaid are by the said intended settlement to be limited and settled as aforesaid: And that there should be inserted in the said intended settlement such or the like clauses or provisos for the indemnity of the purchaser or purchasers. And for empowering the said trustees, with such consent as aforesaid, to lay out and invest the monies to arise by such sale or sales of all or any of the said hereditaments and premises in or upon some of the public stocks or funds, or government or real securities, and for applying the interest or dividends to arise therefrom, from time to time, as were thereinbefore agreed to be inserted in the said intended settlement, concerning the monies to arise from the sale of Mr. Bouverie's Northamptonshire estates, which clauses are in the words following: " And that it shall by the said intended settlement be likewise provided and declared, that the receipts or receipt of the trustees or trustee for the time being, who shall be so empowered to make such sale or exchange as aforesaid, for the monies for which the same shall be so sold, shall be a good and sufficient discharge or discharges to the purchaser or purchasers of the hereditaments and premises to be so sold as aforesaid; and that

that such purchaser or purchasers, or his, her, or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, shall not afterwards be answerable or accountable for any sum or sums of money which in such receipt or receipts shall be expressed to be received, nor for any loss, misapplication, or non-application of the same, or any part thereof; and that the said trustees, so making such sale under or by virtue of the said power, shall by and with the privity and consent of the said Edward Bouverie the father, and Edward Bouverie the son, or of the survivor of them, testified by any writing or writings under their hands, or under his hand, in the mean time, and until a proper purchase or proper purchases can be found wherein to invest the same, lay out and invest the monies to arise from such sale or sales in the public stocks or funds, or in or upon government or real securities, and shall from time to time pay the interest or dividends thereof to the person or persons who for the time being would be entitled to the rents and profits of the lands and hereditaments so to be purchased as aforesaid, in case such purchases were then actually made."

AND IT IS WITNESSED, that the said Katherine Castle did grant and release the said manors and hereditaments to the said John Thomas Batt and Everard Fawkener, to the use of herself until the marriage, and then to the use of said Batt and Fawkener, their heirs and assigns, upon trust, that when said Edward Bouverie (who was then a minor) should make the settlement of his estates therein agreed upon, to convey and settle said hereditaments to the uses, &c. before stated. AND in the said Indenture of Release is contained the usual power of appointing new trustees, to be exercised by Mr. and Mrs. Bouverie, by any writing under their hands and seals, attested by two witnesses.

21st and 22d November 1788.—BY INDENTURES of Lease and Release, bearing date respectively the 21st and 22d November 1788 (being the settlement executed in pursuance of the articles, and after the marriage, between Mr. Bouverie and Katherine then his wife), Mr. Bouverie duly conveyed

conveyed his estates to such uses as were agreed upon by the articles; AND in consideration thereof Batt and Fawkener, the trustees of Mrs. Bouverie, with the consent of Mr. and Mrs. Bouverie, conveyed her said estates at Rougham and Wickenhall, and elsewhere in Suffolk, to Elboro Woodcock, and his heirs, to such uses as were agreed upon by the articles, and as are hereinbefore set forth. AND in the said Indenture of Release of the 22d of November 1788, are contained the following powers of sale and exchange, to be exercised over Mrs. Bouverie's property, viz. "Provided also, and it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the parties to these presents, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said John Thomas Batt and Everard Fawkener, or the survivor of them, or the heirs or assigns of such survivor, with the consent and approbation of the said Edward Bouverie the son, and Katherine his wife, or of the survivor of them, to be testified in manner last hereinbefore directed;" [viz. by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, under their hands and seals, or his or her hand and seal, to be executed in the presence of, and to be attested by, two or more credible witnesses], "from time to time, to sell or exchange all or any part of the manors, hereditaments, and premises, in the said county of Suffolk, in and by these presents settled and limited as aforesaid, and all or any part of the hereditaments and premises so to be purchased by and with the capital of the said trust funds and securities, so as that the money to arise from the sale thereof be laid out and invested in the purchase of, and that the exchange be made for, manors, freehold messuages, lands and hereditaments, and copyhold or leasehold messuages, lands, or hereditaments, which may be near to or be intermixed with, or be proper and convenient to be held and enjoyed with, the freehold hereditaments and premises so to be purchased or taken in exchange; but so as that the copyhold or leasehold hereditaments and premises so to be purchased or taken in exchange as aforesaid, do not exceed one fifth part of the value

value of the entire hereditaments or premises to be so purchased or taken in exchange, so as all the hereditaments and premises so to be purchased and taken in exchange be immediately thereupon conveyed, settled, limited, and assured to the same uses, upon the same trusts, and for the same intents and purposes, as the hereditaments and premises which shall be so respectively sold or exchanged as aforesaid are in and by these presents limited and settled as aforesaid. AND it is hereby declared and agreed, that when and as the before-mentioned hereditaments and premises, or any part thereof, shall be sold for a valuable consideration in money, the receipt or receipts of the said John Thomas Batt and Everard Fawkenor, or of the survivor of them, or of the executors, administrators, or assigns of such survivor, or of the trustee or trustees to be by virtue of these presents substituted in their or any of their place or stead, for all or any part of the monies to arise from such sale or sales, shall be a good and effectual discharge or discharges to the purchaser or purchasers, and his, her or their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, for such sum or sums of money as in such receipt or receipts shall be expressed to be received, and he, she or they shall not afterwards be obliged to see to the application thereof, or be answerable or accountable for any loss, misapplication, or non-application of the same, or any part thereof. Provided also, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said trustees and trustee for the time being, from time to time, by and with such consent as aforesaid, and to be testified in manner aforesaid, to lay out and invest the monies to arise by such sale or sales of all or any of the said hereditaments and premises, in or upon some of the public stocks or funds, or upon government or real securities; and it is hereby agreed and declared, that the interest or dividends to arise therefrom, from time to time, shall be paid to the person or persons for the time being who would be entitled to the rents and profits of the lands and hereditaments so directed to be purchased as aforesaid, in case the same were
then

then actually purchased.” And in the said Indenture of Release is contained a power of appointing new trustees, as prescribed by the articles.

1st and 2nd March 1804.—By deeds of the 1st and 2nd March 1804, Mr. and Mrs. Bouverie, in pursuance of their power, duly appointed Robert Blake, Esq., to be a trustee in the room of Mr. Fawkener, who was then dead.

3d and 4th March 1804.—And by the same Indentures, and by Indentures of Lease and Release of the 3d and 4th March 1804, all the trust-estates were duly conveyed to Mr. Batt and Mr. Blake, and their heirs, to the uses, upon the trusts, &c. of the settlement of November 1788.

28th and 29th June 1811.—By Indentures of Lease and Release, bearing date respectively the 28th and 29th June 1811, the Release made between the said Edward Bouverie, of the first part, Everard William Bouverie, his eldest son, by Katherine his wife, of the second part, William Ainge, of the third part, and Richard White, of the fourth part. After reciting (*inter alia*), that Mr. Bouverie and his son were desirous of destroying the estates-tail created by the settlement of 1788, and all remainders and reversions expectant or depending on the said estates-tail, and of settling the estates therein comprised, subject to the estates then existing therein, previous to the estate-tail of the said Everard William Bouverie, to the uses after mentioned, IT IS WITNESSED, that for barring the estate-tail, &c. the said Edward Bouverie did grant, release, and confirm to the said William Ainge, and his heirs, during the joint lives of the said Edward Bouverie and William Ainge, (amongst many others), the said estates at Rougham and Wickenhall, and elsewhere, in the county of Suffolk, To hold to said William Ainge and his heirs, during such joint lives; to the intent that the said William Ainge might become tenant to the *præcipe* in two recoveries, in which said Richard White was to be demandant, and the said Everard William Bouverie, vouchee. AND it was thereby agreed, that the recoveries, when suffered, should enure “ To the several uses which under and by virtue of the
said

said Indentures of Lease and Release of the twenty-first and twenty-second days of November 1788 were, immediately previously to the sealing and delivery of the Indenture now in recital, or the Lease for a year, on which the same is grounded, subsisting, or capable of taking effect in the said hereditaments, antecedent to the uses by the aforesaid Indenture of the twenty-second day of November 1788 limited to the first and other sons of the said Edward Bouverie, by the said Katherine his wife, severally and successively, according to their respective seniorities, in tail male: AND to the further use, that all and singular the trusts, powers, exemptions and privileges, upon or to the several uses charged, annexed, relating, collateral or limited, to any person or persons seised of or entitled to the same, might still accompany the said several uses, and be vested in, and belong to, and be exercised by, the persons seised of or entitled to the same uses, or in whom the same powers were vested, To and for the end, intent, and purpose, and so that the said several uses, trusts, powers, exemptions, and privileges, might, by the Indenture now in recital, and the recoveries to be suffered in pursuance thereof, be, to all intents, effects constructions, and purposes, established or continued, and corroborated or confirmed. And after the expiration, or sooner determination of the said several uses, and in the mean time subject thereto, and subject to the several powers, and to the uses or estates to be created thereby, To such uses, upon such trusts, &c. as the said Edward Bouverie and Everard William Bouverie should, by any deed or writing to be sealed and delivered in the presence of and attested by two witnesses, appoint, and in default of such appointment, to the use of the said Everard William Bouverie in tail male, remainder to the use of the said Edward Bouverie in fee."

Trinity Term, 51st Geo. III.—In Trinity Term the fifty-first of George the Third, recoveries were duly suffered, in pursuance of the last-mentioned Indentures of Lease and Release, in which the said Everard William Bouverie was vouched and vouched over.

20th and 21st December 1811.—By Indentures of Lease and Release, bearing date respectively the 20th and 21st of December 1811, the release being between the said Edward Bouverie of the first part, the said Everard William Bouverie, of the second part, the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake of the third part, the Reverend John Bouverie of the fourth part, Henry Bouverie, esquire, and the said William Ainge, of the fifth part, the Honourable Philip Pleydell Bouverie, and John Dorrien, esquire, (trustees duly appointed in the room of Edward Vincent and John Blake, both deceased, formerly trustees acting under the said Indenture of Settlement of the 22nd November 1788) of the sixth part, and the Right Honourable John, then Lord Crewe (at the date of the same settlement called John Crewe, esquire, and which said John, then Lord Crewe, had survived the said Frederick Robinson, his co-trustee, named in same settlement,) of the seventh part; Reciting (*inter alia*) said Indentures of Lease and Release of the 21st and 22nd of November 1788, and 28th and 29th of June 1811: And also reciting, that the said Edward Bouverie and Everard William Bouverie were severally desirous of limiting and settling the said several manors and other hereditaments comprised in and conveyed by the said Indenture of Release of the 29th of June then last, and said recovery suffered in pursuance thereof, to the uses after declared concerning same: IT IS WITNESSED, That, pursuant to and in execution of the power and authority to the said Edward Bouverie and Everard William Bouverie, for that purpose given by the said Indenture of Release of the 29th of June 1811, and said recovery, and of every power or authority they, the said Edward Bouverie and Everard William Bouverie, did, by the then present deed or instrument in writing duly executed, direct and appoint, that the said estates at Rougham and Wickenhall, and elsewhere in Suffolk, together with divers other hereditaments, should, immediately after the sealing and delivery of the then present Indenture (but subject and without prejudice to the uses, estates and powers, in and by the same Indenture of Release

limited and raised, or established and confirmed antecédently to the joint power of appointment thereby given and reserved to the said Edward Bouverie and Everard William Bouverie), be and remain to the uses and upon the trusts thereafter expressed and declared. AND it was Witnessed, that in consideration of 10s. by the said John Bouverie paid to the said John Thomas Batt, Robert Blake, Edward Bouverie, and Everard William Bouverie, they the said John Thomas Batt, and Robert Blake (according to their several estates and interests in the hereditaments thereafter mentioned to be thereby released, and so far as they respectively could or ought to do at law and in equity, and not further or otherwise,) at the request and by the direction of the said Edward Bouverie, and Edward William Bouverie (testified by their being severally parties to and executing the now stating indenture), did bargain, sell and release, and the said Edward Bouverie and Everard William Bouverie, did grant, release, and confirm, unto the said John Bouverie and his heirs, All and singular the estates thereby appointed as aforesaid, To hold the same (but subject and without prejudice, as appears by the then present Indenture), unto the said John Bouverie, his heirs and assigns, to the uses after declared: Declaration, that, as well the limitation or appointment, as the grant and release thereinbefore contained, should severally enure to the uses, &c. after mentioned (that is to say), as to all the manors and hereditaments thereinbefore appointed and released, except such part or parts thereof as was or were formerly the estate and inheritance of the said Catherine Bouverie, or of her ancestors, to certain uses therein mentioned; and as to such of the said manors and hereditaments, whereof no use was thereinbefore declared (being the estates at Rougham and Wickenhall, and elsewhere, in Suffolk;) it was thereby declared, that the said appointment and release should enure to the following uses, viz. to the intent that the said Katherine Bouverie might, during the joint lives of herself and the said Edward Bouverie, receive thereout the annuity of 300*l.* provided for her by the settlement of

1788, and also might have and enjoy the powers and remedies by that Indenture provided for securing the payment of same; to the intent that said annuity, and said powers and remedies, might be preserved and continued, corroborated and confirmed; and subject thereto, To the use of the said John Lord Crewe for 99 years, to commence from the date of the said Indenture of the 22d November 1788, by way of continuation, corroboration, and confirmation of the term of 99 years thereby limited, and also by way of continuation, &c. of the trusts thereby declared of the same term, remainder to the use of the said Edward Bouverie and his assigns, for life, *sans waste*; remainder to the use of the said John Thomas Batt, and Robert Blake, and their heirs, during his life, to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the use of the said Katherine Bouverie, and her assigns for her life, *sans waste*, by way of corroboration of the life-estate limited to her by the said settlement of 1788, remainder to the use of the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, and their heirs, during her life, to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the use of the said Philip Pleydell Bouverie, and John Dorrien, their executors, &c. for 500 years, from the decease of the survivor of said Edward Bouverie and Katherine his wife, by way of continuation, corroboration and confirmation of the term of 500 years, limited by the said settlement of 1788, and also by way of continuation, &c. of the trusts thereby declared of the same term, remainder to the use of the said Everard William Bouverie and his assigns, for life, *sans waste*, remainder to the use of the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, and their heirs, during his life, to preserve contingent remainders; remainder to the use of the first and other sons of the said Everard William Bouverie, successively in tail male; with divers remainders over in favour of Mr. Bouverie's younger sons and daughters, and their respective issue, in strict settlement. And in the said Indenture is contained the following proviso: "Provided always, and it is hereby agreed and declared, by and between the said parties to these presents, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, and the

survivor of them, and the executors, administrators and assigns of such survivor, at any time or times hereafter, at the request and by the direction in writing of the said Edward Bouverie, during his life, and after his decease, then at the request and by the direction in writing of any person, who by virtue of the limitations hereinbefore contained shall be tenant for life in possession of any of the manors and other hereditaments hereby severally limited in strict settlement, to dispose of and convey, either by way of absolute sale, or in exchange for, or in lieu of, other manors, lands or hereditaments, to be situated somewhere in that part of Great Britain called England, or in the Principality of Wales, all or any part of the said manors, hereditaments, and premises, of which the said Edward Bouverie, or such other person, shall be such tenant for life as aforesaid, and the inheritance thereof, in fee-simple, to any person or persons whomsoever, for such price or prices in money, or for such equivalent or recompense in manors, lands, and hereditaments, as to them the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, or the survivor of them, or the executors, administrators, or assigns of such survivor, shall seem reasonable: And that for the purpose of effectuating such dispositions or conveyances, (but not for any other purpose,) it shall and may be lawful to and for the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, and the survivor of them, and the executors, administrators, or assigns of such survivor, with such consent and approbation, and so testified as aforesaid, by any deed or deeds, instrument or instruments in writing, sealed and delivered by them or him in the presence of and attested by two or more credible witnesses, absolutely to revoke, determine, and make void all and every or any of the uses, trusts, powers and provisoes hereinbefore limited, declared and expressed of or concerning the said hereditaments and premises so proposed to be sold or conveyed in exchange as aforesaid, or any part or parts thereof respectively; and by the same or any other deed or deeds, instrument or instruments in writing, to limit, declare, direct or appoint any use or uses, estate or estates, trust or trusts of the said premises, or any part or parts thereof, which it shall be thought

thought necessary or expedient to limit, declare, direct or appoint, in order to effectuate such sales, dispositions and conveyances as aforesaid: And also, that upon any such exchange as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful for the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, and the survivor of them, and the executors, administrators or assigns of such survivor, to give or receive any sum or sums of money, by way of equality of exchange; and also, that upon payment of the money to arise by sale of the said premises, or any part thereof respectively, or for any money to be paid by way of equality of exchange, or any part thereof, it shall and may be lawful for the said John Thomas Batt and Robert Blake, and the survivor of them, and the executors, administrators and assigns of such survivor, to sign and give receipts for the money for which the same shall be so sold, or so to be paid by way of equality of exchange, as aforesaid, and that such receipts shall be sufficient discharges to the person or persons paying the same respectively, for the money for which the same shall be so given, or for so much thereof as in such receipts shall be acknowledged or expressed to be received; and that the person or persons paying the same respectively, his her or their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, shall not afterwards be answerable or accountable for any loss, mis-application or non-application of such monies, or be in any wise obliged or concerned to see to the application thereof, or any part thereof respectively." With the usual direction to lay out the sale-monies in the purchase of lands to be settled to the uses before named.

6th February 1813.—By articles of agreement of this date made between the said Edward Bouverie of the one part, and Robert Roper, of Wickenhall, in Suffolk, gentleman (the plaintiff), of the other part; the said Edward Bouverie agreed to sell, and the said Robert Roper agreed to purchase at the price of 30,000*l.*, the manor of Wickenhall, in Suffolk, and the messuage, lands and hereditaments called Wickenhall Farm, and the inheritance in fee-simple, and possession

thereof, 10,000*l.* part of the purchase-money, to be paid on the execution of the conveyance, and the residue to be secured by mortgage of the premises till 11th October 1815. And that said Edward Bouverie should, on or before the 11th October 1813, upon receiving said 10,000*l.* and such mortgage, execute proper conveyances of the said estates under a good title unto said Robert Roper, his heirs and assigns.

11th October 1813.—The said Robert Roper paid the said 10,000*l.* to Mr. Bouverie's trustees upon their receipt, but took no conveyance.

17th January 1816.—And on the 17th January 1816 resold the estate by auction to Mr. Halifax (the defendant), for 20,000*l.*, (exclusive of timber, which is to be taken at a valuation,) the defendant paid a deposit to the auctioneer of 3,000*l.* The defendant has not completed his purchase, in consequence of objections taken by his counsel to the title, on the point now reserved for the opinion of the Court; viz. 1st, Whether a conveyance to a purchaser, under the power of sale directed to be reserved by the articles of March 1788, and the power actually reserved by the settlement of November 1788, would be affected if the purchase-money should not be laid out and the lands purchased therewith settled as mentioned in the said articles and settlement? 2nd, Whether the power of sale contained in the settlement of November 1788, was destroyed by the recovery of 1811; if not, 3d, Whether the power was not released and at an end by the settlement of December 1811? And, if not, whether a good title can be made to the defendant by the plaintiff, and Mr. and Mrs. Bouverie, and their trustees,, under an exercise of the power of sale in the settlement of November 1788, and also of the power of sale contained in the settlement of December 1811, or under one of those powers?

If the Court shall be of opinion that a good title can be so made, then the verdict is to be entered for the remainder of the purchase-money, viz. 17,000*l.*; if not, a nonsuit to be entered.

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The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court.

In stating the case his Lordship said, "By the operation of all the deeds, the estates, powers and trusts created by the original deed of 1788, are excepted out of the deed of 1811."

He then proceeded thus, "It is to be noted that this is not a reference to the Court, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover generally, but of certain points upon which it is agreed that the cause is to depend; those points are three:—

"On the first point we are of opinion, that a conveyance to a purchaser under the power would not be affected by the event mentioned in the question; because it is expressly provided that the receipt of the trustees should be a discharge to the purchaser. There is no case from which a contrary inference can be drawn. The case of *Doe v. Martin* is of a very different description from the present; there the money was to be paid into the hands of trustees; and it was agreed that the purchasers should not be bound to see to the application of it; but the question there was, whether the money was *bonâ fide* paid; there was an infant-trustee, and they put the money in his hands. That case is wholly unlike the present, and cannot govern this. We are of opinion, that by the express terms of the deed, provided the transactions be *bonâ fide*, it is a sufficient discharge.

"Secondly, whether the power of sale, in the settlement of 1788 is destroyed by the recovery of 1811?

"To determine this, we must consider the nature of the power by whom, and for whom, it is to be exercised—By trustees, for the benefit of those who take under the settlement, chiefly with the assent of Mr. and Mrs. B. It is antecedent to the estate-tail. The proposition of the defendant is, that the recovery by Mr. B. and his son, with the consent of Mrs. B., destroys this power, and deprives her and all others of the power. This is contrary to justice, and the intent of the settlers. It lies on the defendant to establish this on principle or authority—He does neither.

The

The effect of a recovery is to destroy all remainders, &c. expectant on the estate-tail. This is a power which must act on the land before it becomes subject to the estate-tail, by substituting other land in its place. It is against all justice that the tenant in tail should destroy the power, without the concurrence of the parties interested. Therefore the power is undisturbed by the recovery.

“ Then it is said, that if the common recovery did not destroy it, it was destroyed by the deeds of December 1811, in which the trustees joined, and were granting parties. We much doubt whether a power of this sort could be destroyed by the trustees—It is a naked authority for the benefit of others—but we are clear that it has not. The deeds of 1811 operate as an execution of the power, and an appointment by B. and his son under that power; but by the terms of the deed they act only on so much of the estate as attended and followed the estate-tail. By the terms of the deed, all previous to the estate-tail is left untouched. They remain on the operation of the deed of 1788, and the trustees retain their authority under that deed.

“ Thirdly, Whether a good title can be made?

“ It is not necessary to say more on the power of 1811, because we are of opinion, that under the deed of 1788, there remains to the trustees full authority, and we are of opinion that a good title may be executed by the trustees. And if these are the questions upon which our opinion is required, we are of opinion the plaintiff is entitled to recover. And we do not mean to intimate that there are any other points in the case to prevent his recovery.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Sketch of an Argument in favour of the Destruction of the Powers.

THE first point is, that the powers were destroyed by the recovery.

The

The powers of sale and exchange were, with reference to the estates created by the settlement, *shifting uses*: Thus, take the settlement to be, to Mr. Bouverie for life; remainder to trustees and their heirs, during his life, to preserve contingent remainders; remainder to his son in tail, with remainders over, and with the power of sale and exchange. The use to be created by the power would be a *shifting use*; for the estate created by the execution of it, viz. the fee in the purchaser, would take place in derogation of the estates limited by the settlement; that is, they would cease, and the use of the fee-simple would shift, and become vested in the purchaser. The power itself therefore may, with sufficient propriety, be called a shifting use.

Now, suppose the estate to be limited in the manner above mentioned, but, instead of the *power* of sale and exchange, a clause to be introduced, providing, that upon payment by *A* of 100*l.* the uses shall cease, and the fee vest in him, this is strictly a shifting use.

In the case last put, it is clear, beyond a doubt, that if a recovery be suffered by Mr. Bouverie and his son, before *A* pay the 100*l.* the shifting use would be effectually barred. Indeed it is so clear that a recovery will bar such shifting uses, that it is settled that estates may be made to shift at any time, however remote, where there is a regular estate-tail limited; because, as the tenant in tail can by a recovery bar the estate-tail, and *also the shifting use*, there is no danger of perpetuity. *Nicholls v. Sheffield*, 2 Bro. C. C. 215.

The doctrine goes farther. A recovery by tenant in tail will even bar a *condition* annexed to the estate-tail. A gift to *A* in tail, determinable upon his non-payment of 1,000*l.*, with remainders over; *A* suffers a common recovery before the day of payment of the 1,000*l.*, and does not pay the money, yet, because he was tenant in tail when he suffered the recovery, by that he bars all. See 1 Mod. 111, where this is laid down by Lord *Hale*; and see *Pullen v. Ready*, 2 Atk. 587.

If

If this be so, where the event upon which the use is to shift, and the person who is to take it, is marked out by the settlement, let us consider how the case stands, where, as in the present case, a power only is introduced in the settlement.

All the uses are created out of the original seisin, whether they are designated by the deed, or a power of designation is given to some person named in the deed: in this respect the uses are similar. And it seems to be wholly immaterial whether the shifting use is limited by the deed creating the primary use, or under a power in the deed. Thus, if a fee be limited to *A*, with a proviso, that if *B* die in his lifetime, *C* shall have the fee; *A* takes a qualified fee, and without any power to defeat the shifting use, which, on the happening of the event, will at once arise and take effect by relation out of the original seisin. If a power be given to *C*, in the same event, to revoke the use to *A*, and limit it to *B*, on the execution of the power the use to *B* would take effect in the same manner as if it had been inserted in the original deed in the place of the power. There is therefore no distinction between the cases.

Now put our case. We have seen that if the shifting use were limited by the settlement itself, the recovery would bar it; why should not the recovery have the same effect, where a power is given to raise a shifting use, which would take effect on derogation of the estate-tail? The power is for this purpose the same as a use expressly limited. It is unimportant, both to the persons taking under the shifting use and the tenant in tail, whether the estate-tail is to be defeated by a clause in the deed providing at once for the event, or by a clause giving another person a power to name the event. If the event provided for happen, or the power be exercised [as the case may be] before a recovery, the estate-tail will be defeated. If a recovery be first suffered, the use or power, which ever it is, will necessarily be defeated.

Try

Try the point thus :

A limitation,

To the use of *A* and the heirs of her body, by a *Searle* to be begotten.

Provided, and upon condition, that if she do marry any but a *Searle*, that then it shall be

To *J. S.* and his heirs.

This case is put by Lord *Holt*, in *Page* and *Hayward*, as a case in which a recovery before the event would bar the gift over.

A limitation,

To the use of *A* and the heirs of her body, by a *Searle* to be begotten.

Provided, and upon condition, that if *B* sell the estate, and appoint it to a purchaser, then it shall be

To the purchaser and his heirs.

This is our case, and it is in no respect distinguishable from the one on the other side.

It must be kept in view, that *powers* cannot be compared with *conditions* at common law. Thus, in *Bullock v. Thorne*, Mo. 615, WALMESLEY, J. held, that a lease for years does not suspend the power of revocation, if it be raised by way of use; *otherwise, if it is of a condition annexed to an estate in possession*. And the Court held, that if one has a power of revocation entire, and he extinguishes or suspends the power in part, he may still revoke for the residue, if it be by way of use; *but not so of a condition annexed to the land*.

The circumstance of the tenant for life having in this case not intended to destroy his powers, is of no weight. The question is, what was the effect of the recovery?

The reversion reserved to him was wholly unimportant; because, although *that* remained in him, yet the *powers* were over-reached by the recovery. The 20,000*l.* clause is also of no effect in this case; it would revest in him his estate for life. *That* the recovery never could over-reach, but it could not bring back with it the powers which the recovery *did* over-reach. A clause to this effect was originally introduced, in order to guard the estate for life against the incumbrances of the tenant in tail.

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Upon the first point, then, the argument stands thus :

A shifting use, limited by the deed, would be defeated by the recovery, whatever was the intention of the parties.

A power is a shifting use, and must therefore also be defeated by the recovery.

And the circumstances of this case cannot vary the rule of law.

If it should be held, that *new* powers were, upon the intention, reserved or created by the recovery-deed, yet that would not help the title ; because, such *new* powers could not over-reach the subsisting estates under the first settlement, which were not over-reached by the recovery.

Secondly,—If, however, the recovery did not destroy the power, yet the subsequent settlement effectually released it.

If the powers were not destroyed by the recovery, the estates after the recovery stood limited, To the use that Mrs. Bouverie might receive pin-money ; remainder to a trustee for a term of years to secure it ; remainder to Mr. Bouverie for life ; remainder to trustees and their heirs, during his life, to preserve contingent remainders ; remainder to Mrs. Bouverie for life ; remainder to trustees, as before, to preserve ; remainder to trustees for 500 years, upon trusts ; remainder to such uses as Mr. Bouverie and his son should appoint. In default of appointment, to the son in tail ; remainder to the father in fee ; with a power of sale in the trustees, and the survivor of them, and the *heirs and assigns* of such survivor, with the consent of Mr. *and* Mrs. Bouverie, or the survivor.

The trustees were Mr. Batt and Mr. Blake. In this state of things the deed of 1811 was executed.

By that deed the joint power of Mr. Bouverie and his son was exercised, and the estates were limited to the uses after mentioned ; subject “To the uses, estates, and powers, by the recovery-deed limited or confirmed antecedently to the joint power.”

This, of course, is immaterial. The power was expressly
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upon its creation, as far as the parties could do it, made subject to certain uses, estates, and powers, and therefore they could only execute the power subject to them. The effect must have been the same, whether the execution of the power had been expressed to be subject to the prior uses, &c. or not, because it was upon its creation made subject to them.

Then comes the second witnessing part of the deed, by which Mr. Batt, Mr. Blake, and Mr. and Mrs. Bouverie, convey the estates, *but subject, and without prejudice as aforesaid*, To the use that Mrs. Bouverie might receive pin-money; remainder to a trustee for a term of years to secure it; remainder to Mr. Bouverie for life; remainder to the trustees, and their heirs, during his life, to preserve contingent remainders; remainder to Mrs. Bouverie for life; remainder to the trustees as before, to preserve; remainder to trustees for 500 years, upon trusts; remainder to Edward Bouverie the son, for life; remainders over; with a power of sale and exchange to the trustees, and the survivor of them, and the *executors, administrators* and assigns of such survivor, at the request of Mr. Bouverie during his life, and after his decease at the request of the tenant for life in possession, during his or her life.

Mr. Batt and Mr. Blake were the trustees. In regard to the conveyance being *subject as aforesaid*, that if it mean any thing, must mean, subject to such of the estates, &c. as the parties could *not* defeat by their conveyance; or it might mean, subject to the power which they had before exercised. It could not mean, subject to *all* the previous estates, &c.; because Mr. Bouverie and the trustees actually conveyed, and of course their conveyance necessarily passed, the estates vested in them: they could not have joined for any other purpose.

It is manifest that the parties *intended*, as far as they could, to defeat the old settlement, and to re-settle the estate. It is clear that the parties were competent to release the powers

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as well as to convey their particular estates. And it would defeat their intention, not to consider the settlement of 1811 as a release of the powers.

The intention of the parties to rest the title as far as they could on the last settlement, is manifest from several circumstances; viz.

1. The concurrence of the trustees, as conveying parties, which could not be necessary under any other view of the case. Their concurrence was in no wise necessary, if the old powers and estate in them were intended to be left untouched.

2. The re-limitation of the *old uses which had not been affected by the recovery*. This was not essential, and could only be done because the parties did not wish to have again recourse to the old settlement.

3. The insertion of a new power of sale and exchange. The *old uses not affected by the recovery*, were, we have seen, re-limited. But instead of *repeating the old* power of sale and exchange, a *new* one is introduced.

Is not this irresistible evidence of the intention of the parties not to save the whole power? Can it be contended that the powers which would be co-existent and co-extensive could be intended to subsist together, although they are to be exercised by different persons?

The *old* power might be exercised by the trustees, or the survivor of them, or the *heirs* or assigns of such survivor, with the consent of MR. and MRS. BOUVERIE.

The *new* power was given to the trustees, and the survivor of them, and the *executors, administrators* and assigns of such survivor, with the consent of Mr. Bouverie *alone*.

Are these powers which, with consistency, can ride over the same estate at the same time? If the trustees were dead, the *heir* of the survivor, with the consent of Mr. and Mrs. Bouverie, and the *executor and administrator*, with the consent of Mr. Bouverie, might execute the two powers at one and the same time. Which would prevail?

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The *intention* must have been to release the power; but even if such was *not* the intention of the parties, the deed of 1811 operated as a release of the powers.

It may be argued that the power was appendant as to the estate of the trustees, and of Mr. Bouverie, and in gross as to the other estates. But the consequence would not follow, that the release of 1811 still left the *old* powers in *esse*, so far as they rode over the estates in respect of which they were collateral. This, where such is the intention, is the rule in regard to some powers. For example, a power to a tenant for life to charge 100*l.* on the estate may well subsist in regard to the estates in remainder, although he has departed with his life-estate. But here the power in its creation was intended to pass the *whole fee*. When the donees of it by their own act prevented themselves from exercising it to that extent, it became void in *toto*. For nothing less than the fee could be sold, because the price of the whole fee was to be obtained for the estate which was to be laid out in the purchase of another estate, to be settled to the same uses. Of course the estate could not be sold under the power reserving to Mr. Bouverie his life-estate. For the money would be necessarily laid out in the purchase of other estates to which Mr. Bouverie would also be entitled for life; and the trustees could not at once settle the new estate on the persons in remainder. It equally follows, that if the donees of the power have departed with the estate in possession for a particular interest which they cannot afterwards defeat, they cannot execute the power at all. For it no longer rides over the entire interest in the subject, which entire interest, and which only, was to be sold under the power.

Our case is distinguishable from

1. A lease granted by a tenant for life, under a power in the settlement, because the power of sale in its creation was made subject to the exercise of the power of leasing.

2. An interest vested in another person, which is defeated by the execution of the power of sale, because *there* the power does convey all which the parties intended it should.

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Here the parties cannot exercise the power in opposition to their own conveyance; and they cannot exercise the power for the remaining interest, because that is contrary to the intention of the settlement creating the power.

Of course an exercise of the two powers cannot make a good title.

No. 5.

Long v. Rankin (c).

Dom. Proc. 12 June 1822.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE ABBOTT.

My Lords,—In this case of *Crawford v. Rankin*, the question your Lordships were pleased to propose for the consideration of the judges was, Whether according to the effect in the law of the several instruments and matters stated and found in the special verdict, the indenture of the 11th of April 1781, operated to demise, grant or limit the premises therein contained, to David Gamble and John Rankin, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, for the lives of three persons therein named, and during the natural life of the survivor of them, or for and during the full space and term of thirty-one years, which lives or terms of years shall longest continue?

The Judges are of opinion that the indenture did operate to limit the premises therein mentioned to Gamble and Rankin, their heirs, executors and administrators, for the natural lives of the three persons therein named, and the survivor of them; and in case all the three persons should happen to die within the period of thirty-one years, then for the remainder of a term of thirty-one years to commence and be computed from the date of the indenture.

As to one part of the question, it is fit I should refer your Lordships to the terms of the power under which the lease in question has been granted. The power, so far as regards the present question, is a power to demise for any term or terms of years not exceeding thirty-one years, or for one, two or three lives, or for any term of years not exceeding thirty-one years,

(c) Vide *supra*, p. 57.

years, or number of lives not exceeding three lives ; (then there are certain qualifications not material to the present purpose pursuant to that power the lease professes to be made.) To have and to hold the said demised premises, with all and every the rights, members, and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining unto the said David Gamble and John Rankin, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, from the 1st day of November last past, for and during the natural life or lives of John Decryn, son of John Decryn of Enniskillen, merchant, aged about years, and the natural life of William Gamble, aged about seven years, and the natural life of Jonas Gamble, aged about four years, the two last mentioned being the sons to David Gamble (party hereto) or for and during the natural life of the survivor or longest liver of them, or for and during the full term and space of thirty-one years."

My Lords, the form of this lease, as regards the term for which the tenements are to be holden, are unusual, and scarcely known in England, but it was stated by one of your Lordships, well acquainted with the form of leases in Ireland, to be common in that country ; we think the language of the power must be understood with reference to the prevailing practice, and we think the language of the lease is conformable to and warranted by the power ; and we see nothing repugnant in itself, or contrary to law in such a limitation. Grants, or leases for the life of one or more persons, and of the survivor of them, and for a term of years to commence at the death of the survivor, are not unknown in England, and their legality has not been questioned ; and as to any consequences that may happen to occur by the death of the lessee, or of the persons for whose lives the leases may be made, with a view to the person in whom the interest may vest by operation of law, there does not appear to be any greater difficulty in one class than in the other ; upon this point, therefore, I conceive it to be unnecessary to trouble your Lordships further.

The validity of the lease to Gamble and Rankin, considered with reference to the fact, that before the time of the making

thereof Robert Crawford, who is therein named as the lessor, had executed certain deeds affecting the legal estate which he took in the premises under the settlement of 1761, is as we understand, the important part of the question proposed to us by your Lordships. For the explanation of this part of the question it is necessary to refer to the several deeds and facts that are found by the special verdict.

It is found that by virtue of deed of 1761, Robert Crawford, by indentures of lease and release, bargained and sold to the said Barry Maxwell and John Chaloner, and their heirs, they then being in actual possession thereof, the lands aforesaid mentioned in the said declaration, to, for, and upon the uses declared and specified in the said last-mentioned indenture, that is to say, to the use of the said Jason Crawford for the term of his natural life, and after his decease, without impeachment of waste, and with full power to commit waste, with remainder to the said Andrew Crawford and Ralph Crawford, parties to the said indenture, and their heirs, during the life of the said Jason Crawford, upon trust to preserve contingent uses therein limited from being barred or destroyed, but yet so as to permit and suffer the said Jason Crawford and his assigns to receive and take the rents, issues and profits of the said lands to his own use, during the term of his natural life, with remainder as before; then after the decease of Robert, to the use of the first son of the said Robert Crawford, and the heirs male of the body of such first son lawfully begotten or to be begotten; and for the want of such issue, to the use and behoof of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh, and all and every other the sons of the body of the said Robert Crawford, to be begotten severally one after another as they and every of them should be in seniority of age, and priority of birth, and of the several and respective heirs male of the several and respective bodies of such son and sons lawfully to be begotten, the older of such son and sons, and the heirs male of his and their body and bodies lawfully issuing, being always to be preferred, and to take before the younger of such son and sons, and the heirs male of his and their body and bodies respectively

respectively issuing; and for the want of such issue, to the use of the daughters of the said Robert Crawford, as tenants in common, and the respective heirs of the bodies of such daughters; and in default of such issue, remainder to John Crawford, second son of the said Jason, for and during the term of his natural life, without impeachment of waste, remainder to the said Andrew Crawford and Ralph Crawford and their heirs, during the life of the said John Crawford, upon trust to preserve the contingent uses therein limited from being barred;" and then, my Lords, there are these terms, " Provided always, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Jason Crawford, and Robert Crawford, and John Crawford, and Ralph Henry Crawford respectively, when and as they shall respectively be in the actual possession of the said lands, tenements and hereditaments, hereinbefore granted by virtue of the limitations aforesaid, and not before, by any writing or writings under their respective hands and seals, attested by two or more credible witnesses, to make any lease or leases of all or any part of the said lands, tenements, hereditaments and premises, to any person or persons whatsoever, for any term or terms of years not exceeding thirty-one years, or one, two or three lives, or for any term of years not exceeding thirty-one years, or number of lives not exceeding three lives." Then there is this proviso, " So as such lease or any leases be made to commence in possession, and not in reversion, or at a day to come, and be not made without impeachment of waste, and so as upon all and every such lease or leases to be made there be reserved yearly, payable during the continuance thereof, the best and most improved yearly rent which at the time of the making thereof can or may be gotten for the same, and so as no fine or sum of money, or other thing in lieu of a fine or sum of money, be taken for making such lease or leases."

The special verdict further finds, " That Robert Crawford, being seised as aforesaid, by certain indentures of lease and release, bearing date on the 13th of March 1772, made between the said Robert Crawford of the one part, and John

Dawson Coates, George Simpson, and William Wilde, of the other part, gave, granted, bargained, sold, released and confirmed unto Coates, Simpson and Wilde, all the lands in question, together with all and singular the rents, members and appurtenances, and so on, unto said Coates, Simpson and Wilde, and the survivor and survivors of them, and the heirs and assigns of such survivor, for and during the life of the said Robert Crawford, to the use of the said John Dawson Coates, George Simpson, and Robert Wilde, and the survivors and survivor of them, his and their heirs and assigns, for the life of the said Robert Crawford, in trust to and for the several uses and purposes following, that is to say, thereby and thereout in the first place to reserve and pay to the said Coates, Simpson and Wilde, and the survivors and survivor of them, their heirs and assigns, yearly and every year during the life of the said Robert Crawford, the sum of 60 *l.* sterling, clear above all deductions and outgoings whatsoever, by two equal half yearly payments in each and every year, during the life of the said Robert Crawford, and from and after payment thereof, and subject thereto, then to pay over the remainder of the rent arising out of the said hereby granted lands, from time to time, under the order of the said Robert Crawford ;” and then he covenants with them that a yearly rent of 80 *l.* clear above all deductions and outgoings whatsoever, shall be paid by rent reserved out of the hereby granted premises on every first day of May, and first day of November in each and every year during the life of the said Robert Crawford, by two equal portions, unto the said John Dawson Coates, George Simpson, and William Wilde, and the survivors and survivor of them, his and their heirs and assigns.

There is also another covenant in this deed of release, which is necessary for me to draw your Lordships attention to ; “and the said John Dawson Coates, George Simpson, and William Wilde, do hereby for themselves severally, and for their several and respective heirs and assigns, covenant and promise, to and with the said Robert Crawford, that in case the present lease of the said hereinbefore granted premises shall

shall happen to expire during the life of the said Robert Crawford, that then it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Robert Crawford to demise and let the same to such person or persons, and for such term and time, as he shall think proper, with the consent of the said John Dawson Coates, George Simpson, and William Wilde, or the survivors or survivor of them, his or their heirs or assigns, first had and obtained in writing, provided a yearly rent be reserved thereon, not less than the present yearly rent of 80 *l.* sterling;" and it appears that notwithstanding the conveyance by Robert Crawford, still that Robert Crawford was to have the power of granting leases, according to the power reserved to him, with their consent, taking care to reserve not less rent than was reserved before.

The special verdict further finds, that on the 11th of April 1811, Robert Crawford demised to David Gamble and John Rankin certain lands, containing in the whole about 210 acres, to have and to hold the said premises, unto the said David Gamble and John Rankin, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, from the 1st of November last past, for and during the lives of three persons there named, or for and during the full term and space of thirty-one years, which lives or term of years shall longest continue, they the said David Gamble and John Rankin, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, yielding and paying therefor and thereout, yearly and every year during the said term hereby demised unto the said Robert Crawford, his executors, administrators and assigns, the yearly rent of 89 *l.* Then there are all the covenants required in this lease, so that this lease is conformable to the power reserved in the indenture of 1761. It is further found, that this indenture was so made and executed by the consent of the said John Dawson Coates, George Simpson, and William Wilde.

It further appears, that Robert Crawford died in 1788, and that the present ejectment has been brought by the person next in remainder, according to the limitations of the settlement of 1762.

My Lords, we are of opinion that by the deeds granting the annuity in 1772, Robert Crawford had parted with the life-estate to which he had become entitled under the settlement; but nevertheless the life-estate originally vested in him was not destroyed by those deeds, as it might perhaps have been by a fine or feoffment purporting to convey the fee; an estate for his life still continued, though it was no longer vested in him; and by the deeds of 1772 an authority was reserved to him as between him and the persons to whom he conveyed his life-estate, enabling him to grant leases with their assent, upon certain conditions as to the amount of the rent to be reserved. This authority is reserved in the form of a covenant on their part to permit him so to lease, but we consider that form sufficient to effect the object of the parties, so far as they were concerned. Simpson, Coates and Wilde, the grantees of the life-estate, assented to the lease of 1781, and that lease is in other respects conformable to the authority reserved by the covenant. Upon these facts it is obvious that both Robert Crawford the lessor, and the present defendants, the lessees, were estopped, at least during his life, from questioning the validity of the lease at law, and if Coates, Simpson and Wilde, had attempted to disturb the lessees, a court of equity would have restrained them from doing so. It is true that Robert Crawford could not, after having conveyed his life-estate to Coates and others, derogate from the effect of that conveyance by an execution of his power; and the inability to derogate from a prior conveyance works what is usually called a suspension of a power. As, if land be granted to *A* and his heirs, to such uses as *B* shall appoint, and in the mean time to *B* for his life, or any greater estate, here *B* has a power to limit and appoint the uses of the fee, but if he makes a lease for years or for life, before he executes that power, common justice requires that he should not derogate from his own grant by a subsequent appointment of the fee, and his power, therefore, is suspended as far as regards the lease and the interest of the lessee, and his appointee must take subject to the lease. But the parts
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of this special verdict to which I have directed the attention of your Lordships show that the lease to the defendants was not in derogation of the estate granted to Coates, Simpson and Wilde, by the deeds of 1772, but rather in conformity to it.

The only question is, whether the lease, upon the death of Robert Crawford, became void as against the remainder-man, and we are of opinion that it did not; leases for years made in virtue of a power, are not derived out of the estate of the lessor. It is not essential to the validity of a leasing power, or of a lease granted in virtue of such a power, that the lessor should have any interest whatever in the lands demised, such powers are not unfrequently given to persons to whom no estate in the land is given. They are often and more often given to persons to whom as in the present instance a life-estate is also given. On such occasions they are more or less guarded according to the discretion of the settler with provisos as to rent and other matters for the benefit of the remainder-man, and so guarded, they are considered beneficial to the whole inheritance, and to all who may successively become entitled to portions of it, as providing the means of keeping the land continually in a proper state of cultivation. A leasing power given to a tenant for life is usually spoken of in our books as a power appendant to the estate of the tenant for life; and it is said that the estate of the lessee is in such a case derived out of the estate of the tenant for life, for such period of the term as he may happen to live. It would probably be more correct to say that it operates upon that estate, than to say it is derived out of it even during that period.

It is not necessary to say in the present case that a leasing power may not by the terms in which it is given be inseparably annexed to the estate of the tenant for life as to become void and inoperative, if he parts with his estate, and transfers it to another. This probably may be so by the terms in which the power is given, because he who gives it may give it with what qualifications he pleases, but, as I have

already observed, it is not essential to the validity of such a power that it should be appurtenant, or annexed to any estate in the land. It is also immaterial to the remainder-man whether or not it be so annexed, his security depends upon the conditions and qualifications under which the power is to be executed, and not upon the estate or interest of the person by whom it is executed. If these are not duly observed the lease is void as against him; and if they are duly observed it matters not to him whether the estate originally given to his predecessor continued vested in that predecessor at the time of granting the lease, or had been previously transferred to another person.

Many occasions arise in which it becomes important to the convenience of a tenant for life that he should transfer his estate to another; an execution of the leasing power after such a transfer cannot, for the reasons already given, be prejudicial to the remainder-man; and the reasons upon which such powers have been introduced show that it may be more beneficial to him that the leasing power should be retained, and continue to exist, than that it should be extinguished and annihilated. We ought not, therefore, to hold that such a power is extinguished by a transfer of the estate unless we see clearly, in the language of the deed whereby the power is created, that the donor of the power intended inseparably to annex it to the life-estate given, and to a continuance of that estate in the identical person to whom it is given; and this brings me to the consideration of the particular terms wherein his power is created, "Provided always, that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Jason Crawford, and John Crawford, and Ralph Henry Crawford respectively, when and as they shall respectively be in the actual possession of said lands, tenements and hereditaments hereinbefore granted by virtue of the limitations aforesaid, and not before, by any writing or writings under their respective hands and seals, attested by two or more credible witnesses, to make any lease or leases of all or any part of the said lands, tenements, hereditaments and premises,

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to any person or persons whatsoever, for any term or terms of years, not exceeding thirty-one years, or for one, two or three lives, or for any term of years not exceeding thirty-one years, or number of lives not exceeding three lives, so as such lease or any leases be made to commence in possession, and not in reversion, or at a day to come, and be not made without impeachment of waste, and so as upon all and every such lease or leases to made there be reserved yearly, payable during the continuance thereof, the best and most improved yearly rent which at the time of making thereof can or may be gotten for the same, and so as no fine, or sum of money, or other thing in lieu of a fine or sum of money, be taken for making such lease or leases, any thing herein contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding."

My Lords, this power is given to several who are to take in succession; and we consider the words "and not before," to be most important in the present case. For looking at the whole clause we do not find that the donor intended to annex the power to the estate; and we think all the words of the clause are best satisfied by construing it to mean only that every person to whom an estate for life is given may make leases after, though not before, the estate shall have once vested in him, and during its continuance, whether in him, or another deriving under him.

We have found no case in which the effect of a power worded like the present has come under the consideration of a court; and in the absence of an authority we think the construction that I have mentioned is the proper construction of this particular clause.

One other observation only remains to be made, and that is this, a lessee is in law and reason considered as a purchaser, even if he takes at the best rent that the land be worth at the time, because he forms his engagements and regulates his affairs upon the faith of his lease, and often expends his money in the improvement of the land, in confidence that he shall reap the benefit of his expenditure by the enjoyment of his term. And the estate of a purchaser is not to be taken from

from him unless it be for some good reason, founded in justice, or in the plain intention and expressions of the original settler of the estate; we think no such reason is to be found in the present case.

LORD CHANCELLOR.—My Lords, as it will be necessary to communicate the substance of this opinion to some noble lords who were present on the argument, I move your Lordships, therefore, that this house do proceed to give judgment in this case on Monday next.

Ordered accordingly.

Wednesday, 19th June 1822.

LORD CHANCELLOR.—My Lords, in the case of Long and Crawford your Lordships were pleased to propound the following question for the consideration of the Judges: “Whether according to the effect in the law of the several instruments and matters stated and found in the special verdict, the indenture of the 11th of April 1781, operated to demise, grant or limit the premises therein contained to David Gamble and John Rankin, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, for the lives of three persons therein named, and during the natural life of the survivor of them, or for and during the full space and term of thirty-one years, which lives or terms of years shall longest continue.

Your Lordships have had the unanimous opinion of the Judges upon that question, and it does not appear to me that there is any thing further I could suggest to your Lordships. The result of that is, that as far as the matter depends upon the present question, this judgment ought to be affirmed.

My Lords, attending to the value of this question, and considering that the property affected is but small, and as this court has decided in the same way as the court in Ireland, it does not appear to me to be improper that the judgment should be affirmed, with 150 *l.* costs.

My Lords, I do not enter into any discussion of the circumstances of the case, but I am a little anxious to say, that I desire it may not be understood that I have given any opinion whatever with respect to the decision of *Renn v. Buckley*.

No. 6.

Hele v. Bond (d).

14th and 16th March, 1684.—BY Lease and Release, and by fine, Sampson Hele made a voluntary settlement. In the release was contained the following proviso: "That if the said Sampson Hele shall at any time or times hereafter during his life be minded to alter and make void the uses limited to the sons of Sampson Hele the younger, and their issue male, and to his own issue male, and shall at any time, or from time to time during his life, by any instrument or writing, by him to be sealed, and with his own hand subscribed, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, who shall write their names as witnesses thereto, signify and declare the same, and thereby, or by any other writing or writings to be by him sealed and subscribed, and witnessed as aforesaid, shall limit, declare, or appoint the use of the premises to any other persons in any other manner than is before limited, and for any estate or estates in fee-simple, fee-tail, for life, or any number of years in possession, &c. And any such new limitation or appointment by any other writing, in like manner to be sealed and subscribed and witnessed from time to time, shall and may revoke and alter, and also make any other limitation of the premises by any other writing in like manner to be sealed and subscribed to any other persons, or in any other manner, or for any other estates in possession, &c. and so from time to time, and so often as the said Sampson Hele, the elder, shall think fit." Then the fine should enure to the new uses.

5th Oct. 1687.—Sampson Hele, senior, by deed-poll, setting forth *in hæc verba*, his said powers to revoke and limit new uses, and such new uses to revoke again, and limit other, and referring to such powers, did, according to the said powers, revoke the estates authorized to be revoked, and
pursuant

(d) Vide *supra*, p. 98. 323. 326. 328. n. 332.

pursuant to the same powers limited new uses. There was no power of revocation in this deed.

11th Oct. 1704.—Sampson Hele, senior, setting forth in like manner his powers in the first settlement, revoked the uses of the settlement, and also those of the deed-poll, and by virtue of his power *in the settlement*, and of all other powers limited new uses.

3d Feb. 1712.—The cause to try the validity of the last revocation came to be heard before Lord Chancellor Harcourt, when several authorities being cited, his Lordship took time to consider thereof; and a few days afterwards he declared it was a new case, and that he did not find any authority to warrant such a revocation, nor was there any instance in any of the authorities insisted on of such power of revocation, but he referred it to the Judges of B. R. for their opinion :

Whether the uses limited by the deed-poll of 5th October 1687 were well revoked by the deed of 11th October 1704, by virtue of the power of revocation contained in the deed of 16th March 1684, or by the recital of that power in the deed-poll of 1687?

10th July 1713.—Lord C. J. Parker, Powys, and Eyre, Justices, certified that they, with the late Mr. J. Powell, heard counsel upon the question, and were all four of opinion that the power of revocation and limitation of new uses in the deed of March 1684, was fully executed by the deed-poll of 1687; and that the further power in the deed of March 1684, to revoke any new limitation or appointment, was void in the creation as to such uses as should afterwards be newly limited, unless a power of revocation should be again expressly reserved, which they thought was not done by the recital of the powers in the deed-poll of 1687, and consequently that the uses limited in the deed-poll were not revoked by the deed of 1704, and that all four were ready to have given their opinion accordingly; but some of the counsel for the defendant desiring to be further heard, they three (since
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the death of Justice Powell) had heard counsel again, but saw no reason to alter their opinion.

18th July 1713.—Lord Harcourt concurred in the opinion of the Judges, and decreed accordingly.

1717.—From this decree there was an appeal. The reasons for the appellant were signed by Northey, Raymond, and Jodrell; and they insisted, 1. That the original power reserved to revoke all new uses was valid, for the intent of the party ought to be the guide in these cases; and this intent was as fully expressed by the proviso precedent to the uses in the deed of 1687, as it could ever be by any proviso subsequent, which had there been, it was admitted the uses created by the deed of 1704 would have been good. And 2. That the original powers were only partially executed by the deed-poll of 1687; and the further power to revoke such new uses was still subsisting, and such an original existing power had never been determined, before this, to be void. On the other hand, the only legal reason insisted upon by Powys and Cowper, who signed the reasons for the Respondent, was, that if such ambulatory and endless powers of revocation (powers within powers, and without precedent in the law) were allowed, purchasers, and marriage settlements, with ease might be defeated, and titles be rendered precarious and uncertain.

This case was ably argued in the House of Lords by Sir Thomas Powys and Sir Peter King for the Respondents, and by Sir Edward Northey for the Appellant.

Both sides insisted upon the Resolution in *Digges's case*, 1 Co. 173, as authorities in their favour.

For the Respondent, it was argued, that the power could be exercised but once. And they likened powers of this nature to conditions at common law; and that at common law such a continuing condition as this could not have been created. They enlarged upon the endless contests which a contrary doctrine would introduce, and the dangers and frauds to which it would subject purchasers, whilst on the other hand
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it was easy to add a power of revocation where such was the intention. And they moreover insisted, that as a power of revocation may be reserved *toties quoties*, this power was only tantamount to the usual power of revocation ; and being once fully executed without a new power reserved, was *functus officii*.

On behalf of the Appellant, it was argued, that as the other party admitted that a power of revocation *toties quoties* might be newly reserved, it was impossible to contend that this power, which in its first creation enabled such revocation *toties quoties*, was invalid. In the cases which had occurred the power was single, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to reserve a new power ; but in this case the first power prevented the necessity of any future power.

It was more consonant to the rule of law to limit all the uses in the first deed declaring the use of the fine (9 Co. 9,) and this was no greater stretch than a power to appoint by will : in which case the *last* will, although there were twenty, would prevail, or a power to appoint by the *last* deed the donee should execute in his life-time. It was in effect a declaration that the last uses he should declare only should stand.

In answer to the other objections, it was said, that the power was only for the life of the owner, and so uses could not be limited *in infinitum* ; nor was it dangerous to purchasers, as the future power would be fraudulent against them, and every purchaser would take a conveyance of the interest, as well as a limitation under the power, which would extinguish the future power.

But even admitting the weight of this objection, it was forcibly argued, that the recital of the powers in the deed of 1687 was tantamount to a declaration of his intention that such powers should continue, and therefore amounted to a reservation.

The decree however was affirmed in the House of Lords. The journals of the House of Lords state, that after hearing the Judges of the Court of King's Bench, as to the matter of law,

law, who continued of the same opinion, as was certified by them to the Court of Chancery, and also hearing *all* the other Judges, who concurred in opinion with the Judges of the Court of King's Bench, the appeal was dismissed, and the decree affirmed (*d*).

No. 7.

Williams and others v. Carter and others (e).

BY an Indenture, bearing date the 9th of August 1802, and made between the Reverend Thomas Carter of the first part, Mary his wife (by her then name and description of Mary Proctor, spinster), of the second part, and the Reverend Daniel Williams, clerk, Robert Philip Goodenough, clerk, Joseph Goodall, D. D., and William Carter, clerk, of the third part (being the settlement made previously to the marriage of the said Thomas Carter and Mary his wife), the expectant share of the said Mary Carter of and in the sum of 5,000 *l.* was assigned to the said trustees, upon trust to invest the same in real or government securities, or in the public funds, and to stand possessed of the same upon the trusts therein mentioned, for the benefit of the said Thomas Carter and Mary his wife, and their issue. And it was provided, "that it shall and may be lawful for the said Daniel Williams, Robert P. Goodenough, Joseph Goodall, and William Carter, and the survivors and survivor of them, his executors, administrators and assigns, in the mean time, after such investments shall be made as aforesaid, and until the trusts hereinbefore declared concerning the said stocks, funds and securities, shall be fully performed, with the consent in writing of the said Thomas Carter and Mary his wife, or of the survivor of them, to change such stocks, funds and securities for others of the same or the like nature, as often as it shall be thought expedient, subject nevertheless to the trusts hereinbefore declared." And by the said Indenture the said
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(*d*) Journ. Dom. Proc. 9 May, 1717. (*e*) Vide *supra*, p. 142.

Thomas Carter covenanted with the said trustees, "that if at any time or times thereafter during the said intended coverture, any hereditaments or real estate should descend unto, devolve upon, or become vested in possession, reversion or remainder, in her the said Mrs. Proctor, or in the said Thomas Carter, in her right, then and in such case, and immediately after the same should happen, all and singular such hereditaments and real estate should be conveyed, settled, and assured upon and for the same trusts and purposes, and subject to the powers, provisoes and declarations as thereinbefore expressed and declared, concerning the said stocks, funds and securities, or as near thereto as the nature of real estate would admit of."

By Indentures of Lease and Release, bearing date respectively the 18th and 19th March 1806, and a common recovery suffered, in pursuance of the said Indenture of Release, certain hereditaments and real estate were conveyed and limited to such uses as Henry Proctor, the father of the said Mary Carter, should appoint, and in default of appointment, to the use of all and every the daughter and daughters of the said Henry Proctor, as tenants in common, and the several and respective heirs and assigns of such daughter and daughters for ever.

The said Henry Proctor died in January 1815, without having made any appointment of the said estates, leaving the said Mary Carter, Jane Proctor, and Emma Anne Proctor his only daughters.

The said Thomas Carter, and Mary his wife, Jane Proctor, and Emma Anne Proctor, contracted to sell the said estates to which they became entitled under the Indentures of the 18th and 19th March 1806; and in February 1818 a bill was filed by the trustees of the marriage settlement, praying (among other things), that it might be declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to have the covenant contained in the said Indenture of settlement of 9th August 1802 specifically performed; and that the third part or share of the hereditaments and premises, to which the said Thomas Carter and

Mary his wife, in her right, had succeeded, ought to stand settled to uses, or upon trusts, and subject to powers similar to or corresponding with the trusts and powers declared and expressed in the said Indenture of settlement, as nearly as the nature of the said third part or share would admit; and that it might be further declared that such powers ought to include powers of sale, and of partition and exchange over the said third part or share, with all necessary directions for giving effect thereto.

By a decree made on the 8th May 1818 it was declared that the share and interest of the defendant, Mary Carter, in the premises in question, were subject to the covenant contained in the settlement of 9th August 1802; and that the settlement to be made in pursuance of that covenant ought to contain powers of sale and exchange by the trustees, with such consent as is required for changing the securities, wherein the share in the 5,000 *l.* mentioned in the settlement is invested.

No. 8.

Appointment and Release to Uses to bar Dower (f).

THIS INDENTURE of four parts, made the 10th day of February, in the 48th year, &c. and in the year of our Lord 1808, between John Smith, of, &c. of the first part, Thomas Brown, of, &c. of the second part, William Taylor, of, &c. of the third part, and Samuel Williams, of, &c. of the fourth part. WHEREAS by Indentures of Lease and Release, bearing date respectively the first and second days of September 1804, the release being made, or expressed to be made, between Richard Sims, gentleman, and Mary his wife, of the first part, the said John Smith, of the second part, and the said Thomas Brown, of the third part, and by a fine *sur conuzance de droit come ceo*, &c. duly acknowledged and levied by the said Richard Sims, and Mary his wife, in or as of Michaelmas Term, in the 44th year of the reign of his present Majesty, in pursuance of

(f) Vide *supra*, p. 194.

of a covenant for that purpose entered into by the said Richard Sims, in and by the said Indenture of Release, and by force of a declaration of the uses of the said fine in the same Indenture contained; in consideration of the sum of 1,000 *l.* to the said Richard Sims, paid by the said John Smith, the messuages, lands, and other hereditaments hereinafter particularly mentioned, and intended to be hereby appointed and released, with their appurtenances, were conveyed, limited and assured, To such uses, upon such trusts, for such intents and purposes, and with, under, and subject to such powers, provisoes, agreements, and declarations, as the said John Smith should, by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, with or without power of revocation, to be by him sealed and delivered, in the presence of, and to be attested by two or more credible witnesses, from time to time direct, limit or appoint. And for default of, and until such direction, limitation, or appointment, To the use of the said John Smith, and his assigns, during his life, with a limitation to the use of the said Thomas Brown, and his heirs, during the life of the said John Smith, in trust for him the said John Smith and his assigns, during his life, with remainder to the use of the said John Smith, his heirs and assigns for ever. AND WHEREAS the said John Smith hath contracted and agreed with and to the said William Taylor, for the absolute sale to him the said William Taylor, of the messuages, lands, and other hereditaments, hereinafter particularly mentioned and intended to be hereby appointed and released, with their appurtenances, and the fee-simple and inheritance thereof, in possession, free from all incumbrances, at or for the price or sum of 1,000 *l.* AND WHEREAS the said William Taylor is desirous that the said messuages, lands, and other hereditaments, should be conveyed and limited to the uses hereinafter expressed or declared of or concerning the same, NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH, that in pursuance and part performance of the said agreement on the part of the said John Smith, and for and in consideration of the sum of 1,000 *l.* of
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lawful money of Great Britain to the said John Smith in hand well and truly paid, by the said William Taylor, at or immediately before the sealing, and delivery of these presents, (the receipt of which said sum of 1,000 l. the said John Smith doth hereby admit and acknowledge, and of, and from the same, and every part thereof, doth acquit, release and discharge the said William Taylor, his heirs, appointees, executors, administrators and assigns, for ever by these presents,) and pursuant to, and by force and virtue, and in exercise and execution of the power or authority to him for this purpose given or limited by the hereinbefore in part recited Indenture of Release, and the fine levied in pursuance thereof, and of every or any other power or authority in any wise enabling him in this behalf, He, the said John Smith, doth by this present deed or writing, by him sealed and delivered in the presence of the two credible persons whose names are intended to be hereupon indorsed as witnesses, attesting the sealing and delivery of these presents by him the said John Smith, direct, limit, and appoint, That the messuages, lands, and other hereditaments, hereinafter particularly mentioned and intended to be hereby granted and released, with their appurtenances, shall henceforth go, remain and be, To the uses, upon and for the trusts, intents and purposes, and with under and subject to the powers, provisoes, agreements, and declarations, hereinafter expressed or declared of or concerning the same. AND THIS INDENTURE ALSO WITNESSETH, that in pursuance and further performance of the said agreement on the part of the said John Smith, and in consideration of the sum of 1,000 l. so paid by the said William Taylor as hereinbefore is mentioned, and for and in consideration of the sum of 10 s. of like lawful money to the said Thomas Brown paid by the said William Taylor, at or immediately before the sealing and delivery of these presents (the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged), He the said Thomas Brown, at the request and by the direction of the said John Smith (testified by his being a party to and

sealing and delivering these presents), hath bargained, sold, and released, and by these presents doth bargain, sell, and release, and he the said John Smith hath granted, bargained, sold, aliened, released, and confirmed, and by these presents doth grant, bargain, sell, alien, release, and confirm, unto the said William Taylor, (in his actual possession now being, by virtue of a bargain and sale to him thereof made by the said John Smith and Thomas Brown, in consideration of 5s. each, by an Indenture, bearing date the day next before the day of the date of these presents, for the term of one whole year, commencing from the day next before the day of the date of the said Indenture of bargain and sale, and by force of the statute made for transferring uses to possessions,) and his heirs, All, &c. [Parcels and general words.] And the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, yearly and other rents, issues and profits of all and singular the messuages, lands, and other hereditaments hereinbefore granted and released, or expressed and intended so to be; and all the estate, right, title, interest, inheritance, use, trust, possession, property, possibility, claim, and demand whatsoever, both at law and in equity, of them the said John Smith and Thomas Brown, and each of them, of, in, to, from, and out of the same premises, and every part and parcel thereof, To have and to hold the said messuages, lands, hereditaments, and all and singular other the premises hereinbefore granted and released, or expressed, and intended so to be, with their appurtenances, unto the said William Taylor and his heirs, to the uses, upon and for the trusts, intents and purposes, and with, under, and subject to the powers, provisoes, agreements, and declarations hereinafter expressed or declared of or concerning the same [Covenant from Thomas Brown that he has done no act to incumber.] And it is hereby agreed and declared between and by the parties to these presents, that the direction, limitation, and appointment, grant, releases, and confirmation hereinbefore contained, and hereby respectively made as aforesaid, shall operate and enure to
such

such uses, upon such trusts, to and for such intents and purposes, and with, under, and subject to such powers, provisos, agreements, and declarations as the said William Taylor shall by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, with or without power of revocation, to be by him sealed and delivered in the presence of and to be attested by two or more credible witnesses, from time to time direct, limit or appoint; and for default of, and until such direction, limitation, or appointment, and so far as every or any such direction, limitation, or appointment shall not extend, To the use of the said William Taylor and his assigns during his life, without impeachment of waste; and after the determination of that estate by forfeiture or otherwise in his life-time, to the use of the said Samuel Williams and his heirs during the life of the said William Taylor, in trust for him the said William Taylor and his assigns during his life, and to the end and intent that neither the present nor any future wife of the said William Taylor may become entitled to dower out of or in the said premises, or any part thereof; and immediately after the determination of the estate hereinbefore limited to the said Samuel Williams and his heirs during the life of the said William Taylor, to the use of him the said William Taylor, his heirs and assigns for ever. [Usual covenants for title.] In witness, &c.

No. 9.

Certificate of the Judges in WRIGHT v. WAKEFORD (g).

I AM of opinion that the power of sale in this case was duly and effectually executed by the Indentures of the 3d and 4th days of March 1788. The only objection made to the execution of the deeds, is, that the signing of the consent of the *Woods* is not properly attested; but it appears to me, that though the form of attestation does not contain in it the word "signed," the witnesses must be understood to have attested the

(g) *Vide supra*, p. 248.

the signing as well as sealing of the deeds by the two *Woods*. Whether the omission of the word "signed" in the attestation arose from a mistake of the witnesses, or some clerk who wrote the attestation, as in the common form of attesting the execution of a deed, does not appear: but whatever was the cause of it, I think that that omission is immaterial.

From the circumstance of the *Woods* being made parties to the deed of release, and joining in the conveyance of the estate, it might very naturally be supposed that the thing to be attested was not merely signing and sealing, but the execution of the deed in the ordinary way; and as the deed was signed by the *Woods*, I think that the attestation must be understood to apply to the signing as well as the sealing and delivery. Though by the rules of law signing is not necessary to the completion of a deed, yet by long-established and universal practice signing is now considered as an essential part of the execution of a deed; and I cannot believe that any man of business now living has accepted, or would accept, a deed that was not signed, or would attest the execution of a deed that was not signed; and therefore, when the witnesses in this case attested the execution of the deed by the *Woods*, they must be understood to attest the signing. I am also of opinion that in this case, if for want of the word "signed" the first attestation had been insufficient, the subsequent attestation by the same witnesses would have supplied the defect; for it appears to me, that by the second attestation the witnesses must be understood only to have done that more formally which they had in effect done before, and which they must know to have been done, by seeing their signatures upon the instrument. I am also of opinion, that if the former attestation had not been made, the second attestation alone would have been sufficient; as I think that the witnesses might at any time after the execution of the deeds, and the consent of the *Woods* under their hands and seals, have signed the attestation. The word "attest," in its strict and proper sense, I apprehend, means only witnesses, or
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bearing witness to ; and the principal object in requiring that an instrument should be executed in the presence of witnesses is, that they may see that the instrument is properly and fairly executed ; but in the ordinary use of the word "attest," as applied to the execution of deeds, it is understood to require that the witnesses should attest in writing ; the principal end of which seems to be to preserve evidence of the instrument's being executed in the presence of the witnesses required ; but I know no rule or case which requires that the attestation should be immediately written at the time of the execution of the instrument, or within any particular limited time after its execution ; and therefore, so long as the witnesses live and remember the transaction, they may, I think, properly write or sign their attestation ; and unless there is some evidence of fraud in the case, they must be presumed fairly to do so. The death of the party whose act they are to attest, does not, I think, furnish any objection to their signing the attestation after his death, because when he has once signed or executed in the presence of witnesses the instrument to be attested, he has done all that is to be done by him, and as far as respects him, it is completed, and he cannot rescind or annul it although it will not be effectual as against others, unless the person to whom it is delivered shall procure the witnesses to attest it. The only objection that I know to have been made to the witnesses signing their attestation at a distant time, is, that it might afford an opportunity for fraud ; but I think that this objection is of no weight. If the fraud apprehended is, that witnesses might be prevailed upon fraudulently to attest an instrument which they had not seen executed, such fraud would not be prevented by requiring that the attestation should appear to be signed at the time of the execution of the instrument, because the witnesses might nevertheless, without any danger of detection, fraudulently sign an attestation, and either put no date to it, in which case it would be presumed to be written at the time of the execution of the instrument, or put
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the same date with that of the execution of the instrument. If the fraud apprehended is, that the witnesses might be imposed upon, and prevailed upon honestly to sign an instrument which they had not seen executed, that appears to me to be quite beyond the bounds of probability.

J. MANSFIELD.

WE are of opinion, that the power of sale in this case was not duly and effectually executed by the Indentures of the 3d and 4th days of March 1788. According to the provisions of the release of the 11th of June 1766, the consent of Thomas Wood the elder and Thomas Wood the younger, or the survivor of them, was required to the due execution of that power, and to this consent two circumstances were made necessary; first, that it should be testified by some writing under their hands and seals; and, secondly, that the facts of their putting their hands and seals to such writing should be attested by two or more witnesses; so that the point in question appears to us to be simply, whether the attestation, written on the Indentures of March 1788, asserts both these facts; that is, whether the word "sealed" necessarily implies that the parties who put their seals to it put also their hands to it, or signed it in the presence of the witnesses, which we are of opinion it does not do, according to the true interpretation and ordinary sense of the word "sealed." If it were to be determined as a matter of fact, whether the signature of the Woods was made in the presence of the same witnesses who attested their having sealed the Indenture of March 1788, a Jury, under all the circumstances to which their attention might be directed, might, perhaps not improperly, presume the affirmative of such question; but as a question of law, we think it must be determined by the true construction of the terms of the attestation; to which, it appears to us, that our consideration must be confined; and we do not think that the signature of Thomas Wood and his son is comprehended in the words made use of in the attestation.

tation. And we are further of opinion, that the attestation required to constitute a due and effectual execution of the power, ought to make a part of the same transaction with the signing and sealing the writing, testifying the assent and approbation of Thomas Wood and his son; such being the usual and common way of attesting the execution of all instruments requiring attestation; which, we think, the parties creating the power had in their contemplation, and intended, and not an attestation to be written at a distance of time after all the parties had testified their assent and approbation.

J. HEATH.

S. LAWRENCE.

A. CHAMBRE.

No. 10.

Tempest v. Sabine (h).

Pollexfen v. Adelmere.

CHANCERY, 29th June 1743.

24th November 1702. By a marriage settlement, a term of 600 years was created to raise and pay to younger children such sums as the father should think fit, and as he by deed or will should appoint, and subject to and chargeable with the same upon trust to attend the inheritance. The father, who was tenant for life, and the eldest son of the man who was tenant in tail, suffered a recovery to the use of the father in fee, but the recovery did not destroy the term. The father and son made a mortgage in fee, and the father covenanted not to make any appointment of portions to over-reach the mortgage. By his will he devised the estates to trustees, to sell and pay the incumbrances and his debts; and out of the remainder of the money to pay his second son 1,000*l.*, and to his two daughters 3,000*l.* a-piece. The second son
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(h) Vide *supra*, p. 290, n.

and two daughters insisted that the will operated as an appointment of portions under the term, and that they were entitled prior to the mortgages. By the decree made by the Lord Chancellor, after stating that a question arising whether the portions and maintenance given by the said will out of the residue of the money arising by sale of the real estate, ought to be considered as an execution of the power vested in the said testator by his marriage settlement, touching portions and maintenances for his younger children, and as a charge on the term of 600 years thereby limited, his Lordship declared that the same could not, under the circumstances of the case, be considered as an execution of the said power, or a charge on the said term of 600 years; and therefore,

Did order and decree the said Wm. Freeman, the surviving trustee of the said term, to assign the same to attend the inheritance, or for the benefit of any purchaser or purchasers of the said estate, as the said Master shall direct.

No. 11.

Wallop v. Earl of Portsmouth, ROLLS, 25th April 1752 (i).

BY INDENTURES of Lease and Release, of the 25th and 26th days of May 1742, the Release being of four parts, and made between William Sloper, Charles Smith, and Alexander Chalmers, of the first part; John Wallop and Catherine his wife, (afterwards Lord and Lady Lymington), of the second part; Thomas Vivian, Esq. of the third part; and Joseph Ashton, Gent. of the fourth part, all the several estates of Lady Lymington were conveyed to several uses, and from and after the deaths of Lord and Lady Lymington and the survivor of them, To the use of such child or children, sons or daughters, or solely to one of them, or
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(i) Vide *supra*, p. 290.

after to be begotten, on the said Lady Lymington, by her said husband, or by any other husband or husbands that she should after marry, in such shares, &c. and for such estates, &c. and subject to such conditions, and to the payment of any sum or sums not exceeding 2,000 *l.* to any person except such child or children of the said Lady Lymington, and at such time and for such uses as Lady Lymington, notwithstanding her coverture, should by any writing, executed by her in the presence of three witnesses, appoint, with or without power of revocation, and with or without power of limitation of new and other uses; in default of appointment to the first and other sons in tail, with remainders over.

The estates were vested in trustees by an act of Parliament, to sell, and pay debts, and lay out the money in the purchase of other estates, to be settled with the estates unsold to the old uses.

Lord Lymington died the 18th November 1749. Lady Lymington died 15th April 1750, without making any appointment, in pursuance of the before-mentioned power in the Indentures of Lease and Release of the 25th and 26th days of March, 1742, unless by will hereinafter mentioned.

Lady Lymington by her will, willed and desired that all her debts, legacies, and funeral expenses, be first paid and satisfied out of her real and personal estate, which she did thereby charge with the same; and gave and bequeathed unto her sons, Barton Wallop and Bennet Wallop, the sum of 2,000 *l.* a-piece, and gave and bequeathed unto her son Henry Wallop the sum of 1,000 *l.* Then she gave other specific and pecuniary legacies. And to her daughter Catherine the sum of 7,000 *l.* besides the 3,000 *l.* she was entitled to by her marriage settlement, which would make her portion 10,000 *l.* to be paid her when she should attain the age of 21 years, or be married: but in case she should happen to die before she attained the age of 21 years, or be married, then her will and desire was that the said sum of 7,000 *l.* should

go and be equally divided amongst her younger children. And lastly, all the rest and residue of her goods, chattels, pictures, furniture, and estates both real and personal whatsoever and wheresoever she died possessed of, (after the above legacies and funeral expenses should be first paid and satisfied) she gave, devised, and bequeathed, unto her eldest son John Wallop, Esquire, commonly called Lord Viscount Lymington, his heirs and assigns.

Quære.—Whether the will, under the circumstances aforesaid, is executed according to law, or not; and if the same will operate as a sufficient appointment by virtue of the deed of the 26th of May 1742, or not?

The answer to this query will depend upon several others, and I am of opinion that the power might be executed by will. That the execution of this will in the manner stated is a sufficient execution within the power. That though she does not refer to the power, nor describes the particular lands subject to it, otherwise than by the words *my* estate, yet if she had no other real estate, (as from its being stated) that all her estates were settled, I presume she had not, I think the will, as 'penned, must from necessity be understood to mean the estates included in her power.

That the several sums of money given to her children and others were charged by virtue of the will and power, so far as her power extended; and,

That the real estate, subject to those charges, is well passed by the will, as an appointment to John Wallop, her eldest son.

D. Ryder, 24th April 1750.

His honour did declare, that the appointment made by the said late Lady Lymington of 2,000 *l.* to her son, the plaintiff, Barton Wallop; of 2,000 *l.* to her son, the plaintiff, Bennet, Wallop; of 1,000 *l.* to her son, the plaintiff, Henry Wallop,

of 7,000 *l.* to her daughter, the plaintiff, Catherine Wallop ; and of 500 *l.* to the defendant, Jeffery Ekins ; 100 *l.* to Elizabeth Barton, wife of Jeffery Barton ; 100 *l.* to Matthew Barton ; 100 *l.* to Montague Barton ; 100 *l.* to George Reynoldson ; 10 *l.* to Mary Brett ; and 10 *l.* to Ann Horsley, is a good appointment. And did order and decree that it be referred to the said Master, to compute interest on all the several sums in the said appointment before mentioned, except the 7,000 *l.*, to the plaintiff Catherine Wallop, after the rate of 4 *l.* per cent. per annum, from the end of one year after the death of the said late Lady Lymington. And it was ordered, that the said several sums, and interest, to be computed as aforesaid, be paid by the defendants John Sanderson and Charles Randolph, out of the surplus of the money which should arise by sale of estates vested in them by the said Act of Parliament. And that the rents and profits thereof, after the other trusts mentioned in the said act of Parliament were performed, and the several other sums appointed for the several other persons before named, and interest for the same, were to be paid them respectively. And in case there should be any surplus of the money which should arise by sale of the said estate, after the execution of the trusts contained in the said act of Parliament, and the payment of the said several sums in the appointment before mentioned, and interest as aforesaid, it was ordered, that the same be laid out in the purchase of lands, with the approbation of the said Master : and such lands were to be conveyed to the defendant, Lord Lymington, and his heirs ; and until such purchase should be made, it was ordered that such surplus be laid out in the purchase of South Sea annuities, subscribed in the name and with the privity of the said Accountant-General ; and he was to declare the trust thereof, subject to the further order of the Court. And it was ordered that the interest of such South Sea annuities be paid to the same persons as would be entitled to the rents and profits of the lands if purchased.

No. 12.

Fox v. Gregg (k).

Duchy Court of Lancaster, before the Chancellor of the Duchy of the county Palatine of Lancaster, assisted by Mr. Justice Le Blanc and Mr. Justice Heath.

The facts were stated by Mr. Justice Le Blanc in giving judgment as follows :

This cause comes before the Court by appeal from the decree pronounced by the Vice-Chancellor of the county Palatine of Lancaster. The cause was originally instituted by Esther Marsland. The cause was revived by her executor, Adam Fox, and the decree of the Vice-Chancellor, by which it was brought to this Court, declares the appointment by the testatrix, Mary Hamilton, of the moiety of the testator's estate to be illusory and void ; and that the moiety is to be applied in such manner as the will of the testator directs ; and it orders the monies to be divided in eighteen proportions.

In order the better to understand the cause, I will shortly state the terms of the testator's will creating the power ; the appointment under the will, and some view of the facts produced from the prodigious mass of papers now before me. The facts are these —Robert Hamilton, merchant, of Manchester, by will, duly made on the 11th July, 1777, devised his real estate to be converted into money, and added to his personal estate, and directed the residue to be divided in two parts. He gave one moiety to Mary Hamilton his wife, for her own use and benefit, and the other moiety was to be put out at interest, and that interest to be paid her during her life. After her death, he directs, “ the same shall be paid to and divided among my cousins, viz.:—The children of my late uncles, Robert Hamilton and John Hamilton, and
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(k) Vide *supra*, p. 310, 576.

of my late aunt Mary Hobson, and my cousin Thomas Davenport, the children of my late uncle Edward Holt, and the grandchildren of my late uncle Robert Holt, deceased, in such shares and proportions, manner and form, as my said wife shall, by any her deed or deeds, writings, or by her last will and testament in writing, notwithstanding her coverture, to be by her duly executed in the presence of two or more witnesses, direct, order, and appoint."—Then comes these words,—“ And in default of such direction, order, or appointment, I give and bequeath the same unto my said cousins, to be equally divided amongst them, *share and share alike* : and it is my will and mind that the child or children of such of my cousins as are now, or at the time of my decease, may be dead, or of such of them who shall die during the life of my said wife, shall stand in the place of their deceased parent or parents, and be entitled to such interest and benefit as the parent or parents of such child or children would have been entitled to by this my will, in case he or she had survived my said wife. And I nominate and appoint my said wife, and William Crane, executrix and executor of this my will.”—The facts which occurred after the will was made are these :—The testator, Robert Hamilton, died the latter end of 1780, or the beginning of 1781, without having revoked, or in any manner altered his will.

After his death, Robert Hamilton, who was his heir at law, and eldest son of Robert Hamilton, the deceased uncle of the testator, claimed to be entitled to and took possession of a copyhold estate situated at Sowerby, the property of the testator, because it was undisposed of, and had not been surrendered to the use it was to be applied to under the will. This, it must be observed, does not make any difference in the will, because if it was the intention of the testator to have this copyhold surrendered, it was to form a part of his general fund, therefore that circumstance may be laid out of the case.

On the 5th of May 1792, in the life time of the testator's
cousin

cousin Robert Hamilton, the testator's widow and executrix, Mary Hamilton, made a will properly attested:—In that will, after reciting the power given her by her deceased husband to divide and appoint one moiety of his personal estate amongst his cousins, in such shares and proportions as she should by deed or will, direct, limit, or appoint; she further adds, that Robert Hamilton, one of such cousins, being the eldest son of her late husband's uncle, Robert Hamilton, had since his death claimed, and was then in possession of, a copyhold estate of which her said husband was seised in fee, and which he intended to devise by his will, but which did not pass thereby for want of having been surrendered to the use thereof; and that she therefore considered the said Robert Hamilton, the son, and his issue, as sufficiently provided for by such copyhold estate; and she, the said Mary Hamilton, declared her will, and directed and appointed the said moiety of the residue of her deceased husband's real and personal estate to be paid and divided as follows; that is to say, the sum of one shilling, (part thereof) be paid unto Robert Hamilton, the eldest son of her late husband's uncle Robert Hamilton, if he should be living, and if he should be dead, then to his issue, as and for and in full of his or his issue's share of the said moiety, and that the remainder of the moiety should be divided into so many and such shares and portions as the same would have been divided into under her said husband's will, in case the said Robert Hamilton, the son, had died without issue.

In 1794, after the making of this will, Robert Hamilton, the eldest son of the heir at law of the uncle of the testator, died, leaving issue four or more children, namely Robert Hamilton, of Bramhall, in the county of Chester, farmer, his eldest son and heir at law; Ann Clark, of Bullock Smithy, in the said county, widow; Margaret Downing, wife of George Downing, of Marple, in the said county, and others.

In 1806, Mary, the widow and executrix of the testator,
her

made a codicil, and after giving certain legacies "confirms her will in all respects, except as to the legacies hereby altered;" at the time of making this codicil Robert Hamilton was dead, but had left children.—She lived to 1810, and then died.

The case was argued at great length, by W. D. Evans, Duckworth and Lyon, Sugden, J. Williams, and Richards, for different parties.

It was admitted that the heir could not be put to his election, *Judd v. Pratt*, 15 Ves. 390. *Evans* in support of the appeal, insisted that the appointment by the will was valid at law, and the equitable doctrine did not apply, in this case, because the appointee of the illusory share died in the life-time of the testatrix. Illusory appointments have only been relieved against at the suit of parties deluded. The original equity is personal. The doctrine ought not to be extended, for it is against the intention. The rule requires a fair distribution. The general doctrine has been confined by the late cases, *Spencer v. Spencer*, 5 Ves. 362; *Butcher v. Butcher*, 9 Ves. 381, 16 Ves. 15. The doctrine does not prevail where there is a provision *aliunde*. This shows the personal nature of the equity. But at all events, the subsequent codicil made good the will. On Robert's death, she might exclude him, his children, and representatives. She could not have made an appointment in his favour. The codicil is executed by two witnesses.

Sugden, contra, contended that the power did not authorize an exclusive appointment, *Kemp v. Kemp*, 5 Ves. 849, and that Robert was not sufficiently provided for so as to authorize the widow to exclude him in effect, 5 Ves. 861; 2 Scho. and Lef. 151; 1 Ves. and Bea. 97. The appointment, therefore, by the will, was illusory and void, and the codicil did not give effect to it as a new will, or operate as an appointment, *Holmes v. Coghill*, 7 Ves. 499, 12 Ves. 206; *Lane v. Wilkins*, 10 East, 241; *Hamilton v. Royse*, 2 Scho. and Lef. 315; *Cadogan v. Sloane*, App. No. 24, to 6th edit. of Sugd.

on Purch. The will must stand as it did at the time of making it. For. 26.

Mr. Justice Le Blanc (after having taken time to consider) pronounced the following judgment :

It was fully admitted by counsel for the Appellant that the appointment of the moiety in the will of Mary Hamilton could not be supported, inasmuch as it gave *one shilling* only to Robert Hamilton, one of the cousins of the testator; and whatever doubts may have arisen in a court of equity, as to what is to be considered a proper appointment of this moiety under the will of the testator, there can be no doubt that the appointment in this will executed by Mary, wife of the testator, was the same as no appointment at all; but then it was contended that the person to whom this residuary bequest had been made was to be considered as not existing at the time her codicil was made; and if he was not to be considered in existence, none of the parties could take advantage of the will as if he had been living when the codicil was made. It was further contended, that this codicil of 1806 operated as a new deed. Robert Hamilton was dead, and taking that to be so, no appointment could be made to him, because he was out of the way. Now, whatever weight this might carry, under a supposition that Robert Hamilton had left no issue, it appears to us that his having left issue is an answer to this objection, and sufficient to decide the present question before the Court. It is observed, that the original testator, Robert Hamilton, considers to whom he will give this moiety, and his mind is obviously bent on the persons: he describes them as his cousins, and then he particularizes the stock from which his cousins spring: namely, the children of his late uncles, Robert Hamilton, and John Hamilton, and of his aunt Mary Hobson. In addition to those, he mentions his cousin, Thomas Davenport, the children of his uncle, Edward Holt, and the grandchildren of his uncle Robert Holt, which shows he meant his cousins once removed, and that he had no intention to convert his estate to the use
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of the children of uncles and aunts farther removed; and when he states that it is for such children who stand in the place of their parent or parents deceased, it clearly proves that it was his will, at all events, the children should stand in the place of their parents, as to any benefit the deceased cousins were to derive under this will; and it is clear that in case an appointment had been made, the benefit was to be derived by those persons. The interest of this moiety being by her to be disposed of according to her husband's will, could it be said that she had the power to apply it differently, and create a new interest after her death? The testator has clearly distinguished the persons to be benefited, by directing it to go in a regular line, namely, among those whom he considers the children of his uncles, and it is clear to me that he was contemplating, at the time he made his will, the death of those who might die, and the interest of those who might outlive them. If his wife, at whose death the appointment could not take place, knew the way this interest would apply, and appointed it to go contrary to the will of the testator, of course it decides the question; for in that case will the appointment be looked at, or will her codicil, by which she confirmed her appointment, be valid? It cannot be valid, inasmuch as it has appointed this moiety while there were others in existence to whom some appointment ought to have been made, and to whom none was made, *videlicet*, Robert Hamilton and his issue. There were his children, who ought to stand in his place, and have such appointment of shares as a court of equity might limit. I have considered this question; and my opinion is, that the object of the testator's will was to give this moiety to his cousins, and that his putting the children in the situation of the parent or parents is a clear definition of his will; such we think was the intention of the testator; his object was to put the children in the situation of the parent in respect to this moiety, and it matters not how the will gives the power of appointment to the widow. Could it be contended, if all the cousins had died in

her life-time, and had left children, the wife's power of appointment would have enabled her to appoint to one child in exclusion of the whole, especially after the testator had selected the children of his uncles and aunt, to be objects of his bounty? Supposing that all the children of his uncle should be dead, the testator, at the time of making his will, directs that the child or children of his cousins deceased, either at the time of making his will, or who may die during the life of his wife, shall be entitled to such interest or benefit as the parent or parents would have been entitled to in case they had survived his wife. He describes Robert Hamilton, John Hamilton, and Edward Holt, his uncles, and Mary Hobson, his aunt, as the stock which is to be benefited, and the descendants of those persons were to receive benefit in the appointment of the moiety by the widow. For this reason, it appears to me that the appointment in the will of Mary Hamilton is invalid; and therefore the fund becomes applicable to the use of the will of the testator. I therefore shall submit to the Chancellor of the Duchy, that the decree of the Vice-Chancellor, declaring the appointment by the testatrix illusory and void, should be affirmed, and the costs of all the parties paid out of the fund; and the decree of the Vice-Chancellor was accordingly affirmed.

No. 13.

Earl of Cardigan v. Montague.

Reg. Lib. A. 1754, fol. 406 (l).

This case arose upon a question of Election.

It appeared that the late Duke of Montague, under a power contained in his marriage settlement, executed leases to the defendant, Edward Montague, who executed declarations of trust,

(l) Vide *supra*, p. 321, 585, 597, 613, 627, 631, 634, 640, 642, 643, 646, 660, 661.

trust, declaring such leases to be made in trust for the Duke ; and the defendants prayed an inquiry as to the *quantum* of the rent, &c. before they were put to their election, and hoped that the Court would thereupon first determine the validity or invalidity of such leases.

Whereupon it was referred to Master Montague, to look into the several leases which were made by the Duke to Edward Montague, of the settled estate, which were then subsisting, and to inquire what powers were vested in the Duke for leasing the estates, and to state his opinion thereon.

The Master by his report stated that he had inquired what powers were vested in the Duke ; and that the only power which was vested in him was contained in a settlement of Jan. 1704, in the words following ; “ Provided also, that it shall be lawful for the said Earl Montague, and John (the late Duke,) as they should be in possession during their lives respectively, by Indenture under his or their respective hand or hands, and seal or seals, attested by two or more credible witnesses, to make any lease or leases of all those iron-works and furnaces in the city of Southampton, and of all other the lands, tenements, woods, hereditaments, rights, privileges, and other things, mentioned in and agreed to be demised by the Earl, by an Indenture bearing date the 29th Dec. 1701, and certain deeds therein recited, for such term and terms, and under such rents, covenants, and agreements, as are therein agreed on, or to any person or persons, from time to time, for any term or number of years absolute, not exceeding thirty-one years, or for any number of years determinable on one, two, or three lives in possession or reversion, or by way of future interest, so as there be not in being at one and the same time any lease or leases for years absolute, for above thirty-one years in the whole, and so as all such leases, determinable on life or lives, be not to continue longer than for three lives, and so as upon every such lease there be reserved such rents or payments, or more, as by the said Indentures thereinbefore referred to was mentioned and agreed to be

reserved; and also, by any Indenture in like manner to be made and attested, to make any lease or leases of any of the said messuages in the county of Middlesex, for the encouragement of re-building the same, for any term or terms not exceeding sixty-one years from the making thereof, at and under the like respective rents as were paid for the same on the first building thereof, or more; and also by an Indenture, in like manner to be made and attested, to make any lease or leases of all or any other part or parcel, parts or parcels of the same premises before mentioned, other than the said capital messuage called Ditton-house, and the orchards, gardens, yards, and lands limited to the use of Lady Mary Churchill, and also other than the aforesaid mansion-house called Boughton-house, with the appurtenances thereof, unto any person or persons for the term of twenty-one years, or for any term or number of years, not exceeding twenty-one years, or for any term or number of years determinable upon the death of one, two, or three lives in possession, or by way of future interest of such of the said premises as have been usually demised for one, two, or three life or lives, or for years determinable upon the death of one, two, or three person or persons, so as such estates granted in possession, and by way of future interest absolute, be not made to continue longer than for twenty-one years, and so as such terms for years granted for longer time than twenty-one years be all made determinable upon the deaths of one, two, or three persons at the most, and so as upon all such leases made of such part of the said premises as have been usually let for three lives, or for any term of years determinable upon one, two, or three life or lives in possession or by way of future interest as aforesaid, there be reserved, to continue due and payable yearly, during such leases, *the ancient, usual and accustomed rents, boons, heriots, and services usually paid for the same, or more,* and so as by and upon all such leases to be made for twenty-one years, or any less term of years absolute, not usually let for life or lives, or for years determinable on lives as aforesaid,

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there be reserved, to continue due and payable yearly, during the continuance of such leases, *the utmost and best improved yearly rent or rents, which at the time of making thereof can or may be reasonably gotten*, without fine or other income for the same, and so as in every such lease or leases which shall be made by virtue of any of the powers aforesaid, there be contained a condition of re-entry for non-payment of the said rent or rents thereby to be reserved, and so as such lease or leases be made without impeachment of waste by express words to be therein contained, and so as the lessee or lessees to whom such lease or leases be made do execute counterparts thereof."

(1) And the Master found twenty-four leases respectively numbered from one to twenty-four, both inclusive, to have been all the leases granted by the Duke under the power; and he stated that he had proceeded to look into them. And he found that the first three of such leases, severally numbered 1, 2, and 3, were each of them made for the absolute term of twenty-one years commencing at Lady-day 1749; and that all the other twenty-one leases were respectively made for the term of ninety-nine years commencing at Lady-day 1749, if the plaintiffs, Mary Countess of Cardigan, her eldest son, and the Duchess Dowager of Manchester, or any of them, should so long live; and as to the lease No. 1, whereby the mansion-house called Montague-house, &c. were demised to Edward Montague for twenty-one years absolutely, at the yearly rent of 300 *l.* payable half-yearly, at Michaelmas and Lady-day, unto the testator the late Duke, and the person or persons who for the time being should be seised of the premises in remainder after him, with a proviso therein contained, that if the Duke should at any time during his life, and the continuance of such lease, pay or tender, or cause to be paid or tendered, to the said Edward Montague, his executors, administrators, or assigns, in the dining-hall of Gray's-Inn, 1 *s.* then the lease and all clauses, &c. therein contained, should absolutely determine; and the like proviso or power being

inserted in every one of the said twenty-four leases, and no other objection having been made before the said Master to the said lessee, No. 1, but what arose from such proviso, which objection had been made to every one of the said twenty-four leases, the Master conceived that the lease No. 1, notwithstanding such objection, was a valid lease, and warranted by the said power of leasing (*m*).

(2) But as to the said lease, No. 2, whereby, not only the honour of Gloucester, but likewise sixteen several manors in Northampton, and more particularly the manor of Boughton, and a great walk, and Boughton Park, with the deer therein, together with other lands in Northampton, and also the manor of Beaulieu in Southampton, were demised to Edward Montague for the like term of twenty-one years, absolute, at the yearly rent of 600 *l.* payable half-yearly as aforesaid, the said Master did conceive, from the general, extensive, casual and uncertain natures, and values of the greater part at least of the premises, and the great difficulty, if not utter impossibility arising from thence, of forming any judgment whether the rent thereby reserved was the utmost and best improved yearly rent which at the time of making such lease could or might have been reasonably gotten for all the premises, and the rather as there was no exception contained therein of Boughton-house, &c. which were expressly excepted out of the said power of leasing, for the said reasons he did conceive that the lease, No. 2, was not a valid lease, nor warranted by the power (*n*).

(3) And as to the said lease, No. 3, whereby the manor of Ditton and Ditton Park, together with a farm called Hams, and ten acres of land, were demised to Edward Montague for the like term of twenty-one years, at the yearly rent of 290 *l.* payable as aforesaid, there being no exception contained in such lease of Ditton-house, &c. limited by the marriage settlement to the use of Lady Mary Churchill for life, which, it was admitted before the said Master, were part of the
manor

(*m*) This was acquiesced in.

(*n*) This was acquiesced in.

manor of Ditton, and were expressly excepted out of the power of leasing, he did therefore conceive the said lease, No. 3, not to be a valid lease, nor warranted by the power (o).

(4) And as to the lease, No. 4, whereby the iron-works in the county of Southampton, and also two corn-mills, and the land thereto, with other lands, were demised to Edward Montague for the term of 99 years determinable on the lives of three several persons therein named, which said iron-works and furnaces, and other premises demised, did appear to be a part only of the premises comprised in the Indenture of December 1701, referred to in the said power of leasing, and which same part was by the same Indenture agreed to be separately and distinctly demised, although upon looking into such new lease, No. 4, and comparing the same with the said Indenture, and particularly with the articles of agreement therein recited, it did appear that the very same premises were separately and distinctly demised by the said new lease, No. 4, and that such and the same rents and payments were thereby reserved as by the said Indenture, and the other indentures, and articles therein recited, were mentioned, and agreed to be reserved, yet the said Master found that in the said articles there was contained not only a covenant on the part of the lessee to maintain, keep, and leave the said premises in sufficient repair, but that there were also contained therein several other covenants on the part of the lessee, with regard to the time or manner of cutting or felling the several coppices and underwoods thereby agreed to be demised, the not putting any stock or cattle into such coppice, and the like, all in their nature tending to the preservation, good management and improvement of the said premises; and that no such covenants on the part of the lessee were contained in the said new lease, No. 4; and as by the said power of leasing it seemed to be particularly intended that all leases to be made of the said iron-works and furnaces, and other the
premises

(o) This was acquiesced in.

premises mentioned in the aforesaid Indenture, or by any of the deeds therein recited, should be made, not only under such rents and payments, but likewise under such covenants and agreements as were therein particularly agreed on, and the aforesaid several covenants on the part of the lessee, being wholly omitted in the said new lease, No. 4, for that reason the said Master conceived such new lease not to be a valid lease, nor warranted by the power (p).

(5) And as to the lease, No. 5, whereby Palace Farm, and other lands in Bewley, were demised to Edward Montague for the like term of 99 years determinable on the same lives, amongst which premises so demised were contained other part of the premises comprised in the said Indenture of the 29th December 1701, and thereby also agreed to be separately and distinctly demised; and although upon looking into such lease, No. 5, and comparing the same with the said Indenture of the 29th December 1701, the same rents and payments did appear to be reserved by the said lease, No. 5, as by the said Indenture of the 29th December 1701, and the Indentures, &c. therein recited, was mentioned, and agreed to be reserved in respect of such part of the said premises as were comprised in the Indenture of the 29th December 1701, yet it appearing that such lease, No. 5, did also contain some other lands and premises not comprised in the said Indenture of the 29th December 1701, and particularly certain lands therein mentioned, for that reason the said Master did conceive that the said lease, No. 5, was not a valid lease, nor warranted by the power (q).

(6) And as to the five several leases following, viz. No. 6, No. 7, No. 8, No. 9, and No. 10, whereby certain messuages, &c. were severally demised unto the said Edward Montague, for the like term of 99 years determinable on the same three lives, it having been objected before the said Master, that the several farms and premises so as aforesaid separately demised by the said five several leases, had not been usually demised

(p) This was acquiesced in.

(q) This was acquiesced in.

demised for one, two, or three lives, or for years determinable upon the death of one, two, or three person or persons, and no old leases, nor any other evidence, having been laid before him to show that such several farms and premises had been usually so demised, the said Master did for that reason conceive that none of the said five leases numbered, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, did appear to be valid leases, or to be warranted by the power (r).

(7) But as the five several other new leases following, viz. No. 11, No. 12, No. 13, No. 14, and No. 15, whereby the messuages, &c. therein mentioned were severally demised to Edward Montague for the like term of 99 years determinable upon the same three lives, to maintain and support which said five new leases, five several old leases had been produced before the said Master, by which it did appear that the several messuages, &c. so as aforesaid separately demised by the said five new leases, were in like manner separately demised by the said five old leases, but upon looking into such five old leases, and comparing the same with the five new leases, he found, that in each of the said five old leases, or counterparts, and also in each of the said five new leases, there was contained a covenant on the part of the lessee to bear, pay, and discharge all taxes, rates, duties, and impositions whatsoever; and that in all of the said five old leases there was also contained a covenant on the part of the lessee to maintain, keep, and leave the demised premises in sufficient repair; and that in some of the said five old leases or counterparts there were likewise contained covenants on the parts of the lessees to spend and lay upon the demised premises all the dung, manure, or compost thence arising; and also not to demise, alien, or assign any part of the said demised premises without the license in writing of the lessor, his heirs, or assigns; but that no such covenants as last mentioned were contained in any of the said five new leases: however, it appearing that the same several and
respective

(r) This was acquiesced in.

respective ancient, usual, and accustomed rents, boons, and services which had been usually paid for and in respect of the several messuages and premises separately demised by the said five new leases, were severally reserved by such five new leases, and thereby made to continue due and payable yearly during the continuance of such leases, and no other particular objection having been made to any of the said five new leases but what arose from the omission of such several covenants as were before mentioned, the said Master did conceive, that notwithstanding such objection, the aforesaid five new leases numbered, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, were each of them valid and effectual leases, warranted by the power (s).

(8) But as to the remaining nine leases, viz. No. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, whereby certain farms, &c. were respectively demised to Edward Montague, for the like term of ninety-nine years, determinable on the same three lives; to maintain and support which nine new leases, nine several old leases, or counterparts, had been produced before the said Master, by which it did appear that the several messuages and premises, so as aforesaid separately demised by the said nine new leases, were in like manner separately demised in and by the said nine old leases; but upon looking into such nine old leases and comparing the same with the nine new leases, the said Master found, that in every one of the said nine old leases, there were contained covenants on the part of the lessees to bear, pay, and discharge all taxes, rates, duties, and impositions whatsoever; and also to maintain, and keep, and leave the demised premises in sufficient repair; and that in several of the said nine old leases there were likewise contained covenants on the parts of the lessees to spend or lay upon the said demised premises all the dung, manure, or compost thence arising; and also not to demise, alien,

(s) This was not acquiesced in; and the Master's opinion in this respect was over-ruled by reason of the omission of the covenant to repair.

alien, or assign any part of the said demised premises without the license in writing of the lessor, his heirs or assigns; and more particularly in the old lease, bearing date the 20th day of April 1664, produced before him, to maintain and support the new lease, No. 19, there was contained a covenant on the tenants part to grind at the mill of the said lessor, situate in Bewley, all the corn and grain which they should spend in and upon the said demised premises; and that in another old lease, bearing date the 20th day of April 1688, produced before the said Master, to maintain and support the new lease, No. 20, there was contained a like covenant on the tenant's part, to grind all his corn at the lessor's mill aforesaid; all which covenants on the parts of the said lessees, as they did in their nature tend to the preservation, management, and improvement of the premises demised, were for that reason for the benefit, advantage, and security, not only of the immediate lessors, but likewise of all persons claiming after them; but he found that neither the said covenant to bear, pay, and discharge all taxes, &c. nor any of the several other covenants therein before particularly mentioned were contained in any of the said nine new leases, and that the like covenant for grinding corn in the said mill was not contained in either of the said two new leases respectively numbered 19, 20; and as the said several, ancient, usual, and accustomed rents which were usually paid under the said nine old leases, did by means of the said covenant for the tenants paying and discharging all rates and taxes become clear and net rents, freed from any deduction whatsoever, and for want of such covenants, the several rents reserved by the said nine new leases must, he conceived, be subject and liable to a deduction thereout, upon account not only of the land-tax, but likewise of other rates and taxes which tended manifestly to the prejudice of the persons who since the decease of the Duke had been, or might thereafter be seised of the demised premises: Under those circumstances, the Master craved leave to submit to the judgment of the Court, how far the
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the several rents which appeared to be nominally reserved by the said nine new leases, for the want of such covenants for the tenants paying and discharging all rates and taxes, could or ought to be deemed, in substance and effect, the same several ancient rents as were usually paid by virtue of the said nine old leases, which seemed to be expressly required by the said power of leasing; and consequently, whether the said nine new leases were valid leases, and warranted by the power or not; and more particularly, whether the said two new leases, respectively numbered 19 and 20, were not invalid for want of the like covenants on the tenants part for grinding their corn at the lessor's mill as were contained in the before-mentioned two old leases, the same appearing to be in its nature a boon or service (s).

An exception was taken by the defendants to the report, for that the said Master had by his report certified, that he conceived that the five several leases therein mentioned by the numbers 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, were valid leases, and warranted by the power; whereas the defendants insisted that he ought to have certified that the said five leases were not valid leases.

His Lordship held the said defendants said exception to be good and sufficient, and therefore ordered that the same should stand and be allowed. According to Lord Mansfield's note of this case, the Chancellor took some days to consider; and declared he was clear upon the argument, but took time, because there was no case in point. The more he thought of it the more he was convinced. The principle he rested upon was, that the estate must come to the remainder-man in as *beneficial* a manner as ancient owners held it (t).

Upon the special matter of the said report relating to the several new leases from No. 16 to No. 24, inclusive, his Lordship declared, that all the said leases were not warranted by the power, and therefore void.

(s) The nine leases were held to be invalid.

(t) 1 Burr. 122.

No. 14.

Daniel v. Goodwin (u).

Exchequer, Trinity Term, 8 and 9 Geo. II.

THE husband, antecedent to the marriage, covenanted with his intended wife, that she should have a power to dispose by will of her estate and effects. Subsequent to the marriage, the wife was made executrix to the last will and testament of *A*. The wife afterwards made her will of the goods and effects she had as executrix; and continued *B* executor thereof. Upon a declaration in prohibition, and demurrer to the plea put in to it, the question was, whether the Spiritual Court had a power to grant a probate thereof, or whether it should not operate as an appointment to be carried into execution by a Court of Equity? And as to this point, the Court took this difference, where the will subsisted upon the agreement of the parties antecedent to the marriage, there the will is in the nature of an appointment, which is to be carried into execution by a Court of Equity; but where the wife is made executrix to another person, there the Spiritual Court may grant a probate of her will, for she may continue the executorship by constituting a person executor to the first testator; and she may by law make a disposition of choses in action, which she was possessed of as executrix, because in *auter droit*; and the Spiritual Court may prove such will (*x*).

(u) Vide *supra*, p. 340.

Abr. 608; Moor, 339; 2 Mod.

(x) 1 Mod. 201; Salk. 308; 170.

Vent. 4; 6 Mod. 241; 1 Roll.

No. 15.

Mansell v. Price (y).

At the Rolls, Michaelmas Term, 9 Geo. II.

CATHERINE MANSELL, before her marriage with the defendant Price, assigned all her personal estate due to her by bond, judgment, &c. except 1,000*l.* which the defendant was to have immediately to his own use, in trust for the defendant Price, and Catherine his intended wife, for their lives, and the life of the survivor of them, and afterwards that the principal money should be laid out in land to the use of the heirs of the body of Catherine by the defendant; and for want of such issue, to the use of the survivor for ever, provided that Catherine should have power, at any time during the coverture, by will or deed, executed in the presence of three or more credible witnesses, to give or dispose of any sum out of the principal money, not exceeding 1,500*l.*, to such persons and uses as he should limit and appoint, which should be payable immediately after her decease, in case she died without issue by the defendant Price. Catherine Price, some time during the marriage, duly executed the power by deed-poll in the presence of three witnesses, and thereby, for the natural affection she bore to her niece Catherine Dawkins, and her eldest daughter Catherine, and for the next daughter her said niece should have, did give, grant, and dispose of the said sum of 1,500*l.* to Sir Edward Mansell, his executors and administrators, immediately after her decease, if she died without issue, in trust, that he should pay to Catherine, the eldest daughter of her niece, 1,000 *l.* when she should attain the age of twenty-one, or marry, in case the marriage should be by consent of her mother; but if she should die before twenty-one, or marry without consent, that then it should be to such uses as
Catherine

(y) Vide *supra*, p. 342.

Catherine the niece, whether sole or covert, by deed or writing, should direct and appoint, except to her husband, if she should have any, with or without power of revocation ; and the other 500*l.* she directed to be paid to the next daughter of her niece when she should be twenty-one, or marry, exactly under the same terms as before. Catherine, the niece, had afterwards issue another daughter, and then Catherine Price died without issue. This bill was filed by the guardian of the infant daughters, to have the money paid, and to be put out for them to have the interest thereof immediately. For the defendant Price it was insisted, that he was entitled to the interest of the 1,500*l.* until the same should respectively become payable, either as a resulting trust (he being administrator to his wife), or part of his right under the articles taken from him by the execution of the power.

The first question was, whether parol evidence could be admitted to explain the intention of Catherine Price, what should become of the interest till the times of payment ; for if that could be admitted, there was sufficient to prove the husband should not have it, but that it should go to the same persons to whom the money was given by the deed of appointment, and the Master of the Rolls was of opinion such parol evidence could not be read.

The second question was, whether there could be a resulting trust to the husband of the interest of the 1,500*l.* till such time as it should become respectively payable according to the limitations in the deed.

As to this, he said this was not a case of a resulting trust, or a trust originally created, but it arose on a power given and executed out of an original trust, by which it must be considered as if it had never been comprised in that trust, because it was absolutely taken out of it by the execution of the power. This case of money differed from land where there was not a complete disposition, for here was an entire and full disposition of the whole money ; and it differed also in this respect, for land by law was always presumed to make a profit,

and the form of all writs in real actions supposes it; but in the case of money it is otherwise, for it is not supposed to have any profit at all, and the time was when it was thought illegal to make a profit of money, and the canon law would not suffer a usurer to make a will. Then here is a disposition of this money to Sir Edward Mansell, a trustee, by virtue of the power, who is not bound to put out his money, though he may be compelled, according to the judgment and direction of this Court; but of his own head he has no authority to put it out; and further, if a trustee, not having power, did put out money, it was at his own risk; and in that case, since he had practised, it had been thought that such trustee putting out money without the direction of the trust, or of the Court, should have the profit for the risk of putting it out; but now, if a trustee puts out money when not warranted by the trust, he must answer for ill security, and yet shall not have the benefit, because of late it had been easy and safe to lay out such money in government securities, which this Court thinks proper securities, having an act of parliament on its side. Then the whole capital money being in the hands of the trustee entirely for the benefit of *cestui que* trust, would draw the interest with it; so he decreed there would be no resulting trust on this power of appointment.

No. 16.

Observations on Hills v. Downton (z).

“THE ground of my determination seems to have been misunderstood. I was of opinion in *Chapman v. Gibson*, that the heirs being persons for whom the testator was under no natural or moral obligation to provide, there was no occasion to inquire whether the heirs were provided for or not. I did indeed say, in that case, they having parents alive whose circumstances did not appear, they could not be presumed to be wholly

(z) Vide *supra*, p. 360, 365, 366.

wholly unprovided for. I found it so often laid down, that the Court would supply the want of a surrender against an heir, if he was not wholly unprovided for, and so many *dicta*, that if he was in that situation the Court would not compel him to surrender, that I thought it proper to enter rather largely into the consideration of the principles upon which the Court acted in supplying surrenders; and I collected the principle to be this, that the heir shall be compelled to make good the disposition of his ancestor, if made in discharge of a moral or natural obligation, as in favour of creditors, wife and children; but still they had not done it where the heir, being a son, could show, that if he was compelled to make that surrender, the consequence would be (he being a son wholly unprovided for), that he would be compelled to fulfil the intentions of his father in discharge of a moral or natural obligation in favour of a widow, or of his brothers and sisters, when it was manifest that he had neglected to discharge the natural obligation he was under of providing for him, his eldest son. I admit that it had been laid down, that the Court would not enter into the *quantum* of provision, of which it is declared the father is the proper judge; and feeling all the difficulties arising from the exception so often made to the rule of an heir wholly unprovided for, I shall be very glad to find that for the future the Court may be at liberty to get over this exception to the rule. But if the case of a son wholly unprovided for were to come before me, I should hesitate, notwithstanding the great authority of the Lord Chancellor, to make a decree against him; and was very glad to be relieved, in the case of *Chapman v. Gibson*, from the necessity of deciding upon that point, it being perfectly clear that the principle could not apply to the case of a collateral heir, for whom the testator was not under any obligation to provide.

“ R. P. A.”

No. 17.

Leach v. Campbell.

Reg. Lib. A. 1773, fol. 698 (a).

The power of leasing is stated correctly in Ambler.

THE original bill stated, that Leach pretended that by Indenture, dated 10th March 1759, Pryce Campbell, in consideration of former covenants, and for other considerations, did demise and grant to Leach all the mines, veins, pits, groves, rakes, beds, and holes of lead, lead ore, and all other mines, which were or should at any time during the demise be found out in or under the lands, with full license to open pits, &c. and work the mines, and to make drains, &c. with right of way to carry away the ore, and liberty to build forges, &c. To hold from 25th March 1759, for 26 years, paying unto Pryce Campbell, his heirs and assigns, during the continuance of the demise, the eighth tondish of all the lead, &c. which should be got; the lessee to cleanse and deliver the same on the banks every three months, or oftener if required. That the defendant insisted the lease was good under the power: But the plaintiff submitted that the lease was absolutely void, not being authorized by the power; but that such power was intended to extend to messuages or lands only, and not to mines, as appeared from the condition of the said power, that there should not be contained in any lease any clause whereby any power should be given to any lessee to commit waste, which condition could not be complied with in a lease of mines, a restraint from commission of waste being totally inconsistent and contradictory to a lease of mines; and the plaintiff also submitted, that if the power should be construed to extend to mines, yet the lease was
not

(a) Vide *supra*, p. 306, 371, 375, 376, 383, 385, 565, 566, 593, 596, 597, 610, 612, 625, 633, 634, 640, 645, 646, 648, 658.

not within the power ; for the lease being made for 26 years was made for a longer term than the power authorized, which was only 21 years. And that the lease being dated the 18th of March 1759, and it being expressed Leach should enjoy the premises from the 25th of that month, the same was in reversion, whereas the power declared that the leases should be in possession only. And that the reserved rent was not thereby made incident to the reversion of the premises, as was required by the terms of the power, but was made payable to Campbell, his heirs and assigns. And also that such rent was not a yearly rent, nor was it the most improved rent which at the time of the lease could be got for the mines. The rent ought to have been a fourth instead of the eighth ; in corroboration of which the produce of the mines was stated ; and it was insisted that Leach deceived Campbell, the lessor, who relied on his information.

The answer admitted the lease to be in effect as stated. Leach stated that he had opened no new mines since the death of Campbell, or the making of the lease : he insisted upon his right to the open mines at the time of the lease, which had been worked by him from 1743, under a lease for 21 years, at a great expense. And he submitted that the parties intended the power to extend to mines, as the mines were at the time of the marriage, and many years before, in his possession.

He stated, that he being in possession of a lease for 21 years, commencing on the 8th June 1753, ending in June 1764, P. Campbell agreed to add 21 years to his term. By the lease for 26 years, the term of 21 years, within a few months, was added to the then subsisting term.

He insisted that the rent was incident to the reversion ; that the reservation quarterly, or oftener, was more beneficial than being reserved yearly, and that the rent was the best that could be got. That after the lease of 1759, and with a view to his enjoying, for 26 years, he laid out large sums in making levels, &c. from several of which he had yet received

no advantage, although between the 25th of March 1759, and the 15th of June 1771, he had paid above 33,000*l.* in making and repairing the works.

He likewise stated, that in 1763 he agreed to erect smelting-works upon the waste lands of Pryce Campbell near the mines; and made proposals to Campbell for taking a longer term in them than he had in the mines, or that a compensation should be made for them at the end of the lease of the mines. P. Campbell, after considering the proposals, did, by letters to the defendant in 1763, declare that he would by all means have the works go on; and that as he should not grant any lease of that for a longer term than the mines, it was but reasonable that a sum should be agreed upon to be paid to the defendant upon the expiration of the said term, the works being left in good repair, and the tools to be bought by appraisement; and that if the mill was left in perfect good repair, he (P. Campbell) should think what the defendant demanded (half of the sum laid out in building it) not at all unreasonable, and that the defendant would always find him very ready to do what he thought was so. And P. Campbell intimated his intention of becoming a partner, which he afterwards declined. That in consequence of the lease, and letters of agreement, the works were erected; but a regular agreement was omitted to be executed until 1768, when P. Campbell informed the defendant that he would have articles drawn relating to the works; but he died in that year, without having executed any.

The answer insisted upon the lessee's right to the enjoyment of the term, at least during the residue of 21 years from the making of the lease.

The Master of the Rolls made the order stated in Ambler. Then a cross-bill was filed by Leach for establishing the lease and agreement. The Master of the Rolls directed the account prayed by the original bill, and dismissed the last bill.

I met

I met with an order for the hearing on the appeal, but could not discover the decree on the appeal, or any subsequent proceedings, although I searched with attention to the end of the year 1777, for the original as well as the cross-cause.

No. 18.

Lane v. Terry.

Reg. Lib. B. 1753, fol. 527 (b).

It was charged by the bill, that it was previously to the marriage agreed that the wife should not have the benefit of the jointure; and that Terry, in trust for whom it was executed, threatened to throw Simon into prison if he refused to come into the measure; That Simon laboured under a mortal disease, of which he soon after died, and was greatly impaired in his senses as well as his health, and in that situation Terry prevailed on him to marry Ann, *with whom he never cohabited*; and the plaintiff submitted, that the intention of the power was to make an handsome provision for the donee's wife, and thereby enable him to marry one of circumstance suitable to his own, and not by colour of such jointure to pay his own debts, to which the premises were not liable, whereas the jointure set up was in fact a settlement on Terry.

It was decreed, "that the settlement by deeds of lease and release, and the paper writing intituled, Proposals upon executing the Marriage Deed, were to be considered as one entire agreement; and that the said agreement and settlement ought to be deemed in this Court fraudulent and void, except as to the annual sum of 20*l.* provided for the benefit of Ann Lane during her life; and it was ordered and decreed that the same should be set aside, except as to the said annual sum of 20*l.*"

Note.

(b) Vide *supra*, p. 410.

Note.—The wife conveyed to Terry, after the death of her husband, upon the trusts, as stated in Ambler.

No. 19.

Aleyn v. Belchier (c).

Reg. Lib. A. 1757, fol. 432 (B).

THE estate in question was devised to trustees in fee, to raise money by mortgage, and then to uses, under which Edmund Aleyn was tenant for life, “with power to him to make a jointure of the manors, lands and premises aforesaid, or any part thereof, upon any wife whom he should after think fit to marry, for her life, and in bar of her dower.”

The trustees under a decree mortgaged to Belchier in fee.

Edmund Aleyn, shortly after his marriage, without any previous agreement, proposed to make a provision for his wife; and being then indebted to Belchier, by an agreement bearing date the 1st day of August 1750, and made between Aleyn and his wife of the one part, and Belchier of the other, reciting the matters aforesaid, and that Aleyn was indebted to Belchier in a certain sum; it was witnessed, that in full satisfaction of that sum Aleyn covenanted to procure a conveyance and settlement to be made by the trustees of the estates devised to them, to the uses, &c. in the will; and immediately after such settlement, to limit the same to his wife for her life, in case she should survive him, for her jointure; and that he and his wife, as soon as they should become seised of the said estates for their lives, would by fine, &c. convey the same to the use of Belchier, or as he should appoint, for the lives of Aleyn and his wife, and the survivor of them; in consideration whereof Belchier covenanted to pay the following annuities, &c.; viz. to the wife, for the joint lives of her and her husband, an annuity of 60 *l.* for her separate use; an annuity of 60 *l.* per annum to Aleyn if he
should

(c) Vide *supra*, p. 419.

should survive his wife; and 100 *l.* a year to the wife if she should survive him; and to the wife's son by a former husband, 100 guineas at twenty-one, and 5 *l.* a year in the mean time for maintenance. A settlement was afterwards executed by the trustees, and Aleyn limited the estates to his wife for her life under the power, subject to the mortgage made by the trustees to Belchier, and afterwards Aleyn and his wife conveyed their life-estates by a fine to a trustee for Belchier. Belchier insisted that the settlement was a good and effectual settlement, and was made upon a good and valuable consideration, and was not void, and that he was entitled to the benefit of it.

The remainder-man stated, that he was advised, that in case the power of jointuring was executed by Edward Aleyn for any other purpose than for a fair jointure for his wife, such execution was contrary to the intention of the testator, and a fraud upon the remainder-man.

It was decreed, "that the deed of appointment was not to be supported in this Court any further than to charge the premises with the annual sum of 100 *l.*, agreed to be paid by the deed of 1st August to Jane Aleyn, the wife of Edmund;" and directions were given accordingly.

No. 20.

Scroggs v. Scroggs.

Reg. Lib. B. 1754, fol. 496 (*d*).

THE trust in the agreement before marriage was, "to permit such son or sons of their bodies, and the heirs male of such sons, to receive the rents during all such time as the trustees should have in the premises, as the plaintiff's father, together with the trustees, or the major part of them, or together with the survivor of them, should appoint." By the settlement, the eldest son was in every event to have 100 *l.* a year,
and

(*d*) Vide *supra*, p. 420.

and *children* were substituted for *sons*. The settlement was executed when the plaintiff, the eldest son, was two and one-half year old, and he had lost his sight. The plaintiff stated that his father wanted him to sell his reversion, which he would not do, and that then the father made a bargain with the second son, to whom he appointed: That the father represented to the trustee that the eldest son had threatened to sell his reversion, and was very undutiful, &c. The plaintiff insisted that the variation in the settlement, as there was then no other son, and he had lost his sight, was to warrant an appointment to a daughter, in case there was no other son.

The father and mother denied any knowledge of the variation; and stated the disorderly life of the son, and his marriage to a woman of no fortune. The father stated that he applied to his son to join in the sale of the estate for his own benefit.

The father's answer, in which he represented the Duke of Somerset, the surviving trustee, as a perfectly consenting party to the appointment, was flatly contradicted by the Duke himself, who stated, that he believed that the father had misrepresented the son to him, and that if he had been apprized of all the circumstances, he would not have executed the appointment.

There appeared to be a dispute between the father and eldest son, about another estate, belonging to the son, of which the father had received the rents during the son's minority.

It was decreed, "that the deed of appointment be set aside, and that it be delivered up to the plaintiff to be cancelled; and that neither the defendant Edward Scroggs, the second son, nor any of his issue, do insist on, or make use of the deed of appointment, or the contents, or operation of it, in any court of law or of equity. And his Lordship doth declare, that the settlement executed after the marriage, hath unwarrantably departed from the marriage articles, by limiting the estate to the use of such *child* or *children* as should be appointed

appointed, instead of limiting the same to such son or sons, &c. and that the same ought to be rectified. And his Lordship ordered a new settlement to be executed accordingly," and the father was decreed to pay the costs.

No. 21.

Phelp v. Hay (e).

Rolls, 18th May 1778.

14th March 1747.—By the agreement made previously to the marriage between the Rev. Abraham Phelp and Ayliffe Tufton.

After reciting, that upon the treaty for the marriage it was agreed that Ayliffe Tufton should have power, as well before as after such marriage, either to make an absolute sale of her lands and chattels, and with the monies by such sale to purchase other lands and chattels any where in England, and convey unto the trustees therein named, their heirs, executors, &c. or unto such other persons as the said Ayliffe Tufton and her mother should nominate, as well all such lands and hereditaments wherein the said Ayliffe Tufton then had an estate of freehold or inheritance in fee-simple or fee-tail, or for terms of years, otherwise howsoever; as also such lands and chattels which might be purchased as aforesaid, to and for the use and benefit of the said Abraham Phelp and Ayliffe Tufton, and the issue of their two bodies, in such manner and form, and by and after such rates, shares, and proportions, either jointly with the said Abraham Phelp, or alone, separate and apart from him, as the said Ayliffe Tufton should think proper and fit to do.

9th and 10th February 1749.—By Indentures of Lease and Release, and by a fine, Mr. and Mrs. Phelp (the marriage having been solemnized) conveyed her sixth part of certain real estates unto Sir George Hay, his heirs and assigns for ever,

(e) Vide *supra*, p. 140, 452, 466, 467, 468, 483, 551, 557.

ever, in trust, nevertheless, to the use of the said Abraham Phelp, and Ayliffe his wife, and their assigns, during their lives, and the life of the longer liver, remainder to the use of such person and persons, and for such estate and estates as the said Ayliffe Phelp should in manner thereby required, appoint; and in default of such appointment, in trust, to and for the use of the right heirs of the said Ayliffe Phelp for ever. Note.—The fine was declared to be to the use of the said George Hay, and his heirs, in trust, nevertheless, to, for, and upon the uses and trusts before expressed.

13th February 1755.—By an Indenture between Ayliffe Phelp, then the widow of the said Abraham Phelp, of the one part, and the said Sir George Hay, of the other part, after reciting the articles of 14th March 1747, and the Indentures of the 9th and 10th of February 1749, and the fine levied accordingly; and also reciting, that by the Indenture of release, a greater power was given to the said Ayliffe Phelp, of disposing and limiting her said lands and estates than was given or intended to be given to her by the said articles made previous to her marriage, it being the intention of such articles, and of the parties thereto, that the said Ayliffe Phelp should limit, settle, and assure her said lands and estates unto and upon the issue of the bodies of them the said Abraham Phelp and Ayliffe, in case they should have any such; and the said Ayliffe Phelp having then three children by the said Abraham Phelp, to wit, Charles Tufton Phelp, her eldest son, Jane Phelp, her daughter, and James Phelp, her youngest son, It is Witnessed, that for the settling and assuring the said sixth part of the said premises upon the children and issue of the said Ayliffe Phelp by the said Abraham Phelp, according to the said articles of agreement, the said Ayliffe Phelp, by virtue of the power unto her given, as well by the marriage articles as by the Indenture of Release, did grant, limit, direct, and appoint that the said Sir George Hay, and his heirs, should from thenceforth stand seised of the said undivided sixth part of the said premises, and that the said
fine

fine, and the uses thereof, should enure to the use of the said Ayliffe Phelp and her assigns for life, remainder to the use of the said Charles Tufton Phelp, James Phelp, and Jane Phelp, or to any or either of them, their, his or her heirs and assigns, in such manner and form, and by and after such rates, shares and proportions, and charged and chargeable with such sum and sums of money, unto and amongst any or either of them the said Charles Tufton Phelp, James Phelp, and Jane Phelp, and at such time and times as she the said Ayliffe Phelp should by any deed, or by her will, to be duly executed in the presence of and attested by three or more credible witnesses, give, grant, devise, limit, direct or appoint; and for want of, and in default of such appointment, to the use of the said Charles Tufton Phelp, James Phelp, and Jane Phelp, and his and their several and respective heirs and assigns as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants.

Charles Tufton Phelp died under age, and without issue.

18th May 1772.—The said Ayliffe Phelp, by her will, duly executed, declared her will and meaning to be, and she did thereby, by virtue of the proviso aforesaid, direct and appoint, that the said Sir George Hay should stand seised of the said sixth part of the said estates, in trust, by mortgage, to raise and pay thereout to testatrix's daughter, Jane Phelp, her executors, administrators and assigns, within six months after testatrix's decease, the sum of 2,000 *l.* and subject thereto to the use of the said testatrix's son James Phelp, and his assigns for life; remainder to the said Sir George Hay and his heirs, during the life of the said James Phelp, in trust, to preserve contingent remainders, with remainder, after the decease of the said James Phelp, to his issue in general tail: and in default of such issue, to the use of testatrix's daughter Jane Phelp, for life; remainder to the said Sir George Hay, and his heirs, during her life, in trust to preserve contingent remainders; with remainder after the decease of the said Jane Phelp, to her issue in general tail, and in default of such issue,

to

to the use of testatrix's mother, Frances Tufton, and her assigns, for her life, with remainder to the testatrix's own right heirs, with power for the said George Hay, and his heirs, with the consent of the person for the time being entitled to the estate, to sell the same, and to purchase other lands to be settled to the same uses.

18th May 1778.—By a decree in a cause wherein the said James Phelp was plaintiff, and the said Sir George Hay, and Charles Blicke, and Jane his wife (late Jane Phelp,) were defendants, the Master of the Rolls declared, that he was of opinion, that under the will of Ayliffe Phelp, the said Charles Blicke, and Jane his wife, in her right, were entitled to the sum of 2,000 *l.* to be raised by way of mortgage of the estate in question, with interest from six months after testatrix's death; and that, subject to such mortgage, the said James Phelp was under the said will entitled to an estate in tail general in the said estate, with remainder to the said Jane Blicke in tail general; and that all the subsequent or other limitations in the said will concerning the said estate were void; and that no valid appointment of such the reversion in fee of the said estate as aforesaid having been made by the said Ayliffe Phelp, subsequent to the Indenture of 13th February 1755, according to the power therein reserved to her, the appointment made by such Indenture of 13th February 1755, did, as to such reversion in fee of the said Leicestershire estate as aforesaid, become absolute; and that under the appointment made by the said Ayliffe Phelp by the said Indenture of the 13th of February 1755, such reversion in fee of the said estate belonged to her three children, Charles Tufton Phelp, James Phelp, and Jane Blicke, their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common, in equal third parts; and that the said Charles Tufton Phelp being dead, intestate, and without issue, his undivided third part descended to the said James Phelp, as his brother and heir at law.; and that by the means and in manner aforesaid the said James Phelp was then entitled to him and his heirs to
two

two third parts of the reversion of the said estate so subject, and in manner aforesaid ; and the said Jane Blicke to her and her heirs to the remaining third part of such reversion as aforesaid of the said estate.

Various proceedings were had in the cause. The Master found that the legal estate was in the heir of Sir George Hay, and he joined with James Phelp, who suffered a recovery of the estate, in a mortgage for securing the 2,000 *l.* and interest.

It appears by the Registrar's book (*f*) that the plaintiff submitted to the Court, that it was the true intent of the articles of 14th March 1747, and the Indenture of 13th February 1755, that Ayliffe should have power to limit and appoint an estate of inheritance either in fee simple or tail to her issue, but that it was never meant that she should have power to limit any smaller estate for her issue than an estate-tail; and that the plaintiff was advised that there was no limitation contrary to the intention, but that he had an estate-tail given to him subject to the payment of 2,000 *l.* The defendant of course submitted the contrary.

No. 22.

Roberts v. Dixwell,

Reg. Lib. B. 1738, fol. 119 (*g*).

THE limitation was to the use of such of the children of the marriage, for such estates, and in such shares and proportions, as the husband and wife or survivor should appoint.

The husband having survived his wife, by his will appointed the estate unto the plaintiff, his only son, his heirs and assigns, for ever, upon condition that he and they should pay his only sister of the whole blood, Elizabeth-Mary Roberts, 3,000 *l.* and 50 *l.* a year, for maintenance, until she attained

(*f*) Lib. Reg. B. 1777. fol. 537.

(*g*) Vide *supra*, p. 404, 459, 461, 533, 558, 570.

attained twenty-one, or married, and the testator charged the estates therewith ; and in case the plaintiff refused to pay the same, then he appointed the estate itself to the daughter, her heirs and assigns, for ever ; 2,000*l.* to be paid to Elizabeth-Mary at twenty-one, or marriage ; but if she died before, the said 2,000*l.* to be paid to his daughter, Mary Roberts, by another marriage, at twenty-one, or marriage ; and he declared the 3,000*l.* to be in satisfaction of the 1,000*l.* as stated in 2 Eq. Ca. Abr.

It was decreed, that “ the plaintiff was entitled by virtue of the appointment, subject to the charge of 2,000*l.* part of the sum of 3,000*l.* therein charged for Elizabeth-Mary, and of 50*l.* a year for her maintenance ; and his Lordship doth decree, that the trustees do accordingly convey the same to him, so subject as aforesaid ; and the defendant, Elizabeth-Mary, is to be at liberty to apply to the Court for raising and paying the sum of 2,000*l.* when the same shall become due ; but his Lordship declared that the limitation over of the said sum of 2,000*l.* to the said Mary Roberts by the will, is void, and as to the sum of 1,000*l.* residue of the said sum of 3,000*l.* mentioned in the will, his Lordship declared that the appointment thereof by the said will, for satisfaction of a debt due from him by covenant contained in his marriage settlement, was void, and that defendant, Elizabeth-Mary, is entitled to have satisfaction for the sum of 1,000*l.* with interest at four per cent, from the death of her father, as a special creditor.” And the necessary directions were given by the decree accordingly.

No. 23.

Newport v. Savage.

Michaelmas Term, 1736 (*h*).

A. HAD a power by will to jointure any wife by limiting &c. to and for her use, or in trust for her, in lieu of her jointure,

(*h*) Vide *supra*, p. 465.

ture, or part of her jointure, all or any part of the estate of which he was tenant for life. *A.*, reciting his power, settles, in trust, for his wife, for her jointure, the land contained in the power for 99 years, *if she should so long live*. It was decreed by the Chancellor, that the power was well executed, and he said, that though in strictness of law this would not have been a good execution of the power, yet a court of equity ought to regard the substance of things. When all parties are mere volunteers, they must be bound by the law; yet where they are purchasers for a valuable consideration, and the execution is defective, the Court will supply it, and it does no injury, for it carries it no farther than the person himself might have done; and even in cases of purchasers, the Court will, in favour of one, supply non-execution of powers; and the reason of their not doing it generally is, because it does not appear that the intention of the party was to carry the power into execution. It was objected, that this was such an estate that this is no bar of dower, but the power is not to give an estate in bar of dower; but *A.* was left at large to make a provision for his wife. Besides, in the settlement made on her, it is generally said to be in bar of her dower, and therefore as it will be an equitable execution of the power, so it will be an equitable bar of dower.

Upon searching the Registrar's book (1), I find that the power was, "for Walter, when he should have any estate in possession in the premises for his life, by virtue of the limitations aforesaid, by any deed, to assign, limit, or appoint to or for the use of or in trust for any woman or women that should be his wife, for her life, in lieu of jointure, all or any part of the premises to take effect from his decease." He limited a term to trustees for 99 years in trust for his wife. The bill was to have the jointure confirmed, and to stay proceedings at law by the remainder-man. The defendant stated a trial at
nisi

(1) Lib. Reg. 1736, fol. 33.

nisi prius; and that a case was reserved for the King's Bench, and he prayed for liberty to proceed in the cause. It was decreed that the plaintiff should be quieted in the estate comprised in the jointure-deed during so much of the term of ninety-nine years as she should live, and the defendant was to pay unto the plaintiffs their costs of the suit; and the injunction formerly granted in this cause, for stay of the defendant's proceedings at law against the plaintiffs, was to be continued.

No. 24.

Read v. Shaw, 1807 (k).

POWER to trustees to sell or exchange in the usual manner: Money to be invested in the purchase of other messuages, tenements, or hereditaments, to be conveyed, to the same uses. The trustees in exercise of the power conveyed the estate to a purchaser, in consideration of 1,700 *l.* And the purchaser, in consideration of the like sum, granted to the trustee a perpetual annuity of 73 *l.* 16 *s.* out of the estate, to the uses of the settlement; and he covenanted to lay out 3,000 *l.* in building on the estate. The purchaser afterwards sold, and filed a bill to enforce the purchase from him to complete the contract. And on the coming on of the cause the title was, without argument, referred to the Master; and by his report, after stating deeds of the 5th & 6th October 1780, the 1st & 2d February 1796, the 3d & 4th February 1796, the 14th & 15th March 1796, and the 21st & 22d March 1796, the Master finds, by a case stated for the opinion of counsel on the part of the plaintiffs, of which the defendants have notice, that the deeds of the 14th & 15th days of March 1796, and of the 21st & 22d days of the same month, were merely formal, executed under the advice of counsel, for the purpose of
apparently

(*k*) Vide *supra*, p. 490.

apparently complying with the requisites of the aforesaid power of sale contained in the marriage settlement of the 6th day of October 1780, but that the real contract between the vendors and the purchasers in that transaction was a sale of the freehold premises in consideration of the aforesaid rent-charge issuing out of the same premises only with the aforesaid covenant, to lay out the said sum of 3,000*l.* in improving the same; and he was of opinion that such transaction was not a due execution of the power to sell, or of the power to exchange, contained in the aforesaid marriage settlement, for which reason he certified, that the plaintiffs could not make a good title to the freehold part of the premises in question.

Exceptions were taken to this report, but they were never argued, and the plaintiffs consented to rescind the contract, and to pay the purchaser's costs.

ADDENDUM.

**line 4 from the bottom, page 189, *after* (43 Geo. 3, c. 75, s. 3.)
read "see 1 W. 4, c. 65, s. 23."**

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